I think we might say it is a kind of believing, but not that is it is in the form of 'believing that'. So, as I have argued before, in other similar conversations with you, I think it makes sense to say that animals believe, but not that they hold beliefs. — Janus
you didn’t clarify why JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude. — neomac
"they believe a spherical object is flat" — creativesoul
What are you ascribing to another prior to having an understanding of belief? — creativesoul
I could be wrong, but not completely. — creativesoul
AS I said this is prone to equivocation. The incoherent interpretation would be equivalent to they believe that "a spherical object is flat" is true. — Janus
...the JTB analysis of "knowledge" challenged by Gettier presupposes (or so it seems) the notion of "belief" as propositional attitude not the other way around. So, unless you have something more convincing to support your claim ("JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude"), b/c that is what I asked, then it is fair to say that you are completely wrong
A theory of belief should fit into a theory of belief ascription not the other way around, the reason being that you as any body else learned the word “belief” and its proper usage in the context of specific linguistic practices about belief ascriptions, prior to any philosophical debate. — neomac
...you as any body else learned the word “belief” and its proper usage in the context of specific linguistic practices about belief ascriptions... — neomac
That is false on it's face.
We learned to use the word "belief" in the context of specific linguistic practices, but those practices were not about belief ascriptions. — creativesoul
We've been using the term belief for thousands of years. We've been attributing beliefs to ourselves and others for at least that long. Some attribute beliefs to the simplest 'minded' of animals, such as slugs.
According to what you've said here, we ought make our theory of belief fit such usage. — creativesoul
FYI I prefer arguments to emoticons. — neomac
( 4 ) Beliefs are mental states in which a statement is held to be true. ( Assumption ) — fdrake
( 6 ) If X is a state, the content of X is part of that state. (Assumption) — fdrake
What is being held equal? "Snow is white" is not the same as snow is white, obviously. "Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, but that's a truth functional equivalence, not an equivalence of identity. Puzzling.( 12 ) The semantic content of "This snow is white" is equivalent to the white snow. (assumption) — fdrake
You did not answer the question I asked about the charge you're levying. — creativesoul
Your belief that folk in Darwin can sometimes buy shoes is not a discrete state of your mind. So it's not quite my view. — Banno
In what way are images suppose to be ambiguous? The only images and words that are suppose to be ambiguous is art. By describing your images and words as "art" you are informing others that the images and words are intended to be ambiguous. If not, then it is assumed that the images and words you make refer to real states-of-affairs, or are meant to inform others of real states-of-affairs.I was more brainstorming about Agent Smith’s question: “Are pictures/images propositions?”
The problem is that propositions are not supposed to be ambiguous, while images are.
Sentences can be ambiguous, but (not surprisingly) there are rules to systematically disambiguate them wrt to the propositions that they are supposed to represent (at least in the case of declarative sentences), that’s not the case for images. — neomac
When I say "how it is said", I'm referring to the scribbles used. Using different scribbles to say the same thing is saying the same thing differently.> So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thing.
Because B1 not only matches with what A1 says (about Alice’s love for Jim) but also with how it is said by A1 (passive form) — neomac
I'm not clear of where we are agreeing or disagreeing here. There are a probably an infinite number of causal relations any of which could be useful to single out depending on our goal. This is simply saying that not all meanings (causal relations) are useful in every given moment. Meaning is everywhere causes leave effects and the time between some cause and effect is a product of our own minds, and what meanings are useful are also a product of our goals.> So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent).
That is the point I’m making as well: what enables us to single out semantic relations between signs and referents out of a causal chain of events is “a mind” with intentionality. If we talked only in terms of causality and effects, we would end up having a situation where, in a causal chain, any subsequent effect be "a sign of” any preceding cause. — neomac
I can only say that would there not be books about Hobbits (effect) if someone did not imagine them (the cause) prior.> Imaginary concepts have causal power.
That is a very problematic statement to me: we should clarify the notions of “concept” and “causality” before investigating their relationship. But it’s a heavy task on its own, so I will not engage it in this thread. — neomac
We're clearly talking past each other. It's not useful to remember/believe that you dream, or to remember/believe you know the difference between dream and reality?> Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).
Not sure about that: e.g. we may remember things without believing in them (e.g. dreams). To my understanding, belief can interact with experience and memory in many ways, yet the latter cognitive skills come ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to any doxastic attitude. — neomac
I'd not put too much emphasis on "mental state", so much as on explanations for behaviours. It is not that there is always a thing in the mind that is a belief. Your belief that folk in Darwin can sometimes buy shoes is not a discrete state of your mind. So it's not quite my view. — Banno
I think this needs cleaning up. Belief is a relation between someone and a statement such that the statement is held to be true. We can loosely call the statement the content of the belief. But in (9) you want to have some sort of transitivity relation here. I can't see how it would work. — Banno
Perhaps you are poking at "Snow is white" being extensional but not "Fdrake believes that snow is white". — Banno
If someone believes that folk in Darwin can sometimes buy shoes then there must be a mental state (or probably better, process) correlated with that belief. — Janus
...the JTB analysis of "knowledge" challenged by Gettier presupposes (or so it seems) the notion of "belief" as propositional attitude not the other way around. So, unless you have something more convincing to support your claim ("JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude"), b/c that is what I asked, then it is fair to say that you are completely wrong
:meh: — creativesoul
Indeed this is what I already — neomac
creativesoul
If "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, and yet it can be believed nonetheless, then it cannot be the case that either all belief has propositional content or all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or other. — creativesoul
Indeed this is what I already remarked in my previous comment:
You mean your pointless challenge: " If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example".
What about this example: X believes that the present King of France is bald. Did I win anything? — neomac — neomac
The first relationship might be called intentional content, the second might be called semantic content. The belief is in relation with the statement (statement is intentional content of belief), the statement is in relation toward the world (the world forms some part of the semantic content of the statement). It seems necessary that there is some transitivity condition implied. If X believes that the snow they are seeing is white, then it would be strange if the semantic content of "snow is white" was consistent with the intentional content of non-white snow. If a person is holding the statement P true, they are also committed to P's semantic content in a manner that a person would be surprised if the world wasn't consistent with the semantic content of P. I believe thats snow is white, I'm not just committed to the statement, I'm committed to its truth, and what that truth says about the state of things. — fdrake
What kind of event fleshes out the truth of the claim "fdrake believes that snow is white" — fdrake
What is the content of a proposition? And is it propositional? — bongo fury
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