Tigers are pre-wired to hunt. — frank
. Like Jablonka & Dor in that paper you cited, they disagree with his generative approach and its implication for evolution of language, but they explicitly say that Chomsky brought valuable progression on the questions needed to be asked about language acquisition (it’s an old paper from 20 years describing a different state of the debate, but never mind that for now). — Saphsin
Evidence has overtaken Chomsky’s theory, which has been inching toward a slow death for years. It is dying so slowly because, as physicist Max Planck once noted, older scholars tend to hang on to the old ways: “Science progresses one funeral at a time. ... [On the basis of that evidence,] all of this leads ineluctably to the view that the notion of universal grammar is plain wrong.
That being said, I think what’s more relevant here is the “theory” part of that sentence. The statement was in response to the claim that Chomsky asserts language is “characterized by universals.” Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. Either you disagree with (1) and (2), which I assume you aren’t, or by “universals” you’re referring to universal features (like negation or noun/verb phrases). I assumed the latter — and if so, that’s misleading. — Xtrix
UG is not just the mere idea that there is a genetic component to language. It specifies - gives specificity to - this genetic component, by suggesting that it is composed of - depending on when exactly one were to ask Chomsky, since he keeps dropping elements as they become more and more inconvenient and obviously implausible - sets of rules or principles by which 'external' language becomes articulated. He calls this "I-language" ('internal language'), as distinct from 'E-language' ('external language'). The technicalities of it are whatever, but the whole schema can be captured by recognizing that it is basically a renovated substance-accident model that's just Aristotle linguistically redux'd. — StreetlightX
The ridiculousness of the schema comes clear in Chomsky's insistence, often made, that there really is only 'one' language, whereas the actually existing diversity of languages are basically epiphenomena. In Kantian terms, Chomsky posits a linguistic noumena that underlies the linguistic phenomena, with the former accounting - magically - for the latter. — StreetlightX
As for the role of culture and society, it does nothing more than bring out this or that feature of I-language already there from the start ('parameters'). This is of course, pure metaphysics, and of the worst kind too [...] — StreetlightX
I use my computer everyday, but this says nothing about how it came to be as it is. The same is true of language: the issue is to account for why grammar is as it is. — StreetlightX
Having learnt language through social use, and then putting that learning to use in 'inner speech' is perfectly consistent with the theorized developmental pathway of 'inner speech'. — StreetlightX
Chomsky argues that UG is specific to humans and that there is at least one language specific feature in UG. Others argue that there aren't any language specific features in UG. (Fewer argue that it's not species specific, though there are some who do.) — Saphsin
I find this to be such a dodge. Here, substitute anything that we can do for 'language' and you can see why — StreetlightX
This stuff is theory-laden as can possibly be: in particular the language of 'faculties' precisely individualizes and anatomizes what is, properly understood, a social technology. Is there a 'faulty of the internet'? A 'faculty of the post office'? — StreetlightX
You're born with an innate capacity for walking, but the structures needed for walking won't form until you try to walk. — frank
'faculty of the imagination', or 'a faculty of sensibility' - typically attributed to the Soul or the 'Rational Intellect' — StreetlightX
But that there exists in the human brain a capacity for acquiring language is hardly metaphysics. — Xtrix
similar sounding noise doesn't activate it — Manuel
But that there exists in the human brain a capacity for acquiring language is hardly metaphysics.
— Xtrix
Isn't the question whether that capacity is specialized to language? — Srap Tasmaner
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