Antinatalism and the harmfulness of death

Agent Smith

Agreed, but you and Agent Smith started it. — T Clark

Are you accusing @Bartricks & me of being prime movers? :blush: I thought there could be only one prime mover! Bartricks, please finish what you started! :grin:

As for antinatalism, I still think it's the most reasonable policy to adopt given the circumstances we're in (overpopulation is an existential threat to humanity: sacrifice the few to save the many is one way out of the mess). If you disagree, it can only mean you want the annihilation of the human race in the most horrible way possible: not only do we end up dying in droves, but we also lose our humanity. Just saying. Convince me otherwise (if you so wish).

Existential Hope

↪Agent Smith

Many ways of losing it, some more subtle than others. Beginnings and endings are perpetual, but I hope that good ones are preferred.

In general, I do think that thoughtlessly creating beings without resolving some of our fundamental issues wouldn't be a good idea. In light of this, it would be better for people to not have children in circumstances where the outcome is likely to be a negative one.

Dijkgraf

Are you accusing Bartricks & me of being prime movers? :blush: — Agent Smith

:rofl:

pfirefry

It seems clear that death is inevitable for anyone living here. And it seems equally clear that death is a considerable harm. Our reason tells us to do virtually anything to avoid it. If avoiding it means sawing your arm off, reason recommends doing that. — Bartricks

This is true. Our reasons tell us to do virtually anything to avoid death. You're suggesting that we should listen to our reasons. That's what we do. Our reasons also tell us that procreation in spite of death is still better than no procreation at all. Although your argument is carefully crafted, our reasons still tell us that we should procreate. Your argument heavily relies on us trusting our reason. This makes it hard for you to argue that we should stop listening to the reason that tells us to procreate in spite of death.

Here are some of the obvious objections to the OP:

The only reason death is harmful is because life is sacred. Even a short period of miserable life is more valuable than instant death. This means that procreation creates more value than harm.
Although death is harmful, there are no reasons to believe that the harm of death outweighs the value of life. It's not clear why someone living and dying would leave the world in a worse state than if the person never existed.
As much as death is harmful for an individual, it is even more harmful for a species. If we have a choice between dying as a species and procreating, our reason tells us that we should avoid the death of species. It is more harmful to inflict death on humanity by not procreating than to procreate.

I think there are better arguments for antinatalism than the harm of death. I would expect them to be about the misery of life. If life is generally miserable and meaningless, then it doesn't make sense to bring new people to it. But if life is great and only death is harmful, then it's not clear why the immanence of death would necessarily outweigh the benefits of life.

Agent Smith

In general, I do think that thoughtlessly creating beings without resolving some of our fundamental issues wouldn't be a good idea — DA671

I'm very pleased that you understand the antinatalist position.

Part of the problem is that we need to be able to predict the future (coincidentally a message on my TikTok read "Can you predict what this is?"). Is the graph pointing up or down? What are we measuring anyway?

Existential Hope

↪Agent Smith

Indeed:) Acceptance will of course vary, but pertinent points of shared concern remain and need to be addressed by all.

The future can be more or less certain. I do think that there have been many goods throughout the past (and the avoidance of certain negative predictions, such as the ones made by Malthus) that can give reason for hope. However, considering that climate change and growing income disparity won't be fixed tomorrow, it surely makes more sense to think twice before taking the plunge and making a choice that won't be conducive to the welfare of people.

Guess I'll have to try out Tiktok now ;)

T Clark

As for antinatalism, I still think it's the most reasonable policy — Agent Smith

I have no problem with that, although I disagree.

you want the annihilation of the human race in the most horrible way possible: — Agent Smith

This - smug, self-righteous, self-serving, unsupported - is what makes me want to kick you and Bartricks down the street. Let's leave it at that.

Bartricks

↪Down The Rabbit Hole

Which premise are you disputing? Note, no premise mentions evolution or our beliefs.

I take it you are attempting to challenge 1 by arguing that as we can give an evolutionary story about how we might have come to 'believe'that we have reason to avoid dying, we do not in fact have reason to avoid dying. If that is your argument, it proves too much, for presumably there is an evolutionary story to be told about all of our beliefs - are you arguing that all our beliefs are false? (Including that one).

So your argument is actually - we have no reason to believe or do anything. As well as being obviously indefensible and itself unbelievable, it applies to any argument for anything. So, it is silly. You haven't engaged with my argument so much as rejected the whole project of arguing for anything. If that's what you are reduced to doing, then my argument is very strong.

Down The Rabbit Hole

↪Bartricks

I take it you are attempting to challenge 1 by arguing that as we can give an evolutionary story about how we might have come to 'believe'that we have reason to avoid dying, we do not in fact have reason to avoid dying. — Bartricks

No, I think there are reasons to avoid dying. I am arguing against trusting our feeling that it is self-evidently true that we should avoid dying - this feeling is at least as likely to be evolutionary programming as anything meaningful.

So your argument is actually - we have no reason to believe or do anything. As well as being obviously indefensible and itself unbelievable, it applies to any argument for anything. So, it is silly. You haven't engaged with my argument so much as rejected the whole project of arguing for anything. If that's what you are reduced to doing, then my argument is very strong. — Bartricks

Only stuff we believe to be self-evidently true is untrustworthy. Our urge to reproduce is a good example - except you didn't fall for that one.

Bartricks

↪Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, which premise are you disputing? You have just said you do think there are reasons to avoid dying - so which premise are you denying? You don't seem to have a stable or cogent criticism

Bartricks

↪pfirefry

I addressed the possibility that death is harmful because of what it deprives us of and provided an apparent decisive refutation of it. Death is clearly something we have reason to avoid even when our lives are slightly miserable. Death under those circumstances would not deprive you of anything worth having. Thus its disvalue is not reflective of the positive value of life. Similarly, when in unending agony, we have reason to die - yet death is still the lesser of two evils under such circumstances. Still bad, then. Yet it deprives one of nothing worth having - far from it.. So it is plainly implausible that the disvalue of death is a function of the value of life. Even when life here ceases to report a benefit profit, it remains rational to avoid death up until the harms of continued living become immense.

I used an analogy of a loss making company. If the company - life plc - is recording a slight loss, year on year, you'd think it'd make sense to wind it up immediately. But your accountant tells you that that's not a good idea at all and that it is best to keep it running at a loss and only to wind it up if the losses become huge. What gives? What would be the rational inference to make? Surely that winding the company up will itself incur huge costs, - losses far greater than the losses you incur by keeping it running.

That's what our reason says about us - the implication is that death itself is immensely harmful, so much so that it never makes sense to wind your life up until or unless continuing it will incur huge costs.

pfirefry

↪Bartricks

Sorry, I'm not really following your argument. It seems to me that you have a small confusion about how things work, which leads you to arrive at great clams about antinatalism. It's not that the claims that you're making are illogical, but that the ground of the claims is a little shaky. I cannot point exactly at the gaps, but I'll share my thoughts.

I addressed the possibility that death is harmful because of what it deprives us of and provided an apparent decisive refutation of it. — Bartricks

I'm not sure what comments you're referring to. This thread has 6 pages. Although I tried to keep up and scrolled through all the pages, I cannot quickly tell what you're referring to. That's fine, because I think you're reiterating the refutation later in the same paragraph. I'll try to address them.

Reveal

Death is clearly something we have reason to avoid even when our lives are slightly miserable. — Bartricks

Do you mean that our lives are slightly miserable in the moment, or do you mean in general? When I feel miserable, I have to remind myself that the feeling is temporary, and that there will be times in my life when I'll feel great. Why do we want to help people stuck in depression and having suicidal thoughts? Because we believe that this emotional state is temporary and it can be changed drastically given enough time and support.

Death under those circumstances would not deprive you of anything worth having — Bartricks

I don't see how this follows. If I'm feeling slightly miserable, I won't accept death as an answer, because it would deprive me of lots of things worth having in the future. I also anticipate that the time will come when I would like to choose death using rational thinking and not being influenced by an emotional state. I'd like to have personal freedom to make this choice. But I'm just speaking for myself. I wouldn't want other people to die, and I'm sure other people wouldn't want me to choose death. I'm talking about this choice as a matter of personal preference, because in the context of society there are lots of legal and bureaucratic pitfalls that hardly make it possible for society to function in the presence of this choice. Therefore, the topic of wilful death becomes a taboo.

Thus its disvalue is not reflective of the positive value of life — Bartricks

Sorry, I cannot understand this statement. It's a bit hard for me to absorb. I'll move on.

Similarly, when in unending agony, we have reason to die - yet death is still the lesser of two evils under such circumstances — Bartricks

So you're saying that death is the lesser of two evils? Which means that death is the best outcome, doesn't it? When life is an unending agony, then death deprives one of nothing worth having. But if we're slightly miserable, then there is a hope for a better life. In which case, death is a bad outcome because it would deprive us of a hope for a better life. Isn't it true? I feel that you're somehow disagreeing with what I'm saying. I'm saying that in rare circumstances when there is no hope, death is the best option, but most of the time there is enough hope to eliminate death as an option.

So it is plainly implausible that the disvalue of death is a function of the value of life — Bartricks

I'm also having hard times understanding this statement. Let me utilise the rule of double negation: implausible->plausible, disvalue->value. "It is plainly plausible that the value of death is a function of the value of life". Basically, one of the functions of the value of life is to add value to death. This should be a plausible statement. I still cannot wrap my head around it.

Even when life here ceases to report a benefit profit, it remains rational to avoid death up until the harms of continued living become immense. — Bartricks

It's a fun thing to say that life can report benefit profits. It's hard to measure the profits of life objectively. But let's say that we did this. We have a period with losses. How would this look like? Does it mean that after a year of my life I ended up more miserable than I was a year ago? Why should I care? Life goes up and down. Just the fact that sometimes it going down doesn't mean that we should end it instantly.

I used an analogy of a loss making company. If the company - life plc - is recording a slight loss, year on year, you'd think it'd make sense to wind it up immediately. But your accountant tells you that that's not a good idea at all and that it is best to keep it running at a loss and only to wind it up if the losses become huge. What gives? What would be the rational inference to make? Surely that winding the company up will itself incur huge costs, - losses far greater than the losses you incur by keeping it running. — Bartricks

That's a weird reference to make. In my life, I've read a few books about entrepreneurship and how to run a business, although I've never run one. If a company is making losses, I would expect the accountant to tell the CEO that it's not a good idea to keep it running. It's common for a company to have multiple departments, with one of them is making losses. I infer from the literature that it is the role of the CEO to make the hard decision to close that department for the benefit of the entire company.

If there in anything we can infer from this analogy, it is that procreation is profitable. Look at the investor firms. The reality they're operating in is that 9 out of 10 startups they invest in will cease to exist, along with their money. But that 1 startup that eventually flies will cover the expenses of the 9 other startups for the investor. That's why it sucks to be a CEO. Essentially, you need to cover for the failures of 9 other startups to the investors. You can demonstrate an incredible growth, but the investors will still pressure you to grow even more to compensate for all their unsuccessful investments.

That's what our reason says about us - the implication is that death itself is immensely harmful, so much so that it never makes sense to wind your life up until or unless continuing it will incur huge costs. — Bartricks

I agree. But I wouldn't make an inference that we should stop procreating. I'm assuming that the main point of antinatalism is not that death is harmful, but that we shouldn't procreate. Death is harmful in the context of a living being. It's not as harmful in the context of procreation. It is more harmful to not procreate than to procreate and to cause death by it. Our reason tells us that life worth living despite death. Otherwise, we would end our lives immediately.

Bartricks

↪pfirefry

Do you mean that our lives are slightly miserable in the moment, or do you mean in general? — pfirefry

I have said nothing about how miserable or not our lives are - clearly, some are happy and some are miserable.

The claim 'we have reason to avoid death even if our lives are slightly miserable' is not equivalent to the claim that 'our lives are slightly miserable'.

If I'm feeling slightly miserable, I won't accept death as an answer, because it would deprive me of lots of things worth having in the future. — pfirefry

No it won't. That's the example. Imagine that your life is moderately miserable and that there is no prospect of it being any better. Now, it is rational for you to kill yourself? Surely not.

How on earth does that make sense if the disvalue of death is a function of the value of the life it deprives you of? If your life is moderately miserable then you won't be deprived of anything of positive value if you die. Yet you have reason not to die. So the harmfulness of death is not a function of what it deprives you of, for it is harmful even when it deprives you of nothing worth having.

It's a fun thing to say that life can report benefit profits. It's hard to measure the profits of life objectively. But let's say that we did this. We have a period with losses. How would this look like? Does it mean that after a year of my life I ended up more miserable than I was a year ago? Why should I care? Life goes up and down. Just the fact that sometimes it going down doesn't mean that we should end it instantly. — pfirefry

Er, you clearly don't understand the example at all.

That's what our reason says about us - the implication is that death itself is immensely harmful, so much so that it never makes sense to wind your life up until or unless continuing it will incur huge costs.
— Bartricks

I agree. But I wouldn't make an inference that we should stop procreating. I'm assuming that the main point of antinatalism is not that death is harmful, but that we shouldn't procreate. Death is harmful in the context of a living being. It's not as harmful in the context of procreation. It is more harmful to not procreate than to procreate and to cause death by it. Our reason tells us that life worth living despite death. Otherwise, we would end our lives immediately. — pfirefry

So, my arguments - which you have not challenged - show that we're all going to hell. That is, no matter how good your life is right now, it is going to end up really, really bad. For you are going to die, and death clearly takes you to a much worse place than here. For that is why your reason implores you to stay here for as long as possible, unless you are in abject agony with no prospect of it ending. (So, the 'other place' that you are going to when you die is not quite as bad as being in abject agony, but is is still not very nice at all).

Now, how on earth would it be ethical to bring another person into that situation? It is awful that we are in it. It would be wicked to bring someone else into it too.

Existential Hope

↪pfirefry

I am afraid that Bartricks is (seemingly) incapable of understanding that we can be afraid of something because we don't want something of value to be lost. A "moderately miserable" life can also be partially good. This fear of loss exacerbated when one also considers the possibility of potential pain and the difficulty people have in imagining nonexistence. But this difficulty has nothing to do with the actual badness of death. One's inability to understand thunder does not automatically make it a satanic force. Confusion reigns supreme when assumptions remain unchallenged. By this logic, I suppose people who really want to die have good reasons to believe that they are going to heaven, which would make existence to be something good. However, neither of the aforementioned views are justifiable, in my view.

The oil spill example is also flawed. One could say that the burns harmed one's health and reduced their happiness, which is not good. The failure to see the movie is only a part of the loss. However, unlike this particular scenario, we do not have evidence to believe that nonexistence is painful. Our aversion to it is driven by a combination of a conflation of death and a painful dying process along with a desire to hold on to the things we cherish that we believe would be "lost" when we don't exist.

Bartricks

↪Tom Storm

They are not bored. They are dealing with depression and post-trauma reactions, or an overwhelming situational problem - a crisis which temporarily has a detrimental hold on them. — Tom Storm

Irrelevant. It would be irrational, would it not, to kill oneself just because one is a bit bored and one's life shows no prospect of being anything other than mildly boring?

It is plausibly rational to kill yourself if you are on fire, say, or if it is the only way to avoid burning to death. It is not plausibly rational to kill yourself if your life is just overall boring.

That tells us something - it tells us that death is immensely harmful to us. Or at least, that's the most reasonable explanation. Death is so harmful that it is rational to try and avoid it as long as possible, even if one's life has ceased to be a happy one.

My role in these cases is to prevent unnecessary death. It is not tied to any presuppositions other than life is preferable to death. — Tom Storm

Precisely - so death must be really, really bad. If it wasn't, then why on earth would we have reason to avoid it like the plague?

The harm of death cannot plausibly reside in what it deprives one of, for if it did then those with moderately miserable lives would have overall reason to kill themselves. Yet it is clear to most of us that even they have reason to avoid death.

So you're not drawing the moral: the moral is that to die is incredibly harmful to the one who dies, regardless of the state of their life.

Imagine Sarah was planning on going to the cinema to see a film she wanted to see, but she accidentally spills boiling hot oil on herself and spends the evening writhing in pain. Now, it is plausible that the harm of oil spill resided in the fact it deprived Sarah of an evening at the cinema? Not remotely. It did do that. But the harm of it resided mainly in the fact it caused Sarah absolute agony.

That's what death is like - it does deprive us of life here, but it is absurd to suppose that its harmfulness to us resides in that, as absurd as supposing that the oil spill harmed Sarah by depriving her of an evening of movie going.

Bartricks

↪DA671

Which premise are you disputing? Here's the argument again:

Argument 1:

1. If we have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances, including circumstances in which our lives are already sub optimal in terms of their happiness to misery balance (up to a certain limit), the best explanation of this is that death harms us and harms us by permanently altering our condition for the worse.
2. We have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances etc.
3. Therefore, death harms us by permanently altering our condition for the worse

Argument 2:

1. If our deaths permanently alter our condition for the worse, then all of our lives are bad overall and cause their subjects far more harm than benefit.
2. Our deaths permanently alter our condition for the worse (from the argument above)
3. Thus all of our lives are bad overall and cause their subjects far more harm than benefit

Argument 3:

1. If our lives are bad overall and cause their subjects far more harm than benefit, then it is immoral to create such lives.
2. Our lives are bad overall and cause their subjects far more harm than benefit
3. Therefore, it is immoral to create such lives. — Bartricks

Try and focus. Don't think I've said things that I haven't said - no premise mentions fear, does it? Again: FOCUS. Which premise do you dispute?

Existential Hope

↪Bartricks

I used fear to refer to our aversion to death. I don't think that you are willing to look hard at the evidence at hand, my friend. Unless you realise that there are a myriad of reasons behind this aversion that don't necessarily point towards the actual badness of the event, progress would be illusory.

I don't think that our lives are bad overall, so I don't believe that procreation is always immoral. I don't deny that they could be.

Argument 2 is irrelevant because I don't think that death "alters" our condition and puts us in some terrible state of affairs.

I've already addressed argument 1 ad nauseam. We "believe" that we have a reason to avoid it. But this reason in itself is fuelled by multiple factors including a desire to avoid loss and pain. Just because one has certain negatives in their life it does not follow that they would want their being itself to end. They could have hopes (which they might not always be aware of) of improvement. And the societal influence of death being this terrible thing remains. Focus is definitely required if one seeks to look beyond a flawed framework.

Bartricks

↪DA671

I used fear to refer to our aversion to death. — DA671

Which premise mentioned that? You seem to think that saying 'we have reason to avoid dying' means the same as 'we are averse to dying' or 'we fear dying'. It doesn't. Don't you understand English?

I don't think that our lives are bad overall, so I don't believe that procreation is always immoral. I don't deny that they could be. — DA671

So what? Your thoughts don't determine what's what, not last I checked. I provided an argument that appears to show that our lives are overall terrible and that procreation is therefore incredibly immoral. You've said nothing to challenge it; all you've done is say things unrelated to it.

Now, which premise are you challenging. None of them are 'irrelevant'. The arguments are valid syllogisms, so if you think the conclusion is false then you need to identify a false premise.

Existential Hope

↪Bartricks

Considering that most people do seem to find immense value in their lives even in the face of harm, I don't think that it's justifiable to believe that all lives are mostly bad. This does not mean that there clearly are severe harms, and I hope that we can reduce them as much as possible.

Your posts have been rather convoluted. Elucidating distinctions is not a reflection of a misunderstanding of language, though the failure to understand that might be an interesting thing to consider. Your replies made it seem that you believe that we have a reason to avoid death because we wish to not die even if things are bad. This seemed to imply that we are averse to death. Apologies if I misunderstood you. If "reason" was referring to something being actually good/bad for us, I already said that I don't think that a valueless state (nonexistence) could have value/disvalue. But this does not mean that people could not find death to be problematic, since it obviously would be a troublesome idea for one who wants to continue living, or does not like the prospect of pain, or even has a sort of internal fear of nonbeing that they haven't fully investigated. Incomplete goals (that we tend to cherish as almost ethereal forces) and impact on loved ones could also be significant reasons. The point is that I don't think the widespread aversion to death gives us a reason to believe that death (the state of being dead) is bad (and neither would a proclivity towards nonexistence necessarily make it "good", but that's a separate matter). Our thoughts certainly don't determine what's what, including pessimistic ones that irrationally attempt to downplay the value of life ;)

I believe that I have challenged them and my points are quite pertinent, but of course, I could be wrong. Alternatively, there could be a fundamental lack of understanding here.

If possible, I would appreciate it if you could make it clear what you mean by "reason". Does "reason" mean that we have some arguments for believing that death is bad irrespective of what anybody thinks? So, it would be bad even if everybody wanted to die? Or does it mean that we appear to have certain concerns about death? Again, the latter has multiple explanations including fear and loss. It doesn't have much to do with the actual "badness" of death.

pfirefry

So, my arguments - which you have not challenged - show that we're all going to hell — Bartricks

That's one standpoint. It's not so hard to challenge. We're all going to heaven. We're all going to the place of peace and calm. We reunite with the nature. No matter how good your life is right now, it is going to end up spectacularly. The only thing is that there is no coming back once you're dead. Your existence (or non-existence) will be peaceful but you will no longer have anything to do with the Earth. You can exit at any time, but you won't be coming back. It's up to you how long you stay. You won't miss out on anything while you're staying here.

My point is that the above wouldn't really change anything. Regardless of how people feel about their inevitable death, they are just currently immersed in their lives. They are not quitters. Not looking for an easy way out. That's what humans do.

You can argue that if people anticipated heaven after death, they would give up more easily and welcomed death. Maybe that's true. But the same would apply if the opposite was true. If death would inevitably lead to hell, then people would just give up their lives and meet their inevitable death. The humanity would be done with. However, the reality is that no one knows if death is good or bad. They are just living their lives. If someone thinks that it's not so terrible to face the immanence of death, they will be inclined to procreate. That's what the majority does.

I think this is as far as I can contribute to the discussion. I'm not expecting to comment more on this topic.

Existential Hope

↪pfirefry

Well, I suppose they could say that people would clearly want to avoid hell as much as possible, not jump into it as soon as possible. But then one also has to remember the fact that there are people who seem far too eager to want to end an existence that's allegedly the only barrier between relief and something terrible. I don't think we have adequate reason to believe that their existence doesn't suggest that the void contains a heaven either. The reality, in my view, is that both of these views remain flawed because we don't have a reason to fear a valueless state of affairs that won't be harm/benefit an actual person. Whatever reasons we "think" we have are a result of many factors that I have mentioned before, such as our culture influencing our thoughts, our desire to continue appreciating the good of life, and also our need to avoid potential pain.

Bartricks

↪pfirefry

That's one standpoint. It's not so hard to challenge. We're all going to heaven. We're all going to the place of peace and calm. We reunite with the nature. No matter how good your life is right now, it is going to end up spectacularly. — pfirefry

Oh, ok. If you say so. It's just it is not what any of the evidence implies. But if you dislike a conclusion, then it's false. That's definitely how reality works.

My point is that the above wouldn't really change anything. Regardless of how people feel about their inevitable death, they are just currently immersed in their lives. They are not quitters. Not looking for an easy way out. That's what humans do. — pfirefry

Relevance?

If someone things that it's not so terrible to face the immanence of death, they will be inclined to procreate. That's what the majority does. — pfirefry

And again: relevance?

Bartricks

↪DA671

Considering that most people do seem to find immense value in their lives even in the face of harm, I don't think that it's justifiable to believe that all lives are mostly bad. — DA671

Which premise are you denying?

Your posts have been rather convoluted. Elucidating distinctions is not a reflection of a misunderstanding of language, though the failure to understand that might be an interesting thing to consider. — DA671

No, you just don't seem to understand the difference between saying that we have 'reason' to do something and saying that we fear something. Anyway, which premise are you denying?

If "reason" was referring to something being actually good/bad for us, I already said that I don't think that a valueless state (nonexistence) could have value/disvalue. — DA671

No, that's not what it means either. And saying something doesn't make it true - argue for your claims.

You need to say which premise you think is false and then construct an argument that has the negation of that premise as a conclusion.

If possible, I would appreciate it if you could make it clear what you mean by "reason". Does "reason" mean that we have some arguments for believing that death is bad irrespective of what anybody thinks? So, it would be bad even if everybody wanted to die? Or does it mean that we appear to have certain concerns about death? Again, the latter has multiple explanations including fear and loss. It doesn't have much to do with the actual "badness" of death. — DA671

You have reason to believe that 3 x 18 = 54. You have reason to do what serves your ends provided that doing so is not immoral. And so on. They're called 'normative reasons'. They're reasons to do things.

Now, if I said we have reason to believe 3 x 18 = 54 would it be sensible to reply "but lots of people are not afraid of 3 x 18 = 54"? Or "some people like it that 3 x 18 = 54, but some people do not"? No.

We have reason to avoid death, extreme circumstances aside. That is uncontroversial.

We have reason to avoid death because it harms us. That is an analysis of why we have reason to avoid death. And it is highly plausible.

Anyway, it's all the in the OP.

Agent Smith

This - smug, self-righteous, self-serving, unsupported - is what makes me want to kick you and Bartricks down the street. Let's leave it at that. — T Clark

Natalists are saying that the world is a safe place for children. Is it?

Existential Hope

↪Bartricks

That most lives are bad.

It is you who fails to understand that very difference, I am afraid. The premise that we have a reason to avoid death under every circumstance is dubious, and I do not think that we have any reason to believe that it "alters" our condition. Unfortunately, you are far too keen to merely indulge in repetition rather than substantiation.

I have already replied to your unjustified claims, my friend. Progress without openness is not possible. As far as the value/disvalue of death is concerned, a valueless state of affairs that does not affect our well-being in any manner seems unlikely to possess any meaningful characteristic. As for your claims:
"1. If we have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances, including circumstances in which our lives are already sub-optimal in terms of their happiness to misery balance (up to a certain limit), the best explanation of this is that death harms us and harms us by permanently altering our condition for the worse.
2. We have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances etc.
3. Therefore, death harms us by permanently altering our condition for the worse."

1. We do not avoid our death under nearly all circumstances. There are clearly many people (including those with good lives) who do not find any value in their life and consequently wish to not exist. The fact that our life contains misery does not entail that people would want to lose the positive aspects of their life or partake in a potentially painful experience. It would also be pertinent to point out that people who are mostly suicidal and depressed could also experience moments where they want to live. Our motivations are quite nuanced, which is why discerning the "reason" for something can be a difficult task that requires looking at the world in a comprehensive manner.

2. We do have a reason (in terms of something being true) to avoid death insofar as it could result in unnecessary pain or lead to a cessation of our positive experiences. But this is not the case with all individuals. Furthermore, not all the reasons could be well thought out, such as an aversion to death that is a result of societal notions about nonbeing.

3. The reason does not entail that death alters our condition. Since no evidence/justification for this claim exists, it remains problematic.

Facts and preferences are not the same. Mathematical truths are verifiable and it would be strange if anybody feared them. We can also safely assume that most people understand their basics. However, this is not the same as death, since it is something that many people fear due to a multitude of reasons that may or may not be justifiable. As I have pointed out before, the possibility of pain is certainly a factor, and so is the idea that is often ingrained into us that nonbeing is something terrible (I do not think it is great or terrible). This means that many people choose to retain their mediocre existence which could still have some good over this supposedly horrible state of affairs. Furthermore, it is manifestly clear that anybody who desires to live would want to ensure that they do not have to face the prospect of its cessation. The point is that all of these elements combine together to give us reasons to avoid death and continue living, but they do not give us a reason to believe that death itself is negative.

Your OP is ... limited in more ways than you realise.