Under the stage theory a similar conception holds, but "I" is merely a label to describe the person the counterparts represent. In this sense "I" also tends to experience other experiences. — Mr Bee

So you tend to experience other experiences? How, then, is the only experience you have of sitting at your computer?

So you tend to experience other experiences? How, then, is the only experience you have of sitting at your computer? — The Great Whatever

Have you even read my post? I literally just explained how in the paragraph above it.

Do you assent to the following two sentences:

1) I only experience sitting in front of my computer
2) I tend to have other sorts of experiences

?

I ask because your position is not clear to me.

What could possibly not be clear about it? If my doctor asks me if I am in pain, I find myself not to be in pain at all, and I tell him I am not. Would he suddenly be confused thinking that I am saying that I tend not to have experiences of pain?

If it means anything, please tell me, specifically, how the two statements contradict.

I'm sorry, but I literally do not understand your position. Can you please just give me a straightforward answer, as to whether you accept both 1) and 2), and if not, which of either you reject?

I accept 1) and 2).

OK. 1) and 2) seem to contradict each other. Surely you are not committing to a contradiction. So why do you believe they don't contradict?

If you are unsure why I think this, change 1) to 'I only ever...' Do you still assent to it?

Let's just assume a presentist world again. There is nothing contradictory in saying the following:

- My experience during the entire time I exist (which in this case is an instant) only includes me sitting in my room.
- I also tend to experience other experiences apart from me sitting in my room (since as time passes, my experiences will change).

Again, if you can tell me how they contradict each other, I would greatly appreciate it.

since as time passes, my experiences will change — Mr Bee

This is not possible since you only exist for an instant.

You cannot both have only one sort of experience, and tend to have different sorts of experiences.

Have you even read my post? I literally just explained how in the paragraph above it. — Mr Bee

In this paragraph you enjoin us to assume that the existence of the experiencing subject is restricted to a moment in time. This is an assumption that distinguishes stage theory from worm theory. If this assumption is thus built into your premise P3, that would make your argument in favor of stage theory circular.

That is literally the presentist viewpoint. Are you telling me the presentist view is inherently contradictory?

I'm asking about your position.

Do you not see why it is a contradiction to claim that you have only one sort of experience, and that you tend to have many kinds of experience? This, so far as I can tell, is what you are claiming.

Where did I assume that? Can you quote the phrase?

Where did I assume that? Can you quote the phrase? — Mr Bee

"Let's say that the entire duration in which I exist is limited to an instant."

Well, what you were asking about happens to be the presentist position (and no, I am not saying here it is my position, in case you were wondering). That is just what the view states.

Perhaps we are not properly understanding each other. I said earlier that I did not understand you habitual claim fully. Can you please, in specific detail, explain what that means. At the same time, explain what you think having a certain set of experiences only at the time you exist means?

Let's say (for the purposes of explanation) that the entire duration in which I exist is limited to an instant. — Mr Bee

That was an example to make things easier to understand. That was not my view or built into my P3. I am willing to initially assume in my OP that our existence can be any duration of time (stage theory or worm theory), whatever it happens to be.

I said earlier that I did not understand you habitual claim fully. Can you please, in specific detail, explain what that means. — Mr Bee

The simple present in English typically has a habitual reading. This is a fact about English, and has nothing to do with any metaphysical position.

For instance, if I say, 'I smoke,' it means that I smoke habitually, not that I am smoking at the time of utterance.

Likewise, if I say 'I experience x,' this might mean I do so habitually. For example, I might say, 'I experience fright whenever I walk alone at night.' And if someone asks me, 'what do you experience?' I might answer, 'I experience all sorts of things: joy, pain, frustration, anger...' and this is not to be read that I am experiencing all of those things now, but rather that habitually I experience all of them.

Read this way, the sentence, 'I only experience sitting at my computer' is patently false, since there are many other things I experience. Note that this has nothing to do with any metaphysical assumptions: this is simply a way the English sentence can be read, and on that reading I take it to be uncontroversial that such a claim (that I only experience being at my computer, etc.) is obviously false.

--

At the same time, explain what you think having a certain set of experiences only at the time you exist means? — Mr Bee

I don't know – this sounds like a technical notion. I know what it means to have an experience, and to have an experience at a certain time.

"Let's assume" was an example to make things easier to understand. That was not my view or built into my P3. I am willing to assume in my OP that our existence can be any duration of time, whatever it happens to be. — Mr Bee

Yes, that might have been your intent in the original post of this thread. (Your argument, back then, seemed to hinge on something like the synthetic unity of experience). But, just now, you had offered this as an explanation (for The Great Whatever) as to why you only are experiencing sitting at your computer, while excluding other experiences had at earlier or later times in your life. You also meant to insist that your intention wasn't simply to restrict reference to what you are experiencing now, but rather to what you are experiencing while you exist. This argument, which doesn't appeal to the idea of synthetic unity of experience anymore, now seems to hinge on a restriction of the temporal scope of your existence. And this is what distinguishes stage theory from worm theory.

Why limit identity to either a single moment or a single worm? And if it is a single moment, why the extent of one brain state, spanning a brain? Does it have any temporal span? Do we have a measure of one Planck time? If no temporal span, why allow spatial span?

The way you are restricting identity seems awfully arbitrary. It would seem less arbitrary to expand it to the universal or atomize it all the way to something like a single bit of information or a smallest possible particle of matter for Planck time. Any notion of identity having some finite span, be it temporal, spatial, or something else, is problematically arbitrary. Why so much? Why so little? Is there some kind of magical boundary around what you consider yourself to be? Can it grow or shrink?

And then you have the mystery of why you happen to find yourself being this part of things and not another. And if it is possible for you to not be most of the stuff in the world, why is that non-identity so incomplete? Why not slip off the world altogether, being completely non-identical with all of it, such that the world is entirely other and you don't exist at all? If it is possible for you to fail to be most of the world, how did you manage not to fail to be part of it at all?

I think it far simpler to think that there is exactly one single experiencer for which everything is immediately present. Identities only seem restricted because the information isn't fully integrated between all the parts of the world. For example, even though that which experiences everything going on in your brain is also that which experiences everything going on in my brain, no memories from your brain are found in mine, and so over here, I don't "remember" having been over there.

Imagine that there is an amnesiac named Joe who has only a small bit of functional short term memory and no long term memory. We put him in a room with a chalk board and have him record what he observes in that room on that board. If we ask him what he has experienced, he reads back what he has written on the board. If we move him to a second room with another board, he will record different experiences there and have no access to the memories on the board in the previous room. So despite the fact that it is the same guy in each room, he has no idea about his other life in the other room. He can't integrate information between the rooms. But this doesn't mean that we are dealing with two separate selves.

While I don't think that we are some detachable perspective thing that moves between brains, our situation is somewhat analogous. The true experiencer is everywhere at once and possibly at all times. But information integration comes in clusters inside this experiential field that are fragmented to varying degrees.

Memory constitutes a sort of information integration across time, between brain states. The present contains information about the past. Perhaps just as experiencing visual redness is what it is like to integrate information in a certain way, experiencing the flow of time is what it is like to integrate temporal information in a certain way.

One interesting thing to note is that there is an asymmetry in apparent identity across time that results from limitations in the availability of information. I feel myself to be the same person as my past self, but I don't feel myself to be identical with my unknown future self in the same way. It is a little like my failure to realize that I am also you. I have almost zero information about myself as an old man. The uncertainty is huge. But I have lots of information about my past self earlier today. And the story I tell myself about myself, from which I construct my falsely limited identity, comes from precisely this limited information that I have access to. Culture also plays a part in telling us how we ought to think of ourselves as distinct individuals. The idea of a soul has particularly strong influence on this self-conception even if we've abandoned traditional religious views.

And perhaps the reason we feel time to be flowing "forwards" is just a result of this information asymmetry. I remember the past, but not the future. The present brain state contains something of an echo of a previous one, but not of the next one.

If we could somehow integrate all the information, we would realize that we are everything. I strongly suspect that if we were to link up our brains in a highly integrated way, similar to the level of integration in a single brain, we wouldn't feel ourselves to be two separate selves in close contact, each with access to the other's brain. Rather, we would feel ourselves to be a single bound mind in the same way as we feel as a network of 100 billion highly integrated neurons spanning a single brain. There are no homunculi sitting in each of our brains that would find themselves as co-pilots in the newly joined larger brain..

The thing is, we know that we have experience that is bound and has at least some span across part of the universe, including many parts. Otherwise our experience would be atomized into tiny experiential fragments, something like the mind dust that William James described. These fragments couldn't have any particular experiential character due to their lack of integration. Seeing red, for example, requires not just detecting red light, but also at the same time registering that neither green nor blue are detected and integrating all this. A red sensing cone alone cannot distinguish between pure red light and white light. And when we see white light, we don't see red. The very visualness requires further integration as well. So you coudn't have an atom of red visual experience. You need span and integration in order to have red visual experience.

And I think we can be sure that we span multiple moments in time. Otherwise, I don't see how we would have any sense of change. So I think we can rule out the atomized end of the identity spectrum. And anything else besides universal identity is hopelessly arbitrary and fraught with problems.

All puzzles of identity are solved in one fell swoop when you realize that you are everything. You just have to accept that you have many windows through which to look out on yourself, each with a limited view. And you may never tie it all together such that you realize you are looking through them all at once.

And you are nothing like a worm. As far as life on this planet goes, you are the whole tree of life, branching, branching, branching. Remember that in block time, this body of yours is literally physically sprouting from that of your mother, and hers from her mother, and hers from hers, all the way back. Why draw some imaginary line between yourself and your mother? And of course, you aren't just the biology and you aren't limited to this planet. Further, you might even inhabit all of the branches of Everett's Many Worlds in all of the many universes produced by eternal inflation!

Sorry, but I am afraid I still have no idea where you derive your contradiction from, and am probably as confused as you are. Maybe I haven't taken enough time to absorb your definition, but as far as I can tell, I don't see how it could be relevant to what I am saying.

Read this way, the sentence, 'I only experience sitting at my computer' is patently false, since there are many other things I experience. Note that this has nothing to do with any metaphysical assumptions: this is simply a way the English sentence can be read, and on that reading I take it to be uncontroversial that such a claim (that I only experience being at my computer, etc.) is obviously false. — The Great Whatever

Can you explain what "I only experience sitting at my computer" would mean under the habitual view? I just want to get a clearer idea on what you take this to be.

I don't know – this sounds like a technical notion. I know what it means to have an experience, and to have an experience at a certain time. — The Great Whatever

Do you need me to explain it to you again? If you don't understand what it means, then why have you been insisting that it was contradictory with your habitual claim?

Yes, that might have been your intent in the original post of this thread. (You argument then seemed to hinge on something like the synthetic unity of experience). But, just now, you had offered this as an explanation (to The Great Whatever) as to why you only are experiencing sitting at your computer, while excluding other experiences had at earlier or later times in your life. You also meant to insist that this is not meant simply to mean to refer to what you are experiencing now, but rather to what you are experiencing while you exist. This argument, which doesn't appeal to the idea of synthetic unity, now seems to hinge on the restriction on the temporal scope of your existence that distinguishes stage theory from worm theory. — Pierre-Normand

Not sure if you understood the context in which I was giving that explanation, but I was trying to explain what having only having a set of experiences at the duration in which we exist would mean, and how it is different from his habitual claim, cause TGW considers them both to be contradictory for some reason. I was not advancing an actual argument at that point.

Can you explain what "I only experience sitting at my computer" would mean under the habitual view? I just want to get a clearer idea on what you take this to be. — Mr Bee

Something like, 'in general, the only thing I experience is sitting at my computer' or 'the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer.'

It's not a 'view,' it's an ordinary way of interpreting that sentence. Again, think about the sentence, 'I smoke.' What does that mean?

Do you need me to explain it to you again? If you don't understand what it means, then why have you been insisting that it was contradictory with your habitual claim? — Mr Bee

I have merely been pointing out that it is a contradiction to believe you only experience one thing, and tend to experience other things as well. I'm not sure why you don't see this as a contradiction – yet this is what you seem to believe.

Something like, 'in general, the only thing I experience is sitting at my computer' or 'the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer.' — The Great Whatever

Can you clarify further what "the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer"? Sorry, I am still trying to make sure you mean what I think you mean.

(Also, I take it that my use of the word "general" earlier when saying that I only experience sitting in my room "in general" may have led you to believe that I was making some kind of habitual claim, given that you mention it in your description. Is that correct?)

I have merely been pointing out that it is a contradiction to believe you only experience one thing, and tend to experience other things as well. I'm not sure why you don't see this as a contradiction – yet this is what you seem to believe. — The Great Whatever

But you don't know what the former really means apparently, at least to the point where you can't explain what it means to you when I asked. That is why I am confused when you so confidently claim that they are contradictory.

I think the reason we are talking past each other is because I am taking the sentences you say at face value as English sentences, and interpreting them that way. You seem to want to interpret them in a theory-laden way. So when you ask "can you clarify what you mean by..." I don't know what to say. If you speak English, you should be able to understand the sentence. Likewise, you should be able to hear the contradiction.

Again, there is no "habitual view." It is a fact of English grammar that simple present sentences can be read habitually (as well as sometimes being anchored to the time of utterance). I do not know of any other way to read the sentences you've said – and since neither reading seems to be what you want, I have no idea what you're claiming.

I just see no sense at all in claiming 1) I only experience one sort of thing, and 2) I experience many sorts of things. Yet this seems to be what you're committed to.

I think the distinction between the worm theorist and stage theorist is suspect. The crashing of the Titanic happened over a finite duration. If we stick to the distinction strictly, the so called stage theroist who isolates a crashing Titanic is effectively posing a worm when we examine just how many finite instances are involved with the accident-- the hitting the iceberg, beginning to sink, and so on, to give a simple example.

If we are to have an account which fits, the worm and stage must be complementary rather than opposed. The Titanic has to be both a stage (not crashed, crashing, after the crash) and a worm (a particular object with a past and future). Otherwise, we cannot say it is the Titanic which was steaming along unhindered, only to change to make contact with an iceberg, and then alter again into a sinking wreck.

In other words: a worm must be a function of many stages, an expression which not any particular stage or moment, given across many stages which are never each other. (e.g. Titanic steaming along, crashing Titanic, wrecked Titanic).

I think the reason we are talking past each other is because I am taking the sentences you say at face value as English sentences, and interpreting them that way. You seem to want to interpret them in a theory-laden way. So when you ask "can you clarify what you mean by..." I dont' know what to say. If you speak English, you should be able to understand the sentence. Likewise, you should be able to hear the contradiction. — The Great Whatever

Most likely that we're talking past each other, but I have tried to clarify what I meant by both sentences so what the terms I use mean normally in English shouldn't be relevant, at least not anymore. I am still not sure how much more clearer I can be on that front.

Okay, let me give you an idea of what I think you mean when you make that statement. The way I see it, according to you, the phrase "the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer" means "I don't occasionally experience anything else other than this experience of sitting in my computer". The opposite of this claim seems to be that "I occasionally experience other things other than my computer experience". For instance, on one occasion, I may experience being outside, and another in the shower. Of course, my body is free to walk around and go outside, there is nothing stopping me from getting in the shower, and most of us are subject to these situations all the time so this seems obviously true.

Thus, when you see me making the above claim the image that probably came to your mind is something like a vegetable strapped to a chair in front of a computer screen forced to live out their entire life in that room. In that case, we would say that such a person does not occasionally experience anything other than being in that room. Of course that is an extreme view to take and it is obviously false (though it could be true though since someone could be like that (which you seem to admit one time earlier) but highly unlikely).

Is this a good description on what you mean?

It is a fact of English grammar that simple present sentences can be read habitually (as well as sometimes being anchored to the time of utterance). I do not know of any other way to read the sentences you've said – and since neither reading seems to be what you want, I have no idea what you're claiming. — The Great Whatever

I have tried proposing that it could be "anchored" to the temporal region of the one making the utterance (which may or may not be bigger than the time in which you make that utterance), but I am not sure if you accepted that reading or if you just treated it as one of the two readings above. Or you could also just not understand what it means, which seems to be the case so far.

but I have tried to clarify what I meant by both sentences so what the terms I use mean normally in English shouldn't be relevant, — Mr Bee

It is relevant because you are appealing to intuition for the truth of an English sentence and presenting your argument in English. P3 and whatever variations of it you might want to use seem to be either not plausibly true, or not relevant for the conclusion you want to draw.

It is relevant because you are appealing to intuition for the truth of an English sentence and presenting your argument in English. — The Great Whatever

So even if I clarify what I mean on the specific terms I use, you will still insist on reading them at face value?

P3 and whatever variations of it you might want to use seem to be either not plausibly true, or not relevant for the conclusion you want to draw. — The Great Whatever

Maybe it is, but even so, I am still not sure why you think that is. Let me repeat once more the version of P3. that I have been proposing:

P3. I find that I am only experiencing sitting in my room during the temporal duration in which I exist. (This is what I find through introspection upon my direct experience)

So far, I still am not clear on what you think about this. I understand why the habitual claim is false (or at least, what I take to be the habitual claim. I can't be sure because you don't seem to be interested in telling me if my description in the last post matches yours), and I can also understand how saying that I only experience sitting in my room "at the time of this utterance" won't work for the purposes of my argument. However, I have still not heard a strong enough rebuttal to the above, even though it is clear that you think that it is wrong.

Do you think it is ill defined? Are the meanings of the individual words used incorrectly? Is it implausible? Is it irrelevant? Do you think this collapses to either the habitual claim or a claim that is actually about the a single time of utterance? Or do you just not understand it?

Even if this sort of claim is completely wrong, I have no idea why you think it is wrong, and because of that I can't respond to your criticisms. Who knows, maybe I'll change my mind if you point out my mistakes, or maybe I'll still think your interpretation is mistaken, but so far, you haven't addressed what I am saying here in any direct manner. The best that I've heard is at best indirect and ambiguous. In some cases, it seems you object to it on grounds of meaning. On others, you seem to object to it as being implausible, and other times you seem to take it as a version of the habitual view.

So please, if you could give me your thoughts on this particular claim, and specifically why it fails, then I will be probably be convinced by your argument. Otherwise I'll just feel like what you've been saying is irrelevant.

Maybe it is, but even so, I am still not sure why you think that is. Let me repeat once more the version of P3. that I have been proposing:

P3. I find that I am only experiencing sitting in my room during the temporal duration in which I exist. (This is what I find through introspection upon my direct experience) — Mr Bee

But this seems prima facie false, assuming only that your existence extends both to the past and to the future (or even, only to the past). It only appears true under the assumption that your own existence is restricted to the duration of your present experience. But this assumption seems to build stage theory onto your premise P3. (Or, more precisely, it builds into P3 a feature of stage theory that distinguishes it from worm theory).

But this seems prima facie false, assuming only that your existence extends both to the past and to the future (or even, only to the past). It only appears true under the assumption that your own existence is restricted to the duration of your present experience. But this assumption seems to build stage theory onto your premise P3. — Pierre-Normand

Just because my existence would extend throughout my entire life, that doesn't suddenly invalidate it. The only way in which I would believe it to be wrong is if we assume that any such claims regarding the contents of my experience must strictly refer to a single time. However, in that case, you would be the one making the assumption about the sorts of claims that I make.

Here I am only making a claim about the contents of my experience in general, without making explicit reference to any particular part of my experience. If this sort of claim would have to be framed temporally, then the only manner which makes sense to me is to say that it would refer to the entire temporal duration in which I (the person having those experiences) exist, not a specific temporal part. How long such a duration could be could very well vary depending on one's theory of time, but regardless of whether that duration is an instant or a lifetime, it shouldn't matter.

I think the distinction between the worm theorist and stage theorist is suspect. The crashing of the Titanic happened over a finite duration. If we stick to the distinction strictly, the so called stage theroist who isolates a crashing Titanic is effectively posing a worm when we examine just how many finite instances are involved with the accident-- the hitting the iceberg, beginning to sink, and so on, to give a simple example. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Suspect of what? The identity distinction seems to hold no metaphysical importance at all except to those views that require to tie some non-physical identity to something physical for the purposes of judgement in the non-physical realm.
So one uses whichever language for is appropriate for the concept being conveyed at the time. I can speak of the reasonably momentary event when the Titanic disappeared entirely below the waterline, or the draw out worm event of the tragedy, or the duration of the Titanic as a whole which had no obvious beginning or end. "See this grease-spot region of somewhat higher mineral density on this (year 3000) map of the ocean floor? That's the Titanic." A true statement I guess, but then when does it stop being the Titanic? I actually chose the iceberg itself as my example because it was one we all know, and it is something that clearly has no stage component in 2017.

If we are to have an account which fits, the worm and stage must be complementary rather than opposed. The Titanic has to be both a stage (not crashed, crashing, after the crash) and a worm (a particular object with a past and future). Otherwise, we cannot say it is the Titanic which was steaming along unhindered, only to change to make contact with an iceberg, and then alter again into a sinking wreck. — TWoD

You use whichever form is convenient. I deny numeric identity of something like the Titanic between the various stages of the Titanic. For one thing, what happened to that identity when the two halves separated? Yet I use the worm form as a language concept that conveys real meaning.

In other words: a worm must be a function of many stages, an expression which not any particular stage or moment, given across many stages which are never each other. (e.g. Titanic steaming along, crashing Titanic, wrecked Titanic). — TWoD

Is the crashing Titanic the same one as the steaming Titanic? Certainly two stages chosen from those to states are not the same stage, but are they stages of the same thing? Is a worm an identity? I have a very strange answer to those questions, which is no, the various stages are not of the same numeric identity of Titanic, but they are stages of the same identity of worm. In my view, there is a 1-1 correspondence between a worm and a stage, it being the stage at which the worm ends, and the stage only being defined from a reference point in that stage's future. All the stages making up the worm are part of it, but do not share numeric identity with the worm, since they don't share that identity with each other.

I probably didn't state that very clearly. I have spotty time to respond right now.