I don't need to read this shit. — frank

Indeed you don't. Yet it seems you do.

Perhaps a community which fosters a desire for it — Ciceronianus

That's actually the key here. Rocks don't formulate the concept of freedom. Only humans do. And as humans are individually confined to their own consciousness, it must needs be that only individuals, individually, can both conceptualize freedom, as well as value it. These two activities precede the emergence of domains predicated upon freedom, it simply cannot be any other way. Concepts have to be formulated and valued before they can be used to establish a mode of behavior, either individually or collectively, to be enacted. The problem is arising from the fact that history is distinguished by the emergence of states predicated on overwhelming force, and superstitiously justified in the subjects as decreed by the divine. Which really worked for the looters for thousands of years, before the expansion and dissemination of the philosophical tradition to as many people as was needed to necessitate a reorientation in the perceptual framework of justifiable human behavior, which I regard to really kicking into high gear in 1400's. Such proliferation of intellectual thought utimately ends in the logical conclusion of freedom for all men to within the context of not violating said freedom, is the preferred mode of being for all those who do not desire domination over others; which again, is not justifiable from any philosophical perspective.

Expound on that, would you? I've never heard of it. — Garrett Travers

The idea is that the Persians invented the idea of progress. As opposed to the Hebrew view where you're born ignorant and have to learn about good and evil, Persians, specifically Zoroastrians, believed you're born with this knowledge and it's your responsibility to choose goodness over evil. It's not a one time choice, but something that's before you every day.

Where in the Hebrew outlook, you can tell if someone is good or evil by their health and wealth status (indicating God's covenant based promise), for Persians, outward status doesn't tell you anything. A person could be rich, but if they aren't choosing good every day, they're evil.

This shows up in Christianity, which received Persian ideas which had already been absorbed by the Jews. You can see that the Persian view is sort of proto inwardness.

Reading Arendt is not like being led through an argument so much as inundated by it. — Banno

That's well put. I wish I had thought of it.

I think Arendt would agree that the Stoics emphasised virtue rather than freedom, and that she would add that private virtue was brought together with the will by Augustine to give us the fraught notion of freedom. Central to Christian concerns is the freedom to choose to go with or against the will of the Lord, who sees into one's soul and judges us on our private thoughts as much as our public actions. — Banno

Augustine, having conceived (a nice way to put it, I believe) Original Sin, had to find a less obviously unjust way by which we could be condemned to the flames of hell. Christ's sacrifice wouldn't do the trick, not entirely. If it in itself removed the stain of Original Sin, did that mean that those who lived before the sacrifice no longer writhed, so justly, in agony for all eternity? Did that mean that those born after it were clean of stain? Of course not. So, Original Sin had to be a proclivity to sin, but not an overwhelming one. We had to choose to sin, or at least appear to do so, and presto! Free Will was born.

you win a bottle of Laphroaig, — Banno

Mmmmm. Laphroaig. It's so smokey.

The idea is that the Persians invented the idea of progress. As opposed to the Hebrew view where you're born ignorant and have to learn about good and evil, Persians, specifically Zoroastrians, believed you're born with this knowledge and it's your responsibility to choose goodness over evil. It's not a one time choice, but something that's before you every day. — frank

So, a bit like Plato's anamnesiac idea of recalling the forms which are already embued in your memory banks that simply need to be triggered, eh?

Where in the Hebrew outlook, you can tell if someone is good or evil by their health and wealth status (indicating God's covenant based promise), for Persians, outward status doesn't tell you anything. A person could be rich, but if they aren't choosing good every day, they're evil. — frank

Very cool. Especially for primitive thought. Superstition dominated early Man. These intimations of elevated powers of perception are always interesting to me. Which is why I love ancient Eastern philosophy, just for its beauty and approximately correctness that is contained in its truisms.

This shows up in Christianity, which received Persian ideas which had already been absorbed by the Jews. You can see that the Persian view is sort of proto inwardness. — frank

Very interesting. Okay, I'll look into this. I'm far more attuned with Western Ethics, but this looks like good material to incorporate. Thanks a bunch for indulging my curiosity.

frank

So, a bit like Plato's anamnesiac idea of recalling the forms which are already embued in your memory banks that simply need to be triggered, eh? — Garrett Travers

I hadn't thought of that, but yes, it is similar. Innate knowledge vs starting with a blank slate.

Thanks a bunch for indulging my curiosity. — Garrett Travers

:up:

Perhaps a community which fosters a desire for it, instead. Free from, would make more sense than free with, I think. I find it hard to conceive of a community which fosters freedom as we think of it now--or at least as I think of it. Perhaps those damn Romantics, with their emphasis on individuality, bear some responsibility for this perspectives. I like to poke at them now and again, as well. — Ciceronianus

I think that is exacly the point. You equate freedom immediately with 'free from'; free from interference, free from those pesky other people. That is whatthe whole of western tradition was geared towards, freedom became 'free from'. As a lawyer that idea is immediately appealing, we hold our human rights in high regard and a community making demands is suspect. Her challenge to that I think is to rethink this notion. She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you ar efree with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others.

She specifically mentions a number of logical challenges to the idea of volition. Her approach is: this crap is taking place in the realm of philosophy, and this is why: people became ensnared by theology and so fail to see the wisdom of the Greeks (which is actually a Hegelian insight, not Greek, but anyway,) — frank

I always like Hegelian ideas, but here I am not sure what you mean. I can follow it to some extent, but what is the Hegelian insight you speak of? Not to quiblle, an honest question for some clarification. Which of course you are under no obligation whatsoever to give... ;)

Stop it, Harry. You can't will that rational assessment freely like that. Others are required to provide that freedom to you in the form of not impinging it with violence, and vice versa. — Garrett Travers

:lol: :up:

She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you ar efree with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others. — Tobias

This is true. However, in the course of her unclear explication of freedom, she actually concedes its true requirement, although it would take a couple cracks at analysis to pick up on:

"Freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation, the companyof other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them a politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed."
https://grattoncourses.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/hannah-arendt-what-is-freedom.pdf (pg.6)

In other words, freedom requires first the experience of being liberated from the forces of nature or man's arbitration, then to conceptualize and value it, to thereby be enacted in word and deed. So, she actually concedes my position, oddly enough. I think what she's really trying to do is confuse her readers by providing a bunch of (fallacy of ambiguity) ancient definitions for the word and assert positions based on them (etymological fallacy) that don't actually follow from her premises (formal fallacy). Meaning, there's a handful of fallacies associated with her assertions, as well as the concession that individual conceptualization of freedom is necessary for a free domain, even though having only a few short sentences previously claimed that such inner sense of freedom is an illusion. It really makes no sense, in all honesty...

She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you are free with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others. — Tobias

In that sense, she is not opposing the idea of isolated individuals over against an idea of society or community but saying that the former is not sufficient by itself. The quote from Thomas Paine she gives is: ""to be free it is sufficient [for man] that he wills it," That may describe a necessary recognition of equality for the purpose of disavowing the claims of tyranny. It does not, however, address how to develop the means to go forward as a way of life.

The nature of this insufficiency can be approached from many different points of view. Kierkegaard said that freedom was the ability to do things. Living as an individual requires more than setting up a boundary.
The matter of capabilities and resources appears immediately when enough people associate with each other to share or not share them. Declaring all to be equal may be one way to begin but hardly is adequate for the struggles such a life must engage with.

And when the forces of tyranny do gather their capacity to cancel freedom, the strength to resist comes from those capabilities being alive and well. That work doesn't happen by simply establishing a set of rules.

She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you ar efree with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others. — Tobias

I think a community can, as a community, as a nation, assert its commitment to the freedom of all its members/citizens. The U.S. does that and has done that since its foundation; so have other nations (France, most notably, since the Revolution). So that in itself is quite "thinkable." It's apparent, in fact, so I assume that's not what she refers to, and this of course raises the question--what does she mean?

A nation of course may go beyond mere assertion and adopt laws which restrict the power of government and guarantee certain freedoms. That would be the exercise of sovereignty in favor of freedom, at least to an extent. How renounce that and achieve the wished for freedom? Or does she speak of individuals renouncing any claim to sovereignty of some kind over others, e.g. someone claiming his/her individual freedom.rights have priority over the freedom/rights of others? The conflict of rights, if not freedoms, is something we certainly know of and of course is something the law must address wherever legal rights exist. It's likely inevitable and in many cases has to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps she's recommending we refrain from engaging in such conflicts? Is that what she's touting, using Epictetus as an example?

The matter of capabilities and resources appears immediately when enough people associate with each other to share or not share them. Declaring all to be equal may be one way to begin but hardly is adequate for the struggles such a life must engage with.

And when the forces of tyranny do gather their capacity to cancel freedom, the strength to resist comes from those capabilities being alive and well. That work doesn't happen by simply establishing a set of rules. — Paine

Yes, that seems clear as regards all domains of conceptual framework, not just freedom. For example the Manhattan Project could never have manifested itself the way it did without the scientific conceptual framework x amount of scientists unified in the achievement of the same goal, it's the basic principle of manpower. But, the whole process begins with individuals that integrate the perceptions that stimulate the consideration, which is thereby vetted for it's validity to the best of one's ability, then formulated through the processes of coherence, resulting in a clear framework with which to inform behavior. That's fundamentally the process.

How does that observation relate to the matter of insufficiency that was the central point of my comment?

what does she mean? — Ciceronianus

Yes, that is exactly what one is left to think reading this, I agree.

That would be the exercise of sovereignty in favor of freedom, at least to an extent. — Ciceronianus

More like exercise of the recognition of sovereignty for the constituents from within, while also asserting sovereignty of the constituents from without, in the direction of exterior domains of established sovereignty.

Or does she speak of individuals renouncing any claim to sovereignty of some kind over others, e.g. someone claiming his/her individual freedom.rights have priority over the freedom/rights of others? — Ciceronianus

She believes the concept of sovereignty is best understood in the historical sense (again with the etymological fallacy), within the context of governments. Even though current definitions cover both individual understandings of sovereignty, as well as societal, or state sovereignty.

Definitions: supreme power or authority/ the authority of a state to govern itself or another state/ a self-governing state/ a self-governing state/ freedom from external control/ one that is sovereign

As you can see, the contemporary definitions are far more broad and sohisticated than simply relying on historical contex of sovereignty and covers both domains.

Perhaps she's recommending we refrain from engaging in such conflicts? Is that what she's touting, using Epictetus as an example? — Ciceronianus

She certainly critiques authoritarianism, but, it's really not clear what she's ultimately using as reasons to conclude any of her assertions. As I posted above, they are laced with fallacy.

I provided an example of the phenomenon you mentioned, not addressing the process that is involved in such a phenomenon failing against forces that would oppose it. Nor, is it a topic of what is being discussed here, although interesting.

To address it: I would say, yeah, you're right. The capacity to resist DOES come from those capacities being alive and well. What animates them is individual value in the virtues that ensure those capacities, rules won't compel it. Rules are little more than an agreement on standards for interpersonal interactions and conduct decided upon by the people that were there to agree upon them. An individual has to value those standards to uphold them, and by extension have the constitution requisite to meet forces head on that would threaten it.

"Freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation, the companyof other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them a politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed." — Garrett Travers

In other words, freedom requires first the experience of being liberated from the forces of nature or man's arbitration, then to conceptualize and value it, to thereby be enacted in word and deed. So, she actually concedes my position, oddly enough. — Garrett Travers

Yes, one needs first 'liberation'. In slavery one is not free. However, you hold on to some 'true requirement', as if that is enough. For her that is not enough. That is where her essay gets interesting.

The nature of this insufficiency can be approached from many different points of view. Kierkegaard said that freedom was the ability to do things. Living as an individual requires more than setting up a boundary.
The matter of capabilities and resources appears immediately when enough people associate with each other to share or not share them. Declaring all to be equal may be one way to begin but hardly is adequate for the struggles such a life must engage with. — Paine

Exactly, but I think Kierkegaard would not go far enough for her. Indeed one needs to ability 'to do things', but also to have a voice in setting the rules of the social game so to speak. Ahrendt asserts the 'right to have rights' in The Origins of Totalitarianism which she seems to divide the right to action and the right to opinion. Her point, at least the way I take it, is that you have a right to matter, in the sense of being taken into account. One is only free if one can matter politically. If not, if a group is marginalized and becomes politically outcast, it will lose all other rights. For that, you need a space in which you deal with others on an equal footing. Quite Habermassian this all seems. Therefore, liberation by itself is not enough.

There Cic's point comes in:

I think a community can, as a community, as a nation, assert its commitment to the freedom of all its members/citizens. The U.S. does that and has done that since its foundation; so have other nations (France, most notably, since the Revolution). So that in itself is quite "thinkable." It's apparent, in fact, so I assume that's not what she refers to, and this of course raises the question--what does she mean? — Ciceronianus

Yes it can, but this assertion as a kind of motto is not worth anything. It has to provide that ground in practice. The USA in her time nominally supported freedom but there were many social groups disenfranchized even more so than now. I guess in her view, the thinking in terms of sovereignty prevents this politically free space to emerge, because politics is not a free space in which 'free men can insert themselves by word and deed', but an arena, to use a common sociological term, in which one wins and loses. Whether she is right I do not know, it is what I gather from her texts.

And when the forces of tyranny do gather their capacity to cancel freedom, the strength to resist comes from those capabilities being alive and well. That work doesn't happen by simply establishing a set of rules. — Paine

Indeed! It requires a rethinking of 'setting rules' to begin with.

Additionally, her point is not that freedom is not thinkable, she is trying to rethink freedom so that would be as silly assertion, but that it is unthinkable in the terms we have hitherto been using. Then she says, will you end up in contradictions. I do not know if that is true, but quite frankly I do not care, because if I get hung up there I miss the rest of her essay. Perhaps it is hyperbole, god knows.

The first page or so brings out a strange little paradox for those who insist they have free will: Are you free to act against your own will?

Hence the "Oppression of the will". — Banno

You can oppress your own will. Like that of others.

Yes, one needs first 'liberation'. In slavery one is not free. However, you hold on to some 'true requirement', as if that is enough. For her that is not enough. That is where her essay gets interesting. — Tobias

That's correct, and in non- slavery one is free and does not need liberation to know it. This concept of freedom is in accordance with her hisrorical assessment of states and the perpetual non-freedom Man found himself in. Because freedom was in perpetual negation, and Man is ignorant and blind without philosophy and thereby subject to the vagaries of brute force, he must be liberated to experience his from. But, this is true ONLY in this context, and even in this context it still emerges as an individual value internally, to outwardly flow thence and build communities with people who share the same value. Again, she concedes my position in this assertion. It is her concept that is limited, not mine. She relies solely on the historical context of freedom to formulate her definitions of freedom which inform her conclusions, which is again, an etymological fallacy. I accept her domain of freedom, as long as it is not limited to that, but instead expanded to cover the individual element that the Enlightenment gave us as a result of more thought on the concept and it's essential nature to the survival of Man.

I do not know if that is true, but quite frankly I do not care, because if I get hung up there I miss the rest of her essay. Perhaps it is hyperbole, god knows. — Tobias

I've already presented the reason why this is not contradictory. But, just to add to that argument, it is contradictory itself to conclude that freedom is contradictory from the perspective of inner thought, as it is inner thought that is at all times emerging as a free exercise of the activity of the brain, even when experiencing external intereference. The brain is in a perpetual state of thought and action, even if executive function is being overridden by force or nature. It is the definition of freedom: unrestrained action and thought in accordance with its nature. The only way to stop a brain from operating in this manner is trauma. Thus, the source of freedom cannot contradict itself in its own natural observation of its own freedom, which is a capacity of the human being as a result of superior-pattern-processing and exectutive function.

I provided an example of the phenomenon you mentioned, not addressing the process that is involved in such a phenomenon failing against forces that would oppose it. Nor is it a topic of what is being discussed here, although interesting. — Garrett Travers

That comment evades the problem of the sufficiency of declaring individual freedom that I referred to.
That topic is integral to Arend's argument:

In reality Rousseau's theory stands refuted for the simple reason that "it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the future"; a community actually founded on this sovereign will would be built not on sand but on quicksand. All political business is, and always has been, transacted within an elaborate framework of ties and bonds for the future such as laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances all of which derive in the last instance from the faculty to promise and to keep promises in the face of the essential uncertainties of the future. A state, moreover, in which there is no communication between the citizens and where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny. That the faculty of will and will-power in and by itself, unconnected with any other faculties, is an essentially nonpolitical and even anti-political capacity is perhaps nowhere else so manifest as in the absurdities to which Rousseau was driven and in the curious cheerfulness with which he accepted them.

Animals in the zoo are free, but animals in the wilderness are not. This is why zoo animals are so unhygienic. It's their little protest to pee and shit all over the place.

Although it depends on how they run the zoo.

That comment evades the problem of the sufficiency of declaring individual freedom that I referred to.
That topic is integral to Arend's argument: — Paine

No, it doesn't evade anything. Just a remark. I wasn't making an argument against what you said, as I expounded on afterward.

A state, moreover, in which there is no communication between the citizens and where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny.

Nobody here has argued for such a thing.

That the faculty of will and will-power in and by itself, unconnected with any other faculties

This is scientifically illiterate. Will is the sum total of all possible actions and thoughts of a human being, will and body are not disconnected and nobody here argues such.

Honestly, I'm not understanding why this is being shown to me. Care to explain a bit?

Arendt is saying that if the principle of individual sovereignty was sufficient for the life of freedom, it would not lead to the absurdities noted in Rousseau's version of it.

Arendt is saying that if the principle of individual sovereignty was sufficient for the life of freedom, it would not lead to the absurdities noted in Rousseau's version of it. — Paine

I see, yes, among other assertions she presents that do not make sense. Yes, nobody says the mere concept is sufficient to create the "life of freedom," but that people value the concept as a prerequisite for such "life of freedom" to exist between people within a given domain, and also that such a concept is first and foremost an emergent thought and value within the individual brain. You cannot have the free domain without individuals who value freedom that comprise it as constituents. If humans are atomized, they can still live without force from other humans, but it decreases the liklihood. So, there is a dimension along which I agee, but only to that degree.

She also, again, makes many claims, among which is the impossibility of freedom to be defined, and the inherent contradictions in the concept of individual freedom, which are also assertions that simply do not make sense. For the reason I just explained, or have already explained with definitions and explanations that are consistent with the modern philosophical approach to freedom.

She also, again, makes many claims, among which is the impossibility of freedom to be defined, and the inherent contradictions in the concept of individual freedom, which are also assertions that simply do not make sense. For the reason I just explained, or have already explained with definitions and explanations that are consistent with the modern philosophical approach to freedom. — Garrett Travers

She defines freedom as action ,or praxis, which is prior both to reason- intellect and to the will. This notion is influenced by Hegelian dialectics. When she argues that freedom should not be equated with sovereignty of will she means that will should not be thought of in terms of a mastery. of ourselves. Action is the opposite of this. It represents a becoming and self-transformation , a new beginning. We are only free when we are surprised by what we will , rather than being masters over our thoughts.

“Action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance
of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will although
it needs both for the execution of any particular goal but springs from some­thing altogether different which (following Montesquieu's famous analysis of forms of government) I shall call a principle.”

“…the manifestation of principles comes about only through action, they are manifest in the world as long
as the action lasts, but no longer. Such principles are honor or glory, love of equality, which Montesquieu
called virtue, or distinction or excellence the Greek det dpLcrrerW ("always strive to do your best and to be the best of all"), but also fear or distrust or hatred. Free­dom or its opposite appears in the world whenever such principles are actualized; the appearance
of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the performing act. Men are free as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom as long
as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.”

She defines freedom as action ,or praxis, which is prior both to reason- intellect and to the will. — Joshs

Which is another problematic definition, as one is free as one sleeps without someone interupting said sleep. Furthermore, modern cognitive neuroscience is out pacing this definition itself, by describing to us what the brain does. And what it does is complex maintenance of activity in the form of thought, emotion, and action (will) at all times, with the prefrontal cortex acting as the control center, and is connected to the entire neural, and emotional processing networks of the body. Meaning, the will (sum total of all individual human action) is never in a state of inactivity, outside of trauma induced inactivity. Freedom is not action, freedom is the will of an individiual emerging without the application of force to impeded, or inhibit him.

As far as mastery and sovereignty is concerned, I would on partially second that opinion. Yes, mastery as in, total active command as if a slave to a mastery, sure. But, if we mean sovereignty in these forms: freedom from external control/ controlling influence/ supreme power or authority/ a self-governing state, then yes, sovereignty is not just applicable to the concept of freedom, it's part and parcel

the appearance
of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the performing act. Men are free as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom as long
as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.” — Joshs

This is in direct contradiction to both the Hegelian sense of freedom, which is to say thought itself in all of its manifestations including action, and to the current working definitions that cover both thought and action, which as I explained about the brain, is perpetual. Man is never in a state of inactivity. Freedom is the existence of man unimpeded by force.


In short, I know how she defines this stuff, she's simply wrong about her conclusions. Her conclusions should be resticted to the boundaries of her definitions, and it would also help her case if she would provide a clear definition on anything, which I've yet to see.

I like her idea that evoking “freedom of consciousness”, or applying freedom to other metaphysical spaces, is irrelevant. Freedom is the prime concern of politics, of the polis, of political action, and not of inward universes. “The raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action”.

For Arendt, politics and freedom are intimately linked. She gives a better account of freedom in her The Promise of Politics:

"Politics", in the Greek sense of the word, is therefore centered around freedom, whereby freedom is understood negatively as not being ruled or ruling, and positively as a space which can be created only by men and in which each man moves among his peers. Without those who are my equals, there is no freedom, which is why the man who rules over others—and for that very reason is different from them on principle—is indeed a happier and more enviable man than those over whom he rules, but he is not one whit freer. He too moves in a sphere in which there is no freedom whatever.

At the very least her essay is a good reminder that until everyone is free to participate in the polis, there is no freedom. Given Arendt's criteria, we can look at places with rigid lockdowns and confirm that we are not free, that there is no freedom.

It is free to choose to choose the objects of its desire. — Tobias

The will does the enacting, but is it responsible for the choosing? I take Arendt's point to be the somewhat pedantic one that choosing is not an act of will but rather that willing is the enactment of the choice. Perhaps we should talk of free choice rather than free will. In any case we are in agreement that the notion of free will is problematic.

This is part pointing out that "thought makes freedom disappear"; and that I take as part of an overall argument that the sort of internal freedom of the individual is incongruous, since it is missing the social arena in which to enact its choices.

It's not too dissimilar a point to Sartre, in that the fact remains that our choices are governed by nothing, not by thought nor by will, but by what she somewhat enigmatically calls the "principle"...

For, unlike the judgment of the intellect which precedes action, and unlike the command of
the will which initiates it, the inspiring principle becomes fully manifest only in the performing act itself... Men are free as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.

The principle, and hence freedom, is found, then, not in thought or in will but in action. And action occurs in the public sphere, not the private.


It does seem odd that @frank agrees with Arendt agrees, only to say that she is wrong.

Yes it can, but this assertion as a kind of motto is not worth anything. It has to provide that ground in practice. The USA in her time nominally supported freedom but there were many social groups disenfranchized even more so than now — Tobias

Yes, that's true. And as for the French Revolution, the Terror followed it, and eventually Napoleon. This suggests a community is incapable of promoting individual freedom or inclined against it by its nature, absent law--which I suppose may be deemed communal. We can't give up the law, though. But retirement beckons, so perhaps soon. Regardless, the law's certainly an expression of sovereignty, so that won't work.

Maybe Stoic "freedom" truly is what she means. There is no sovereignty for the Stoic Sage. Nobody is sovereign over the Sage; the Sage is sovereign over nobody, and this constitutes Stoic freedom.

She could have just said so.

That's not addressing the article so much as covering your ears and sceaming "She's wrong, she's wrong, she's wrong". Length is not depth.