And the aspect of classical theism that Davies emphasizes throughout the book is its commitment to the doctrine of divine simplicity, together with such implications of that doctrine as the theses that God is immutable, that he is timeless, that he is not a particular instance of some general kind of thing, and so forth.
What makes someone a “theistic personalist” as opposed to a classical theist, then (as I read Davies), is essentially that he either explicitly denies the doctrine of divine simplicity, or that he at least implicitly denies it by virtue of denying God’s immutability, or claiming that God is an instance of a kind, etc.
divine simplicity
I have a hard time understanding what theistic personalism is.... — Dermot Griffin
↪Dermot Griffin Whether "classical" or "personalist", IME, theism is not true :point: ↪180 Proof. — 180 Proof
The question is really what sort of game is it? If its feet touch no ground anywhere, then what are the criteria in argument? You cannot tell anyone what they can, or should, or cannot or should not believe. There is inner consistency, but true believers worry not about that. And the conclusions drawn, whether supported with adequate premises, or no premises at all, notwithstanding. So players get to play. But the question why anyone should care, stands. But I am invited out, and accept, unless someone replies. — tim wood
Well, there's the question. Do not you think that if God existed it would be merely a question of consulting that existence to determine an answer? Lacking that, it would seem "existence" in this context is a word with its meaning amputated. And what is left of a discussion as to aspects of an existing thing which does not exist?What does everyone think about the debate between classical theism (that God exists outside of time and does not have parts) and theistic personalism (that God is a person and likewise exists in time and has parts). — Dermot Griffin
On the one hand:
If God is all powerful, all knowing, all good, unchanging and timeless, then how can we have a relationship with Him or He with us?
On the other hand:
If God is a person as we understand persons to be and if God is able to give and take in relationship with us, then how can He be also a supreme and eternal being? — Cuthbert
I have always been convinced that classical theism is more logical, God being both immanent in the world and transcendent beyond it — Dermot Griffin
being that which gives everything its being; in that sense he’s always interacting with everything. — AJJ
Necessity isn’t nonsensical; it just means can’t not exist. Omnipotence understood as every power that exists - like the power heat has to boil water - coming from God also seems reasonable. — AJJ
You didn’t mention any other issues. — AJJ
Necessity is something you can assert about things. To say something is necessary is just to say it can’t not exist; you might be wrong in making that assertion, but it isn’t nonsense — AJJ
I have always been convinced that classical theism is more logical — Dermot Griffin
You didn’t mention any other issues, just the one about interaction. — AJJ
“It is in the nature of a triangle to have 3 sides. Given that a triangle exists, it necessarily has 3 sides.”
“It is in the nature of God to exist. Given that he exists, he exists necessarily.” — AJJ
You mentioned temporality in respect to interaction. — AJJ
It wasn’t hand-waving — AJJ
I know what it means (and strictly speaking, "necessary" means necessarily true, not necessarily existant). And yes, that's how deduction works: if something is given- for instance, the existence of some X- then, it follows necessarily that that thing exists. Which is the correct and meaningful way we can talk about necessary existence; i.e. based on the condition of something... as opposed to the nonsensical talk of an absolute and unconditioned necessity, i.e. as of God's existence.Necessary means can’t not exist. It doesn’t follow from something existing that it’s necessary.
Please actually, if you’re willing — AJJ
Possibility, existence, and necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of manifest tautology, when the definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the logical possibility of the conception—the condition of which is that it be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental possibility of things—the condition of which is that there be an object corresponding to the conception, is a trick which can only deceive the inexperienced. — Kant
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