When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to. — Harry Hindu

Not sure about that. Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently.

Meaning, however, is not arbitrary. It is the relationship between cause and effect. What some scribble means is what caused it to exist on the paper or on the screen. It is caused by a mind — Harry Hindu

The idea that “a mind” is causing “scribble means” doesn’t sound right to me.
“Scribbles” may be the kind of entities that can be caused, but “means” are not caused, nor can be rendered in causal terms.

So non-language creatures have beliefs in that they learn by making observations and what they learn is what they believe to be the case in other similar states-of-affairs. Their beliefs are not in the form of propositions, but the visual experiences they had. The same goes for scribble-using humans, and is how they learned a language in the first place by believing that scribbles can be used to refer to what is the case or not. You have to believe that before you can begin using scribbles. — Harry Hindu

I’m inclined to agree with you in general, but the devil is in the details. So, I agree that animal cognitive skills and consequent behavior are much more constrained by their experience than human cognitive skills are. Yet it doesn’t sound right to me to claim that animals’ beliefs are “in the form of their visual experiences”. The problem is that experience (visual or other) doesn’t seem to be enough to grant belief (see the case of optical illusions like the Müller-Lyer illusion [1]: the 2 arrows keep looking different in length even if one correctly believes that they have the same size), therefore animals’ beliefs too are not necessarily nor tightly coupled with their experiences.
Besides the claim that human’s beliefs are “in the form of propositions” does sound right, at least in part. However I would complement it by saying that a belief in propositional form is just a belief that is expressed through a declarative sentence, i.e. through a specific linguistic behavior, that doesn’t imply that humans are equipped only of propositional beliefs.


[1]

I'm genuinely confused by your hesitance to agree.

Russell, Gettier, and Moore all took JTB to task. It's not survived very well. No one seems to have figured out what the problem was because those who've been convinced by those critics still hold on to the same conventional notions that gave all three their foothold. Rendering human belief as propositional attitude has remained as a structural ledger. That's quite unfortunate, because that rendering was, and it remains to be a structural problem. It's not entirely wrong. It's just that not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes, and thus those exceptions cannot be sensibly rendered in those terms. That's what my broken clock example shows us, and quite clearly it seems to me.

We can and do know that at that particular time, and in that particular situation, they most certainly had to have believed that that particular clock was working, for there is no other way to come away believing what it said.

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it!

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

But you want to say more than just this, don't you? Somehow this is supposed to show the be;eifs are not propositional.

Fill in the gap.

But you want to say more than just this, don't you? Somehow this is supposed to show the be;eifs are not propositional.

Fill in the gap. — Banno

What I said was enough. I admire your brevity, when it's appropriate. I'll mimic.

Then so far as I can see you have presented no argument.

Jack believed that: the clock showed the correct time.

"The clock showed the correct time" is the propositional content of Jack's belief.

Truth is I can't seem to be able to wrap my head around:

1. The fact that you're using propositions to, in a way, denounce propositions: (some) beliefs are nonpropositional.

2. There's a difference between a sentence (in a language) and the proposition it's about. I hope you're not confusing the two. Propositions are about reality and the sentences that state them are about language. How can a belief, necessarily concerning reality, be nonpropositional?

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

Are you objecting to the above quote?

The first rings hollow... the second is nonsense. The sentence "that is a tree" is not about language.

How can a belief, necessarily concerning reality, be nonpropositional? — Agent Smith

In the context of this discussion...

By virtue of not having propositional content.

Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

He believed it was broken? Or he believed it was working?

It was a broken clock that he believed to be working.

If we were in Jack's room...

We could show Jack the error. Jack would readily agree that he had indeed believed that that particular broken clock was working. How else does one get lucky about what time it is after looking at a broken clock, if not by virtue believing that the broken clock was working?

This goes to prove my point. We can have belief that we are unaware of. Believing that a broken clock is working is one such belief.

It makes no sense to render that belief as a propositional attitude.

That's a problem for that practice.

Jack does not believe that: the broken clock is working.

He does not - cannot - believe that "the broken clock is working" is true while believing that the broken clock is working, because he does not know it is broken.

again,

Jack believed that: the clock showed the correct time. — Banno

What here is problematic for beliefs being propositional attitudes?

Your point, if there is one, remains hidden.

Why are you looking where the problem is not showing itself?

...so far as I can see you have presented no argument. — Banno

I've given the simplest of them. They've not been given subsequent due attention. Not once.

What sort of argument would you say counts as a negation if not one that shows a belief that cannot be put into the form of a propositional attitude?

a belief that cannot be put into the form of a propositional attitude? — creativesoul

What is that belief?

I'm at a loss here, my friend. You simply have not given us a belief that cannot be put into the form of a propositional attitude.

Jack believed a broken clock was working. While holding such a belief, Jack cannot have an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock was working" such that he believed it to be true. It could be rightfully rendered as such - but only in hindsight after becoming aware of his error. At that point in time, he would no longer believe that a broken clock was working.

He never believed "a broken clock is working" was true.

Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently. — neomac

The all share the same set of truth conditions. So, in that sense they're about the same things...

Jack believed a broken clock was working. — creativesoul

Sure. But jack did no believe that: a broken clock was working. All you have done is to stuff up the parsing of Jack's belief.

That is, "Jack believed a broken clock was working" is not an accurate rendering of Jack's belief, since you have substituted "a broken clock" into the belief, and Jack did not believe the clock to be broken.

• Jack believed that: the clock is working.
• The clock = the broken clock

Substituting,

• Jack believed that: the broken clock is working.

We know that substituting within the scope of a propositional attitude need not preserve truth value, and hence that the conclusion is invalid.

Hmmm...my mind is involuntarily thrown to Descartes, doubting the validity of his senses, even as he constructs propositional statements about the reality he seems to experience via the senses. Is it not implicit in the proposition 'the mouse ran behind the tree' - if my senses are not decieving me? Is not belief - different from knowledge in this regard, that belief is at the same time, supposed to be true, but uncertain? And does not the propositional nature of belief exist in this uncertainty? That so, the question devolves to one of, what is a proposition and what is a justified true belief; resolved by a series of scientifically controlled experiments to determine, beyond all reasonable doubt, if in fact the mouse is behind the tree. Then saying the mouse is behind the tree is not a proposition - it's a statement of fact.

@creativesoul. Jack's mistaken belief that the clock is working when it actually isn't doesn't imply that beliefs are nonpropositional. Am I missing something here?

Russell, Gettier, and Moore all took JTB to task. — creativesoul

I don’t see what JTB about knowledge has to do with our understanding of belief ascriptions.

It's just that not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes, and thus those exceptions cannot be sensibly rendered in those terms. That's what my broken clock example shows us, and quite clearly it seems to me. — creativesoul

Your understanding of belief ascriptions is biased by your philosophical understanding of propositional attitudes. While de dicto/de re belief ascriptions have an appropriate usage and make sanse to competent speakers independently from your ideas about propositional attitudes.
And there is a strong reason to prefer de dicto belief ascriptions over de re ascriptions b/c the former ones generally explain better believers’ intentional behavior, than the latter (assumed they are both correct).

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

Your claim is misleading for 2 reasons: 1. De re belief ascriptions make absolutely sense in some cases (e.g. when we try to solve belief ascriptions ambiguities wrt other subjects’ contextual and shared background understanding of the situation [1]), yet it’s not correctness the ground for de-re belief ascriptions! 2. Your de re belief ascription about Jack is based on a de-contextualised assumption that the description “that brocken clock” is correct by hypothesis (an assumption that nobody would take for granted in controversial real cases b/c even your belief ascriptions are beliefs after all!).


[1]
A toddler runs toward a woman walking with her partner in a park, the toddler’s father runs after him, and, knowing that couple from the neighbourhood, explains to the surprised partner: “my son believes that your wife is his mum”. Of course the toddler knows nothing about the marital relationship between the partner and the woman, he doesn’t even have the concept of “marriage”, nor “motherhood” for that matter, as shared by adults, therefore the father’s belief ascription is not de dicto (what would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler’s belief?), yet this de re belief ascription is epistemologically plausible to the father and the couple based on their background and shared understanding of the situation.

This is why I don't engage. You have no sense of charity and your posts are unpleasant. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yet look at all of the posts you have created since my last post. You're willing to engage but only if you dictate the topic, which is off the topic of this thread that you want to avoid so that you don't have to address my points.

It's the tone of your insistence. It's off-putting. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question then abandoned it and would now rather waste thread space with your ranting. Your behavior is off-putting by not being intellectually honest.

His heart is in it. He feels he's created or uncovered something devastating or catalytic to the history of philosophy. That foments a profound experience of life-meaning: wakefulness, inspiration, excitement, a superior feeling,* a sense of domination - of philosophical material and of philosophical opponents. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Sounds like you're describing an emotional attachment to me. My only goal in being here is to learn from others by asking them questions and to subject some of my own ideas to criticism. You aren't willing to do either and only seem to be willing in entertaining the ideas of someone with delusions of grandeur. Good luck.

Animals, since they lack human-like languages, may think in pictures/images. Picture theory of meaning?

If so,

1. Are pictures/images propositions?

or

2. Are (some) beliefs nonpropositional? — Agent Smith

Good question. Here is another one: if all propositions can be rendered in linguistic form, then what proposition would correspond to the following image? — neomac

What are propositions if not images of scribbles? So to think in propositions is to think in visual images, or sounds if you're talking to yourself in your head.

What form does a language you don't know take if not visual scribbles and sounds? In hearing a language you don't know are you able to distinguish subjects from predicates, or even just the ending of one word from the beginning of the next?

"This is a picture of a duck or a rabbit, depending on how you look at it." The picture would be an example of "ambiguity".

Not sure about that. Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently. — neomac

I agree that all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs so we are agreeing that all four statements are translatable with the other. In saying that all 4 statements are about the same state-of-affairs you are saying that they are all translatable with each other. You can even have two different sentences in the same language that mean the same thing (A1 and A2), meaning that translating isn't necessarily between two or more languages. It is between two or more symbols (scribbles).

Synonyms are different words that mean the same thing. So you can create two different sentences in one language that mean the same thing and when translated to another language that also has synonyms that mean the same thing as the other two sentences. You can say the same thing different ways. The point is what you are saying, not how you are saying it. In other words none of these statements used is an example of people talking past each other.

The idea that “a mind” is causing “scribble means” doesn’t sound right to me.
“Scribbles” may be the kind of entities that can be caused, but “means” are not caused, nor can be rendered in causal terms. — neomac

I didn't say means are caused. I said meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Causes leave effects and when we look for the meaning of the effect, we are looking for the cause. Examples would be a criminal investigator using the crime scene (effect) to find the identity of the criminal (cause) so this fingerprint means Crooked Joe Smith committed this crime, or tree rings in a tree stump where the rings (effect) are caused by how the tree grows throughout the year (cause) so tree rings means the number of years the tree has existed.

Scribbles are the effect. What they mean is the relationship between the scribbles existing and what caused them, which is an idea and the intent to communicate them and then the act of typing them and clicking Post Comment. If none of those things happened, scribbles would not appear on this screen.

What are you asking for when you ask what does X mean?

I’m inclined to agree with you in general, but the devil is in the details. So, I agree that animal cognitive skills and consequent behavior are much more constrained by their experience than human cognitive skills are. Yet it doesn’t sound right to me to claim that animals’ beliefs are “in the form of their visual experiences”. The problem is that experience (visual or other) doesn’t seem to be enough to grant belief (see the case of optical illusions like the Müller-Lyer illusion [1]: the 2 arrows keep looking different in length even if one correctly believes that they have the same size), therefore animals’ beliefs too are not necessarily nor tightly coupled with their experiences.
Besides the claim that human’s beliefs are “in the form of propositions” does sound right, at least in part. However I would complement it by saying that a belief in propositional form is just a belief that is expressed through a declarative sentence, i.e. through a specific linguistic behavior, that doesn’t imply that humans are equipped only of propositional beliefs. — neomac

Thank you for the detailed response which is more than I can say about many veteran members on this site.

Beliefs are not necessarily true. Someone that holds a belief may have some degree of certainty in maintaining their belief, which is to say that they have some reason or justification, but usually isn't logically justified, only justified by observation. A bent straw in a glass of water is a good example. When observing a bent straw in a glass of water one might believe the straw is bent with their reasoning being their own observation for believing it. But when you integrate it with other observations (like taking the straw out of the water and integrating the knowledge that we see light and not objects) and logic then beliefs can be disbelieved or justified even further into knowledge. The straw is not bent. The light is bent.

In the example of your lines, one may believe that one line is longer until you get out the ruler.

So beliefs would be an idea that something is true based on one observation, while knowledge would be something is true based on multiple observations that are integrated with logic.

We know that substituting within the scope of a propositional attitude need not preserve truth value... — Banno

That is one of the places where convention goes wrong. That's Gettier's foothold as well. Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Smith believed that he would get the job. The substitutions made changed the truth conditions and thus the meaning of the beliefs. In both cases, as explained earlier, when we make such substitutions, we are no longer talking about Jack's or Smith's belief.

Jack's mistaken belief that the clock is working when it actually isn't doesn't imply that beliefs are nonpropositional. Am I missing something here? — Agent Smith

No. Jack's mistaken belief has propositional content. A cat's cannot. Both can be rendered using propositions.

You're willing to engage but only if you dictate the topic — Harry Hindu

"Dictate" is a bit overblown. Just following my muse. My attitude toward analytic philosophy is decidedly lighthearted. To my view, there's wisdom in that. Do you have an interest in wisdom?

Sounds like you're describing an emotional attachment to me. — Harry Hindu

Like I said:

I had a compassionate feeling for creative — ZzzoneiroCosm

You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question — Harry Hindu

I told you I was muddling through and following along. I considered that a confession of ignorance. Yet you continued your imperious questioning.

I don't have clear answers to the bulk of the questions that came to light in this thread. Your off-putting tone made it easy (and likely wise) to ignore you.


At any rate, I'm ready to move on if you are. :smile: