Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm
Following Kant, we obviously construct the phenomenal world we know out of the noumenal world in some way - presumably from the sensations which present themselves to our consciousness. Is there any simple way of describing how this is might be understood to actually work? — Tom Storm
In describing the noumenal world (which we do not know in any way) Kant seems to be saying that there is a real world (the world therefore is not entirely a product of our minds) but we are unable to perceive it directly. — Tom Storm
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearance. — Schopenhauer
Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form — Tom Storm
I think so, if at the same time it's understood to be his model for his world. In a manner akin to how Newton is understood. But before going even that far, in order to judge Kant, you have to read him and understand what you're reading. Much is said about the difficulty of reading Kant, but it mostly just is not that difficult, period (at least in good translation). Far too many people in effect say, "I don't understand it, therefore I must be right and Kant wrong." Except that most do not admit that they do not understand, but instead claim that they do while at the same time giving clear evidence that they do not. Strange when Kant was in his lifetime regarded as a giant, and still is.Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood.... — Tom Storm
Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm
"Might be understood"? Sure, Kant's way. "Actually"? Do you mean how the brain works? I think not, and maybe never. Or do you mean is there some Intro. to Phil. 101 way to understand it? Maybe, as with the tree, what actually of or from the tree is incident on you that enables - or constitutes ground - for you to even suppose that you "see" it?Is there any simple way of describing how this is might be understood to actually work? — Tom Storm
"Direct" feedback? What exactly does that mean? And of course by "dying" do you mean something other from and different from living? And to be sure, you can "take" whatever you like, but for present relevance your take must accord with Kant. On my reading, nothing "direct" from the noumenal world but that is not first kneaded and baked into a perception, and perception is all you get, from the noumenal world.Could dying then be taken as an example of receiving direct feedback from the noumenal world? — Tom Storm
Incidentally I'm puzzled by Kant's attitude to the noumenal. — Wayfarer
whether 'the noumena' and 'things in themselves' really are synonymous - this is one of the things Schopenhauer criticized, saying he used both terms inconsistently. — Wayfarer
Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm
Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.
I am trying to understand an essential difference between Kant's version of idealism and versions of idealism which came before him. Berkeley would be the most prominent example for my purposes. — Tom Storm
No. The noumenal world, according to Kant, transcends both (the forms of) space & time. So, again, it can’t be, in any sense of the word, “physical” like a wave; because, although waves may be incapable of being pinned-down to a point, they nevertheless extend through multiple points in space. Thus the word “physical” isn’t superfluous, as in it being unnecessary due to redundancy, but it’s altogether illegitimate when speaking of noumena in Kantianism.Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm
To be clear, we don’t construct the phenomenal world out of the noumenal world, according to Kant; that is, noumena aren’t themselves the materials, i.e., the “matter” of appearances, that compose the phenomenal world. All of this is done/works by representing, or arranging under certain relations, such materials with respect to the a-priori forms of the sensibility & the understanding, i.e., with respect to space & time & the categories.Following Kant, we obviously construct the phenomenal world we know out of the noumenal world in some way - presumably from the sensations which present themselves to our consciousness. Is there any simple way of describing how this is might be understood to actually work? — Tom Storm
Whether in this life, or the hereafter, Kant maintains that we can never have any kind of experience of noumena or things-in-themselves.Could dying then be taken as an example of receiving direct feedback from the noumenal world? — Tom Storm
... & so he’d style himself to be (no offense, but you’d have to be unfamiliar with both of their philosophies in order to say something like that). Yet, I’m interested, how do you figure?... Arthur Schopenhauer... (and who IMO is, ..., a much more consistent, lucid, 'Kantian' than Kant himself). — 180 Proof
If the pure forms & the pure concepts are possessed a-priori, then how can then the brain, which we experience a-posteriori to occupy space, be their subject? Surely the subject of the pure forms & concepts can’t be derived from, or inhere in, what’s experienced to occupy space a-posteriori; since it’s the very condition of such a thing. To equate the brain with the subject of the pure forms & concepts, by which the phenomenal world is constructed, is a misrepresentation or distortion of Kant’s philosophy.(That's what your fantastically elaborated hominid brain does with all that processing power. It creates a world, the only one you'll ever know.) — Wayfarer
"Direct" feedback? What exactly does that mean? And of course by "dying" do you mean something other from and different from living? — tim wood
End game: in Kant, there is no such thing as a noumenal world, as far as the human cognitive system is concerned. If there is one, merely from logical non-contradiction, our system does not admit the possibility of the experience of its constituency. — Mww
the distinction he makes is between 'things as they appear to us' - as phenomena - and 'as they are in themselves' (the infamous ding an sich) which is often equated with the noumena. However opinion is divided as to whether 'the noumena' and 'things in themselves' really are synonymous - this is one of the things Schopenhauer criticized, saying he used both terms inconsistently. — Wayfarer
Apologies, no idea what you were saying - when 'spacetime' enters a reply I generally experience a collapse of my wave function.. — Tom Storm
You're certainly entitled to that "opinon".Schopenhauer is so inferior to Kant ... — Mental Forms
What I need is a basic primer that articulates this in summary. — Tom Storm
To equate the brain with the subject of the pure forms & concepts, by which the phenomenal world is constructed, is a misrepresentation or distortion of Kant’s philosophy. — Mental Forms
The distinction he makes is between 'things as they appear to us' - as phenomena - and 'as they are in themselves' (the infamous ding an sich) which is often equated with the noumena. However opinion is divided as to whether 'the noumena' and 'things in themselves' really are synonymous - this is one of the things Schopenhauer criticized, saying he used both terms inconsistently. — Wayfarer
The Greek word νοούμενoν nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν noeîn "to think, to mean", which in turn originates from the word νοῦς noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος nóos[a] "perception, understanding, mind."[3][4] A rough equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".
Regarding the equivalent concepts in Plato, Ted Honderich writes: "Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumena, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses... This dichotomy is the most characteristic feature of Plato's dualism; that noumena and the noumenal world are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy."
.'...we may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessary claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined by nature, nor by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual I.'
:up:Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant in this, is that in calling the noumenal "things in themselves" he contradicts his denial that they could be spatio-temporal entities, since there can be no "things" without difference and no difference without spatial and temporal separation. — Janus
On the other hand, asking about a noumenal world in general presupposes it, in which case the ask becomes....can the physical forms of noumena be understood. Now the answer is incomprehensible, insofar as only real physical objects which affect the senses can be intuited, and these, being phenomena, as arrangement or synthesis of object matter into a logical form, are for that reason, not noumena but actual objects of knowledge. It is quite absurd, and mutually destructive, to attempt the cognition, and thereby the experience of two entirely different kinds of worlds at the same time under the same conditions. — Mww
But in Buddhism that is elaborated through meditation which is a discipline of getting direct insight into the way the mind constructs the world. — Wayfarer
The Tao is called "non-being" and the multiplicity is called "being." It can't be conceptualized. It can't be spoken. Conceptualizing it is what turns the one into a multiplicity. — T Clark
But in Buddhism that is elaborated through meditation which is a discipline of getting direct insight into the way the mind constructs the world.
— Wayfarer
I had never thought of it in those terms, but it has the ring of truth. — T Clark
That's what I linked the Westacott article for. I know Kant is a lot of f****ing reading but that article is about 2,200 words and an excellent primer, by a philosophy prof. (If you want, here's a decent edition of the entire Critique of Pure Reason.) — Wayfarer
To simplify, the Tao is what there was before there were people to see it and talk about it. But of course, that's not right, because, to Lao Tzu, before oneness was divided into a multiplicity, those things in a sense didn't exist. — T Clark
“It is indeed even then inconceivable how the intuition of a present thing should make me know a thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation.” — Mental Forms
One of Kant's key insights is that we're not the passive recipients of sensations but knowledge is in part constituted by a priori or transcendental factors (contributed by the mind itself) imposed upon the data of experience 1. — Wayfarer
One of Kant's key insights is that we're not the passive recipients of sensations but knowledge is in part constituted by a priori or transcendental factors (contributed by the mind itself) imposed upon the data of experience — Wayfarer
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