Common mistake: it's 'in medias res'. — Janus

:ok: In medias res it is!

What is attributed to God, of course, is an absolute and unconditioned necessity. Which is, as I noted, and as countless philosophers going back to Hume have pointed out, simply meaningless- a misuse of terminology. — Seppo

Is there any similarity between the fallacious conceptualization you describe in the above quote and the problem that Georg Cantor ( considered the founder of modern set theory) discovered within his unrestricted comprehension principle?

To be clear, I'm asking if the lack of restriction in both instances links them together as similar fallacies.

Hume has this to say:

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it. — Hume

Both Kant and Hume are in agreement with what I’ve said: necessity can be asserted about things; the assertion may not be right, but there isn’t a logical problem with making it.

Temporality and causality... interaction.

Transcendence: you can’t find God as an object in the world.

Immanence: he’s that which gives everything its being.

The concepts are clear. — AJJ

Still just hand-waving. If the concepts are clear, then answer the questions I posed.

Necessary means can’t not exist. If an object such as a pen exists you can make it so it no longer exists, i.e. it isn’t necessary. — AJJ

You keep repeating this, as if this is what is in dispute here. Are you even reading the posts you're attempting to respond to, or are you just being lazy? We know what the word "necessary" means, that's not the problem.

Both Kant and Hume are in agreement with what I’ve said: necessity can be asserted about things; the assertion may not be right, but there isn’t a logical problem with making it. — AJJ

They are most explicitly not in agreement with what you're saying: they both explicitly repudiate the concept of necessary existence, which you mistakenly claim is perfectly fine.

And no one said there was a "logical problem" (as in a contradiction, or a fallacious inference) with it; what I, and virtually every philosopher (as opposed to apologists/theologians) to consider the matter going back to Hume, have said is that its a terminological or conceptual error: unconditioned necessary existence, without respect to some condition/antecedent, is an abuse/mis-use of logical terminology and is not a meaningful concept that can be correctly attributed to any entity or object, and God's existence is not a necessary truth.

I'm not sure if I understand you correctly, but I don't see any obvious relation; the problem with God's "necessary existence" isn't that it leads to contradiction (as in Russell's Paradox), its the mistaken idea that one can meaningfully talk about necessary beings, or necessary existence without respect to some antecedent (in virtue of which something is necessary, or exists necessarily).

I suppose it would be like saying something "follows", but doesn't follow from anything, or that something could be "to the left of" without being to the left of anything: you're simply misusing terms, such that they've ceased to be meaningful or intelligible.

They don’t repudiate the concept. Read the quotes I provided.

Oh dear. Yes, both of them explicitly repudiated the concept. Hume could hardly have been more specific::

The words, therefore, "necessary existence", have no meaning, or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent. — Hume, DCNR Part 9

(italics mine for emphasis)

I mean honestly, how did you miss this? Did you not even bother reading the cited sections? Or is it that you see no problem in asserting that people said the literal exact opposite of what they actually said?

Either way, its clear you're either unwilling or unable to have a serious conversation on this topic, so I'll spare myself further wasted time by ending this conversation here.

He’s rejecting its demonstrability. The concept remains intact, since he applies it in principle to the universe.

Plus, in the other quote Kant acknowledges the conception to be a logical possibility.

So when Hume says "The words "necessary existence" have no meaning" (after arguing extensively to that effect), your interpretation is that he meant they do have meaning. Uh huh. :rofl:

Like I said, not serious. Go waste someone elses time.

It’s rhetoric, or else he wouldn’t bother applying it in principle to the universe.

:lol:

The laughing emoticon represents a forfeit. GG.

Pretty sure the laughing emoticon represents laughing (yikes- nice try though, I guess).

Now seriously, go troll someone else; you've wasted enough of my time already.

It represents a forfeit.

Your response is logical & clear. I think I understand you. Here goes: You're saying that a necessary being must have an antecedent condition in virtue of which it necessarily follows.

In my question, I'm not concerned with the fact that Cantor's set logic, without a limiting condition applied to its comprehension principle, leads to a paradox.

I'm not trying to ascribe any degree of the paradoxical to your statement about an antecedent condition being required for a necessary being.

Instead, I'm looking at the two instances from a broadly inclusive, wide-angle point of view.

I'm asking if they're similar in that they have something in common: limiting condition required.

Sure, I suppose, broadly speaking. But the details are very different, so I'd be hesitant to press the comparison.

Theology has created a god based on the attempt to guard against any reasonable objection. Vanity of vanities.

The God of theistic personalism is the God of the Bible, the God of Abraham and Moses.

The God of Classical theism is the Neoplatonic God, Plotinus' God, at least a variant of it.

There is definitely tension between these two models of God.

There is also a Neo-Classical God that approaches Theistic Personalism. Ryan Mullins makes a good case for this.

Could you possibly tell me more about this “Neo-Classical God?” First time I’ve ever heard of it.

Here is an excellent essay where the neoclassical approach is also discussed in a nutshell.

You can read it online without having to log in:

https://www.academia.edu/20717983/The_Difficulty_with_Demarcating_Panentheism