Jack believed that: the clock is working.
The clock = the broken clock
Substituting,
Jack believed that: the broken clock is working.
We know that substituting within the scope of a propositional attitude need not preserve truth value, and hence that the conclusion is invalid. — Banno
"This is a picture of a duck or a rabbit, depending on how you look at it." The picture would be an example of "ambiguity". — Harry Hindu
The point is what you are saying, not how you are saying it. — Harry Hindu
I didn't say means are caused. — Harry Hindu
I said meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. (...) What they mean is the relationship between the scribbles existing and what caused them. — Harry Hindu
So beliefs would be an idea that something is true based on one observation, while knowledge would be something is true based on multiple observations that are integrated with logic. — Harry Hindu
Thank you for the detailed response which is more than I can say about many veteran members on this site. — Harry Hindu
Maybe Banno has a reference for this info so that we can read about the history of substitution in analytic philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Sure and propositions statements sentences (and whatever else you have in your menu) can be parsed in sequences of electric impulses with different electric voltages, therefore - by transitivity - beliefs are attitudes toward sequences of impulses with different electric voltage.Those who are working on these problems accept that beliefs can be parsed as attitudes towards statements, sentences or propositions. — Banno
There's a difference between a statement and an utterance — Banno
It's found in Frege. I mistakenly assumed familiarity, given that it is so common. — Banno
Jack believed a broken clock was working. While holding such a belief, Jack cannot have an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock was working" such that he believed it to be true. It could be rightfully rendered as such - but only in hindsight after becoming aware of his error. At that point in time, he would no longer believe that a broken clock was working.
He never believed "a broken clock is working" was true. — creativesoul
Jack believed a broken clock was working.
— creativesoul
Sure. But jack did no believe that: a broken clock was working. All you have done is to stuff up the parsing of Jack's belief. — Banno
I don’t see what JTB about knowledge has to do with our understanding of belief ascriptions. — neomac
Your understanding of belief ascriptions is biased by your philosophical understanding of propositional attitudes. While de dicto/de re belief ascriptions have an appropriate usage and make sanse to competent speakers independently from your ideas about propositional attitudes.
And there is a strong reason to prefer de dicto belief ascriptions over de re ascriptions b/c the former ones generally explain better believers’ intentional behavior, than the latter (assumed they are both correct). — neomac
Your claim is misleading for 2 reasons: 1. De re belief ascriptions make absolutely sense in some cases (e.g. when we try to solve belief ascriptions ambiguities wrt other subjects’ contextual and shared background understanding of the situation [1]), yet it’s not correctness the ground for de-re belief ascriptions! 2. Your de re belief ascription about Jack is based on a de-contextualised assumption that the description “that brocken clock” is correct by hypothesis (an assumption that nobody would take for granted in controversial real cases b/c even your belief ascriptions are beliefs after all!). — neomac
A toddler runs toward a woman walking with her partner in a park, the toddler’s father runs after him, and, knowing that couple from the neighbourhood, explains to the surprised partner: “my sun believes that your wife is his mum”. Of course the toddler knows nothing about the marital relationship between the partner and the woman, he doesn’t even have the concept of “marriage”, nor “motherhood” for that matter, as shared by adults, therefore the father’s belief ascription is not de dicto (what would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler’s belief?), yet this de re belief ascription is epistemologically plausible to the father and the couple based on their background and shared understanding of the situation. — neomac
In other words, other folks have come across this tricky conundrum and have set a rule in place to remedy the specific confusion you're wrestling with. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Thank you for the detailed response which is more than I can say about many veteran members on this site.
— Harry Hindu
He'll learn. — Banno
More relevant to our present discussion is that these are puzzles of belief attribution, and not of belief as such. That is, they do not show a problem with treating beliefs as propositional attitudes, but rather with reporting those beliefs. Those who are working on these problems accept that beliefs can be parsed as attitudes towards statements, sentences or propositions.
There are interesting issues here. — Banno
It was once believed the Earth was flat. It was not believed that the spherical Earth is flat, because for those people the Earth was not spherical. The belief in propositional terms was " The Earth is flat " is true, not "The spherical Earth is flat" is true. This is analogous to your "broken clock" example.You are conflating actuality with belief and producing a fatally incoherent admixture. — Janus
It has everything to do with it, for it is the basis of belief as propositional attitude. — creativesoul
Are you of the position that Jack cannot believe that a broken clock is working when he looks at it to find out what time it is? — creativesoul
Is that supposed to be clearer and more accurate somehow than just admitting that we can mistakenly believe that a broken clock is working? — creativesoul
What would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler's belief? I mean, ought we not all do our own work? — creativesoul
My tone hasn't changed yet here you are not ignoring me.Like I said:
I had a compassionate feeling for creative
— ZzzoneiroCosm
You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question
— Harry Hindu
I told you I was muddling through and following along. I considered that a confession of ignorance. Yet you continued your imperious questioning.
I don't have clear answers to the bulk of the questions that came to light in this thread. Your off-putting tone made it easy (and likely wise) to ignore you.
At any rate, I'm ready to move on if you are. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Were you asking me to describe the image, or what the image is about? The image isn't about anything because it is ambiguous. The image is ambiguous, therefore it's not about anything, but the words, "this image is ambiguous" is about the image. One might say that art is intentionally ambiguous - meaning that art isn't about anything itself, rather it is meant to play games with images, or words in the way of poems or music. Also the image isn't about tigers and bears, only rabbits and ducks. So it's limited in its ambiguity.That is the problem of putting visual content into propositional form. Images can be ambiguous in a way that is not captured by any related descriptions.
Besides one and the same image can correspond to many possible descriptions, whose number is arguably higher than any limited mind can conceive of. — neomac
But using a different language is itself a difference in how things are said from how it is said in another language. Different symbols and rules are used to refer to the same thing. This is what I meant when I said that symbol use is arbitrary. I can use different symbols, even in the same language, to mean the same thing.When we translate, we take into account precisely how things are said, otherwise it wouldn’t be a translation.
So you can not use an active form in your native language to translate a foreign sentence in passive form, if you want to translate literally the foreign sentence of course.
That is why, in the examples I listed, B2 is a correct translation of A2, and not of A1, despite the fact that all 3 statements are about the same state of affaires. — neomac
So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thig. How is that so?A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice — neomac
I agree that causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events. All of these prior events can be discovered by correctly interpreting the effect. Your use of words not only informs me that you have an idea and the intent to communicate it, but also your level of education in English and what part of the world you are from based on your accent and dialect. So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent). Is it to know where you are from, or to know what you intend to say? If I really wanted to I could use the effect of your scribbles to even show that it is evidence of the Big Bang, as you would not be here putting scribbles on a screen if the Big Bang did not occur, nor if stars did not fuse heavier elements together and then scatter them across the galaxy in a supernova.Still I disagree on this. My conviction is that linguistic meaning presupposes intentionality and intentionality can not be understood in causal terms for several reasons.
Here I limit myself to 3 and will leave it at that:
1. Causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events, so in this chain of events start and end of a meaningful correlation (say between a sign and its referent) are identifiable only by presupposing the constitutive correlates of intentional states: namely subject (who would produce linguistic signs ) and object (which would be the referent of the linguistic sign).
2. “reference” between signs and referents is grounded on rule-based behavior that presupposes intentionality with its direction of fit, while causality has no direction of fit at all.
3. a sign can refer to things that do not exist, and things that do not exist can not cause anything — neomac
I think I understand what you are saying is that the justification (observation) is not the belief. The attitude seems to occur with the initial observation as useful observations are remembered. Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).Belief can be based on one or multiple observations, agreed. But this seems to contradict instead of supporting the idea that belief can be taken “in the form of their visual experiences”. Perceptual beliefs exceed the related visual experience: they are attitudes, but visual experiences are not attitudes. This should be true for both men and animals, to my understanding. — neomac
Are you of the position that Jack cannot believe that a broken clock is working when he looks at it to find out what time it is?
— creativesoul
Yep that would be my presupposition — neomac
It was once believed the Earth was flat. It was not believed that the spherical Earth is flat, because for those people the Earth was not spherical. The belief in propositional terms was " The Earth is flat " is true, not "The spherical Earth is flat" is true. This is analogous to your "broken clock" example. You are conflating actuality with belief and producing a fatally incoherent admixture. — Janus
A sentence is semantically de re just in case it permits substitution of co-designating terms salva veritate. Otherwise, it is semantically de dicto. — creativesoul
The point of this exercise, on my end anyway, is to show how the consequences of conventional accounting practices are absurd — creativesoul
Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working? — creativesoul
So, we cannot say of those people that they believe that a spherical object is flat — creativesoul
Well, you are trying to make your belief ascription analysis fit your understanding of belief. For me, it should be the other way around. — neomac
...'that they believe of a spherical object that it is flat'... — Janus
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