I think it is obvious that understanding is not close to being exhausted by theoretical accounts. And I also think it is equally obvious that we don’t really understand much of anything, hence the infinite "why" questions, which must be answered with a “that's the way it is” type replies. Because we just don’t know. — Manuel
So we may get a theory, perhaps, but how can something "objective" could lead to something "subjective", goes beyond our comprehension, it seems to me. — Manuel
The point I saw Chomsky making about this was that Chalmers' approach seems to suggest that we understand matter as thoroughly as possible, and we don't. I don't think Chalmers does assume that. — frank
See what I mean? — frank
It turns out he was wrong then, Dennett and the Churchlands are making the same mistake now, only with updated physics, — Manuel
For Chomsky, as these terms are commonly used today, "physical" stands in for what we more or less theoretically understand, physics, biology, etc.
"Non-physical" stand in for those things we don't understand the mind, consciousness, thinking, etc — Manuel
Maybe it's normal to try to push our present conceptual scheme to its limits before giving up and calling for new ways of thinking.
I'm pretty unsatisfied with Dennett because he doesn't really push the envelope. His ambitions seem to be limited to casting doubt that we need new ideas. — frank
So in the past, "physical" was things like billiard balls. Now it covers the whole range of the objects of theory. :up: If we don't have a theory for it, it's non-physical. — frank
mean, one thing is to read his essays. But to listen to his lectures or interviews, I find it pretty remarkable. He's like "it's obvious that this and this will happen in such systems" and "of course this will happen given natural selection." — Manuel
Ah right so you're just restating your claims without addressing anything I said. — StreetlightX
Yes, because you haven't demonstrated a great understanding of what's being claimed, nor displayed a tone of openness to the ideas. — Xtrix
After fifty years of research, all that is left is the original assumption of infinite generativity—the idea that everything we ever do and experience, which is finite by definition, is always an arbitrary obstacle on our way toward the fulfillment and understanding of our infinite linguistic potential. This is a philosophical assumption, actually a religious assumption, that goes against the very idea of science. In this sense, the series of articles by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch might be more favorably read as joint statements of resignation: we have tried to find common ground between linguistics and evolutionary science; as far as the periphery of language is concerned, we believe there is no real problem; at its core, however, language still seems to defy the mode of explanation that is at the core of evolutionary theory; maybe, only maybe, what we believe about the core of language might be reconciled with something at the periphery of evolutionary theory; but beyond that, we really have nothing to offer. The mystery is there to stay.
I don't believe that religion ought to be accorded any respect whatsoever — StreetlightX
After fifty years of research, all that is left is the original assumption of infinite generativity
the idea that everything we ever do and experience, which is finite by definition, is always an arbitrary obstacle on our way toward the fulfillment and understanding of our infinite linguistic potential. This is a philosophical assumption, actually a religious assumption
Which you'd know if you read anything outside the Tomasello, Dor, and Everett. — Xtrix
It's the simple view that there are things we can know and things we cannot, given that we are natural creatures. Not in this essay, but in a different one, he distinguishes between "problems" and "mysteries", problems are those questions we can ask and (hopefully) answer. "Mysteries" are those we can ask and not answer, such as say, free will or how is it possible for matter to think? Then there are questions we can't even ask, because we don't know how to phrase them.
This would give an "updated" view on the intuitive aspect:
https://cprtrust.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/COMPLETE-REPORT-Goswami-Childrens-Cognitive-Development-and-Learning.pdf
Particularly "naive physics" p.6. — Manuel
The 17th century scientific revolution was a reaction to Aristotelean physics, which postulated occult forces that no longer made sense. But of course, Aristotle was taken very seriously and was considered by many to be among the greatest of thinkers, no doubt about that. Aristotle was likely highlighting other aspects of our innate "folk psychology", putting emphasis on different aspects of the world, which were not satisfactory for many of the 17th century figures. — Manuel
I'd only quibble that I don't think physicists have intuitions about how gravity works, they have intuitions about how theories about gravity work and how they can relate to other phenomena in the world. The intuition would be on the theory side. — Manuel
The main topic of the essay, as I read it, is that we've lowered the standards of science, we no longer seek to understand the world, but seek theories about aspects of the world. That's a big lowering of standards of explanation. — Manuel
As for your last question, I think, in the end, the point is going to be person dependent. For me, it's quite crazy that we understand so little and that the world exists at all, it's baffling to me. There's no reason to expect any species to evolve having a capacity to ask and answer questions about the world at all, there's no obvious benefit to doing these things. — Manuel
Is this what you think Chomsky means with his "mysteries"? — SophistiCat
The claim itself is unremarkable, considering that it has been known and studied for decades. But the implication of the unintelligibility of the world and impossibility of knowledge is nonsense. Intelligibility and knowledge aren't about innate intuitions, or else we would have to say that pretty much our entire body of so-called knowledge isn't actually intelligible to us! This is just language on holiday. — SophistiCat
But whose standards are these? Who ever thought that a newborn babe, so to speak, could intuitively grasp how the world works, down to the very foundations?
This is why I am skeptical that this is really what Chomsky was driving at - that he was even driving at any such specific thesis. He seems perfectly happy and engaged with his dilettante notes on the history and philosophy of science, but I don't see him pushing hard for some grand claim. — SophistiCat
Well, evolution is notorious for its lack of foresight. I also don't think that there was any simple and specific reason for this outcome. — SophistiCat
I want to say, first, that I approve of your sense of wonder. — Srap Tasmaner
But one must imagine that when great new theories are put forth, it's only possible because of our imagination, thus, there's something about it which is more accurate as to the nature of the world than perception. — Manuel
As we gain sophistication in terms of mental power, we pierce further in the universe. — Manuel
And, as you suggest, maybe we can't, but that's just the way it is, and the products of our imagination, in one sense, reach beyond what we can imagine, in another sense. If so, that in itself is an interesting result. — Srap Tasmaner
On the other hand, the cognitive scientists are going to tell us that all we've ever understood are theories we generate unconsciously. But there may still be a difference in kind, if our "native" theorizing hooks up to particular cognitive capacities that our scientific theories don't. — Srap Tasmaner
The problem starts when we become puzzled about this common sense. — Manuel
On the other hand, you might note that the apple falling makes sense to you, but shouldn't. — Srap Tasmaner
Or, in the case of the falling apple, there ought to be an explanation for why we don't find its behavior surprising. — Srap Tasmaner
And there again it's a question of how our various capacities hook up one with another -- not everything you understand can readily be put into words, for instance.
What then, after all, are we up to when doing philosophy? — Srap Tasmaner
The apple falling does make sense to us and probably should — Manuel
There's nothing in experience that guarantees that apples won't go up next time they "break away" from a tree. — Manuel
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