reliance on the ‘object’ in his third critique.
— Possibility
What ‘object’? — Mww
Kant argues that mathematical reasoning cannot be employed outside the domain of mathematics proper for such reasoning, as he understands it, is necessarily directed at objects that are “determinately given in pure intuition a priori and without any empirical data” (A724/B752). Since only formal mathematical objects (i.e. spatial and temporal magnitudes) can be so given, mathematical reasoning is useless with respect to materially given content (though the truths that result from mathematical reasoning about formal mathematical objects are fruitfully applied to such material content, which is to say that mathematics is applicable to and a priori true of the appearances (Shabel 2005). Consequently, the “thorough grounding” that mathematics finds in its definitions, axioms, and demonstrations cannot be “achieved or imitated” by philosophy or physical sciences (A727/B755).
Kant aimed among other things to:
Justify our conviction that physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truth...
Laying the foundation for pursuit of the first aim, which as he saw it was no less than the aim of showing why physics is a science, was what led Kant to his views about how the mind works. He approached the grounding of physics by asking: What are the necessary conditions of experience (A96)? Put simply, he held that for our experience, and therefore our minds, to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together must reflect the way that, according to physics, says objects in the world must be tied together. Seeing this connection also tells us a lot about what our minds must be like.
Our neonatal brains are evolved feedback systems endowed with aptitudes that develop competences for adaptively interacting with their environments like any other encephalized species. A biophysical (i.e. empirical) process – not a "transcendental condition of the possibility..."Bab[ies] are born with a priori knowledge. — Dijkgraf
Our brains are much more like a 'neural net wetware micro-subsystem' (of an environmental macro-system) than a monadic-modular hardware-O/S-software difference engine. No "pre-installation" necessary, like e.g. (Darwinian) cellular automata, — 180 Proof
reliance on the ‘object’ in his third critique.
— Possibility
What ‘object’?
— Mww
Nature, art, etc. — Possibility
The base structure of Kant’s schema is the subject-object relation, with the subject bracketing out sensation, or affect/desire, as if it is irrelevant. — Possibility
The TTC, on the other hand, acknowledges affect/desire as the directional flow of energy through the entire schema, and advocates the disciplined practice of aligning this aspect of ourselves with that of nature — Possibility
I'm glad I seemed to have managed to express this well enough to make sense (for a change!).
It is probably one of the most common misconceptions of Kant's work I come across and some people just cannot see it likely because it is so blindingly obvious and they don't see the importance of stating something so obvious. Others are just atheists or theists trying to force views upon others by taking his words and terms out of context to justify some silly political view. — I like sushi
So Kant apparently rejects intellectual intuition — Janus
Perhaps, not in idealist (folk psychologist) terms, "intuition" is just (the perceptual – noninferential – aptitude of) pattern-recognition (e.g. gestalts). — 180 Proof
That constructed schema is a “non-empirical intuition — Mww
Do you think we learn to see things as things via being taught to as well as possessing evolved constitutional aptitudes? — Janus
That constructed schema is a “non-empirical intuition”
— Mww
It is certainly arguable though that it could be an abstraction derivative of empirical intuitions. — Janus
Kant argues that mathematical reasoning cannot be employed outside the domain of mathematics proper
Doesn't that negate applied mathematics, which is so fundamental to science? — Wayfarer
You are well aware, it goes without saying, that while we observe relationships in Nature, the laws which explain that relationships are not given by the observation alone. — Mww
He approached the grounding of physics by asking: What are the necessary conditions of experience (A96)? Put simply, he held that for our experience, and therefore our minds, to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together must reflect the way that, according to physics, says objects in the world must be tied together. Seeing this connection also tells us a lot about what our minds must be like.
The transcendental view seems to rely on the existence of something otherworldly or divine — Janus
That conception of the transcendental seems to be based on the assumption that empirical intuitions are not always already conceptually mediated, even prior to conceptions becoming explicit. — Janus
On that alternate view..... — Janus
......the conceptual dimension of the empirical is not given transcendentally...... — Janus
.....but immanently. — Janus
The transcendental view seems to rely on the existence of something otherworldly or divine — Janus
in its '"ordinary" sense, as something not empirically observable 'transcendental' retains its coherence — Janus
I'm sure that that is not what Kant means by transcendental. Doesn't he go to the trouble of differentiating 'transcendental' from 'transcendent' to avoid that implication?
Layman's explanation: what is transcendental is what is always already the case, what must be assumed to be so by any supposition, what is implicit in experience without being visible to it. — Wayfarer
Firstly, Kant nowhere claims that differences must be spatiotemporal. One pure concept is different than another, & yet none of them originate a-posteriori in space & time; indeed, they couldn’t, because they’re in one’s possession a-priori & would still be had, as such, even if they’re never employed in relation to space & time. So Kant never contradicts himself in that respect.Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant in this, is that in calling the noumenal "things in themselves" he contradicts his denial that they could be spatio-temporal entities, since there can be no "things" without difference and no difference without spatial and temporal separation. — Janus
Then I misunderstood you if you never tried to pass it off as being representative of what Kant says. Sorry, my mistake.It was a paranthetical comment, not representative of what I think Kant says, but suggestive of an important point in its own right. — Wayfarer
... & you to yours. Yet are you unwilling to give your reason(s) for opining that Schopenhauer is a better Kantian than Kant?You're certainly entitled to that "opinon". — 180 Proof
Yet to that point of yours. If, according to you, the brain constructs the world, then wouldn’t that brain itself have to already exist in order to do so? For, what’s non-existent can’t create, let alone do, anything, right? — Mental Forms
For, in Kant’s sense, both the material & the formal aspects of phenomena depend on such a subject & can’t exist without it; so the subject is essential to the creation, construction, or coming-into-being of such phenomena — Mental Forms
Oh, okay. If you might have well said “the mind,” instead of the brain, then I guess that I’d misconstrued your meaning due to what I perceived as being ambiguous; I thought that you were trying to say, in one way or another, that the mind is the brain. Again, my mistake.I'm not in the least a materialist-reductionist or a brain-mind identity theorist. I might well have said 'the mind constructs....' but was making the point with respect to the brain, because of the acknowledged fact that the human brain is the most complex and sophisticated known natural phenomenon. Read the next comment again: 'It creates a world, the only one you'll ever know'. By that I mean, the mind synthesises and creates the only world you will ever know, but by pointing to the acknowledged complexity and sophistication of the brain, was making a rhetorical point. — Wayfarer
the laws which explain that relationships are not given by the observation alone.
— Mww
They're deductive. Synthetic a priori, yes? — Wayfarer
....for our experience, and therefore our minds, to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together must reflect the way that, according to physics, says objects in the world must be tied together.....
We never can properly say how objects in the world are tied together, but only how reason ties the representations of them together in accordance with observations. — Mww
Firstly, Kant nowhere claims that differences must be spatiotemporal. One pure concept is different than another, — Mental Forms
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearance — Schopenhauer
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