Obviously, the societies of the time have something to do with the characteristics of their God, but I was interested in knowing what you thought about the idea of there actually existing only one God, which is identified under different names/personalities across all global religions. — Javants

The problem is that many societies don't accept that there is only one god. How can there really only be one god that is identified across all societies just by different names when a single society might identify a half dozen gods all having different abilities?

Obviously, the societies of the time have something to do with the characteristics of their God, but I was interested in knowing what you thought about the idea of there actually existing only one God, which is identified under different names/personalities across all global religions. — Javants

Isn't that fundamental to the idea of "God", that there is only one God. And despite what you might say about God, you are saying it about that one and only God. The reason why different people attribute different properties to God is that they don't know God very well.

The idea that different representations of God, are actually different gods, is based in the atheist assumption that the representation is the god, i.e. that God is a fiction.

Isn't that fundamental to the idea of "God", that there is only one God. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, many cultures don't accept monotheism. It's even arguable that Christianity isn't monotheistic entirely, especially Mormonism.

No, many cultures don't accept monotheism. It's even arguable that Christianity isn't monotheistic entirely, especially Mormonism. — Hanover

Those cultures which are not monotheist don't believe in God, do they?

Those cultures which are not monotheist don't believe in God, do they? — Metaphysician Undercover

Funny you should ask this during Passover, which celebrates the Jew's exodus from Egypt. So the story goes, the Jews were held in slavery by the oppressive pharaoh and not until God exacted 10 plagues of increasing severity did Pharaoh relent and release the Jews. The whole story can be found at Exodus chapters 7 to 11. Read it carefully. The purpose of God's (the Hebrew God) plagues was not to prove there was only one god, but to prove he was the most powerful god of them all. That is, his plagues showed his supremacy over the Egyptian gods. This makes clear that these ancient Hebrews were not entirely monotheistic, but were actually just of the opinion they had the best of all gods. It also shows that the Egyptians also believed in God, despite having their own inferior god. To be sure, though, their belief was more empirical than faith based, considering they experienced the plagues first hand.

Another example is Mormonism, although I claim no scholarship there. My understanding is they treat the trinity as three separate entities, thus causing some to claim they are a polytheistic religion. It's less important whether they are ultimately polytheistic than whether one can hypothetically believe in God and be polytheistic. It seems one could, especially if one held that the father, the son, and the holy ghost were 3 different things. I do know that Mormons find the concept of the trinity as set forth in Catholicism and most of Protestantism to be incoherent nonsense.

I do know that Mormons find the concept of the trinity as set forth in Catholicism and most of Protestantism to be incoherent nonsense. — Hanover

Some of us pretty much heretic protestants and catholics find the concept of the trinity kind of incoherent and nonsensical too. Press a priest and you get "It is a mystery." I'll say it's a mystery, all right.

As has been mentioned, in Christianity, the Trinity (God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit) is considered to be one being with three different 'faces'. As you said about Mormonism, some denominations of Christianity choose to interpret the Trinity as three separate beings. Could the same not be true about polytheistic religions, without being explicitly stated? In other words, all the Gods of that pantheon are, in fact, just the different personalities of the same God, which are being perceived as different beings.

As has been mentioned, in Christianity, the Trinity (God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit) is considered to be one being with three different 'faces'. As you said about Mormonism, some denominations of Christianity choose to interpret the Trinity as three separate beings. — Javants

This strikes me as a very non- Mormon comment. I'd expect their response to be that you've chosen to misinterpret the meaning of the trinity.

Could the same not be true about polytheistic religions, without being explicitly stated? In other words, all the Gods of that pantheon are, in fact, just the different personalities of the same God, which are being perceived as different beings. — Javants

I suppose you could say that if you were hell bent on modifying other people's beliefs to make them compatible to your own.

I know. It's a mystery how something so incoherent can be a centerpiece to a belief system.

Throughout history, 'God' has been described in various ways — Javants

However, the wise know that the supreme principle is always beyond description.

Obviously, the societies of the time have something to do with the characteristics of their God, but I was interested in knowing what you thought about the idea of there actually existing only one God, which is identified under different names/personalities across all global religions. — Javants

I think the idea of a single God that presents itself differently to different cultures is an interesting one, and so is the idea of multiple gods.

I cannot see any way that we can figure out which of these is the case - or whether it's something else entirely - maybe no gods, maybe we are all gods, maybe we are all god.

I am not in a special hurry to die, but one of the things to look forward to about it is that, if there is a god or gods waiting until we die to reveal itself, that will be a nice surprise (as long as it isn't a horrid god).

God may not be revealed to you at the time of your death. I think the Christian notion, anyway, is that resurrection happens only at a later time. There may be some Purgatory waiting for you.

Some of us pretty much heretic protestants and catholics find the concept of the trinity kind of incoherent and nonsensical too. Press a priest and you get "It is a mystery." I'll say it's a mystery, all right. — Bitter Crank

The classical depiction of the Trinity:

You will notice:
F = G
S = G
H = G

But:
F =/= S
F =/= H
S =/= H

Are we to understand that identity is not a transitive relation, or does Christianity claim for itself a special brand of "theological" logic, to which the normal rules of inference do not apply?

I've seen the trinity expressed as "Father", "Son", and "Holy Spirit". Holy spirit refers to the relationship between father and son. There is no father without a son, and no son without a father. So the existence of both Father and Son is dependent on the existence of Holy Spirit. Remember, God is supposed to be immaterial, having the same type of existence as a concept. Introduce the notion of a daughter and we could have a father without a son, thus breaking the logic of the trinity.

Remember, God is supposed to be immaterial, having the same type of existence as a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

If concepts are here taken to be abstract objects, then I would disagree with this contention, as abstract objects lack causal efficacy, and any God worth believing in does have such efficacy.

If concepts are taken to be mental states of some sort, then this analogy may be closer to the mark, provided we do not adhere to an identity theory of mind, wherein mental states are identical to the physical states which realize them (as that would imply that God is physical, contradicting the premise that he's immaterial). If the ontology of mental states is understood as a substance dualist might understand them, i.e. as non-material entities possessing causal efficacy, then God might fit that bill.

If concepts are here taken to be abstract objects, then I would disagree with this contention, as abstract objects lack causal efficacy, and any God worth believing in does have such efficacy. — Arkady

You don't think that the concept of a circle, pi, the right angle, or the Pythagorean theorem have any causal efficacy? I beg to differ.

If concepts are taken to be mental states of some sort, then this analogy may be closer to the mark, provided we do not adhere to an identity theory of mind, wherein mental states are identical to the physical states which realize them (as that would imply that God is physical, contradicting the premise that he's immaterial). — Arkady

I agree, this would be a problem, but there is no reason to adhere to an identity theory of mind. If a concept is a mental state, it is an unchanging state of mind, an idea, held like a belief. When referring to the physical brain, there is no such thing as a "physical state", because the brain is continuously active, even in sleep. So there cannot be "identity" between these two.

You don't think that the concept of a circle, pi, the right angle, or the Pythagorean theorem have any causal efficacy? I beg to differ. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said that if concepts are taken to be abstract objects, then they lack causal efficacy, by definition of abstract object.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/#CausInefCrit

Well I probably don't agree with your definition of "abstract object" then. I just constructed a building. I used the Pythagorean Theorem (abstract object) to lay out a square foundation. Are you claiming that the Pythagorean Theorem is not a cause of the building being square? Or are you saying that the Pythagorean Theorem is not an abstract object?

Well I probably don't agree with your definition of "abstract object" then. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you have an idiosyncratic definition of the term, which is at odds with its actual usage in philosophy. That being the case, then I see no point in continuing to talk about it, as a conversation in which the participants don't even agree on the definitions of basic terminology is bound to be unfruitful.

Well, I'm a philosophy graduate and I've been exposed to much usage of the terms. According to your link, your definition is provided by Frege, who defines an abstract object as "causally inefficacious". So I think it's really you who is trying to restrict usage to an idiosyncratic definition.

That being the case, then I see no point in continuing to talk about it, as a conversation in which the participants don't even agree on the definition of basic terminology is bound to be unfruitful. — Arkady

Those who define their terms such that their arguments are simply begging the question, and then refuse to examine their definitions, shouldn't even bother with philosophy.

I've not begged the question, and, speaking of the article, you may note that it says "According to the most widely accepted versions of the Way of Negation: An object is abstract (if and) only if it is causally inefficacious." But, I suppose that point is moot now. Cheers.

Well I probably don't agree with your definition of "abstract object" then. I just constructed a building. I used the Pythagorean Theorem (abstract object) to lay out a square foundation. Are you claiming that the Pythagorean Theorem is not a cause of the building being square? Or are you saying that the Pythagorean Theorem is not an abstract object? — Metaphysician Undercover

If the Pythagorean Theorem is causally efficacious then it just isn't an abstract object according to Frege's definition (even if it's an abstract object according to your definition). But this is hardly an important issue. We can do away with the term "abstract" if it helps avoid unnecessary semantic disputes.

To better explain this, I'll refer to the SEP article:

"This illustrates a general point: when technical terminology is introduced in philosophy by means of examples but without explicit definition or theoretical elaboration, the resulting vocabulary is often vague or indeterminate in reference. In such cases, it is normally pointless to seek a single correct account. A philosopher may find himself asking questions like, ‘What is idealism?’ or ‘What is a substance?’ and treating these questions as difficult questions about the underlying nature of a certain determinate philosophical category. A better approach is to recognize that in many cases of this sort, we simply have not made up our minds about how the term is to be understood, and that what we seek is not a precise account of what this term already means, but rather a proposal for how it might fruitfully be used in the future.".

The actual philosophical issue (as opposed to just terminological) is whether or not the Pythagorean Theorem is causally efficacious. You say it is, but others say it isn't. Instead they'd say that you used your hands to lay out a square foundation, and that the movement of your hands was causally influenced by electrical activity in the brain. The Pythagorean Theorem isn't to be equated (or so some say) with any of the physical processes that actually caused your body to move the way it did, and so isn't the cause of the building being square.

I am at best ambivalent about believing that God in any form exists, so I'm probably not a very reliable witness to the validity of the Trinity. On many days I'm pretty sure He doesn't exist at all. But still, the Trinity seems to me to be an utterly unnecessary contrivance even for ardent believers.

An all powerful, all knowing, all present God just doesn't need this divine ménage à trois. Whatever happened, the omni-etc. unitary being (God, period) is perfectly capable of doing it. The cosmos-creating god can manage a few miracles and can comfort a bunch of troubled believers without needing to add personnel to himself, or play different roles.

So I guess I would be a Unitarian on the days that I ambivalently believe anything about God's existence.

All that aside, I understand that the Trinity has a long history, and the trinitarian formulation was uttered as early as the second century.

The first of the early church fathers to be recorded using the word "Trinity" was Theophilus of Antioch writing in the late 2nd century. He defines the Trinity as God, His Word (Logos) and His Wisdom (Sophia) -- so says Wikipedia.

Aside from the difficulty of extricating the trinitarian invocation from ritual (along with cross-sign-making) the trinity is also a major plank in the creed. Not much chance of revisiting the Council of Nicaea (325 a.d.) at this point.

Besides the theological investment in the Trinity, there would be many expenses involved in dropping it. Billions would need to be spent renaming buildings, institutions, and colleges, plus all the stationary that would have to be reprinted. Then the behavioral therapy to suppress sign-of-the-cross making among Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and Orthodox would be high. (It would be a boom for pavlovians or skinnerians, though. That's a plus.)

An all powerful, all knowing, all present God just doesn't need this divine ménage à trois. Whatever happened, the omni-etc. unitary being (God, period) is perfectly capable of doing it. — Bitter Crank

I'm not an expert on the historical aspect of the Trinity, but I would imagine its development was motivated at least in part to reconcile the apparent tension for Christians in believing that God is unitary and yet also had son who was himself God.

Of course, some Christians also maintain that God is simple, which itself seems to be in some tension with Trinitarian ideas.

One interesting interpretation of God and Jesus is that God became Jesus, and ceased being God. The death of God? Yes, at a particular time for a particular reason. In Jesus, God poured himself into this world.

This theory doesn't do much for people who thought God was part of this world anyway, and it does nothing for people who were planning on meeting God in heaven. God isn't in heaven anymore. I haven't heard what actually is in heaven, these days; maybe just unsupervised spirits of the deceased -- perish the thought. This theory doesn't do much for people who thought that God was co-terminus with the cosmos.

Abstracts are not causally inefficient if regarded as constraints or delimiting factors in the interactions of objects. The fact that so much of physics has been discovered by mathematical analysis is an indication of that - science has discovered things, like neutrinos, that are implied by the mathematics, so to speak - the maths 'shows they must exist'. So, agree with Metaphysician Undiscovered's point - the idea that abstracts are not causal comes from too narrow a definition of 'cause'.

As regards the Trinity - comparative religion notes the idea of 'the three' in many different religious cultures. There is a Hindu trinity - Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, as the Creator, Maintainer and Destroyer of worlds. There is also a trinity in Mahāyāna Buddhism - the Tri-Kaya, or Three Bodies of the Buddha. I think a Jungian analysis would be, these represent an archetypal structure or form which appears universal.

Purgatory? Sure - that's one of very, very many eschatological theories. Won't it be fun finding out which one is more accurate?

"Whereof one cannot speak..." was never so true as in theology.

Anything said about god is wrong.

It seems more like it is the holding of ideas by concrete individuals which is causally efficacious. I cannot see how the idea of formal constraints as being causally efficacious makes sense, because the idea of causal efficacy just is the idea of efficient causality, and to say that formal causality is efficient would be to dissolve the distinction between efficient and formal causality. I don't believe we even have a coherent notion of formal causation, as we at least do of efficient causation.

So, for example if the laws of nature are real, acting constraints, rather than merely abstract formulations of what is observed and conceived as generalities, then they cannot rightly be thought of as merely abstract entities.

Perhaps we may never find anything out about it...
:-O