We never can properly say how objects in the world are tied together....
— Mww
Physics does that, though. — Wayfarer
n Kant, “directional flow of energy” aside, this affect/desire is separable, as affects on the subject, and desires of the subject, differences in principles, origins and manifestations being rather obvious, I should think. The judgements here are aesthetic, concepts relate to each other, the imagination is “...productive...”, practical reason being the logical arbiter. — Mww
Kant doesn't see that noumena is just a term for what is in the phenomenological "presence". Experience itself is thoroughly noumenal. There is an insight here that is elusive, slippery. One way to say it is this: we live an breathe metaphysics. We think of metaphysics as being impossibly remote (like Kant does in the transcendental dialectic) but this is all wrong, simply put. — Astrophel
Such are the ‘logical’ constraints of language, which positions the reader/observer always outside any description of reality — Possibility
What a tantalising response. Can you say more about experience itself being noumenal? — Tom Storm
Such are the ‘logical’ constraints of language, which positions the reader/observer always outside any description of reality
— Possibility
This is true, but Kantian metaphysics has nothing to do with the logical restraints of language, per se. It is not concerned with the reader/observer, but of the thinker. The logical restraints of reason, now, which has no need of language, is itself sufficient causality for the thinking subject to be the immediate describer of reality, or, in fact, anything at all, hence cannot be outside such descriptions. — Mww
But in the "contradiction" between finitude and infinity, one looks for the ground where the finite simply ends, and off everything goes to infinity. Given the finite, the limited, the well structured and familiar, I see no "place" where this can stand apart from infinity. Infinity does not have its termination anywhere, but rather "runs through" all that is. If infinity is taken as a mere extension of the familiar, as in a sequence of negative time moments that has no end or a spatial extension of "further ons" with no end (both Kant denies in any way describes noumena, of course) then all we have is a concept of infinity that is, if you will, finitized, made finite. Pointless to even bother taking seriously if this is the best one can do, and Kant thought this the case. Clearly not what Eckhart had in mind with God. With him there is something entirely Other. And this Other is not the vacuous noumena of Kant. — Astrophel
yet the thinker, even as the immediate describer of reality, is to an extent other than their description. — Possibility
....when we describe a logical reality.... — Possibility
the key to his (Kant’s) philosophy (in light of the TTC) is to recognise that when we describe a logical reality, we do so from an affected position, using a relative schema. — Possibility
To the extent that we claim a logical position ourselves as describer, our resulting description is also relative, affected. — Possibility
Thanks for the thoughtful response. Mysticism I am familiar with but I have no idea what the rest of what you say means but will read it again later and see if I can unravel it. I am not a philosopher and the idea of infinity has never captured my attention. — Tom Storm
I am trying to understand an essential difference between Kant's version of idealism and versions of idealism which came before him. — Tom Storm
Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm
Is there any simple way of describing how this is might be understood to actually work? — Tom Storm
Could dying then be taken as an example of receiving direct feedback from the noumenal world? — Tom Storm
But this possibility cannot be determined by reason. — Fooloso4
The manifold of sensations are processed according the structure of the mind, what he calls the "categories of the understanding". — Fooloso4
Things as they are in themselves are not accessible to us, only things as they are for us. Although they are not accessible to us they are an essential part of experience. In short, they do have physical form. — Fooloso4
There seems to be significant difference and disagreement amongst the positions held by phenomenologists - Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty. I understand Merleau-Ponty rejects Husserl's transcendental reduction and intentionality. I wonder how anyone can tell which reading is faithful and who has the preferred approach? If you say that as a mere reader you can discern each position as intended and from this determine which approach is more helpful, then I must assume your mind is as penetrating and original as the author's. — Tom Storm
I am curious about what structures of the mind can mean when understood more deeply. — Tom Storm
Can we say from this that Kant's idealism is a form of naturalism? — Tom Storm
Can we say from this that Kant's idealism is a form of naturalism? — Tom Storm
The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequentially whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a perhaps more extended use not restricted merely to objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was solely a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of using the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, pg 259
For instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgement is as yet a judgement of perception only; I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to each other. But if I would have it called a judgement of experience, I require this connection to stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances. — ibid. 299
Can we say from this that Kant's idealism is a form of naturalism? — Tom Storm
which reduces to.....no science is ever done without first being thought. — Mww
Far, far more interesting and important is the non rational nature what is in the world. The extraordinary affectivity is where we find the substance of our existence. — Astrophel
I'm not sure what you are getting at. Since you say "understood more deeply" I assume you are not inquiring about what the categories are. — Fooloso4
How would a logical reality even be recognized as such, if the system that views it isn’t itself logical? It would appear then, we do not describe a logical reality, but rather, we describe a reality logically. — Mww
Why should that be? Why care what the non-ration nature of the world includes, if it must still be met with our particular, human, method of understanding it? Even if we can say we find the substance, or, that there is substance found, by its affectivity on us, it remains a condition of human nature to determine both what it is, and how it relates to other substances.
That non-rational nature is indispensable is given, but it isn’t all there is. — Mww
Which is to say, consciousness is other than its content. I think this an unnecessary reduction. A describer that does not describe is a contradiction, and a description that does not arise from a describer, is impossible. Parsimony, and good philosophy, suggests the thinker and his thoughts are, if not identical, than at least indistinguishable. — Mww
We know our descriptions are logically constructed, but we don't know whether what we describe, prior to our descriptions of it, is logically constructed. — Janus
Of course, (....) what does it matter, what could it matter? — Janus
Reason is empty. Necessary for dividing the world up into things and their properties, but without intuitions, empty, as Kant said. — Astrophel
Add sensory intuitions and it is still empty. — Astrophel
Dewey had it right: our experiences are all "consummatory", that is, inherently aesthetic as well as pragmatic/rational. — Astrophel
A thinker is not identical to his thoughts.... — Possibility
a description that does not arise from a describer, is impossible....
— Mww
A description does not arise wholly from a describer, but consists of the relation between describer and schema. — Possibility
I’m not suggesting that describer, description or even schema exist without the other two. Reality is triadic - that’s my point. — Possibility
describer is pure affect and schema is pure relation. — Possibility
What he (Kant) didn’t appear to realise was that it was never a matter of the subject in a dyadic relation to object. — Possibility
Hmmm. I won’t attempt to argue your assertion; you are quite welcome to it, and may even be able to justify it. But the qualified assertion is wrong. Kant says concepts without intuitions are empty. Actually, void, but, not quibble-worthy. — Mww
Momentarily granting the assertion, reason being empty with or without intuitions merely makes explicit the alleged emptiness of reason is unaffected by intuitions, which is correct, insofar as reason is unaffected by intuitions whether or not it is empty.
What do you mean by empty, and what do you think reason is, such that it could be empty?
———— — Mww
Kant also accounts for that duality. So if Dewey got it right, but Kant got it right first..... — Mww
Kant says concepts without intuitions are empty. Actually, void, but, not quibble-worthy.
— Mww
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. That is a quote. This is really the basis of the transcendental dialectic. — Astrophel
What do you mean by empty, and what do you think reason is, such that it could be empty?
— Mww
This would be a challenge to the idea that all you need is sensory intuitions and concepts and therefore you have meaning. — Astrophel
No, we don’t, but there comes from the possibility, that damnable, cursed transcendental illusion, in that we know we construct logically predicated on our intelligence, then it follows that if reality is logically constructed, reality is its own form of intelligence. — Mww
That reality may be constructed logically does not necessarily imply reality is its own intelligence, when it could just as possibly be that reality is constructed logically by an intelligence that so constructs in its own right. — Mww
I can’t find a reference for reason being empty, and without a citation, I have nothing by which to judge your assertion, mostly because I don’t think Kant said anything of the sort. — Mww
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.