What would human civilization and culture amount to without it? What is it that enables discovery of novel facts? — Wayfarer

I don't mean it this way. I mean, reason as such has no value, just like musical score without the performance.

This, I don't understand. What of pure mathematics? Isn't it an entire discipline solely dependent on reason? — Wayfarer

So there you are, studying pure mathematics. What would a full analysis tell you about this event? What drives it? One is not driven by the logical structure of the event. One interested, has a desire to know, is fascinated by the elegance of the complexity of mathematics, and so on. One might be tempted to call this will to power. But keep in mind that Nietzsche was a very sick man who spent his life seeking the power to overcome his many illnesses. His "aggressive metaphysics," if you will , and contempt for Christian passive metaphysics compromised his objectivity. But this leads to a discussion about affectivity and its analyses, for there are many kinds emotions, attitudes, moods, desires, drives.

To me, the whole issue rests with this: a study of affectivity and its aesthetics. Therein lies the final philosophical work, for "the beautiful" and "the good" as well as their darker counterparts are terms (see the brief above) that are, see the above, derived from a primordial transcendental whole (one way to say, nothing escapes noumena).

which, I think, in very recent contemporary terms in the wake of the Kantian critiques of Kantianism mentioned above, has been put to bed for good by speculative realists — 180 Proof

Put to bed, yes, by good parents, good believers in the efficiency of parenting, exhausted by the demands of an errant "child".

First...a concession: Reason, the passive noun, in granting it as an intrinsic subjective condition of being human, merely as an exemplar for the given distinction from other animals, is empty, as is the other, to wit: feeling. Reason, active as a higher faculty of cognition relating judgement to knowledge, is proved to be not empty.
————-

Kant is a rationalist for a good reason: he doesn't understand the value foundation of being human. — Astrophel

Rationalist for good reason, because the conditions intrinsic to a pure subjectivity, are the only possible ground from which representations for value foundations for being human are to be found, which are, the moral feeling, conscience and respect. See “The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics”, XII, A., 1780, in Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, at Gutenberg.

To say he didn’t understand a thing because it doesn’t conform to a different criteria is mere disagreement. To say he didn’t understand a thing at all, when the exposition in which it is given is unknown to the claimant, is acceptable. To say he didn't understand a thing, in disregard of the exposition of it by the claimant, is dishonest.
———-

it is very important to understand that when analyze experience as experience, we are not going to generate anything that is what experience is. — Astrophel

As my ol’ friend Phoebe would say.....well, DUH!!!!. To take apart a house doesn’t give you a house. When experience, or anything else conditioned by something, is analyzed, all that’s determinable is that which makes those things possible. How important can it be to understand such a proposition, when the act of it is its own apodeictic proof?

The actuality itself is not this. — Astrophel

Which supports the notion that, neurobiology/physics aside, human mental machinations adhere to a representational theoretic. Representations presuppose that which is represented, which makes this......

just taking up something AS a particle of language. — Astrophel

.....a perfect example of it, in that words merely represent the something taken up. Humans cannot communicate with that which makes communication possible, just as you say, the actuality itself (communication) is not this (communicating).

An aside: consider that the only reason there are words, is because it is impossible to communicate in the images of pure thought.
—————

So value, reason, pragmatics, all terms that are abstractions of an original whole whcih is not reducible to anything. — Astrophel

Given the concession above, let it be that reason fulfills the initial condition antecedent to all that reduces to it, but the reducibility of which is itself unintelligible. It is clear, in this sense, that to analyze reason the faculty gives the antecedents which makes the faculty possible, but to analyze reason the condition, gives nothing, insofar as there are no antecedents for it.

Of course, those who reject uncaused causes, while still unable to prove a sufficient cause, find themselves in an awkward position indeed. Maybe best to just stick a finger in the dike, and accept that even if the cause, in this case reason itself, was actually known, it wouldn’t make any difference.
————

I think any undertaking one can take on, the value question is always begged — Astrophel

Not if the value question has its answer in the very domain from which it is asked. Every otherwise rational, cognizant human, values, which makes every value question, answerable.

The question that haunts metaphysics is, why thrown into a world with this powerful dimension of affectivity? — Astrophel

This in incoherent. There’s something missing. What haunts metaphysics is the impossibility of its empirical proofs, but the rest....dunno.
————

So.....your turn. Where does powerful dimension of affectivity fit in all the above?

This is to some extent my own instinctive sense of reason. I find it interesting how many believers with a philosophical bent still attempt to use reason to demonstrate that a belief in God is rational and necessary. But then what? Even if reason demonstrates that God is necessary, could it not be that a responsible human says 'fuck off' to the deity? — Tom Storm

If that deity is simply a metaphysical embodiment of reason (??) then I suppose we would have to do what "it" said, I mean, this would be an analytic truth, for this god would really KNOW what it is that knowing is all about, so to defy what it says would be a willful contradiction, which, by this weird standard, would be what sin is reduced to....and tautology would be the df. of God's grace?? The massive absurdity of this revealing, I think. A perfect world without meaning beyond the agreement of concepts.
"Fuck off?" Enter Dostoevsky's Underground Man. This grand struggle we are thrown into is nothing so utterly and stupidly trivial as a Kantian philosophy suggests. (Kant, so against metaphysics, yet draws up in his antimetaphysics a sterilization of our humanness.)

This also resonates with me. Some might argue that reason is at war with affectivity and that the latter must be tamed by rationality as it too readily leads to conflict and reactive behaviours with ourselves and others. Affectivity is surely the prime mover behind the best and worst in human behaviour as it tends to activate a transcendence of personal and cultural limitations and allows us to make 'impossible' choices for good or ill. — Tom Storm

I think something like this is right, and Kant would agree. For him, a moral act must be born of duty, and I do have some respect for this: Our greatest philanthropists, like Bill Gates and his foundation, do make a big difference in the world and I am impressed by what money can do, by by them I am not impressed in the least. Those that are truly impressive are the ones who go into the worst environments to help. Doctors without Borders, for example.

But those I really admire are certainly NOT dispassionate and Kantian. They are DRIVEN in the best possible way. Often Christian (bad metaphysics forgiven here. They are not metaphysicians), but their hearts powerful engines of motivation. It doesn't bother me that their theology has holes.

Rationalist for good reason, because the conditions intrinsic to a pure subjectivity, are the only possible ground from which representations for value foundations for being human are to be found, which are, the moral feeling, conscience and respect. See “The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics”, XII, A., 1780, in Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, at Gutenberg. — Mww

Metaphysical Elements of Ethics is a good one. Thanks!

I had to read around a bit to make sure I gave Kant his due. Duty rises from the absence of sentiment and motivation or anything outside the pure call of reason. But elsewhere he makes some concessions, but these seem incidental. "Disinterested benevolence" and "all duty is necessitation and constraint" are the ways Kant talks about feelings. It is our duty (that issues from pure reason) to do good whether we love others or not, and by love we can put any of the outreaching emotional attitudes.

**I find myself behind this very strong claim: Reason is the handmaiden of affect; it is a tool, and I am close to saying "and nothing more" but since I think our intellectual constitution is bound up with human agency itself (that is, to be a person at all, one must have a rational constitution which is essential for having an identity; this is another very interesting argument) that allows us to act on affect (here, compassion, empathy, caring, sympathy, love, commiseration, and the like), and think through to its realization, I cannot do this. Kant gives reason for this privileged position, but reason is empty (as he makes very clear repeatedly), and as "pure" all the more so (because explicitly so; indeed, I believe you will find that his concessions to feelings and conscience are only because they are necessary in the service of pure morality against the weakness of our own imperfect moral agency. We are not angels! if holy is defined as rationally perfect).

I am afraid I am quite on the opposite end of this from Kant.

To say he didn’t understand a thing because it doesn’t conform to a different criteria is mere disagreement. To say he didn’t understand a thing at all, when the exposition in which it is given is unknown to the claimant, is acceptable. To say he didn't understand a thing, in disregard of the exposition of it by the claimant, is dishonest. — Mww

I said he doesn't understand the value foundation of being human. Not that he doesn't understand a thing. If I said something like this, it was in context (or, I was being rhetorical?).

As my ol’ friend Phoebe would say.....well, DUH!!!!. To take apart a house doesn’t give you a house. When experience, or anything else conditioned by something, is analyzed, all that’s determinable is that which makes those things possible. How important can it be to understand such a proposition, when the act of it is its own apodeictic proof? — Mww

Kant would like to divide the world and I do not abide by divisions. What I say our analyses do not give us the world on a given analysis' terms I do not mean to endorse the Kantian phenomenon/noumenon division, as if language cannot possibly be about a thing in itself, but only about a representation. I rather mean to say that language fails in its useful grasp of things to tell us what a sensible intuition is. The real "behind the real" is not a remote noumena, but an immanent one.

Language has its own interpretational possibilities, bound up with culture and history, and interpretations come and go. But then there is the intuition as presence. This is a Husserlian point and it reveals something I think is essential to the matter of foundational philosophy: An idea may be false, but the presence of the false idea is real in the construction of an occurrent experience (like my writing this on the computer now) and is no less real than the sensory intuitions that ideas synthesize with to make the experience. So the error of language may lie in its interpretation, but, says Husserl, the actual language event as an intuited presence is apodictic.

The point of this goes to my claim that Kantian noumena need to be delivered from the dark reaches of the impossible (where analytic philosophy happily puts it. Dennett calls it "pre personal"). Noumena has no limits. Language is noumenal.

Which supports the notion that, neurobiology/physics aside, human mental machinations adhere to a representational theoretic. Representations presuppose that which is represented, which makes this......

just taking up something AS a particle of language.
— Astrophel

.....a perfect example of it, in that words merely represent the something taken up. Humans cannot communicate with that which makes communication possible, just as you say, the actuality itself (communication) is not this (communicating). — Mww

Then what does one do with this? That is, which way will you take, the analytic road or the continental road? Analytic philosophy simply resigns itself to this impossibility, and after a hundred years or so of tearing Kant apart, simply decides to give philosophy to science. Continental philosophy got very interesting.

Taking something AS is Heidegger's jargon.

An aside: consider that the only reason there are words, is because it is impossible to communicate in the images of pure thought. — Mww

I don't know what an image of pure thought could even be. Sounds like the purity of the thought would have to be first understood. But what could this be? Kant doesn't talk like this as he maintains the pure reason can only be witnessed in an embodied form.

Given the concession above, let it be that reason fulfills the initial condition antecedent to all that reduces to it, but the reducibility of which is itself unintelligible. It is clear, in this sense, that to analyze reason the faculty gives the antecedents which makes the faculty possible, but to analyze reason the condition, gives nothing, insofar as there are no antecedents for it.

Of course, those who reject uncaused causes, while still unable to prove a sufficient cause, find themselves in an awkward position indeed. Maybe best to just stick a finger in the dike, and accept that even if the cause, in this case reason itself, was actually known, it wouldn’t make any difference. — Mww

I think there is an end to this, and that lies with Derrida. At the point where we start circling round and round, and the hermeneutic tail of the serpent is grasped in its own jaws, we have to say uncle and admit that the error lies in our interpretative pov. The way out is to drop a pov. This is what Buddhists and Hindus do (not to put too fine a point on it). The one in the west to discover this is Derrida. Language at this level of analysis is indeterminate. It can be very determinate once contextualized, but when contexts run thin, or run out altogether (uncaused causes?? When this steps into thinking, then apodicticity itself has been abandoned), one has to pull back and see if something has changed in the world in light of this impossibility. Kirkegaard called this a collision between reason and actuality.

I say, Husserl was right, and I can't say what this is because it would take too long. You find throughout existential thought this motif of the qualitative movement (which started with Kierkegaard, though he was an amalgam of so much prior). Sartre called it reflective consciousness, Heidegger called it authenticity, Levinas talks about totality and infinity; and so on. But Husserl and his epoche mostly explicitly makes the idea clear.

Not if the value question has its answer in the very domain from which it is asked. Every otherwise rational, cognizant human, values, which makes every value question, answered. — Mww

By domain I guess you are referring to a context in which values are conceived. But these are not at issue. At issue is what makes value what it is. The question of value has an independent analysis. It begins with G E Moore and the non natural quality of value in ethics. This is a discussion of metaethics.

This in incoherent. There’s something missing. What haunts metaphysics is its impossibility of empirical proofs, but the rest....dunno. — Mww

For this, a discussion of metaethics is needed. When you say empirical proofs, there is in this the ethical dimension of experience. What is this? It is value. What is this? A proof, a transcendental analysis, is called for, keeping in mind what Kant had in m that was beyond analysis, the pure forms. Here, it is the "pure" value, the good. But where pure reason is empty, the good (and the bad) is palpable.

Can I ever think, and be unaware that I think? If not, then when I think I am necessarily, and simultaneously, aware of it. Even granting that as practical self-awareness, it remains that it is only the singular “I” that thinks and is at the same time the very same “I” that is aware of thoughts. — Mww

In a way, yes. When I think what I am aware of is thought and its phenomenal effects. But thought is the result of thinking - when I am aware of thoughts, thinking is inferred. So I predict what that thinking would most likely be, based on existing conceptual structures. Time is not an issue here - all awareness at this five-dimensional cognitive level is simultaneous.

If we’re honest, it is thought and not thinking that we’re aware of in most cases when we say ‘I think’. The ‘I’ that thinks is aware of thoughts, but not directly aware of thinking. When we talk about ‘thinking’ as philosophers, mostly we’re using our existing concepts to substantiate the inference from an awareness of thoughts. Awareness of thinking involves much more than an isolated cognitive system - a more complex and interconnected ‘I’.

By practical (transcendental) self-awareness I’m referring to meditative practices or deep philosophical self-reflection, beyond conceptualisation. This awareness is practical in the sense that it’s temporally located, whereas awareness of thought need not be. We entertain some correlations by thinking (forming connected ideas), integrate plenty of others unexamined, and ignore, isolate or exclude the rest according to affectivity.

Because Kant’s system brackets out this affectivity and strives to isolate the cognitive system, it is largely ignorant of the broader context in which thinking occurs. Hence the question:

What would a thought emerge from, and with what do we recognize it as such? — Mww

Thoughts emerge from correlations and connections between qualitative (non-conceptual) ideas. We recognise thoughts as a form of connected ideas with our capacity for understanding beyond cognition: an awareness that thinking is not the only method for correlating ideas - nor necessarily the best. Kant barely touches on this capacity in CofJ - but in backing away from it reveals his own affect: a personal preference for pure reason over the good. This capacity for human understanding that looks at the world as an embodiment of the Good and the Beautiful - from a position of pure, non-judgemental logic - is Kant’s event horizon.

I am afraid I am quite on the opposite end of this from Kant. — Astrophel

I find myself somewhere in between, proposing a triadic model. Kant claims that pure reason has primacy as the structure of reality; you claim the substantiation of reality is affectivity. Both of you then appear to direct humanity towards embodying the good - an impossible task thwarted by this apparent opposition.

But it’s only an opposition if we want it to be. When we view these positions in terms of a triadic model - pure reason (logic), affect (energy) and the good (quality) - then what was a dichotomy is now a stable triadic system in which human experience is capable of embodying (and further purifying our understanding of) each position in turn, providing the necessary checks and balances to human knowledge.

I am thoroughly enjoying your discussion here with Mww, by the way. There’s so much there.

I find myself somewhere in between, proposing a triadic model. Kant claims that pure reason has primacy as the structure of reality; you claim the substantiation of reality is affectivity. Both of you then appear to direct humanity towards embodying the good - an impossible task thwarted by this apparent opposition.

But it’s only an opposition if we want it to be. When we view these positions in terms of a triadic model - pure reason (logic), affect (energy) and the good (quality) - then what was a dichotomy is now a stable triadic system in which human experience is capable of embodying (and further purifying our understanding of) each position in turn, providing the necessary checks and balances to human knowledge. — Possibility

A couple of things. One is, energy is not another word for affect. In fact, I don't know what energy is, and neither do physicists beyond something blatantly question begging. Affect designates the emotional and attitudinal and even valuative phenomena in general and this takes one directly to the intuition of a pain or a feeling of contentment and this kind of thing. My first priority to clarity in thinking philosophically is recognize that there is only one authority and that is intuited presence of the world and its objects. Everything there is to talk about is there first.

The good as quality: Okay, but how is this demonstrated in the world? What is the context, that is? We talk about good couches and bad shoes all the time, and the standards are variable: maybe I want uncomfortable shoes (recall the Chinese practice of foot binding). Most think this variability demonstrates a variability in ethics, and this shows ethics has no foundation beyond the vagaries of subjectivity.
But this thinking is absurd. What we really want to know at the basic level is when a person says something is good, what does this mean in a non contingent way, just as we ask about reason what it is in a way that sets aside its incidentals (we are all rational about different things). This requires a transcendental deduction of affectivity.
I like this stable triadic system, but I think to stabilize something, one has to clearly reason through its parts, that is, what is there, in the world, and for this we need a kind of reduction that will allow for things to seen as they are in themselves. This is Husserl (e.g., Cartesian Meditations).

It is our duty (that issues from pure reason) to do good whether we love others or not — Astrophel

Our duty to do good, which is predicated on practical reason, is not the same as duty itself, which has nothing to do with reason.
“....Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law....”
—————

The point of this goes to my claim that Kantian noumena need to be delivered from the dark reaches of the impossible — Astrophel

“....a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, they must not therefore be held to be impossible...”

True enough, insofar as noumena are objects of understanding alone, and understanding being the faculty of thought, and...

“....I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself...”

Noumena has no limits. — Astrophel

Yes they do: noumena I think that cause me to contradict myself.

Language is noumenal. — Astrophel

Language is limitless so therefore language is noumenal? But noumena are limited, so language is limited. We already knew that; language is limited by the conceptions they represent, and conceptions are limited to that which the understanding can think. Coincidentally enough, returning us right back where we started. Worse, actually. If noumena are conceptions without an object, and the object belonging to a conception is its name, what name can a conception have that has no object?

We can think noumena as a conception of a discursive understanding and named as such, in juxtaposition to phenomena; we cannot think a noumenon representing that conception. Kant never uses the noumenal adjective as a descriptor. There is nothing to describe.

The real "behind the real" is not a remote noumena, but an immanent one. — Astrophel

The real behind the real. We don’t even know the extent of the real, so we should complicate matters by trying to find out what’s behind what we don't know? Those who wish that, are those that wish Kant, et. al. had never spoken to the irrationality of it.
—————

I don't know what an image of pure thought could even be. — Astrophel

And yet, the human brain gives them to us constantly, always noticeably in dreams, generally unnoticed in the repetitive conscious state, usually noticed on the occasion of newly experienced conscious states, but always present nonetheless. The irreducible ground of subjectivity, the transition from neurological physical predicates to the appearance of images. The images are the fundamental ground that allows us to talk about what the brain does.
—————

Kant would like to divide the world, and I do not abide by divisions. — Astrophel

No, he would not. The world is, period, undivided. It is we, who are divided. Don’t abide the divisions in the world, but you must the divisions of us. The perfectly natural human dualism demands it.

By practical (transcendental) self-awareness I’m referring to meditative practices or deep philosophical self-reflection, beyond conceptualisation. — Possibility

A division abided. One half of the natural dualism.
—————

At the point where we start circling round and round, (...) we have to say uncle and admit that the error lies in our interpretative pov. The way out is to drop a pov. — Astrophel

Why not adopt a pov that recognizes the roundy-roundy for what it is, and shows how to not go there?
Can’t prevent it from happening, as it is the wont of reason by its own nature. We will always ask ourselves questions we can’t answer, but recognizing and turning away from it, is the next best thing.
—————

This grand struggle we are thrown into is nothing so utterly and stupidly trivial as a Kantian philosophy suggests. (Kant, so against metaphysics, yet draws up in his antimetaphysics a sterilization of our humanness.) — Astrophel

I had to read around a bit to make sure I gave Kant his due. — Astrophel

And with that little self-contradictory tidbit, I find my interest waning.

Not that it hasn’t been fun......

when I am aware of thoughts, thinking is inferred. — Possibility

Hmmm...but mustn’t I think, in order for there to be thoughts to be aware of? Can’t infer that which has happened.

Thoughts emerge from correlations and connections..... — Possibility

True enough, and transposing, we have.....I am aware of the emergence of correlations and connections. But that which correlates and connects is still required.

This awareness is practical in the sense that it’s temporally located, whereas awareness of thought need not be. — Possibility

Are you aware of having more than one thought at a time? I submit you are not, because thought is singular and successive, which makes them temporally located, if only in respect to each other.

We recognise thoughts as a form of connected ideas with our capacity for understanding beyond cognition — Possibility

This is the ground for moral, as opposed to epistemological, philosophy. Freedom, will, duty, interests, pleasure/pain, imperatives, and so on, are still conceived by understanding, and cognitions related to them are used in discussions about moral philosophy, but the doing of it, the determining of the moral worth of actions, and the moral worthiness of individuals because of them, do not.

Kant barely touches on this capacity in CofJ - but in backing away from it reveals his own affect: a personal preference for pure reason over the good. — Possibility

The CofJ does not address moral philosophy itself; only the kind of judgement, that is, aesthetic, whereby the determinations of the will relieve their subjective approval. THE good, good in and of itself, is found in “The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals”, 1785.

Kant doesn’t say much about good in itself, except to say there is only one of its kind, that being the will. Tough pill to swallow for some, who mistake the goodness of a thing to represent the good in itself. In which case, the will has absolutely no power whatsoever, and consequently, deontological moral philosophy disappears. Those that mistake are the same that joyously wave bye-bye, I’m sure.

In fact, moral philosophy in Kant has more power than the epistemology of pure reason, so he doesn’t prefer pure reason over the good.

“...The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason. (...) Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws—for the regulation of our actions—which are deduced from principles entirely a priori....” (A840/B868)

Much more to this of course; I’m just making a point in refutation.
—————

Kant’s event horizon.... — Possibility

....I think, would be psychology. Even in its infancy back then, he foresaw both its impending growth, and metaphysical uselessness, all the same.

A couple of things. One is, energy is not another word for affect. In fact, I don't know what energy is, and neither do physicists beyond something blatantly question begging. Affect designates the emotional and attitudinal and even valuative phenomena in general and this takes one directly to the intuition of a pain or a feeling of contentment and this kind of thing. — Astrophel

I can see your point. ‘Energy’ is a placeholder for the possibility from which affect emerges. I use ‘energy’ precisely because we don’t know what it is, and yet what affect does corresponds to what energy does: designates attention and effort across spacetime interaction. Except energy in physics is free from qualitative valuation, whereas affect is limited by it. So affect, as I see it, is a localised, logical reduction of energy by way of quality.

My first priority to clarity in thinking philosophically is recognize that there is only one authority and that is intuited presence of the world and its objects. Everything there is to talk about is there first. — Astrophel

This is where I tend to depart from traditional Western philosophy: recognising only one authority renders thinking clearer within language constraints, sure - but I find it lacks the accuracy required for wisdom. I prefer accuracy of understanding over clarity of thinking - this makes it difficult to write about my philosophy from a static perspective, granted, but much easier to practice it. I’m working on that.

The good as quality: Okay, but how is this demonstrated in the world? What is the context, that is? We talk about good couches and bad shoes all the time, and the standards are variable: maybe I want uncomfortable shoes (recall the Chinese practice of foot binding). Most think this variability demonstrates a variability in ethics, and this shows ethics has no foundation beyond the vagaries of subjectivity.
But this thinking is absurd. What we really want to know at the basic level is when a person says something is good, what does this mean in a non contingent way, just as we ask about reason what it is in a way that sets aside its incidentals (we are all rational about different things). This requires a transcendental deduction of affectivity. — Astrophel

‘The good’ refers to a localised, logical reduction of quality by way of ‘energy’. Ethics is limited by (relative to) affect: the attention and effort each of us is prepared to designate anywhere at any moment. The Chinese practice of foot binding is painful for the wearer, not so much for the parent who inflicts it, and even less for the future husband who values apperception of its results.

I can see your point. ‘Energy’ is a placeholder for the possibility from which affect emerges. — Possibility

'Affect' in a precognitive phenomenological sense would precisely be energy, since there is no affect without change and no change without energy, so I think you should stick to your guns..

I preface this to say I've been extremely pre-occupied with other things the last week (the mother of all house-moves) but I had previously entered some responses to your earlier posts so wanted to raise them. The context is, my interest in Platonism, that is, the reality of intelligible objects.

I think it is very important to understand that when [we] analyze experience as experience, we are not going to generate anything that is what experience is — Astrophel

That is a very Buddhist observation.

So value, reason, pragmatics, all terms that are abstractions of an original whole whcih is not reducible to anything — Astrophel

As is that. This is something that seems to come across from some of your remarks.

Analysis is an abstracting from the given preanalytic actuality, dividing it into parts and ways experience presents itself — Astrophel

Recall the origin of classical metaphysics with Parmenides. He was an axial age philosopher, contemporary of the Buddha. Parmenides is where the reality of the idea of the forms was first considered, so is the origin of metaphysics proper. (I suppose it is this that is the subject of Heidegger's criticism of Western metaphysics, although I've yet to study that in detail.)

I read in a letter from Husserl to I think it was Rudolf Otto, he wrote how his students were becoming Christian converts in their studies of phenomenology. — Astrophel

Most famously, Edith Stein, who became a nun and was canonized a saint.

I note your appeals to 'pure presence' and (I think) the pre-rational sense of being, which is somehow opposed to the rationalist view or the appeal to reason, of which you are generally dismissive. And I am intuitively sympathetic to that, as I did an MA in Buddhist Studies 10 years ago, and have pursued Buddhist meditation.

I reconciled some of my thoughts on the relationship of Buddhism and Platonic Realism on a thread on dharmawheel - see especially this post (only if you're interested.)

So there you are, studying pure mathematics. What would a full analysis tell you about this event? What drives it? One is not driven by the logical structure of the event. One interested, has a desire to know, is fascinated by the elegance of the complexity of mathematics, and so on. One might be tempted to call this will to power. — Astrophel

The point about pure mathematics, is only that it is a real subject, something about which can be completely wrong, yet it contains no empirical percepts whatever. It is a vast area of knowledge - not even to mention applied mathematics, which has had such enormous consequences for our age. And that is the theme of the often-discussed essay by Nobel Laureate, Eugene Wigner, called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences - actually one of the first articles I encountered via philosophy forums.

And I'm still not seeing how Kant's philosophy of mathematics does justice to this subject, as I put it in this post, although I also recognise that nobody seems to understand what I'm talking about.

So - yes, I understand this approach I'm pursuing is different to yours, and also different to the general preoccupations of phenomenology. I'm trying to understand Platonic realism, which I think is real. I'm heartened by the fact that one of the pre-eminent scholars in that field, Lloyd Gerson, has recently published a book called Platonism and the Possibility of Philosophy, which 'contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy.' All of which is, I suppose, tangential to Kant, but nevertheless Kant is central to it.

Mathematical intuition is something analogous to a kind of sense perception.
— Rebecca Goldstein

Which is something that I don't think Kant seems to have seen, and I'm baffled as to why not. — Wayfarer

On “a kind of sense perception”:

Empirical intuitions of sense perceptions is the arrangement of the matter of objects according to forms contained a priori in the sensuous faculty of representation. For objects of thought, which are conceptions and not sense perceptions, the matter becomes the conceptions, and the arrangement of the concepts follows according to the same rules as objects of sense, such that both kinds of objects can be phenomena, hence objects of cognition, hence, experience.

“....or take the proposition: "It is possible to construct a figure with three straight lines," and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere conception of a straight line and the number three. All your endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition...” (***)

Now, the proposition brought forward by its being thought, stands in stead of the object perceived, the concepts in the proposition, re: line, three straight, represent what would be the matter of the object, the arrangement of those concepts of the proposition, becomes a non-sensuous phenomenon, subsequently conceived as “triangle”.

Now the notion of a kind of intuition that is purely mathematical is granted, but only from the notion of intuitions themselves. As to whether it is as well a kind of sensuous perception remains, insofar as sensuous perceptions do in fact give empirical intuitions but do not give mathematical intuitions, which makes explicit a form of perception not sensory is required, in order to give a kind of phenomenon that is not empirical. It suffices nicely, that to give yourself an intuition is to give yourself something, which can be called an image, and that without self-contradiction. So it follows that the arrangement of the matter of the proposition, according to the rules contained in it, that is, a figure must be possible, is imagining them into a construct that conforms to the predicates the proposition seeks to verify, an enclosed space. Hence, no incursion of mere trial and error, or common sense, or Hume-ian nonsense of consigning stuff to the flames without knowing what’s being burned, from which is given the apodeictic certainty of all mathematical principles.

TA-DAAAAA!!!!!
———-

On the “unreasonable certainty of mathematics”:

“....This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena** greatly enlarges our a priori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its precision to objects of experience, and without it the validity of this application would not be so self-evident...”

** The principle being, “...Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space and time); consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter, is indisputably valid of the former....”
————-

(***) This exposition serves to deny noumena on the one hand, and to exemplify them as “the limitations of sensibility” on the other. You cannot give yourself an object in intuition (the limit) based on the schema of a conception understanding thinks, when that conception has none. There is, then, nothing in the conception of noumena to be arranged in intuition, hence can never be cognized (the denial), which makes experience of them impossible. For us.

I can see your point. ‘Energy’ is a placeholder for the possibility from which affect emerges. I use ‘energy’ precisely because we don’t know what it is, and yet what affect does corresponds to what energy does: designates attention and effort across spacetime interaction. Except energy in physics is free from qualitative valuation, whereas affect is limited by it. So affect, as I see it, is a localised, logical reduction of energy by way of quality. — Possibility

Like all words, it requires context to understood, and then the values kick in. This is why functional concepts like 'material substance" are so vacuous when they are used in philosophy: they are supposed to be some kind of underlying substratum for all thinks, but all things presents a contextless state of affairs, which is not a state of affairs at all. But talk about material physics makes perfect sense. What is yarn? Well, it is a soft material of woven fabric, and so on.
Right, free of both qualitative and quantitative valuation.

This is where I tend to depart from traditional Western philosophy: recognising only one authority renders thinking clearer within language constraints, sure - but I find it lacks the accuracy required for wisdom. I prefer accuracy of understanding over clarity of thinking - this makes it difficult to write about my philosophy from a static perspective, granted, but much easier to practice it. I’m working on that. — Possibility

Accuracy of understanding over clarity? Absolutely! The world is NOT "clear". I don't know what you are reading, but I have wasted enough time on anglo american analytic philosophy to see that clarity for clarity's sake is a complete failure. Good if one is fascinated by puzzles (e.g., those Gettier problems) I guess, but dreadful if one has a passion for truth. Passion and philosophy have become such enemies, and foundational thinking handed over to hyperintellectuals with a gift for logic.

Analytic philosophy is dead. See Robert Hanna on this: Analytic Philosophy From Frege To The Ash Heap of History (I have a massive library of of philosophical works, btw. All are welcome to these pdf files if they conceive of how they might be sent with all due privacy)

Then I read Husserl. Then Heidegger, and onward. Changed everything. This IS philosophy.

‘The good’ refers to a localised, logical reduction of quality by way of ‘energy’. Ethics is limited by (relative to) affect: the attention and effort each of us is prepared to designate anywhere at any moment. The Chinese practice of foot binding is painful for the wearer, not so much for the parent who inflicts it, and even less for the future husband who values apperception of its results. — Possibility

True. It is the localization of this I take issue with. When value is localized, then arguments get very involved and unwieldy. Foot binding can actually be defended as a cultural practice. Those who inflicted the suffering on children were conditioned to believe that this was proper, and an entire society's beliefs backed this, and so on. Not that foot binding a good idea, but what are good ideas removed fromt he culture in which good and bad ideas are conceived?

Good question, I say, because it is here philosophical thinking begins, this process of "bracketing" culture to focus on things essentially true. Take this to its logical limit, and you find yourself face to face with the "pure phenomenon". This pain in the foot, not as good or bad "for" anything. But it itself, what is it?

Value is, in my thoughts, the final frontier. I borrow from Kant the idea of a transcendental deduction of value: Kant had to prove that pure concepts were not just a fiction, that these had to be posited in order to explain the possibility of the way actual judgment and thinking work. Value needs just this. So, what is it that is there in experience that requires a transcendental argument? Of course, good and bad. Empirically, the good is used as an instrumental term. Something is good because of such and such, this such and such is never stand alone, but is embedded in a body of contingency, like the justification for foot binding.
And so the argument moves forward toward absolutes or transcendental foundations, tha t is, toward a determination that they have an actuality beyond contingency.

that clarity for clarity's sake is a complete failure. Good if one is fascinated by puzzles (e.g., those Gettier problems) I guess, but dreadful if one has a passion for truth. — Astrophel

That's exactly right. In general, it's good to be clear and precise. But some people try to be so precise they end up saying nothing at all.

On the other hand - and this applies to Kant - one should be able to express these sophisticated ideas in a manner that most people would at least get a "flavor" of, if they wished to get the gist of the topic.

One can, I think, express Kant's basic notions without much verbiage, which is something he is guilty of. Look at Schopenhauer, for instance, he states many of Kant's ideas in a very clear manner (most of the time).

That is a very Buddhist observation. — Wayfarer

Right. And it never was the prerogative of language to BE what language talked about. The trap is hermeneutical: Can language ever talk about something other than language? For all my words have their meanings bound to one another, and without this "difference" among terms, meaning falls apart.
But deconstructing meaning leads to disillusionment with language, or, language's culture, history, science paradigms and so on, and a turn toward the presence of the world itself.

Miraculous, literally, that we can do this, because impossible. Meaning is supposed to be what can be said, and if being said is simply this contingent, assailable kind of thing, and if language is this "totality" that makes the world toe the line, then there is no hope for the understanding to step beyond this.

But this kind of thinking misses the point completely. The given actuality of the world is not given in language, but is given intuitively. It is language that has to toe the line to the world, and the world is magnificent, intractable, powerful, eternal, and note how words like this are so elusive, intellectually fuzzy. Analytic philosophers would NEVER talk like this. Hence, the failure of analytic philosophy.

Recall the origin of classical metaphysics with Parmenides. He was an axial age philosopher, contemporary of the Buddha. Parmenides is where the reality of the idea of the forms was first considered, so is the origin of metaphysics proper. (I suppose it is this that is the subject of Heidegger's criticism of Western metaphysics, although I've yet to study that in detail.) — Wayfarer

The flower blooms and fades, but the idea of the flower endures. Which is more real? This is where Plato started. I know Heidegger thought very highly of the Greeks, especially Parmenides and Heraclitus who he considered "primordial" philosophers. He was very interested in making fundamental changes in t he way we think and going back to these beginnings were part of this. But this idea that something deeply important has been lost through the ages of bad metaphysics is a good one. But for Heidegger the answer rested with language, as he thinks language carries forth meaning. But have never read that he could make that really interesting transition from language to intuition, which is one way to talk about what Buddhism is about. Putting aside the details and the mountains of academic work, Buddhism is THE primordial grounding for discovery. Of this I have no doubt at all.

I'm reading Heidegger's Parmenides now. He is always interesting, always leads us away from beaten paths.

I note your appeals to 'pure presence' and (I think) the pre-rational sense of being, which is somehow opposed to the rationalist view or the appeal to reason, of which you are generally dismissive. And I am intuitively sympathetic to that, as I did an MA in Buddhist Studies 10 years ago, and have pursued Buddhist meditation.

I reconciled some of my thoughts on the relationship of Buddhism and Platonic Realism on a thread on dharmawheel - see especially this post (only if you're interested.) — Wayfarer

On this that you wrote, apologies for getting carried away, but it is an interesting idea:

Vert sticky wicket. As with all philosophical questions, first, I say, drop the science. It has no place, nearly, in philosophy. Nominalists that I have read are generally guided by the lack of the "real" presence of concepts, numbers, but once this real is no longer defined in terms of physicality or materiality (whatever these could possibly mean; to me, they are just the reification of a scientist's perspective, an attempt to "solidify" science's claims into a foundation for all issues. But as foundational, they are instantly refutable), then ontological standards are turned on their head: the "out thereness" of physical objects yields to the "presence" of meaning. "Out thereness" doesn't vanish, it is simply understood as a contextually determined concept, which is often used. The salt is "over there" and Jupiter is many miles away.

Anyway, what does this have to do with numbers, concepts and ideas? Keeping in mind that even by a typical physicalist/nominalist's thinking, numbers exist, it's just that they are not numbers. They are reducible to, say, neurological events. I mean, a nominalist has to admit that thinking about a number is not the same as not thinking at all. But your realist (contra nominalists, adn this seems to be your position) wants to say numbers exist AS numbers. I agree with this, for I am convinced that if the number two is not real as the number two, than neither is a house or a chair, for a house is not a house apart from its "eidetic" constitution. The attempt to say the house has a physicality a number doesn't have forgets physicality is just a scientist's biased way of looking at things, and has no real meaning here, and has no foundational justification. Numbers have meaning, and further, meaning is the only real standard for ontology.

But then, all concepts are in essence interpretative entities, and so, a house is not eternally, platonically, a house. It is, as an "intuition of a house", apodictically real, but not in the Platonic sense of forms vs things that "have a share" of the forms. the former simply reduces my thought, talk, remembering, planning about houses, to the actual event of talking, thinking etc. The event did occur! And this is beyond doubt, this actuality of occurrent thinking is absolute. The taking up the givinness of sensible intuitions AS a "house" is no less real than anything one can imagine. BUT, in the way this thinking expresses truth, this becomes arbitrary. Truth in the everyday sense is pragmatic.

You say:

The Buddha (and the Bodhisattvas) are the archetype of all wisdom. And archetypes are, in fact, 'universals', of which individuals are examples or instances. And to my mind, that is how come the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas are real beyond their particular, individual existence (which I certainly believe is so).


While you can see by the above I don't agree with the Stanford article that says, "universals are occult pseudo-entities that should not be taken seriously by a responsible thinker concerned with ontology," but I do think your claim needs more. Being an archetype of wisdom is something thick with questions, isn't it?
My thinking is very concrete, but the concrete is CERTAINLY NOT what science and its nominalist's take it for.

The point about pure mathematics, is only that it is a real subject, something about which can be completely wrong, yet it contains no empirical percepts whatever. It is a vast area of knowledge - not even to mention applied mathematics, which has had such enormous consequences for our age. And that is the theme of the often-discussed essay by Nobel Laureate, Eugene Wigner, called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences - actually one of the first articles I encountered via philosophy forums.

And I'm still not seeing how Kant's philosophy of mathematics does justice to this subject, as I put it in this post, although I also recognise that nobody seems to understand what I'm talking about.

So - yes, I understand this approach I'm pursuing is different to yours, and also different to the general preoccupations of phenomenology. I'm trying to understand Platonic realism, which I think is real. I'm heartened by the fact that one of the pre-eminent scholars in that field, Lloyd Gerson, has recently published a book called Platonism and the Possibility of Philosophy, which 'contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy.' All of which is, I suppose, tangential to Kant, but nevertheless Kant is central to it. — Wayfarer

But Plato is metaphysics, Kant tries not to be. He doesn't think, as far as I've read (and this is certainly not everything) we can say anything about our mathematical truths issues from eternity. Plato says the world of becoming has a share of the eternal world of forms. Plato gets awkward when you pull away from things like virtue, justice, the good; see the "third man" arguments, e.g. Is there an eternal form of a cow? A toaster?
But I do see some light on universals in the Platonic sense, but it is not clear to me yet. The argument goes to agency, that is, being a person as an agent that can be aware in the essential way for enlightenment. There IS such a thing as enlightenment, but for this to occur, one has to experience a break with the world. This is another matter.

That's exactly right. In general, it's good to be clear and precise. But some people try to be so precise they end up saying nothing at all.

On the other hand - and this applies to Kant - one should be able to express these sophisticated ideas in a manner that most people would at least get a "flavor" of, if they wished to get the gist of the topic.

One can, I think, express Kant's basic notions without much verbiage, which is something he is guilty of. Look at Schopenhauer, for instance, he states many of Kant's ideas in a very clear manner (most of the time). — Manuel

The meticulous mind is very useful, but becomes fascinated by the turning of its own wheels. Thinking becomes inherently entertaining. But on the other hand, some of the most verbose philosophers are extremely insightful. For me, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and others. Verbose, did I say? Certainly. Sometimes after pages and pages, and you then get it, and then, why does he have to say it like that?

Can language ever talk about something other than language? — Astrophel

Of course it can; it talks about the world all the time.

Of course it can; it talks about the world all the time. — Janus

That is a tough call. There are those who think explanations are all references to other explanations, not to put too fine a point on it. The proof lies in the way the answers to questions about any and all things in the world are provided in more language. What is a bank teller? A cat? Your understanding does not reach into the world and grab a cat. It produces definitions, descriptions, talk of properties, contexts, and all of this is language. Of course, we assume there is something out there that is a cat, but the meanings that id the cat are not out there at all.

Heidegger has his own philosophy which depends on the use of language, it's a kind of description of the world attached to a way of thinking. Kierkegaard too, to a lesser extent.

Yet look at Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger, it's very clear. Some may debate how accurate it is, but it can be quite useful.

I think Aristotle is verbose and Locke isn't a good writer, yet both have much to say.

Descartes and Hume, are quite clear, though Hume is harder to understand because the topic he's speaking of is quite abstract in certain areas.

The point here being that these topics are already hard, verbosity only makes it harder without necessity (in the vast majority of cases). Of course, some people simply lack style or the capacity for clear expression. That's fine.

Once you enter Hegel territory, I'm very suspect much of substance is being said.

Once you enter Hegel territory, I'm very suspect much of substance is being said. — Manuel

I occasionally go back to The Phenomenology of Spirit. I have to if I want to understand Kierkegaard, and it is not entirely nonsense, though it's not like he's not trying. I certainly do not understand him well, but K considers that Hegel didn't understand Hegel very well, which is the real problem.

Some of Heidegger is presented to us from his lectures, and these can be rambling, like his Parmenides, which I am reading now. Kierkegaard is frankly the worst offender. His style is filled with irony and metaphor and cleverness, combined with an extensive knowledge of the thinkers of his day.

All of the pre Kantians are pretty accessible compared to what came after. I just don't read them. Descartes is important, succinct. Should be read if one is going after Husserl and beyond. Everyone has a bone to pick with Descartes because his res cogitans and res extensa are so challenging. Now he was clear, I think.

Of course, we assume there is something out there that is a cat, but the meanings that id the cat are not out there at all. — Astrophel

If you and I were in the presence of a fairly ordinary looking cat I can say 'look at the cat, what colour and pattern would you call that, tabby or tiger?' and I can be confident that the answer you give will be sensible and understandable. You won't say 'it's purple, no pattern at all'.

If that's not talking about something in the world, what would count?

Your understanding does not reach into the world and grab a cat. — Astrophel

I don't even know what that means. It seems to be some sort of weird inapt analogy between grasping with the hand and grasping with the mind; I'm not seeing the relevance.

I don't even know what that means. It seems to be some sort of weird inapt analogy between grasping with the hand and grasping with the mind; I'm not seeing the relevance. — Janus

I think he's saying that your understanding of the cat is constructed by mind, not the thing itself...

I would have thought it is a collaboration; otherwise solipsism rears its boring head.

Sure. Collaboration with what? The noumenal or the cat? :wink:

How would a phenomenologist describe the nature of a person's experience of a cat?

Kant's idea:

1. The thing in itself (noumenon)
2. The perceiver/subject/consciousness.

The two interact (perception/phenomenon)

Question: Is it possible for perceptions/phenomena to occur in the absence of noumena (hallucinations). Idealism! There's nothing out there, it's all in our heads.

The existence of noumena is uncertain; its existence can't be confirmed and so we're left studying/analyzing appearances (phenomena).

Question: How would we prove/disprove that noumena and phenomena are the same thing! Impossible? It seems a bit extravagant and paranoid to hold that noumena and phenomena differ.

Hmmm...but mustn’t I think, in order for there to be thoughts to be aware of? Can’t infer that which has happened. — Mww

Based on what? All you have is your awareness of those thoughts as evidence, and your understanding that thought = evidence of thinking. This does not amount to an awareness of thinking, but an inference. You can infer that which ‘has happened’ beyond your conscious awareness - remember, the awareness of thought and inference of thinking are simultaneous.

True enough, and transposing, we have.....I am aware of the emergence of correlations and connections. But that which correlates and connects is still required. — Mww

This is letting language structure limit understanding. There is an existing possibility of interconnectedness and correlation between all ideas. All that is required is attention and effort directed towards qualities. Correlations and connections refer to potentialities, not actions. The intention of a subject is not required.

This awareness is practical in the sense that it’s temporally located, whereas awareness of thought need not be.
— Possibility

Are you aware of having more than one thought at a time? I submit you are not, because thought is singular and successive, which makes them temporally located, if only in respect to each other. — Mww

But can you be aware of more than one thought at a time? I submit that you can - because once I’m aware of thought, it ceases to be a temporal entity. What I guess I’m trying to say here, though, is that awareness of thought need not be preceded by awareness of the thinking behind it.

This is the ground for moral, as opposed to epistemological, philosophy. Freedom, will, duty, interests, pleasure/pain, imperatives, and so on, are still conceived by understanding, and cognitions related to them are used in discussions about moral philosophy, but the doing of it, the determining of the moral worth of actions, and the moral worthiness of individuals because of them, do not. — Mww

Sorry, you lost me here.

I’m not a fan of moral philosophy as such - I don’t think it’s useful at all for us to try and determine the moral worth of anything but our own intentions. Freedom, will, duty, interests, pleasure/pain, imperative, etc - all of these conceptions exist relative to affect, and so any cognitions related to them are necessarily distorted by this, filling any discussion with relational inaccuracies. You can see it in almost every thread on these topics, despite the best intentions of posters. An accurate understanding of pleasure/pain, for instance, must take into account the relativity of reason, both to ‘the good’ and to affect as limitations to human knowledge, but not to understanding. An accurate discussion of pleasure/pain needs to at least initially refrain from both concept consolidation and judgement - rendering all expressions of feelings valid, worthy. But this is not how most philosophy is done. Reductionist methodology invariably kicks in well before all available information is gathered.

Kant doesn’t say much about good in itself, except to say there is only one of its kind, that being the will. Tough pill to swallow for some, who mistake the goodness of a thing to represent the good in itself. In which case, the will has absolutely no power whatsoever, and consequently, deontological moral philosophy disappears. Those that mistake are the same that joyously wave bye-bye, I’m sure.

In fact, moral philosophy in Kant has more power than the epistemology of pure reason, so he doesn’t prefer pure reason over the good.

“...The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason. (...) Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws—for the regulation of our actions—which are deduced from principles entirely a priori....” (A840/B868) — Mww

Acknowledging power or superior position is not the same as personal preference. Kant only critiques practical reason in relation to a ‘good will’, as if the will and the good were a singular entity which gives power to reason. Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason, the will and the good is distorted by the fixed central position he gives to human experience. It is only when we decentralise this experience and consider a broader understanding of these aspects (beyond the object-subject distinction) that the relationship becomes clearer.

Regardless of moral philosophy, will is the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action - or more broadly, by which all change is determined and initiated. It consists of three ‘gates’: awareness/ignorance, connection/isolation and collaboration/exclusion.

Energy, quality and logic all influence the capacity of the will. Kant’s idea of a ‘good will’ is the maximal capacity for awareness, connection and collaboration of any one person at any one time. This is highly variable in terms of energy availability, which affects attention and effort. So, any judgement that someone else should (or should not) have acted in a certain way doesn’t take into account any difference in the energy available to a ‘good will’.

If you and I were in the presence of a fairly ordinary looking cat I can say 'look at the cat, what colour and pattern would you call that, tabby or tiger?' and I can be confident that the answer you give will be sensible and understandable. You won't say 'it's purple, no pattern at all'.

If that's not talking about something in the world, what would count? — Janus

But all eyes are on the process that produces the understanding. It's not like a person is some kind of epistemic mirror of transparency of the world such that the cat is there and I receive the cat in the relation. Quite the opposite: when I observe a brain's physicality, I see there can be nothing more opaque. If that brain can "see" the world as it is, so can a fence post. Yes, the lens in the eye allows light to pass through, and so on. But a brain is a thick organic mass. Nothing out there gets in here. (So how does one affirm the brain to talk about brains and their opacity if to observe a brain requires transparency? It does not.....or does it? Go with the latter, and you are inviting mysticism.)

I don't even know what that means. It seems to be some sort of weird inapt analogy between grasping with the hand and grasping with the mind; I'm not seeing the relevance. — Janus

You would have to consult Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". He started it with his "Copernican Revolution". The matter turns on what he calls synthetic apriori judgments: The structure of the world is apriori.
But you don't really need Kant for this. Just ask in the most earnest and insisting way: how does anything out there get in here (pointing to the brain)? This would be a question that a physicalist/materialist would have to ask, framed like Neil DeGrasse Tyson would frame it. A brain is a physical thing. How can an epistemic relation exist between it and objects out there? It just makes no sense at all.

I can see your point. ‘Energy’ is a placeholder for the possibility from which affect emerges.
— Possibility

'Affect' in a precognitive phenomenological sense would precisely be energy, since there is no affect without change and no change without energy, so I think you should stick to your guns.. — Janus

I stand by what I wrote - but I can see why the argument was made. Phenomenology acknowledges its affected position. Energy = affect when understood from beyond affect.