An accurate understanding of pleasure/pain, for instance, must take into account the relativity of reason — Possibility
Whether Husserl goes "beyond" Kant, is a matter of taste. Fair or not, we haven't really moved beyond the framework made popular by Kant. We have to modify some of his ideas, such as "spacetime" instead of space and time and most of us would say that his categorical imperative is impossible to live up to. — Manuel
But Kant's a-priori presuppositions are, strictly speaking, false. We may individuate space and time as being different things, but they're not. We can't envision space without time, and maybe even time without space.
It's crucial to remember that Kant was a Newtonian, he took Newton's concepts of space and time to be a-priori, but these were empirical postulates made by Newton.
This doesn't mean that there's nothing a-priori, on the contrary, likely most things are, in some sense. But they're not obviously evident to discover, I don't think. — Manuel
I stand by what I wrote - but I can see why the argument was made. Phenomenology acknowledges its affected position. Energy = affect when understood from beyond affect. — Possibility
The cat looks the way it looks to anybody that looks at it (either tabby, ginger, tortoise-shell, male or female, relatively large or small, and so on), so the way it looks cannot be constructed by my mind, even though it is mediated by the kind of mind and sensory setup I have. — Janus
Fair enough. So for a phenomenologist Kant's metaphysics and idealism in general is of no particular value? — Tom Storm
The cat looks the way it looks to anybody that looks at it (either tabby, ginger, tortoise-shell, male or female, relatively large or small, and so on), so the way it looks cannot be constructed by my mind, even though it is mediated by the kind of mind and sensory setup I have. — Janus
Whether Husserl goes "beyond" Kant, is a matter of taste. Fair or not, we haven't really moved beyond the framework made popular by Kant. — Manuel
From a phenomenological standpoint, the cat looks the way it does as a function of a subjective constituting process that also involves an intersubjective aspect. To say it is constituted does not mean ‘invented’ out of whole cloth by a subjectivity. Rather, there is an indissociable interaction between subjective and objective poles of the perception. — Joshs
An accurate understanding of pleasure/pain, for instance, must take into account the relativity of reason
— Possibility
This one I find curious. Is reason relative? Judgments are, but not in their form, rather in their content. — Astrophel
I stand by what I wrote - but I can see why the argument was made. Phenomenology acknowledges its affected position. Energy = affect when understood from beyond affect.
— Possibility
Doesn't affect feel like energy to us though? Something moves us, and we know from our embodied experience that all movement requires effort (energy); we feel the energy of that movement. What is emotion if not e-motion? — Janus
It’s more than just feeling energy, though. You’re referring to affect as positive energy, but affect is also inclusive of what holds us back, what renders us ignorant or non-responsive - and even this language inaccurately implies a force acting on us, when that isn’t the case. — Possibility
The involvement of an inter-subjective aspect would only be possible on account of agreement. If the cat were not a certain way: tabby, ginger, male, female, etc,. there would be no possibility of inter-subjective agreement. — Janus
But the cat is a certain way for me differently that it is for others. Each has their own perspectives on a changing experience. For me to expereince this changing flow of senses as ‘this cat’ is already for me to form an abstraction, an idealization, a single unitary ‘this’ out of what is only ever experienced as this changing flow. My own experience of this flow as a unified object is an idealization, since my actual experience of the ‘thing’ never completely fulfills this identity. — Joshs
Sometimes movement consists of more than just where effort is directed, but where it isn’t, or where it’s redirected from. Same with attention.
Consider change as a localised 3D relation of energy, effort as a localised 4D relation of energy, and affect as localised 5D relation of energy. It’s a matter of perspective. — Possibility
But there also recognizable commonalities like colour, sex and so on, which, even though they too may be different for each of, the fact of their existence is arguably independent of any subjective act of constitution. — Janus
Right, affect can be considered to be something acting upon us, primordially speaking, even unconsciously. It can also be considered to be a felt impulse or emotion. In the cases where what holds us back is not a negative affect it would seem to be a lack of affect. I would also say that there is a sense in which lack of affect amounts to a force restraining us; think about depression, for example. — Janus
I don't understand why you have gone from talking about cats to talking about brains. How do we know anything about brains if we don't know anything about the world? How can we say anything about brains if we can't say anything about the world? — Janus
Affect is part of us, part of our awareness, connection and collaboration with the world. It refers to an ongoing distribution of attention and effort. When what we experience appears to be a ‘lack of affect’, it translates to insufficient attention and/or effort directed towards a particular aspect of experience, rather than a generalised lack. — Possibility
Depression can appear to be a force restraining us, but it, too, may be more accurately described as an ineffective distribution of attention and effort. — Possibility
For Husserl affect is directed both from the subject side of an intentional experience and from the object side. The object exerts an attractive pull on the subject and the subject turns toward the object. We notice the object when it stands out from a field, and draws our attention. From the side of the subject there is an affective pull also, a drive or striving to know the object better, that is , to anticipate its future appearances.
From both the objective and subjective sides, what is key for Husserl is that the affective meaningfulness of an experience is linked to how similar we can perceive it to be with respect to previous experience. So affect isnt simply a neutral or mechanical
energy, it is inextricably linked with the relevance of objects for a subject — Joshs
Yes, but what makes attention possible? Husserl argues that after it isn’t just shining a spotlight on something already there, it is a creative act, the making of something. — Joshs
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