I like her idea that evoking “freedom of consciousness”, or applying freedom to other metaphysical spaces, is irrelevant. Freedom is the prime concern of politics, of the polis, of political action, and not of inward universes. “The raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action”. — NOS4A2

Oh, yeah, I never meant to imply that some of these ideas weren't neat. I simply play the role I am committed to as a philosopher in training. I have to test these assertions before people willing to defend them, so that in the case of someone being correct and I being wrong, I can integrate that into my epistemology. And I would agree, as well. It's quite clear that human psychopathology is an ineradicable element of human nature and until we figure out how to end child abuse forever, or create medicine that can cure it as it naturally emerges, we'll need a mechanism of defense. So, in practical terms, she is correct on that aspect. Freedom HAS emerged out of politics, which is the domain one would expect it to emerge from. But, the fact of the matter is, it actually emerged - going a level down closer to the base of things- from individual humans that could conceptualize a world outside of oppression and value it. Politics is down stream from valued conceptual frameworks. Brute force tyranny is not, it is conducted by those who desire freedom for themselves- there's freedom again see, that? - without regards to human ability and production that the recognition of sovereign boundaries not only induces, but is required for the domain of freedom to exist. The domain of freedom being where individuals congregate with the tacit recognition of the sovereignty of the individuals within said domain, and each individual has to individually value it, or it breaks down immediately in favor of brute force.

For Arendt, politics and freedom are intimately linked. She gives a better account of freedom in her The Promise of Politics — NOS4A2

That's without question. Again, this falls back to human psychopathy. Humans who lack ability and recognition of sovereign boundaries between individuals, will destroy the freedom that is natural to man, if left alone to exist within the context of his evolutionarily derived domain of existence. Thus, humans have to have a mechanism to repel said force. Now, that actually doesn't mean politics is required, there may be other options that we as a species haven't experimented with yet. But, she is right about the emergence of freedom as conceptual framework in tandem with politics, historically.

but he is not one whit freer.

Yes, he is. He is not inhibited in any comparable manner to his subjects, this is just not true. It's specifically for this freedom that warlords assert themselves as rulers by brute for and suspicion.

He too moves in a sphere in which there is no freedom whatever.

Yes, uninhibted by legions of men while his subjects are forced to relinquish their labor earnings, and toil away in an immobile caste, or be sent of to die in war that King has no obligation to fight himself. This is simply just irrational. You wouldn't apply this same metric to Mercantilist robber Barons and the lords that gave them Charter, it's completely mental.

At the very least her essay is a good reminder that until everyone is free to participate in the polis, there is no freedom. — NOS4A2

No, true freedom comes when I'm not required to participate in the polis, and my will can thereby emerge without restriction, in accordance with the recgnition of the sovereign boundaries of others. The polis is the monopoly on force, it is the destroyer of the freedom intrinsic to your being, and of the will, it's what has always been doing so and has been used by Arendt to define freedom in relation to the application of said force To desire the gun of the polis, is to desire the power to destroy freedom that the brute lords wielded, it's a self-destructive position.

Given Arendt's criteria, we can look at places with rigid lockdowns and confirm that we are not free, that there is no freedom. — NOS4A2

My exact point. The polis (the state, political power) is the destroyer of freedom, not its guarantor. Hell, I could rest my case here...

That's not addressing the article so much as covering your ears and sceaming "She's wrong, she's wrong, she's wrong". Length is not depth. — Banno

Hey, this isn't an argument, and as you've simply insulted me again, instead of telling me what is awry in my assessment, or even telling me which assessment you're critiquing, I'm forced to conclude that you are either unable to, or afraid to because you've come to a determination on something that you don't want challenged to the point of possibly dismissing it.

Reading Arendt is not like being led through an argument so much as inundated by it.
— Banno

That's well put. I wish I had thought of it. — Ciceronianus

I still have images of the Tongan Tsunami in my head.

Yes, it seems we owe free will to the Church Fathers. That in itself was worth the price of admission.

Mmmmm. Laphroaig. It's so smokey. — Ciceronianus

Well, if you can contrive to turn up at the same time as @Tobias, perhaps he will allow us to make a night of it.

You can oppress your own will. Like that of others. — Dijkgraf

No, you can't. The term will encompasses the sum total of human thought and action. And where as thought and action are controlled by the brain, and the brain is part of the body and not separate, it does not follow that the brain can oppress itself, only express itself based on a hierarchy of values and desires that are organized into action. In other words the will and "you," as you say, are the same expression of the brain.

This can help put things into perspective: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2017.00431/full

No, you can't — Garrett Travers

If I want to go left I can say no and go right. I can even build a wall to keep myself from entering left in my noctambule nights.

And where as thought and action are controlled by the brain — Garrett Travers

The brain controls nothing. Thoughts just appear. You can't control your thoughts.

If I want to go left I can say no and go right. I can even build a wall to keep myself from entering left in my noctambule nights. — Dijkgraf

And in which case you will not be oppressing your will, but fulfilling it. The control center responsible for pattern processing and executive functions, is part of a system called the emotion processing network of the brain. The pre frontal cortex is the center that gives you self perception, and the illusion that you and your will are separate. When in reality, the same pre frontal cortex is responsible for governing and organizing all non-executive functions in the same network. Meaning, they're all the same system that express the sum total of your actions and thoughts, or will. You can only fulfill your will, you can't oppress it. But, pattern processing and executive function allows for the adoption of values, and the more coherent the values are, the more the are going to override basic desires. You might think of people who all of a sudden come to Jesus and stop drinking and other unwholesome behaviors as an example of what I'm talking about. .

The brain controls nothing. Thoughts just appear. You can't control your thoughts. — Dijkgraf

I don't know what to say to this.

For me the issue is undecidable as well and therefore interesting — Tobias

Right, I don't say that there has been no point exploring thinking about free will vs determinism; it's just that the topic has been so thoroughly explored, done to death, so to speak, that I doubt we could come up with any new ideas on the issue.

Sartre, as you say, in thinking the self as 'no-thing' posits absolute freedom of the will. But the self is subject, if to nothing else, then at least to the constraints of nature. In any case, it seems obvious to me that selves are subject to all kinds of psychological, cultural, social and political constraints.

It does not, however, address how to develop the means to go forward as a way of life. — Paine

In the text following that quote Arendt shows the will to be incompatible with the political space, for what one wills is subject to change, yet the political space is one bound by agreement. The will is "non-political or even anti-political".

(Ah, I see you address this further down the page)

Hence,

Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the phi- losophical equation of freedom and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human freedom namely, if it is realized that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only at the price of the freedom, Le., the sovereignty, of all others.

This, it seems to me, is by way of articulating the antisocial consequences of what has been revealed as the Christian notion of free will.

This, it seems to me, is by way of articulating the antisocial consequences of what has been revealed as the Christian notion of free will. — Banno

This is nonsense. "Do unto others..." etc., and in Christian morality, one is to be held accountable for their acts; both by society and by God.

you've simply insulted me again... — Garrett Travers

Yes, but your posts have improved markedly; perhaps my misbehaviour had an impact.

The principle, and hence freedom, is found, then, not in thought or in will but in action. And action occurs in the public sphere, not the private.

It does seem odd that frank agrees with Arendt agrees, only to say that she is wrong. — Banno

Interesting indeed. It was also the point nicely put by @Joshs However, than we are faced with the question why action occurs in public space but not in private. I am actually inclined to think that for Arendt freedom manifests itself in collective action, well, in individually being able to take part in collective action. Another interesting turn looms actually: the relegation of the private sphere. She accepts that apparently without any hesitation. I have the idea though that currently this notion is being critiqued (though I do not know enough of the subject).

This suggests a community is incapable of promoting individual freedom or inclined against it by its nature, absent law--which I suppose may be deemed communal. We can't give up the law, though. But retirement beckons, so perhaps soon. Regardless, the law's certainly an expression of sovereignty, so that won't work. — Ciceronianus

By its nature, or perhaps, by the way we have bundled together ideas of community, sovereignty and freedom as Arendt suggests. However, that for me is also perhaps a tad overestimating the power of philosophy and conceptualization. It is a bit of an empirical question, how are communities that followed a different trajectory of development doing in terms of allowing everyone a place?

Law is an expression of sovereignty but also a relinquishing of it. The state also binds itself by law. However, I agree with you that sovereignty is central to law. Maybe legal anthropology is of help here. I do know that a lot of sociologists of law question the centrality of the state for law, following John Griffith. However I tend to hold on to a more classical centralized conception as well. How Arendt conceives of law I do not know. She certainly uses the discourse of rights, which according to me are also an expression of sovereignty... A lot of rethinking to do before you may retire Ciceronianus ;)

In the text following that quote Arendt shows the will to be incompatible with the political space, for what one wills is subject to change, yet the political space is one bound by agreement. The will is "non-political or even anti-political". — Banno

Well, again, values inform the will. As pattern processing mamals with executive function, we have the capacity to store concepts in memory to build coherent systems of value that inform behavior in a manner that often supercedes basic desires, or subconscious computation. This includes political values. The problem with political values, is that they are enforced by a one-way barrel. The only way that I see that will is compatible with politics, is the mutual respect for sovereign boundaries, enforced by a one-way-barrel. Meaning, the one thing that won't be dismissed as a political framework, is freedom itself. Which freedom doesn't encompass humans who are actively violating the freedoms of others, which is the issue, not changing will. But, the gun is seductive and the desire therein informs behavior of the looters.

And Arendt doesn't show the incompatibility in that passage, she simply asserts it without justification.

Yes, but your posts have improved markedly; perhaps my misbehaviour had an impact. — Banno

No, you're just growing less mad that I'm easily dismissing the arguments of this philosopher. I'm pleased to say that I'm looking forward to you finally presenting an argument here soon, now that you're cooling down.

Well, if you can contrive to turn up at the same time as Tobias, perhaps he will allow us to make a night of it. — Banno

That would be a truly joyous occasion! Talks and drinks... smokey, non-smokey... smooth and sharp...

The idea of self-control as not being ruled by external or internal compulsion is more of a Stoic idea.
That difference is the point of Arendt saying:

Yet the Augustinian solitude of "hot contention" within the soul itself was utterly unknown, for the fight in which he had become engaged was not between reason and passion, between understanding and Thumos, that is, between two different human faculties, but it was a conflict within the will itself. And this duality within the self-same faculty had been known as the characteristic of thought, as the dialogue which I hold with myself. In other words, the two-in-one of solitude which sets the thought process into motion has the exactly opposite effect on the will: it paralyzes and locks it within itself; willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and not to will at the same time. — Paine

This is a good indication as to why Arendt is dealing with a faulty description of "will". It leads to contradiction in the description of the self-same thing, in the form of the "duality within the self-same faculty". This is why "will" needs to be defined as distinct from those other basic capacities, like desire and reason, so Augustine proposed a tripartite mind, as memory, understanding (reason), and will.

The ironic, or seemingly paradoxical thing about the will is that it is not necessarily free, we must will it to be free, by making freedom of will a principle which we choose to follow. That is because by its very nature it is not bound by necessity, so we cannot propose a principle such as "free", and claim that the will is necessarily such, that would be self-defeating.

And in which case you will not be oppressing your will, but fulfilling it. — Garrett Travers

Of course not. If I want to go left and force myself not to go left but go right, I fulfill my free will-not. I don't want to go right. I go though. The fact that I go right doesn't mean I want to.

This is a good indication as to why Arendt is dealing with a faulty description of "will". It leads to contradiction in the description of the self-same thing, in the form of the "duality within the self-same faculty". This is why "will" needs to be defined as distinct from those other basic capacities, like desire and reason, so Augustine proposed a tripartite mind, as memory, understanding (reason), and will. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is exactly right. These assertions from Arendt are being informed by outdated notions of will and freedom, across multiple philosophical interpretations, without the context of modern neuroscience. Will is the content of individual human thought and action, no separation. Self perception and concept integration is governed by the same neural structure as all of the emotional centers of the brain, which in symphony result in action and thought. The only scientifically consistent view of will that encompasses all of the previously understood ideas, as well as provides a clear understanding in our current time, I have asserted here on this thread: The will is the sum total of all individual human action and thought, the emergent expression of the content of the information the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process. Nobody has addressed this in this thread.

the will is that it is not necessarily free, we must will it to be free, by making freedom of will a principle which we choose to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

For the will to not necessarily be free, you will have to describe an instance where the brain is not in operation, integrating data, processessing stimuli, recalling memories of interest or value, regulating the body's core structure, organizing emotion, processing patterns for recognition, formulating values, anticipating threats, etc. The will is quite literally everything that the brain uses to contribute to cognition and action.

Meaning, freedom of will is going to be the natural state of the brain, without the trauma requisite to make it stop being applied. Thus, the principle to be integrated is freedom from the application of interpersonal force, or otherwise uninvited interference with the will's natural and independent expression.

Of course not. If I want to go left and force myself not to go left but go right, I fulfill my free will-not. I don't want to go right. I go though. — Dijkgraf

If you do not want to go right, you will not do so, unless a separate desire is presented that would have you go right that supercedes the previous desire, which will correspond to your internal hierarchy of values. In which case you'd be fulfilling your desire, and that expression is an expression of your will. If you tell me you can go left as a demostration, you will be doing so out of a desire to demonstrate. The freedom of your will is me not interfering with you during the demostration. Your will is the expression of your desire to demonstrate.

It's the same as someone forcing me. I don't want to jump in the fire, but if they make, there is little I can do. They can be them or myself. I jump against my will without any need to demonstrate, as you claim I do.

It's the same as someone forcing me. I don't want to jump in the fire, but if they make, there is little I can do. They can be them or myself. I jump against my will without any need to demonstrate, as you claim I do. — Dijkgraf

So, if someone is forcing you to do something, your internal hierarchy of values will reorient your desire to initiate behavior which is, in accordance with your intelligence, likely to achieve the best outcome. In other words, life threatening situations cause a disruption in the natural process of will expression. You will only jump into the fire if you see absolutely no alternative, then and only then, if you value your life.

You will only jump into the fire if you see absolutely no alternative, then and only then, if you value your life. — Garrett Travers

If they push me I don't have a free will. Likewise, I can be obsessed by internal voices who make me do things against my will. If I jump but don't want to it's by definition against my free will.

modern cognitive neuroscience is out pacing this definition itself, by describing to us what the brain does. And what it does is complex maintenance of activity in the form of thought, emotion, and action (will) at all times, with the prefrontal cortex acting as the control center, and is connected to the entire neural, and emotional processing networks of the body. Meaning, the will (sum total of all individual human action) is never in a state of inactivity, outside of trauma induced inactivity. — Garrett Travers

The pre-frontal cortex has been described as a ‘control center’, the executor of actions, but this a misnomer. It receives inputs from the rest of the brain , the body and the environment and forms expectations and anticipations in order to interpret this input as something recognizable, but is at the same time affected and altered by these inputs. So its decisions are not purely pre-figured by its prior state, as if it already knew what it wanted to will. Rather , we FIND ourselves willing or deciding. The distinction here is that there is no purely logical connection between the desire or thought that occurs to us and the ‘us’ that exists just prior to what pops into our head. Just as you say, the brain is never in a state of inactivity. Its activity is continually transforming the basis of its actions and thinking. The rational basis on which its decisions are being made is shifting its ground in spite of itself. This is why to will is always in some respect to be surprised by what one wills. This I think comes close to what Arendt means when she says action precedes rational deliberation.

This is why "will" needs to be defined as distinct from those other basic capacities, like desire and reason, so Augustine proposed a tripartite mind, as memory, understanding (reason), and will. — Metaphysician Undercover

The quote I gave earlier does employ the language you object to:

The will, however, commits sin when it turns away from immutable and common goods, toward its private good, either something external to itself or lower than itself. It turns to its own private good when it desires to be its own master; it turns to external goods when it busies itself with the private affairs of others or with whatever is none of its concern; it turns to goods lower than itself when it loves the pleasures of the body. Thus a man becomes proud, meddlesome, and lustful; he is caught up in another life which, when compared to the higher one, is death. — St. Augustine, book 2, 19, translated by Benjamin and Hackstaff

Your inclination to not have the same faculty at odds with itself certainly echoes a sensibility evident in the Greek philosophical tradition. The matter of sin being a choice between two possible lives is the source of the duality involved here. Otherwise, there is no choice.

I don't know what to say to this. — Garrett Travers

It's you who uses the brain. You can move yourself because of it, think thoughts and feel feelings, or perceive the world in sound and vision. It controls bodily functions for you, but how can you control a thought? You cannot think what you want, because the moment you know what you wanna think you already think it.

If they push me I don't have a free will. Likewise, I can be obsessed by internal voices who make me do things against my will. If I jump but don't want to it's by definition against my free will. — Dijkgraf

That's specifically my point. Will is free and perpetually in operation unless force, or trauma is applied. Those internal voices are your voices, the voices of competing desires, interests, memories, and values being organized by the brain in the hierarchy.

Those internal voices are your voices — Garrett Travers

I don't think so. Just like the Moon isn't mine, neither are the thoughts I experience or the dreams I have. The inner world is as distant from me as the world around me.

This, it seems to me, is by way of articulating the antisocial consequences of what has been revealed as the Christian notion of free will. — Banno

Strictly speaking, Arendt is giving a genealogy of the way political ideas about freedom became equated with free will. It is the equation she is militating against. The objective is not to give the last word on free will, Christian or otherwise. Her intention is to uncover a big mistake and move on with the problems of meaningful politics after correcting it.

It's you who uses the brain. You can move yourself because of it, think thoughts and feel feelings, or perceive the world in sound and vision. It controls bodily functions for you, but how can you control a thought? You cannot think what you want, because the moment you know what you wanna think you already think it. — Dijkgraf

No, you have only the control allotted to you through executive function by the pre frontal cortex. Most of your motion is subconscious, thoughts are predominantly not controlled but can be influenced through executive function. Thought emergence has latency as far as perception of it, but it is informed by memory, sensory receptive field expansion, things of that nature that help inform chains of thought that lead one from another.