Rights, schmights.

The only rights worth speaking of are legal rights; that is to say, those are the only rights which matter, as they are (generally) recognized and may be enforced. We may claim we have rights of all kinds, of course, and ascribe them to God or Nature--for all the good it will do us--but unless they're recognized in the law we're merely expressing our self-regard.

Rights in the law serve the purpose of restricting the government and others from restricting us from doing, saying or thinking what we wish, or at least discouraging them from doing so and making them subject to penalty in that event. It's not clear to me that a conception of something along the lines of inalienable rights granted us in some obscure manner by a creator or inherent in the universe is needed to serve such a purpose, however.

Ah well, thought I'd make a statement.

(Y)

Rights, schmights.

The only rights worth speaking of are legal rights; that is to say, those are the only rights which matter, as they are (generally) recognized and may be enforced. We may claim we have rights of all kinds, of course, and ascribe them to God or Nature--for all the good it will do us--but unless they're recognized in the law we're merely expressing our self-regard.

Rights in the law serve the purpose of restricting the government and others from restricting us from doing, saying or thinking what we wish, or at least discouraging them from doing so and making them subject to penalty in that event. It's not clear to me that a conception of something along the lines of inalienable rights granted us in some obscure manner by a creator or inherent in the universe is needed to serve such a purpose, however.

Ah well, thought I'd make a statement. — Ciceronianus the White

Although I agree with the general idea, I think you're forgetting non-legal rules that are recognised and enforced, e.g. employment, family, religion, etc.

But can't there be an unjust government and unjust laws? If so, it seems the government and laws are being judged by a higher authority.

Although I agree with the general idea, I think you're forgetting non-legal rules that are recognised and enforced, e.g. employment, family, religion, etc — Michael

I'm not sure what you mean. There certainly are non-legal rules, i.e. rules of conduct which are generally observed without being law, but I don't think they're necessarily founded on the concept of "rights."

But can't there be an unjust government and unjust laws? If so, it seems the government and laws are being judged by a higher authority. — Hanover

There are both. I don't think there is a higher authority who acts as a judge would, though, nor do I think one is required for that purpose. I don't think we need a notion of non-legal rights in order to maintain that governments and laws are bad.

When we speak of having a right to do something, or of our rights being infringed, I think we say simply that we should be allowed to do, say or think something or that someone should not be preventing us from doing, saying or thinking something. I personally find it difficult to maintain that God says I--or anyone else for that matter--should be allowed to do, etc., something, or that it is a law of nature that I of anyone else should be allowed to do, etc., something.

I don't think we need a notion of non-legal rights in order to maintain that governments and laws are bad. — Ciceronianus the White

Non-legal rights are just another way of saying what morality requires, but I don't see the quibble over whether to call them "rights" or not is significant. We typically speak in terms of our moral duties to others, which would imply the other person has a certain right to be treated a particular way, and none of that implicates law.

I personally find it difficult to maintain that God says I--or anyone else for that matter--should be allowed to do, etc., something, — Ciceronianus the White

Such is the quandary of the non-religious in offering a foundation for morality in every instance. I'm not suggesting that God is necessary to be moral, but removal of some higher authority from the equation does make it difficult to explain why your moral beliefs are more correct than another's.

Regardless of where you think these higher order duties derive, I suspect that you find them to exist absolutely. That is, a government that passes a law killing all of a particular hair color would be wrong, and they'd be wrong for their violations against those people. If you set forth what rule it is that you believe is being violated, then you are declaring a non-legal rule which trumps legal rules. This higher order rule is, for lack of a better term, a natural law. In fact, I would assume your fidelity to right and wrong in a non-legal sense is higher than your fidelity to legislatively passed law, as the latter you realize is the just the best work of a group of lawmakers, as opposed to the former which is the way things truly are.

I'm not sure what you mean. There certainly are non-legal rules, i.e. rules of conduct which are generally observed without being law, but I don't think they're necessarily founded on the concept of "rights." — Ciceronianus the White

Just as we might say that I don't have the right to kill my neighbour because the law forbids it we might also say that a child doesn't have the right to stay up all night because their parents forbid it.

But can't there be an unjust government and unjust laws? If so, it seems the government and laws are being judged by a higher authority. — Hanover

I don't think that a higher authority is required. We can talk about it being unfair for women to have to compete with men in certain sports without referring to something like a God. So why not talk about governments and laws being unjust without referring to something like a God? Perhaps justice is like fairness.

What I have done so far, as the debate has gotten rather lengthy, is put together a shorter response which formulates the answer properly, and posted it as a separate thread here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1287/on-the-practical-application-of-natural-rights

I'm not suggesting that God is necessary to be moral, but removal of some higher authority from the equation does make it difficult to explain why your moral beliefs are more correct than another's. — Hanover

That's what ethical theory is for (and the higher authority is shared human values like life and liberty not some ineffable superbeing with a carrot and a stick) "God" doesn't help at all. In fact, "God" is as often used as an excuse for bad law as good. Sometimes, insanely bad. And "God" can be shown to be on pretty much anyone's side with enough cherry picking. If you want to know how to make fair laws, read Rawls not the Bible, Quran, Torah etc. Unless you want to live in a theocracy.

'Fairness' is not the objective of natural rights at all. You will find the explanation of that at the beginning of my summary on this thread at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1287/on-the-practical-application-of-natural-rights

Thanks ernestm. Would you mind just sending me a list of all the links you have to everywhere so I know that everything I say is wrong before I say it? Alternatively, you could just quote my post and address my actual point. Either or.

Well the problem you place to me is that your confusion is so fundamental, I would have to write another 2,000 words to answer it. So I already wrote it for you as succinctly as I can.

Well that reply and five bucks will buy you a coffee and a worthless article on the internet written by some pompous twit with zero social skills.

As I see it, if I spend 8 hours editing down what I write so that it is easier to read for everone, that is of far greater utility than spending 8 hours repeating the same things, which less attention to detail, for you. And the section at the top, which answers your issue, is now only 500 words instead of 2,000. but as you now resorted to ad hominem, I now know you are really no more than a bully, so don't expect anything else from me specifically for you.

Please don't deprive Baden, he spoke impetuously. For me, just give him one more chance to drink of your wisdom.

Well, that is the first kind word out of you )

I have completed draft of the topic https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1287/on-the-practical-application-of-natural-rights#

This will be my second article submission on the philosophy forum. My first, on 'formal logic in the post-truth era' has already been accepted and is undergoing minor copy editing.

Non-legal rights are just another way of saying what morality requires, but I don't see the quibble over whether to call them "rights" or not is significant. We typically speak in terms of our moral duties to others, which would imply the other person has a certain right to be treated a particular way, and none of that implicates law. — Hanover

I think it's more appropriate to say we should or should not treat another person a certain way, rather than he/she has a "right" to be treated or not treated in a certain way. To say we have "rights" which are unenforceable, and may be flaunted at will--which are not, in other words, legal rights--makes little sense to me. I think it's much like saying "I have a right which should be enforceable and which you should not flaunt, but I can't enforce it nor can you be penalized for infringing it. It is, nonetheless, a right." That, for me, is confusing.

Such is the quandary of the non-religious in offering a foundation for morality in every instance. I'm not suggesting that God is necessary to be moral, but removal of some higher authority from the equation does make it difficult to explain why your moral beliefs are more correct than another's. — Hanover

There is no quandary presented, though, unless you think it necessary that the creator or governor of the immense universe thinks, or has somehow mandated, we creatures living here have certain "rights" or has granted us such, in order for there to be moral conduct.

I think it's more appropriate to say we should or should not treat another person a certain way, rather than he/she has a "right" to be treated or not treated in a certain way. To say we have "rights" which are unenforceable, and may be flaunted at will--which are not, in other words, legal rights--makes little sense to me. — Ciceronianus the White

I think the reason it does not make sense to you is that the view you are approaching the issue from the wrong end of the stick. To quote from my above submission https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1287/on-the-practical-application-of-natural-rights#

If everyone can pursue happiness, Locke reasoned, then more people act for the greater good, resulting in betterment of society. That is the objective of positive law. It is not ‘positive law’ because rights are entitlements, rather than restrictions. It is positive law because its objective is to enable good....

....In practical applications, the correct approach is thus not "what rights do I have which the government may not take away?" That would be viewing rights as entitlements. The correct question is: "what authority must the government have to maximize everyone's rights?" That results in the greatest amount of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness; and hence the greatest prosperity and well being of all.

I think it's more appropriate to say we should or should not treat another person a certain way, rather than he/she has a "right" to be treated or not treated in a certain way. — Ciceronianus the White

That's a quibble really. I think it makes perfect sense to say "I have a right to be treated with dignity" as much as it is to say "You should treat me with dignity." I also think that enforcement can take on many forms, from legal enforcement, to military action, to negative feedback, to ostracism. If you treat your wife, for example, in a manner unacceptable to her, she has a whole slew of methods to enforce the way she think she has a right to be treated.

There is no quandary presented, though, unless you think it necessary that the creator or governor of the immense universe thinks, or has somehow mandated, we creatures living here have certain "rights" or has granted us such, in order for there to be moral conduct. — Ciceronianus the White

If it isn't a quandary, what right do the women in Saudi Arabia (for example) have to be treated equal to men? A. there is no enforcement mechanism, and B. there is no higher good demanding such equality.

I think it makes perfect sense to say "I have a right to be treated with dignity" as much as it is to say "You should treat me with dignity." — Hanover

It makes perfect sense, but it has nothing to do with the USA's natural rights. The government has no authority to enforce good manners, except where it interferes with due process. So it is really nothing to do with this topic.

You say that because you insist that there is no other way to define natural rights other than the way Locke did, which isn't directly related to this post either, considering your question was who was the smartestest, Hamilton or Jefferson.

As I recall, our conversation left off with your explaining that the death penalty was inconsistent with the natural rights expounded by Jefferson and Locke, despite them saying otherwise, thus making you more an expert in Locke and Jefferson than Locke or Jefferson.

You hold the distinction of being one of the few people I've met here who actually fail the Turing Test from time to time, simply reciting text in response to various questions and then reciting insults when called out on your inability to respond to questions.

No, I say that because this topic is about Hamilton vs. Jefferson, and assigned from one revisionist historian, it is generally accepted that Jefferson derived his theory of natural rights from Locke.

Instead of moderating this thread, maybe respond to the fact that you pontificated on Jefferson's opposition to the death penalty despite the fact that he explicitly stated he was in favor of it, and, if you get a chance, explain why abortion is permissible pre-viability, despite there being no way to infer the viability criteria from natural rights theory.

That's a quibble really. I think it makes perfect sense to say "I have a right to be treated with dignity" as much as it is to say "You should treat me with dignity." — Hanover

I don't think it's a quibble. The meaning of "I have a right..." is quite different to the meaning of "You should...". Although we might say that you should treat me with dignity because I have the right to be treated with dignity it would be wrong to interpret this claim as circular. So denying that people have rights (of this supposed "natural" kind) does not prima facie mean denying that we have an obligation to behave a certain way, and conversely accepting that we have an obligation to behave a certain way does not entail accepting that people have rights (of this supposed "natural" kind).

Virtue ethics might be an example of normativity without rights.

Virtue ethics might be an example of normativity without rights. — Michael

Yes, I think that's so.

There are some things worse than death, such as torture, and Jefferson regarded life in the prisons of the time to be of the same order. Which it was. So you have again returned to the same ugliness. We should instead be glad for the reformation ideas of Penn and Mill, which hadn't been implemented at that time.

As you speak of your right to dignity, I can only reply you have already offended mine with your continual insistence that I repeat answers on killing and worse. I made the mistake of thinking you actually could be polite and considerate of other people. Good bye again, this time for good.

That's a quibble really. I think it makes perfect sense to say "I have a right to be treated with dignity" as much as it is to say "You should treat me with dignity." — Hanover

There is a difference, though, between "I have a right to be treated with dignity" and "I should treat you with dignity." In the first sentence, the speaker is making an essentially selfish claim, asserting that they must be treated in a certain way." In the second case, the speaker is asserting he/she should act in a certain way towards another. The speaker in the second case has accepted or acknowledges an obligation to act in a certain way; in the first case, the speaker claims others have an obligation to the speaker, by virtue of the fact that he or she is the speaker.

Is it the case that I have an obligation to act towards X in a certain way solely because X has a "right" to be treated in a certain way? That would require quite a multiplicity of rights. Perhaps I should act in a moral way for reasons which don't require that I assume the existence of rights which cannot be infringed.

I think I do have a right to be treated with dignity though, and I'd hold that regardless of whether the government agrees or whether the government affords me redress. It's for that reason it's a quibble, even if there are instances where right and ought vary.