Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant in this, is that in calling the noumenal "things in themselves" he contradicts his denial that they could be spatio-temporal entities, since there can be no "things" without difference and no difference without spatial and temporal separation. — Janus
On the other hand, it's clear our minds are not blank slates. — T Clark
Kant’s crucial insight here is to argue that experience of a world as we have it is only possible if the mind provides a systematic structuring of its representations. This structuring is below the level of, or logically prior to, the mental representations that the Empiricists and Rationalists analyzed. ' — Wayfarer
Following Kant, we obviously construct the phenomenal world we know out of the noumenal world in some way - presumably from the sensations which present themselves to our consciousness. — Tom Storm
"The concept of noumenon is, therefore, only a limiting concept, and intended to keep claims of sensibility within proper bounds, and is therefore only of negative use. But it is not mere arbitrary fiction; rather, it is closely connected with the limitation of sensibility, though incapable of positing anything positive outside the sphere of sensibility." — I like sushi
In short there is no noumenon other than the concept used in relation to phenomenon applicable ONLY in a negative sense. — I like sushi
I cannot do much better than that without writing a helluva lot more ... I don't want to right now, so hope that gives you food for thought at least. — I like sushi
"On a different view, the distinction merely reflects Kant's understanding that all knowledge is knowledge from a standpoint, so the noumenal is the fraudulent idea of that which would be apprehended by a being with no point of view." ~ Ency. Brittanica — Tom Storm
The Greek word nooúmenon (plural nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν noeîn "to think, to mean", which in turn originates from the word noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος nóos[a] "perception, understanding, mind."[3][4] A rough equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".
Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.
Gödel was a mathematical realist, a Platonist. He believed that what makes mathematics true is that it's descriptive—not of empirical reality, of course, but of an abstract reality. Mathematical intuition is something analogous to a kind of sense perception. — Rebecca Goldstein
The Tao is called "non-being" and the multiplicity is called "being." It can't be conceptualized. It can't be spoken. Conceptualizing it is what turns the one into a multiplicity. — T Clark
But I'm happy to keep looking into it. Is there a specific reference in the Tao you can point to that resonates with any aspect of Kant, or are you talking more in terms of tone of the work itself? — Tom Storm
The Tao is called "non-being" and the multiplicity is called "being." It can't be conceptualized. It can't be spoken. Conceptualizing it is what turns the one into a multiplicity.
— T Clark
I can see some parallels here. Noumena are non-being; it is itself a conception but cannot be conceptualized, which is to say there are no schema represented under it. For that reason, while noumena can be spoken, it is nevertheless, empty, content-less, hence cannot ever be a multiplicity.
Reflecting this on Kantian methodology, which makes explicit all humans reason exactly the same way, does not mean human reason is the only way to know the world, which at least makes room for the logical possibility of noumenal worlds. Understanding “...takes for granted....” the possibility of the logical form, but it is pure reason alone that prevents population of the form by its schema. — Mww
The difference is that Kant is also bound by the pre-Darwinian Western notion that humanity is in a sense ‘super-natural’, so while Laozi strives to include humanity within both his schema and the Tao, Kant cannot but position humanity outside of the noumena, as an entity in relation to it, and to his schema. I think this is evident in a reliance on the ‘object’ in his third critique. — Possibility
We cannot talk of, or about, a 'thing' that we're at base level incapable of experiencing. It is not an it, it has no 'thinghood'.
Our world, our entire world, is phenomenon. Noumenon in a positive sense isn't anything we have any relation to and as we are here talking about 'noumenon' it is only in the negative sense as a marker for the limitation of our sensible experience (sensible in the terms of how Kant uses the term 'sensible' ... experienced).
If there was noumenon then we wouldn't be able to refer to it or articulate it in any form. Think about it a little. The thing-in-itself cannot be referred to on those terms in any way that makes any sense. It is only our habit of inferring that leads to the belief in some 'otherness' that is beyond our realms of comprehension ... but if some said item is beyond our realm of comprehension then our merely stating the possibility of some item is referring to some item and that is contrary to the said item being 'beyond comprehension'.
We can talk of a square circle and conjure up some image merely by stating it. Stating something gives it authority even though it is a construct based on experience. — I like sushi
We cannot talk of, or about, a 'thing' that we're at base level incapable of experiencing. It is not an it, it has no 'thinghood'.
Our world, our entire world, is phenomenon. Noumenon in a positive sense isn't anything we have any relation to and as we are here talking about 'noumenon' it is only in the negative sense as a marker for the limitation of our sensible experience (sensible in the terms of how Kant uses the term 'sensible' ... experienced).
If there was noumenon then we wouldn't be able to refer to it or articulate it in any form. Think about it a little. The thing-in-itself cannot be referred to on those terms in any way that makes any sense. It is only our habit of inferring that leads to the belief in some 'otherness' that is beyond our realms of comprehension ... but if some said item is beyond our realm of comprehension then our merely stating the possibility of some item is referring to some item and that is contrary to the said item being 'beyond comprehension'. — I like sushi
So the 'noumenal object' is not something unknowable - rather it is the idea or principle of the object as perceived by nous. The idea is the form of the particular, determining its identity. I can't see how that is represented in Kant, though. I'm hoping to glean the answer from the Pollok book I mentioned. — Wayfarer
Kant Bxxvi-xxvii...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.
Baby's are born with a priori knowledge. If born blank knowledge gathering can't even start. — Dijkgraf
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