We commonly take a believer’s perspective on a given situation as a fundamental accuracy condition for belief ascriptions about him, and intensional belief ascriptions are designed for expressing this understanding — neomac

Is the practice of using "intensional" to ensure that our ascriptions are somehow congruent and/or otherwise amenable to the believer's perspective at the time? Given what I've quoted below, it would seem so.

All I can say is that the most accurate report of someone’s belief at time t1 is the one that best matches the point of view of the believer at time t1. Why would I pick the point of view of some person P at time t2 (or some other person Q at time t1) as a criterium of accuracy for reporting P's belief at time t1? — neomac

One great reason to deny the need for a match between our report and the person's own perspective and/or point of view at that time is when they believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, but they've no idea that they believe that. That man in that suit is a very large part of the meaningful content of any belief that he is a sheep. That man in that suit is both, unknown and influential to the believer.

The believer does not know at the time that they believe a man in a sheep suit is a sheep.

One great reason to pick the same person at another time is when we find ourselves discussing another's belief that they themselves do not know that they have. We can ask them later after they become aware of the relevant facts. It seems to me that that part of what I'm saying here honors and satisfies your standard of matching the individual's perspective concerning what exactly they believed at time t1. Moreso even than the alternative.

Yet one can wonder if all intensional belief ascriptions can be in principle replaced by extensional belief ascriptions without omitting the believer’s perspective. How? By rendering the believer’s perspective in terms of metalinguistic belief ascriptions (belief about the truth-value of some propositions).
This is why one can claim as valid both <Jack believes a broken clock is working> (extensional belief ascription) and <Jack believes the proposition “a broken clock is working” false> (extensional belief ascription rendering the believer’s perspective in metalinguistic terms).
Where is the benefit? At least, in preserving truth-value through substitution of co-referent terms, even for belief ascriptions, and without giving up on the believer’s perspective. — neomac

The above is not half bad. That's supposed to be a compliment.

> In your rendering of my contentions here, you've placed far too much importance on the notions of intentional, intensional, and extensional..

Indeed I reported that premise (there was a typo: I wrote “intenTional” instead of “intenSional”), b/c if you want to make a philosophical proposal that is appealing to me, or those holding the conventional view of belief ascription, you should feel intellectually compelled to show understanding toward what we are concerned about (de dicto report are necessary for rendering believers' p.o.v.), and prove by that that we are not talking past each other. The burden is on you, b/c it’s you who wants to challenge the conventional view, not the other way around.
Otherwise our exchange will just end up in butting heads against the wall of our diverging intuition pumps. It’s pointless. So we can work out our different views better if we start from common grounds or at least reciprocal concessions (depending on the burden of proof).

> I mean, it looks like a very intelligent viewpoint is being described.

So, do you find my formulation good enough despite of “you've placed far too much importance etc.”, or not good enough because of “you've placed far too much importance etc.”?




> The above is not half bad. That's supposed to be a compliment.

So, is the part you quoted acceptable enough or not? And if not, for what reason?




> One great reason to deny the need for a match between our report and the person's own perspective and/or point of view at that time is when they believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, but they've no idea. […]
One great reason to pick the same person at another time is when we find ourselves discussing another's belief that they themselves do not know that they have. We can ask them later after they become aware of the relevant facts. It seems to me thatthat part of what I'm saying here honors and satisfies your standard of matching the individual's perspective concerning what exactly they believed at time t1. Moreso even than the alternative.

Here my objections:

• In my comment, I contrasted P’s belief prospective at t1 with both Q’s belief prospective at t1 and P’s belief prospective at t2 (when she understood her belief at t1 to be wrong). And I said our report is accurate when it matches P’s belief prospective at time t1. In your comment, you start denying the need for that match in case of Q’s belief ascription, and then conclude with claiming that my standard is satisfied in the case of P’s belief prospective at t2. These claims are, at least, twice contradictory: first, it seems you are distinguishing 2 cases (belief ascription by Q at t1, and belief ascription by P at t2) even though there is no such difference with respect to what is ascribed to P at time t1 in both 2 cases, according to your belief ascription report (at t1, P believes that a broken clock is working, for both Q at t1 and P at t2). Secondly, since for me there is no difference in belief ascription failure between Q at t1 and P at t2, then you are not satisfying my standard, b/c at least in case of Q at t1 - you claim - there is no need for matching. Not to mention the fact that even the belief ascription by P at t2 is not satisfying my standard either, as I intend it: P at t2 is not offering any accurate report of P at t1 if she used your belief ascription report.
• My reformulation was aiming at rescuing your proposal also from the line of reasoning you just drafted, which I find simply catastrophic, even if we forget the aforementioned objections. Why? Because “accuracy” as an intrinsic fitness-condition of beliefs is what grounds our expectations about our honest reports, like the expectation that a factual report about facts at time t1 should match them, and the expectation that a belief ascription to P at time t1 should match the belief prospective of P at time t1 (i.e. the way P would express her belief at time t1). While what you are trying to do is to blend the 2 distinct expectations in a belief ascription that matches neither the prospective of the believer nor the relevant facts: a broken clock is working is neither a fact nor the perspective of P at time t1, just a blend of what you take to be a correct description of the relevant facts ("the broken clock") with P’s perspective (“is working”). The utmost preposterous consequence of your approach is that all false beliefs are equated to contradictory beliefs (since, the belief ascription subordinate clause "a broken clock is working" is a contradiction). This amounts to a categorical confusion between epistemology and logic: a false belief is not a contradictory belief (!!!), since a contradictory belief is always false, while a false belief could have been true, and this depends on the relevant facts not on its internal logic. Indeed this would also make the believers look always irrational, when they could have been simply ignorant about the relevant facts.
• Why would you do such a catastrophic move? My impression is that you are misled, by your unaccounted knowledge claims (“we find ourselves discussing another's belief that they themselves do not know that they have”), into thinking that belief report accuracy is based on knowledge (track knowledge or lack thereof). This is wrong for 2 reasons: 1. belief ascriptions by S are themselves beliefs and do not warrant S’s knowledge of the relevant facts, nor need for such a warrant 2. knowledge ascriptions about P presuppose belief ascriptions about P (and not the other way around). In other words, a theory of belief ascription can not settle issues about belief and belief ascription by presupposing knowledge, b/c knowledge presupposes belief, therefore accurate belief reports should be understood in terms of intrinsic fitness-condition of belief, not in terms of extrinsic fitness-condition of belief (as knowledge is).

My reformulation of your proposal looks better because it is not based on anything I found highly controversial in your claims (wild propositional calculi, confusion between false and contradictory beliefs, confusion between knowledge and belief ascriptions) and it doesn’t evidently betray any intrinsic accuracy condition for belief ascriptions (since the believer's perspective is still preserved through metalinguistic belief ascriptions) which is at the core of conventional understanding of belief ascriptions.

Indeed I reported that premise (there was a typo: I wrote “intenTional” instead of “intenSional”), b/c if you want to make a philosophical proposal that is appealing to me, or those holding the conventional view of belief ascription, you should feel intellectually compelled to show understanding toward what we are concerned about (de dicto report are necessary for rendering believers' p.o.v.), and prove by that that we are not talking past each other. The burden is on you, b/c it’s you who wants to challenge the conventional view, not the other way around.
Otherwise our exchange will just end up in butting heads against the wall of our diverging intuition pumps. It’s pointless. So we can work out our different views better if we start from common grounds or at least reciprocal concessions. — neomac

Very well put. I'm fairly certain that we are not talking past each other. I'll give your objections due attention as soon as time permits. There's quite a bit wrapped up in there, and again... I appreciate the due attention. You've presented what seems to be a cogent well considered reply and as such it deserves the same in response.

There are a few things I'd like to talk about here. First, we are discussing our differing standards regarding exactly what counts as an acceptable rendition of another's belief. You've suggested that our report must match their perspective and/or their point of view at that time(time t1). You've placed emphasis upon our keeping their point of view and/or perspective in mind. You've subsequently charged that my proposal of what they believe at time t1 does not match their point of view and/or perspective at time t1. You're perfectly well within the bounds of saying so. I've said so myself. So...

I agree. That is not a problem, for I am talking about a belief that they are unaware of having at time t1. Thus, my proposal ought not match their point of view at time t1. My proposal of what they believe ought match what they believe. Sometimes we believe things that we are totally unaware of.

At time t1, if we should ask, "Hey!... Jack!... Do you realize that you believe that that broken clock is working?" they would be quite surprised that they had just believed that that particular broken clock was working.

In my comment, I contrasted P’s belief prospective at t1 with both Q’s belief prospective at t1 and P’s belief prospective at t2 (when she understood her belief at t1 to be wrong). And I said our report is accurate when it matches P’s belief prospective at time t1. — neomac

According to the standard you've put forth for what counts as an acceptable report of Jack's belief at time t1, Jack's own reporting at time t2 would not meet that standard.

Ah shit! That's true! At time t1, I did believe that that particular broken clock was working!

> I am talking about a belief that they are unaware of having at time t1. Thus, my proposal ought not match their point of view at time t1.

First of all, the expression “unaware of” is ambiguous here: “unaware” can mean that the belief is there just implicitly/dispositionally there; or it can mean we are “unaware” of the actual truth value of a belief (b/c we will discover it later or never) or if it expresses knowledge or not.
Secondly what your proposal ought to do, depends on the accuracy condition for belief ascriptions: as I said they should be intrinsic to belief and not extrinsic to it (as knowledge is) and when we are reporting beliefs at time t1 they should ideally track the p.o.v. of the belief holder at time t1 (it doesn’t matter if the belief is implicit or explicit) which can not be contradictory just because later it is proven to be false (so if a false belief is presented as contradictory, it will be ambiguous wrt to the believer’s p.o.v. at time t1 as it is confusing logic and epistemology).
Therefore the appeal to beliefs we are unaware of, doesn’t hint at anything decisive unless you are specifically referring to the actual truth-value or knowledge-status of the belief. But in this case, there is the problem of the unwarranted knowledge claims, on top of the irrecoverable ambiguity of your belief ascriptions.

> According to the standard you've put forth for what counts as an acceptable report of Jack's belief at time t1, Jack's own reporting at time t2 would not meet that standard.

Right, this is coherent with my view and indeed this is what I explicitly claimed in my previous comment ("P at t2 is not offering any accurate report of P at t1 if she used your belief ascription report"). Yet I also pointed out to a specific situation where a belief ascription like yours (“Jack believed that a broken clock was working”) even though doesn’t meet the standard I acknowledge, it could be tolerated b/c easy to disambiguate (which also means that your “Jack” example does not necessarily support your view more than the conventional understanding of belief ascriptions!).

> Ah shit! That's true! At time t1, I did believe that that particular broken clock was working!

The philosophical task, as I understand it, consists precisely in looking for what justifies one’s intuitive assumptions and not giving them for granted, all the more if they are not shared (like in your case). This amounts to trying to strengthen one’s position or weaken alternative positions, by means of sharper analysis of our assumptions, assessments of the explanatory power of available&shared evidences, assessments of our theory internal coherence or theoretical benefits.
In other words, if you think you can advance our philosophical dispute by dramatizing an example you invented and appealing to its intuitive force, then I’m afraid we do not have the same understanding of the philosophical task and your proposal is no longer intellectually challenging to me.

Well, if you do not wish to continue, there's not much more I can do. I am very short on time for doing this stuff, for having this discussion, but I am making time just to be able to do so. You've levied a fair amount of serious charges here, and evidently you do not feel the obligation to allow the accused to provide a defense.

Due to the depth and breadth of the charges, I was planning on going through your objections one at a time. So, I began with your objection that my report of Jack's belief at time t1 did not match Jack's point of view at time t1. That objection was based upon your own proposed standard that our report of another's belief at time t1 match the point of view and/or perspective of the believer at time t1. You further supported this idea of matching the believer's own viewpoint.

So, I raised the valid objection that, at time t2, the believer's own report of their belief at time t1 does not meet the standard you've set. Do you not find that problematic? Are we to say that, at time t2, Jack is wrong about what they believed at time t1? What ground is there for us to accept his point of view at time t1(while mistaken) and reject it at time t2 after he's become aware of and subsequently corrected the mistake?

That's absurd. Special pleading at best.

There is nothing at all wrong with our saying that they held a belief that they were unaware of at time t1, but later when they became aware of the relevant facts concerning the clock along with their belief about it, they would readily admit that they had indeed believed that that broken clock was working.

The problem of our doing so is that it goes against the conventional notions.



You also seem to want to say that I am somehow attributing a self-contradictory belief to Jack, but I've yet to see you explain how I have done so. Thus far it's been gratuitously asserted along with other charges as well. That said, granted, going by the standards you're working from and one absolute presupposition they rest upon, it would be contradictory to say that anyone believed that broken clock was working. However, if we acknowledge the fact that we can and do hold belief that we are unaware of holding at the time of holding it, it is not at all contradictory to believe that a broken clock is working.

The standard you've presented presupposes that a believer is always aware of their own belief at the time it is influencing their behaviour. That is a false presupposition.



You've also complained several times about the fact that I've been using a thought experiment and/or hypothetical scenario, as if that is a problem? Surely, you do not want me to show you how absurd that is... do you? Here's the thing, it's not just a thought experiment...

It's something that happens! It is also something that can be tested in a controlled environment. Now, I would agree that the subjects would agree to both reports; that they believed that that clock was working, and that they believed that a broken clock was working. They could do so without any self-contradiction whatsoever.

Lastly, it has become more and more apparent to me that we have mutually exclusive notions of belief at work. I'm still wondering about something you said earlier regarding whether or not our notion of belief ought match our standard for belief ascription or the other way around. I'll ask you again...

What are you attributing(ascribing) to another prior to having a standard for what exactly counts as belief?

The philosophical task, as I understand it, consists precisely in looking for what justifies one’s intuitive assumptions and not giving them for granted, all the more if they are not shared (like in your case). — neomac

Have you never believed a clock that was not telling the right time?

:worry:

... it seems you are distinguishing 2 cases (belief ascription by Q at t1, and belief ascription by P at t2) even though there is no such difference with respect to what is ascribed to P at time t1 in both 2 cases, according to your belief ascription report (at t1, P believes that a broken clock is working, for both Q at t1 and P at t2). — neomac

You state this as though it is a problem. My report about Jack's belief at time t1 matches Jack's own report at time t2 of his belief at time t1. If that does not count as matching Jack's point of view then nothing will.

Secondly, since for me there is no difference in belief ascription failure between Q at t1 and P at t2, then you are not satisfying my standard, b/c at least in case of Q at t1 - you claim - there is no need for matching. Not to mention the fact that even the belief ascription by P at t2 is not satisfying my standard either, as I intend it: P at t2 is not offering any accurate report of P at t1 if she used your belief ascription report.

At time t2, Jack's own report of his own belief at time t1 matches mine. Somehow, you find this to be a problem. According to the above, we're both wrong. That's an incredible claim!

Now, just to be clear, I agree that there are times that we can know another's belief better than they do, but this is not one of those times(you do not know Jack's belief at time t1 better than Jack at time t2).

If the position you hold forbids you to admit that we can do both, believe that a broken clock is working, and admit of having held that belief at a later time, then I suggest you seriously consider incorporating the fact that we can and do hold belief that we are unaware of holding at the time.

Do you also deny that it is possible for us to believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, or that a barn facade is a barn?

> Well, if you do not wish to continue, there's not much more I can do. I am very short on time for doing this stuff, for having this discussion, but I am making time just to be able to do so. You've levied a fair amount of serious charges here, and evidently you do not feel the obligation to allow the accused to provide a defense.

The problem is not that you do not have time, but how you use it to respond to my “serious charges”. Even this time, you wrote a lot, but no value added. Just more of the same. And if you keep repeating the same "begging-the-question" claims and framing examples based on your questionable assumptions, I will just repeat my objections (unless you are unlucky, b/c I will add more objections on top of the ones I already made).

> I raised the valid objection that, at time t2, the believer's own report of their belief at time t1 does not meet the standard you've set. [...]
That's absurd. Special pleading at best.

It’s absurd how much trust you put in this argument.
First of all we are talking about a fictional character you invented to support your claims, while real people like us are questioning the intuitive strength of your claim. So no, my denial is not absurd at all, especially if compared to your claim.
Secondly to the perceived plausibility of “Jack believed that a broken clock was working” can be explained also by our common understanding of belief ascriptions, without supporting your idea that your belief ascription style is accurate or even more accurate than “Jack believed that a broken clock was working”. So no special pleading.
In conclusion. your objection relies on the fact that the believer's own report (in your fictitious example) is accurate and this suffices to destabilize a common understanding of belief ascriptions. I question both, and justifiably so.


> You also seem to want to say that I am somehow attributing a self-contradictory belief to Jack, but I've yet to see you explain how I have done so. […] it is not at all contradictory to believe that a broken clock is working.

Pls focus: “a broken clock is working” is a contradiction (!!!). You are attributing to Jack, in your example ("Jack believed a broken clock was working"), a contradictory belief. The consequence is that, by your standard, any false belief is equated to a contradictory belief. This shows a confusion between false belief and contradictory belief, therefore your belief ascription is inaccurate and ambiguous.
If it wasn't already enough, here you go with two other preposterous consequences of your view:
1. if a belief ascription about P at time t1 is based on P's p.o.v at time t1m, we shouldn't change the belief ascription every time P changes her mind about the relevant facts (which she can do in an unlimited number of time). While with your standard we should revise our belief ascriptions at every revision of P's beliefs about the relevant facts.
2. We (collectively) do not always know or can determine the truth-value of our beliefs (are there aliens in the universe? can we prove this mathematical conjecture?), yet that doesn't prevent us from believing and being attributed beliefs, independently from of our capacity to determine what the relevant facts are. This is perfectly compatible with a belief ascription that aims at reporting the p.o.v of the believer independently from the truth about the relevant facts and knowledge claims, while with your standard the real content of a belief would be indeterminate until we can't determine what the relevant facts are.

> Thus far it's been gratuitously asserted along with other charges as well.

Marginal observation: how you can talk about “the depth and breadth” of my “serious charges” (which I seriously doubt you grasped) and yet claim that they are gratuitous (wrt your intuitions, I guess), is a mystery to me, but at this point I can't find it surprising anymore.

> The standard you've presented presupposes that a believer is always aware of their own belief at the time it is influencing their behaviour. That is a false presupposition.

Not only I do not presuppose this but I also declared that the false belief of P is explainable in terms of her ignorance (so lack of awareness about the relevant facts). However I also clearly stated that knowledge ascription should not be presupposed by belief ascription: i.e. Jack, in your example, ignored at t1 that his belief was false or he was not aware at t1 of his mistaken belief until t2. And an accurate way to express this is "at t1, Jack mistakenly believed that a clock was working", so there is no need to mention at all the "broken clock" within the scope of Jack's belief, even after he becomes aware that his belief was false. Replacing "clock" with "broken clock" would mess up the belief report, not make it more accurate.

> What are you attributing(ascribing) to another prior to having a standard for what exactly counts as belief?

I don't get the sense of this question. I exposed my understanding of belief ascriptions when I talked about intrinsic/extrinsic fitness conditions of beliefs, did you read and understand the point I made there? If you do not agree, what would be the reasons?

Have you never believed a clock that was not telling the right time? — creativesoul

Pls, focus: "to believe a clock that is not working" is as fine as "to believe a broken clock that is working", these are a kind of de re ascriptions that can be legitimately, accurately and unambiguously used in certain contexts, and that possibility is grounded on the fact that "the (broken) clock" is within the cognitive scope of the one who makes the belief ascription, not within the scope of the believer . And I already discussed about this kind of belief reports before you did, so don't look for disagreements where there are none.
My problem is only with the claim that this belief report “P (mistakenly) believed that a broken clock was working” is not only accurate, but even more accurate than “P (mistakenly) believed that a clock was working”. So I’m challenging you to explain why, and in particular, accurate with respect to what. Your belief attribution report is not accurate wrt to the relevant facts ("a broken clock is working" is not a fact), nor it is an accurate report of P's p.o.v at time t1 (since at time t1, P doesn't know his belief is wrong and would express this by saying "I do not believe that a broken clock is working" or "I do believe that 'a broken clock is working' is false"), so what else? Even if you claimed that it matches P's p.o.v at time t2, there is big problem: why should we take P's p.o.v at time t2 as an accuracy condition for belief ascriptions about P at t1, instead of P's p.o.v at time t1? Here is where you need to feel in your defensive arguments without "begging the question".

It still seems to me we have a different understanding of what a philosophical debate is, and until you do not prove to me you are playing the same game, your case is not intellectually challenging to me.

Jack believed that a broken clock was working” can be explained also by our common understanding of belief ascriptions, — neomac

Show me again, because thus far you've changed Jack's belief in your translation.

My problem is only with the claim that this belief report “P (mistakenly) believed that a broken clock was working” is not only accurate, but even more accurate than “P (mistakenly) believed that a clock was working”. — neomac

It has to do with the content of Jack's belief...

My position can admit and accept all three of the renditions we've been discussing. You're the one who has issue with the fact that we do sometimes believe that broken clocks are working.

Pls focus: “a broken clock is working” is a contradiction (!!!). — neomac

While believing that a broken clock is working is not.

It's the difference between understanding that believing a broken clock is working is not the same as believing "a broken clock is working".

The latter is how those who hold all belief as propositional attitude would render Jack's belief that a broken clock is working. Not all belief can be successfully rendered as such.

> What are you attributing(ascribing) to another prior to having a standard for what exactly counts as belief?

I don't get the sense of this question. — neomac

What is your criterion for belief?

You've based your arguments here on your understanding of belief ascription. What exactly are you ascribing to another when you say that they believe something?

The last post of mine seems the most promising for attaining a mutual understanding of one another's position. The entire discussion has skirted around the underlying issue, which is - as mentioned heretofore - mutually exclusive notions of belief at work. Setting our notions out here in the public square will go a very long way to establishing where the pivotal key differences are.

We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief.

Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to.

I mean, we are both clearly dug in regarding our own respective reasoning for accepting and/or rejecting saying that we can and sometimes do believe that a broken clock is working. So, in line with your own suggestion of looking towards assumptions, etc., this is a perfect place to start!

Show me again, because thus far you've changed Jack's belief in your translation. — creativesoul

Quoting myself:
OK let me help you with your case. Indeed, I think there might be a way out for you but only if you reject this line of reasoning: “Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working?” (along with the idea that de re belief ascriptions are appropriate independently from pragmatic and contextual considerations, or a better rendering than de dicto belief ascriptions). Indeed if you rejected that line of reasoning, then you could explain the situation in your thought experiment based on pragmatic considerations and shared assumptions, much better. How? Here you go: since at moment t2, you and Jack share the same assumptions about the reliability of that clock, the belief of Jack about that clock at t1, and the rationality of you and Jack, then between you two it would be easier to disambiguate the claim “Jack believed that broken clock was working”, and this is why you two would not find it so problematic to use that belief ascription (BTW that is also why we can't exclude a non-literal or ironic reading of this belief ascription either). However, as soon as we add to the story another interlocutor who doesn’t share all the same assumptions relevant to disambiguate “Jack believed that broken clock was working” then this rendering would be again inappropriate or less appropriate than de dicto rendering “Jack believed that clock was working”.

You're the one who has issue with the fact that we do sometimes believe that broken clocks are working. — creativesoul

Closer but still wrong, since I question such a fact as well as framing my view based on this putative fact. So, more accurately, I (as many others here) have issue with your claim that we do sometimes believe that broken clocks are working.

While believing that a broken clock is working is not.
It's the difference between understanding that believing a broken clock is working is not the same as believing "a broken clock is working".
The latter is how those who hold all belief as propositional attitude would render Jack's belief that a broken clock is working. Not all belief can be successfully rendered as such. — creativesoul

OK, let’s delve into this other claims of yours.
But first, let me notice that I don’t know whom you are talking about here (“those who hold all belief as propositional attitude”), since in the literature propositional attitudes are not normally rendered as attitudes toward quoted sentences, making them look as metalinguistic beliefs or beliefs about sentences! This notation is more likely your way to mark a difference between propositions and contents of belief. But if you take propositional attitudes as metalinguistic attitudes then your understanding of propositional attitudes certainly doesn’t match the common understanding of propositional attitudes and indeed this is confusing wrt to the related debate: e.g. for Frege, propositions are thoughts (senses), while for Russell they are complexes of objects and properties as extensional referents of words (probably state of affairs), while neither renders belief as belief that ‘p’ (with quotation marks). So from whom did you get the idea that beliefs as propositional attitudes are by definition attitudes toward sentences to be reported in quotation marks (as in “S believes that ‘p’” instead of “S believes that p”)? Until I do have a convincing answer to that, your claim is another unacceptable example of framing the issue in a way that presupposes your understanding as correct.

Said that, here my 3 questions:

• Does believing a clock is working (without quotation marks) have the same truth conditions of believing “a clock is working” (with quotation marks)? If they differ, what is the difference?
• If “a clock is working” is true, does this imply that “Jack’s believes that a clock is working” is true? If not, why not?
• Take the statement “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” and the statement “a broken clock is working”, do they share the same content? If they differ, what is the difference?

What exactly are you attributing/ascribing to another when you say that they believe something? — creativesoul

I'm attributing a belief: beliefs are intentional cognitive states/events with intrinsic mind-to-world fitness conditions expressed through behavioral attitudes in a given context. These intrinsic fitness conditions constitute - broadly speaking - the p.o.v of the believer. So I take the task of identifying the intrinsic fitness conditions of a given belief in a given context as equivalent to providing an explanation of P’s behavior in a given context based on her cognitive intentionality. Since what better explains the cognitively-guided behavior of P at time t1 based on cognitive intentionality (i.e. P's belief at t1), to me, is the p.o.v. of P at t1 than any other alternative (like the p.o.v. of Q at t1, or the the p.o.v. of P at t2), then belief ascriptions about P at time t1 are accurate in so far as they match the p.o.v. of P at time t1.

We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief. — creativesoul

OK let’s try. Now it’s your turn to clarify what belief is. However, I would still like to hear at least your answers to my 3 questions b/c it helps clarify your ideas about belief.

So from whom did you get the idea that beliefs as propositional attitudes are by definition attitudes toward sentences to be reported in quotation marks (as in “S believes that ‘p’” instead of “S believes that p”)? Until I don’t have a convincing answer to that, your claim is another unacceptable example of framing the issue in a way that presupposes your understanding as correct. — neomac

That's a very odd phrasing at the end. There were others earlier, but they all seem inconsequential. I think you meant to write "Until I do..." rather than "Until I don't...". Clarify please if my interpretation is incorrect. If it's correct, no need to spend time verifying.

That's a fair and relevant question given the discussion. The near equation of statements and propositions amounts to combinatory vestiges from earlier discussions, including but not limited to the belief that approach which I've always taken to be about belief statements and the presupposition of truth inherently embedded within them such that suffixing them with "is true" amounts to redundancy.

It's good to know that that's not what you're doing with those words. Duly noted! Seeing that I've no issue with using them however you wish here, I'll follow your lead. I'm not at all married to the idea of propositions or attitudes towards them such that one takes them to be true(in the sense of propositions as statements) or such that one takes them to be the case(in the sense of propositions as states of affairs/events).

To your point, I would concur that I certainly cannot offer a valid objection, should I have an issue, regarding the practice of rendering belief as propositional attitudes if I've not understood what is meant by your use of the term propositional attitude; or better yet, if I've not rightly understood the practice.

I now understand, perhaps moreso than at the time, why you opened with the questionaire that you did. So, this serves as a reminder to me that there's often very good reasons why some want to begin by defining one's key terms.

What exactly are you attributing/ascribing to another when you say that they believe something?
— creativesoul

I'm attributing a belief: beliefs are intentional cognitive states/events with intrinsic mind-to-world (cognitive) fitness conditions expressed through behavioral attitudes in a given context. These intrinsic fitness conditions constitute - broadly speaking - the p.o.v of the believer... — neomac

In the spirit of building a bridge of mutual understanding, I must say that that's considerably more confusing to me than it is clarifying. It seems theory laden, and quite heavily so. This is not meant as an insult or necessarily a negative thing(to be theory laden). However, I now more than ever want to be sure that I understand what you're saying.

You're drawing a distinction between one's point of view and one's belief. Could you unpack them both individually please, so as to be able to compare and contrast the two?

I must say that it seems odd to me to say something like "beliefs are intentional cognitive states/events with intrinsic mind-to-world (cognitive) fitness conditions..." The double use of the term "cognitive" is throwing me.

On your view, does cognition include things not contained inside the skull?

Now it’s your turn to clarify what belief is. However, I would still like to hear at least your answers to my 3 questions b/c it helps clarify your ideas about belief. — neomac

I plan on it. They are good questions.

Does believing a clock is working (without quotation marks) have the same truth conditions of believing “a clock is working” (with quotation marks)? If they differ, what is the difference? — neomac

Believing a clock is working is something that happens as a result of knowing how to read a clock and looking towards one as a means to know what time it is. Things such as these are not the sort of things that we say have truth conditions. Rather, they are the truth conditions of statements about what's happened, and/or is happening.

It makes no sense to me to talk about the truth conditions of (believing "a clock is working"). That does not at all seem to be a truth apt set of meaningful marks contained within the parentheses. The truth conditions of the statement are another matter altogether...

"A clock is working" is true when and only when a clock is working.

If “a clock is working” is true, does this imply that “Jack’s believes that a clock is working” is true? If not, why not? — neomac

No. Why would it? The statement about the clock is true when and only when a clock is working. The statement about Jack's belief is true when and only when it corresponds to Jack's belief.

Take the statement “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” and the statement “a broken clock is working”, do they share the same content? — neomac

They both consist of meaningful words, some of the same ones in the same sense. One's about Jack's belief, and the other is about the working condition of a clock.

If they differ, what is the difference?

See above.

Now it’s your turn to clarify what belief is — neomac

Reduced to the point of near breaking...

Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so.

> That's a very odd phrasing at the end. There were others earlier, but they all seem inconsequential. I think you meant to write "Until I do..." rather than "Until I don't...". Clarify please if my interpretation is incorrect. If it's correct, no need to spend time verifying.

My bad, I meant until I do. I re-edited my text.

> That's a fair and relevant question given the discussion. The near equation of statements and propositions amounts to combinatory vestiges from earlier discussions, including but not limited to the belief that approach which I've always taken to be about belief statements and the presupposition of truth inherently embedded within them such that suffixing them with "is true" amounts to redundancy.
It's good to know that that's not what you're doing with those words. Duly noted! Seeing that I've no issue with using them however you wish here, I'll follow your lead. I'm not at all married to the idea of propositions or attitudes towards them such that one takes them to be true(in the sense of propositions as statements) or such that one takes them to be the case(in the sense of propositions as states of affairs/events). To your point, I would concur that I certainly cannot offer a valid objection, should I have an issue, regarding the practice of rendering belief as propositional attitudes if I've not understood what is meant by your use of the term propositional attitude; or better yet, if I've not rightly understood the practice. I now understand, perhaps moreso than at the time, why you opened with the questionaire that you did. So, this serves as a reminder to me that there's often very good reasons why some want to begin by defining one's key terms.

I find this answer unclear. And the situation could get much messier if there are different assumptions on the literature we are familiar with. Since I find your understanding of propositional attitudes peculiar wrt what I read so far on the subject, I was wondering where you got it from.

Let me clarify this a bit more. It seems you distinguish between these 2 types of statements:
S believes that p
S believes that ‘p’

However based on the literature I’m more familiar with (e.g. Frege and Russell), belief as a propositional attitude is always rendered as “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p). Yet I’m fairly confident that “S believes that ‘p’” could be taken as a metalinguistic belief, namely as a propositional attitude about a sentence, which would allow claims as “S believes that ‘p’ is true” or “S believes that ‘p’ is not a correctly formed proposition” (if metalinguistic belief ascriptions can be reduced to non-metalinguistic beliefs is another issue). In any case, both renderings express propositional attitudes.

What I understood so far from your claims is that, for you, “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p) does not express a propositional attitude, while “S believes that ‘p’” (with quotations mark around p) expresses a propositional attitude. Is that right? If so then, your understanding of propositional attitudes is different from the literature I’m familiar with, and I would like to understand from whom you got your idea that “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p) is not a propositional attitude while “S believes that ‘p’” expresses a propositional attitude?

The only author whom your understanding of propositional attitudes seems to be referring to is Carnap: according to Carnap, “Jack believes the clock is on the table” should be analysed as “Jack believes-true ‘the clock is on the table’” (indeed Carnap’s position is called sententialism, i.e. beliefs are understood as attitudes towards sentences). However you do not seem to take “S believes that ‘p’” (with quotation marks around p) as an analysis of “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p). On the contrary, it seems you take “S believes that ‘p’” (with quotation marks around p) as a wrong analysis for “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p). Am I right? If I’m right, the following holds:

• Sententialism is but one way of understanding belief as propositional attitude. So at best you questioned one specific way of understanding belief as a propositional attitude.
• For Russell and Frege, “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p) is a propositional attitude. And “S believes that ‘p’” (with quotation marks around p) is not an analysis of “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p). But probably there are implications between the two statements. For that reason, your idea that “S believes that p” (without quotation marks around p) does not render a propositional attitude while “S believes that ‘p’” (with quotation marks around p) renders a propositional attitude, is quite incomprehensible wrt to authors I’m more familiar with.

> You're drawing a distinction between one's point of view and one's belief. Could you unpack them both individually please, so as to be able to compare and contrast the two?

It is impossible to unpack these two notions individually, since for me they are essentially linked together. A belief is, by (my) definition, an intentional state/event with intrinsic cognitive fitness conditions. By (my) definition, the intrinsic cognitive fitness conditions constitutive of a belief is the point of view (p.o.v.) of a believer.
I could say more about how I understand the intrinsic cognitive fitness conditions constitutive of belief b/c the definitions I just provided are not that controversial in the literature about intentionality (despite possible non-substantial differences in phrasing), while my substantial understanding of belief intrinsic cognitive fitness conditions could sound more controversial (even within the literature about intentionality). But I will not do it for two reasons:
- I’m reluctant to open too many fronts of contentions at the same time, especially if I do not see enough convergence in background knowledge, terminology and methodology. As it seems to be the case with you. So since the thread focus is on your & Banno’s positions, not mine, I prefer to keep it that way.
- A good deal of objections I made to your position are not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief, but more on the way we intuitively use belief ascriptions (so on linguistic facts), on what I take to be common knowledge about the debate on belief as propositional attitudes, or propositional calculus, or the internal logic of your claims as far as I understood/misunderstood them.


> The double use of the term "cognitive" is throwing me.
My bad, I removed “(cognitive)” from my text.






> Believing a clock is working is something that happens as a result of knowing how to read a clock and looking towards one as a means to know what time it is. Things such as these are not the sort of things that we say have truth conditions. Rather, they are the truth conditions of statements about what's happened, and/or is happening. […] The truth conditions of the statement are another matter altogether…

OK, so you are contrasting statements and things happening outside statements, and claim that truth values can be attributed only to statements and not to things that happen. Since beliefs are something that happens in the world, they do not have truth values. Is that it? If so, the least I can say is that I find it highly counter-intuitive for 2 reasons:
- Statements are taken to be true or false b/c they describe something happening, yet the sequence of verbal/written signs that constitute a sentence do not seem capable to describe anything by themselves. They do only if someone is expressing her belief about how things are through verbal/written signs and related linguistic rules. So truth-values are attributed derivatively to statements because they are originally attributed to beliefs.
- We attribute beliefs also to non-human animals and infants incapable of producing or understanding verbal/written statements. Yet we do not take their beliefs to be beyond any cognitive accuracy assessments, just because they happen to have them. Actually we would take as a sign of intelligent behavior from animals and kids, one were beliefs could be revised over time based on past cognitive failures.

> It makes no sense to me to talk about the truth conditions of (believing "a clock is working"). That does not at all seem to be a truth apt set of meaningful marks contained within the parentheses.

Profiting from you own suggestion, I would encourage you to change your phrasing style from:
S believes that p (where p is not a statement but the referent of the statement ‘p’ in the real world)
S believes that ‘p’ (where ‘p’ is a statement)
To:
(S believes that p) (where all the items within parentheses - or other types of brackets - are taken to be the referents in the real world of the belief ascription “S believes that p”, as such the expression within parentheses is neither true nor false)
S believes that p (as a statement, more precisely a belief ascription, that can be true or false)

The second rendering would not conflict with more common ways of reporting beliefs as propositional attitudes. In other words, it will spare others to adopt your non-conventional phrasing style, or to be always misrendered/misunderstood wrt to your view. Unless there are substantial reasons to not do it, and I would like to hear which ones.


> The statement about the clock is true when and only when a clock is working. The statement about Jack's belief is true when and only when it corresponds to Jack's belief.

All right, and if “Jack’s believes that a clock is working” is true, does this imply that “a clock is working” is true?



> Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so.

I’m not sure to understand what “drawing meaningful correlations” is supposed to mean. But I find this definition counter-intuitive, b/c one can draw meaningful correlations without believing anything: fantasizing or contemplating a painting are ways where we draw meaningful correlations but that doesn’t mean we believe any of that; even the simple understanding of a statements whose truth-value we acknowledge is unknown to us, requires “meaningful correlations” to be drawn yet understanding a statement is not believing what the statement says.

I think both sides of the beliefs versus objects debate get something essential right.

If you look at it from a cognitive science perspective, both are making accurate statements about how thought is assumed to work.

First, information comes to a person from outside that person. Solipsistic concerns aside, I don't think this is a controversial point. From a physicalist standpoint, it is necissarily true as the mind can't be generating this information itself.

Thus, sensory inputs are of objects. Statements about those inputs are essentially about the objects that are known through those inputs, not about the inputs themselves. We have specific language we use when we want to specify that we are talking about our perceptions of an object, not the object itself, as when at the top of a mountain we say "the car looks small from here."

When I say, "the used bumper I bought was rusted through," I am making a statement based on my beliefs, based on the sensory experience I have of the thing, but the statement is not about those things, it is about the bumper. If the mechanic hits it with a wire brush and just an outer coating of rust falls off, revealing a solid bumper, I will except that my proposition was false, which only works if my proposition was about the actual bumper.

However, the belief side of the argument is getting at something just as essential, which is that the proposition is only ever about the object "as it is for conciousness." This is essentially what Kant's "Copernican Turn," got at, but we understand how cognition works much better today, and how this is true in more detail.

There is about 1.509 bits of information in a proton, 0.187 bytes . The content of a gram of hydrogen gas would be around 1.87 * 6.023 10^22 bytes if we're just talking about the details that can be measured about individual protons, let alone getting into the total entropy of the phase space. (Unrelated: you can get that from normal Boltzmann entropy S = k B ln Ω, just by swapping the natural log for log2, which I found made picturing entropy far more intuitive because I could think about true/false values).

The human brain has an enormous memory potential, about a petabyte, or 2^50 bytes. But even with this massive potential, it's obvious that it could only code and store an infinitesimally small amount of the total information in the objects it hopes to represent. Aside from that, human sensory organs are also far too limited to get at most of this information. Additionally, there is a huge amount of noise in the channels through which the mind accesses this information, as well as errors in the coding process going on in the brain itself.

So a proposition, itself something formed in a code, is necissarily referencing another code that is an extremely compressed and often error ridden representation of an object (or more confusingly, mental abstractions with no direct ties to specific objects, such as propositions about "all cats").

A proposition is necissarily based on and vetted using codes, regardless of if tools are used to help the vetting process.

"The car is red," can be a statement about an actual object, but it's about how that object is to conciousness. This must be, since redness itself isn't a property of light waves except as experienced in conciousness.

I think the confusion comes from thinking that information in the form of codes containing information has to be somehow different in kind from the source of the code. It is different, in that the information is compressed, is stored differently, and has errors, but it doesn't become something totally different. If this were true, the same digital picture shared over and over across the internet is actually millions of different pictures. Different copies of War and Peace would contain different information, and so your propositions about War and Peace wouldn't just be propositions about beliefs about War and Peace, but propositions about beliefs about a particular copy of War and Peace.

Believing a clock is working is something that happens as a result of knowing how to read a clock and looking towards one as a means to know what time it is. Things such as these are not the sort of things that we say have truth conditions. Rather, they are the truth conditions of statements about what's happened, and/or is happening. — creativesoul

OK, so you are contrasting statements and things happening outside statements, and claim that truth values can be attributed only to statements and not to things that happen. Since beliefs are something that happens in the world, they do not have truth values. Is that it? — neomac

No. Believing is not equivalent to belief.

The former is an activity. Activities are not the sort of things that have truth conditions. Activities are not capable of being true or false. Whereas at the core, the latter are compositions of meaningful correlations manifesting in varying complexities drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature capable of doing so.


Regarding the earlier intuitive offense...

I would agree that not all meaningful correlations constitute belief. I mean, all sorts of meaningful things aren't belief. All meaningful things become so as a result of being a part of some creature's correlation(s). All belief consists of correlations, nonetheless. There's still a bit of honing to go on this basic level, for sure. For now though, it's proving to have immense explanatory power.

...since the thread focus is on your & Banno’s positions, not mine, I prefer to keep it that way. — neomac

An interesting response to offer in lieu of a yes or no answer to a simple question. A baffling one when held in light of the subsequent extensive efforts to convince me to adopt your accounting practices.

When we say things like let's "keep it that way", we're presupposing that things have been that way. Your position has been the ground of your objections throughout!

If you want to critique my contributions here, by all means be my guest! The more well considered appropriately placed scrutiny the merrier. I mean, given that one cannot see the flaws in their own work, one cannot recognize their own mistakes should there be any. So, I welcome any and all valid criticism. I am most certainly not beyond reproach.

A good deal of objections I made to your position are not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief, but more on the way we intuitively use belief ascriptions (so on linguistic facts), on what I take to be common knowledge about the debate on belief as propositional attitudes, or propositional calculus, or the internal logic of your claims as far as I understood/misunderstood them.

Knowing what sorts of beliefs that which sorts of creatures can and do have in which sorts of situations and/or circumstances requires knowing what belief is and how it emerges and evolves over time. I am now quite confident that you're working from a gross misunderstanding and/or misconception of belief. As a result, the practice of ascribing belief to another suffers. This holds good regardless of whether or not you hold one of the conventional views/positions.

Since you've been advising that I adopt what I find to be dubious methods based upon specious notions, I've a bit of advice for you.

The notion of a point of view is fraught. Dispense of it. It's nothing more than an aggregate of thought and belief. One's point of view is thought and belief-based. Belief systems emerge and grow in their complexity. Point of views are the result. If you do not have belief right, you'll never have a point of view right either.




Depending upon the complexity, reports of another's belief can be true or false; partly true and partly false; mostly true or mostly false. Surely you get the picture. Our reports of Jack's belief at time t1 are no exception. Any and all reports of what another believes at time t1 must correspond to what the other creature believes at time t1 in order to be true. Our reports of Jack's belief can be true, even when Jack's mistaken and/or false belief cannot be.

To answer your earlier objection regarding my earlier mention of my rendering being more accurate than yours...

"Jack believed that a clock was working at time t1" is the way you've insisted is more acceptable for all the reasons you've been offering, ad nauseum. Here's the glaring problem...

Your report ascribes a belief to Jack that would be true when any clock is working at time t1. Jack's belief cannot be true! Yet you've attributed one to him that is because somewhere there was a clock working at time t1! Jack's belief is false. We all agree there! The disagreement is regarding which accounting practice offers the best rendering of Jack's belief. I'm showing you exactly how your ascription practices fail in the attempts to accurately depict and/or portray Jack's belief at time t1.

So, to reiterate, when it comes to what it would take for Jack's belief to be true, if we adopted your ascription practice, any working clock would suffice to meet the truth conditions of the belief you've insisted on attributing to Jack.

Jack was not just believing that any clock was working. He believed that one particular clock was working. The particular clock that Jack believed to be working was a broken one. At time t1, Jack most certainly believed that that particular broken clock was working.

His belief that that particular clock was working could not have been true! If his belief were rendered as "a clock is working", it would be true if and when any clock was working! So...

No thanks, but I'll stick to my own position on such matters...

Thanks for all the fun, but I gotta run. Toodles!

:flower:

> No. Believing is not equivalent to belief.
The former is an activity. Whereas at the core, the latter are compositions of correlations in varying complexities drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature capable of doing so. Believing is an activity, and as such it is something that happens and/or takes place over an extended period of time.
Some belief can be and/or become true(in the case of predictions), and some cannot(false and/or otherwise mistaken belief). Believing cannot. It's an activity. Activities are not the sort of things that have truth conditions. Activities are not capable of being true or false.

All right, so for you “believing” is an activity with no truth-value while belief is the representational result of the activity “believing”, representational b/c it can be true or false. Is that it?
What is the difference between a proposition and a belief as a “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”?


> An interesting response to offer in lieu of a yes or no answer to a simple question.

If I simply said no, one could be misled into thinking that it is b/c I can’t (which is possible, I don’t have answers for all kinds of challenging philosophical questions) instead of because I don’t want. And I also wanted to profit from your question to point out at a methodological constraint, that it helps not disperse intellectual energies. So far I insisted on two methodological constraints: focused objections, and avoid framing other people's claims. Here is one more: do not open too many fronts of contention at the same time.


> A baffling one when held in light of the subsequent extensive efforts to convince me to adopt your accounting practices. […] When we say things like let's "keep it that way", we're presupposing that things have been that way.

You are missing the larger picture here:

• I’m here in the first place to discuss about your debate with Banno as the main post title is suggesting.
• My main motivation is simply and only my own fun as long as the “philosophical game” we are playing here is challenging to me (based on lots of factors: analysis sharpness, definitional/argumentative clarity, internal theoretical coherence, logic rigor, argumentative originality, honest effort in avoiding sophistry, etc.).
• You are my direct interlocutor in this exchange right but whatever answer I’m giving to you is aiming at a more general audience (whoever is following or might follow our exchange, and find my arguments at least, as interesting as yours, if nor more)
• “My accounting practices” are the common ones, you are the one who wants to reform them. So I’m not personally invested in this exchange as much as you should be.
• I gave up on the idea of convincing people of their own philosophical mistakes ages ago, b/c most of philosophical debates I engaged in or witnessed almost never ended up in a change of philosophical convictions, but at best in an open ended reciprocal challenge. So I take the objective of convincing you as improbable from the start, but also of little interest.
• Concerning my effort of unpacking my ideas, you shouldn’t complain too much, given that you drafted at best only the necessary conditions of the notion "belief", while I drafted necessary and sufficient conditions.

In conclusion, the efforts I’m putting here are justifiably focused around your position on the subject, and motivated by ultimate reasons that have nothing to do with convincing you.


> When we say things like let's "keep it that way", we're presupposing that things have been that way.

This is what the title of the main post is suggesting, and I’m fine with that.


> Your position has been the ground of your objections throughout!

Of course, my position is the ground of my objections. You are absolutely right. What I’m denying is simply that my objections have anything to do with my specific understanding of what belief (or believing) is, that is why there is no need to specify them. Let me summarize some of my arguments for clarity:

• The claim that “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” is not accurate, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief.
• The claim that your argument “Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working?” Is a preposterous example of propositional calculus, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief.
• The claim that Jack believes that a broken clock is working is attributing to Jack a contradictory belief, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief.
• The claim that belief ascription I can not be based on unaccounted knowledge claims, b/c knowledge ascriptions are based on belief ascriptions, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief.
• The claim that belief can not be reduced to “drawing meaningful correlations”, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief.

Besides my first objection is also similar to the ones other people made (which again proves
that it is not directly link to my specific understanding of belief), and since I didn't elaborate further my specific understanding of belief, you do not even have evidences to support the claim that my objections are based on my specific understanding of belief.

Again: focus.

> All belief consists of correlations, nonetheless. There's still a bit of honing to go on this basic level, for sure. For now though, it's proving to have immense explanatory power.

Really? Then show me how this definition is supposed to support your claim that “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” is more accurate than “Jack believes that a clock is working”.

> Your report ascribes a belief to Jack that would be true when any clock is working at time t1. Jack's belief cannot be true!

That is correct but it’s a weak objection b/c we can ascribe to Jack more specific beliefs regarding the clock while always maintaining our common practices. Indeed our ordinary belief ascriptions (linguistic fact) can not be taken out of context (as I claimed since the beginning). That is why I started with examples like “Jack believes that clock is working”. However, as you scroll our past exchanges, you would notice that I’m trying to stick to your examples and claims. So when you started using belief ascription as “Jack believes that a clock is working”, I did the same. But I didn’t make to you the objection you are now making to me, because the focus of my objection was on the contrast between “Jack believes a broken clock is working” and “Jack believes a clock is working”.
Said that, here’s the glaring problem with your objection: the same objection you are making to me can be retorted to you. "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be true for any broken clock at time t1. Of course, you could sill claim that “a broken clock” is a more accurate description than “a clock”, but then “Jack believes a broken clock is working” would still be less accurate than “Jack believes that a clock that ex hypothesi CreativeSoul believes broken, is working” b/c if “a broken clock” is a more accurate description than “a clock”, “a clock that CreativeSoul believes broken” is not only a more accurate description than “a broken clock” but it also matches our ordinary belief ascription practices. Now what's your defense?

Again the focus of my contention is that the accuracy conditions in our common practices of belief ascriptions are not based on whatever level of descriptive accuracy you can come up with but only on those ones that match as best as possible the believer’s p.o.v. in the given circumstances (and if we infringe that rule, this is for pragmatic reasons not for accuracy concerns).

> No thanks, but I'll stick to my own position on such matters…

Pls stick to it in the most challenging way possible (at least, to me).

the same objection you are making to me can be retorted to you. "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be true for any broken clock at time t1. — neomac

You could charge me with the same, but that doesn't make our respective practices guilty of the same offense.

You've ascribed a belief to Jack that is true. I have not. Jack's belief is false. False beliefs cannot be true. Jack's belief cannot be the one you've ascribed to him.

You're not alone in misattributing true belief to another when their belief is false. It's a common occurrence with the accounting malpractices you've been citing for reasons I began to offer earlier.

Gettier and the cottage industry following from Gettier's infamous paper all do exactly the same thing. Do you understand that much about the conventional practices you've insisted on following?

Belief is not equivalent to propositions. Belief is not equivalent to propositional attitudes, such that the believer takes the proposition to be the case or to be true. You keep insisting upon attempting to use conventional accounting practices to take proper account of something that they cannot.

The claim that “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” is not accurate, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief. — neomac

My friend. Despite your objections, it is. Your rejection of the very idea that we can and often do believe that broken clocks are working is directly linked to what you conceive of being a belief.

The claim is about the accuracy of the belief being attributed to Jack by the speaker. An accurate ascription claim will be true. If Jack does not believe that a broken clock is working, then "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be false. If Jack does believe that a broken clock is working, then "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be true.

If you do not have a general understanding of what sorts of things beliefs are, then there could be no possible way for you to know what sorts of ascriptions are accurate, if being so requires being true.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. When Jack is in the process of believing that a broken clock is working he is totally unaware of it. The proposition, assertion, claim, sentence, statement, thought, belief, and/or utterance - a broken clock is working - is always false. Broken clocks do not work. This is all just a matter of how we use the words everyday. We cannot knowingly believe that broken clocks are working, but we can and do believe that they are nonetheless.

Not one iteration I've offered here, despite the overall quantity of slightly different offerings, is ever even capable of being true. They all pass Leibniz's muster. They can all be interchanged and attributed to Jack without any unacceptable change in meaning. Jack's belief is false. As such, it is his belief that determines the truth value of any and all ascriptions thereof. Therefore, any and all ascriptions to Jack must be of false belief. That is to say, that any and all true attribution of belief to Jack at time t1 will be of some belief that it is humanly impossible to knowingly believe.

:flower:

All right, so for you “believing” is an activity with no truth-value while belief is the representational result of the activity “believing”, representational b/c it can be true or false. Is that it? — neomac

No. I did not say all that either. How many strikes do we get before we're counted out?

What is the difference between a proposition and a belief as a “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”?

All sorts of differences. I'll set out a one worth delving into...

Propositions are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. The same is not true of all belief.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. The same is not true of all belief. — creativesoul

What is naming and descriptive practices if not the use of symbols to refer to things that are not symbols (or else you'd have an infinite regress of readers never getting at what you're naming and describing)‽

What is the redness and shape of the apple if not a description of how ripe the apple is and its location relative to you?

Just as scribbles are not the thing they are about, colors and shapes in the mind are not what the thing being observed is (naive vs indirect realism; observation vs thing being observed; map vs territory). Maps are propositions about the territory made with lines and shapes, no different than if you just typed scribbles (lines and shapes) describing objects and their location in the territory.

It seems contradictory to assert that black scribbles mean things, but red apples don't mean anything. So a red apple is just as propositional and descriptive as a string of black scribbles.

Beliefs are dependent upon observations as a preliminary justification for some belief.