You're missing the point. It is still good to benefit me. — DA671
I have said multiple times that just because we have a reason to help someone, it doesn't mean that we have to do it. — DA671
Just because we believe something, it doesn't mean it's true. — DA671
If this were the case, then I suppose one could summarily dismiss antinatalism on the basis that most people do believe that having children is good and so is the preservation of the positive aspects of life. — DA671
You have described the argument, as did I, but not addressed my criticisms of it. — Bartricks
Sometimes we wish to close the door in front of us not only because the room in front of us looks bad, but also because leaving the majestic hall one is in would hardly be desirable ;) — DA671
focus on removing extreme harms before chasing minor pleasures. — DA671
Stopping thoughtless procreation would definitely go a long way in helping this endeavour. — DA671
Suicide is about as much evidence as the love people feel for life is evidence for the claim that the absence of happiness is bad even if nobody needs it (since many people want to keep living for as long as possible) but the absence of pain isn't (since many people don't seem to care about the fact that potential harm would also be averted, which might be the reason why many people want to preserve life even in instances of severe harm). — DA671
I do not think so. I think it is more likely that we have not turned on all the lights. The place could turn bad, sure, but it is not always the case. — DA671
Why? Do my criticisms of it fail - in what way? — Bartricks
He might have this wrong but I'd be prepared to grant it for the sake of argument.“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives” — Benatar
you're not focussing on what this thread is about - which is the credibility of the asymmetry, not the credibility of antinatalism — Bartricks
"Neutral" state of affairs might be better than bad ones (such as harm), but they are also worse than good ones (such as happiness). In light of this, I do think that if it can be good to prevent harms, it can also be bad to prevent potential joys. — DA671
I think the asymmetry is this:
Scenario A. Person exists: Presence of benefit = good, Presence of harm = bad
Scenario B. Person does not exist: Absence of harm = good. Absence of benefit = not bad
By not procreating we can prevent suffering without depriving anyone of good. So there is net benefit. — Cuthbert
"The asymmetry cannot be properly explained and it is a special case of a more general asymmetry." — Cuthbert
But if he can establish that the asymmetry also exists in the special case then that is enough for the argument to work. — Cuthbert
"We might pre-exist and suffer harm from not being brought into existence." — Cuthbert
True, we might, but it's a big assumption and we have no way of telling whether it's true or false or how happy or unhappy pre-existent persons may be. So it should not figure in our calculus of happiness. — Cuthbert
I gave a reason why the asymmetry, despite being valid in consideration of people as consumers of pain and pleasure, fails when we add their role as producers. The pain of a childless couple can be mitigated in one way only. — Cuthbert
My second argument was attacking the asymmetry indirectly. If asymmetry is sound, then nihilism follows. We already reject nihilism. So we can reject the asymmetry without even knowing in detail what might be wrong with it. — Cuthbert
Your 1st point: No explanation for Benatar's asymmetry. — Agent Smith
Suffering has more weightage than joy; people want to get rid of pain more than they want to acquire joy. Put simply the priority, first objective, is to end pain (at all costs); only after that can we discuss pleasure. — Agent Smith
I mentioned suicide as evidence. People don't mind/even prefer nonexistence to pain and this basically proves Benatar's asymmetry: absence of pain is good even when there's no one to experience it + the absence of pleasure is bad only when there's someone who exists and experiences that absence. — Agent Smith
Your 3rd point: Preexistence nullifies the asymmetery. I'm afraid that isn't correct. Benatar's asymmetry applies to all existence involving suffering and the ability to opt out (suicide). — Agent Smith
I am saying that Benatar's asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life cases, for Benatar's asymmetry has no self-evidence to it. — Bartricks
If you put quote marks around something you're saying it is a quote — Bartricks
Irrelevant. That's not a criticism of the asymmetry. — Bartricks
...we can explain the asymmetry by appeal to self-evident truths of reason about desert.. The explanation of why we have no positive obligation to create the happy life is that the happiness in question is non-deserved and thus we have no positive reason to perform an action that generates it. By contrast, we have positive obligation not to create the miserable life because the misery is undeserved and we have positive reason not to perform acts that create undeserved harm. — Bartricks
“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives” — Benatar
I don't think Benatar is/has to explaining/explain the asymmetry. — Agent Smith
Preexistence doesn't affect Benatar's asymmetry. The same argument applies to all instances of existence. — Agent Smith
That is interesting particularly because Benatar makes the same (I think) point:
“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives”
— Benatar — Cuthbert
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