So even if I clarify what I mean on the specific terms I use, you will still insist on reading them at face value? — Mr Bee

If you clarify what you mean, then the sentence may lose its intuitive plausibility: that is the gamble one takes when moving from an intuitively plausible premise to one spelled out in technical jargon. Though I'm not sure you have clarified what you mean, yet. I still don't understand the claim.

I find that I am only experiencing sitting in my room during the temporal duration in which I exist. (This is what I find through introspection upon my direct experience) — Mr Bee

But this just doesn't even sound true. For my own case, I don't find that at all – I find that I experience many things while I exist: yesterday, for example, I existed, and I experienced being on the L-train, and not at my computer, as I experience myself being now.

I don't know what to make of the present progressive 'am experiencing.' The present progressive is clearly anchored to the speech time, so again, the only way I can read it is as something like 'am experiencing now,' which again, is confusingly what you've insisted you don't mean. As for 'am experiencing during the entire time I exist,' this just seems like word salad to me – the only way I can make sense of it is to draw the bizarre implication that I only exist right now, and that's the only thing I experience right now. But then, you've said you don't want to assume any bizarre / presentistic premises for your argument.

Do you see why the weird use of English makes this impossible to understand? Once you clarify, it will probably not be plausible. I am not sure how to parse your claim, and so I can't tell you what I think about it. If it's supposed to be an intuitive truth based on introspective evidence, surely I should be able to recapitulate your conclusion? But my guess is if you asked most people this question, they would either not know what you're talking about (because 'am experiencing during the entire time that I exist' sounds like word salad without the aforementioned bizarre implication, and in any case the notion that one intuits directly how long one exists for, and what one experiences for their entire existence, is wildly implausible), or they would construe it as anchored to the present (and so not serviceable to your argument) or possibly habitually if you drop the progressive (and so false).

First off, thank you for responding to my request. Because of that, I now have a better understanding of your objections so hopefully the conversation can continue from there.

But this just doesn't even sound true. For my own case, I don't find that at all – I find that I experience many things while I exist: yesterday, for example, I existed, and I experienced being on the L-train, and not at my computer, as I experience myself being now. — The Great Whatever

You seem to be equating "the temporal duration in which I exist", with "my entire life". This is a fact that is only true under certain theories of time. For instance, under the worm theory, we are temporal worms, and are extended through our entire lives, but under presentism and also the stage theory, we are only limited to a single time, which of course is not what we would consider our entire life (note that I am not endorsing presentism here). The use of the former was meant to be neutral with respect to those theories of time.This was the reason why I have assumed presentism in my earlier example, to make clear the distinction between the meanings of both.

I don't know what to make of the present progressive 'am experiencing.' The present progressive is clearly anchored to the speech time... — The Great Whatever

Earlier, I said that your saying that your use of A-theoretic terms in the sense above is wrong-headed because we are talking about situations where one is assuming Eternalism. You apparently weren't sure about what to make of that then, but let me try to expand upon what I mean when I said that.

Technically, under eternalism, all times are equal. Time in this case is very much like space here, to the point where it has often been said by eternalists that time is literally the fourth dimension of space. This is why terms such as "will" experienced" that you mentioned earlier make no sense because under a theory in which there is no flow of time, there is no sense in which an even "will" happen. It at best is described as being "later" than other events just as much as a location in space can be described to the "right" of another. It has sometimes been said that eternalism is sort of like presentism in the sense that technically, under A-theoretic terms, everything is "now". The block universe would not be fundamentally different from a glorified present moment, sans the flow of time, which contains all facts about the universe from beginning to end. All times, existing on a par, can also be said to be "present" in an A-theoretic sense as well.

So much as you are saying we use the present tense in an argument, assuming by that you mean the common A-theoretic version of the term, it doesn't mean what you normally think it means unlike common everyday situations, because the situation under the worm theory is quite alien to our usual understanding of things passing from moment to moment through the flow of time.

It is for this reason why I find unjustified the assumption that my claims about my experience must be anchored to a specific time of speech, when the one making the claim is a temporally extended worm. It makes as much sense as saying that "here" means "the specific place of the utterance itself" for us beings who are spatially extended (which is a fact that holds for all theories of time). Even if claims about our experiences must always be confined to a specific time of our entire lives, assuming that we should experience all of them together, then that fact should at least figure explicitly in the sort of judgement I make (that is, I should understand when I am talking about a part of my experience and not the whole. Saying that I have an experience at a temporal part would be no different from saying that I have a pain in a specific part of my body). So the problem, as I see it so far, is that you were neglecting the fact that our discussion is done within the context of eternalism and are interpreting facts in a manner that conforms to our everyday sense of time.

You seem to be equating "the temporal duration in which I exist", with "my entire life". This is a fact that is only true under certain theories of time. For instance, under the worm theory, we are temporal worms, and are extended through our entire lives, but under presentism and also the stage theory, we are only limited to a single time (note that I am not endorsing presentism here). The use of the former was meant to be neutral with respect to those theories of time.This was the reason why I have assumed presentism in my earlier example, to make clear the distinction between the meanings of both. — Mr Bee

If I can intuit from my introspective experience "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is sitting at my computer, etc.," and the truth of this requires that stage theory be true, it follows that I can intuit from my own introspective experience that stage theory is true. But I can intuit no such thing – so you must have made a mistake. Or, if you like, I can't intuit from my introspective experience how long I exist for. Yet if I can't intuit this, then I can't know what "the time in which I exist" is, and so I cannot intuit the truth of any such proposition as "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is..."

If the very question under discussion is whether or not I exist for more than the present, then you cannot appeal to a premise in your argument that requires for its truth that this holds. This is begging the question.

As for the claim read as an ordinary claim of English, which is what I take it must be to prove useful in this argument, I cannot understand it as meaning anything but my entire life. It is only if I take 'exist' in some special, technical sense, that I can read 'I will not exist a minute from now' as true. As the word 'exist' is used in English, I will exist a few minutes from now so long as I don't die.

This is why terms such as "will" experienced" that you mentioned earlier make no sense because under a theory in which there is no flow of time, there is no sense in which an even "will" happen. — Mr Bee

But the word "will" does make sense. So either eternalism is false, or your characterization of it is. I'm guessing the latter – I'm sure eternalists have reasonable semantic proposals for "will."

All times, existing on a par, can also be said to be "present" in an A-theoretic sense as well. — Mr Bee

This is, so far as I can tell, nonsense – it's not possible for all times to be at the same time, since to be different times is precisely for them not to be (at) the same time. So either eternalism is nonsense, or your construal of it is false. My guess is the latter. My guess is the eternalist would say that all times are on a par in some sense, but not in a temporal sense, i.e. that they're all 'at the same time,' any more than all spaces are 'at the same space.' This simply makes no sense.

So much as you are saying we use the present tense in an argument, assuming by that you mean the common A-theoretic version of "present", it doesn't mean what you normally think it means under common everyday situations, because the situation under the worm theory is quite alien to our usual understanding of things passing from moment to moment through the flow of time. — Mr Bee

I mean the present tense as it is used in the English language, which is the language in which you are making your claims.

It is for this reason why I find unjustified the assumption that my claims about my experience must be anchored to a specific time of speech, — Mr Bee

If you do not want to so anchor them, you must not make them in English using the present progressive. For that is what that grammatical construction will do, regardless of your intentions or theoretical assumptions. You must cast them in some non-English or quasi-English technical vocabulary, or find some way to avoid using that tense.

If I can intuit from my introspective experience "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is sitting at my computer, etc.," and the truth of this requires that stage theory be true, it follows that I can intuit from my own introspective experience that stage theory is true. — The Great Whatever

Nope. It could also mean that presentism is true as well, but that is if you are not an eternalist. Technically, the worm theory can still be true, if we consider spacetime worms to be instant sized. Of course that option sounds ridiculous.

Or, if you like, I can't intuit from my introspective experience how long I exist for. Yet if I can't intuit this, then I can't know what "the time in which I exist" is, and so I cannot intuit the truth of any such proposition as "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is..." — The Great Whatever

So far as I can tell, I am not introspecting upon a part of my experience, the way, say, I consider a colour patch on the left side of my vision to be a part of my phenomenal experience. In fact, it doesn't seem like the specific experiences of sitting in my room are a part of any larger experience at all. So it seems like I am referring to my total experiences, which would, by definition, include all of my experiences that occur at every time I exist, however long that may be.

Note that none of the above assumes the truth or falsity of the worm theory. Under the worm theory, that total experience should include my other life experiences, but does what I consider to be my total experience match up with that?

This is, so far as I can tell, nonsense – it's not possible for all times to be at the same time, since to be different times is precisely for them not to be (at) the same time. So either eternalism is nonsense, or your construal of it is false. My guess is the latter. My guess is the eternalist would say that all times are on a par in some sense, but not in a temporal sense, i.e. that they're all 'at the same time,' any more than all spaces are 'at the same space.' This simply makes no sense. — The Great Whatever

I don't think anything I can say would help convince you, since not knowing anything about eternalism yourself we are at the point where you will just assume that I am mistaken. So here is a quote from Stanford:

It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a Non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists right now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of ‘x exists now’. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with ‘x is present’. The Non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of ‘x exists now’, it is true that no non-present objects exist right now. But in the other sense of ‘x exists now’, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that x exists now is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates. When we attribute to Non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit the Non-presentist only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers). — Stanford Entry on Time

And here is some random guy I found online saying what I would say:

Saying "all times exist now" is really shorthand for "The [Eternalist] ascribes to the Past and Future the same type of reality which the A-theorist only ascribes to the Present." — Aron Wall

Not authoritative, I know, but still I am not the only person making claims like this.

If you do not want to so anchor them, you must not make them in English using the present progressive. For that is what that grammatical construction will do, regardless of your intentions or theoretical assumptions. You must cast them in some non-English or quasi-English technical vocabulary, or find some way to avoid using that tense. — The Great Whatever

It's not that I do not want to anchor them. I will have to make statements in the sense you ascribe as far as I can tell. It is just the idea that it has to be "anchored to the speech time" that I find objectionable. There are other senses of what "now" could mean, as the Stanford article mentions, so I don't see why it should necessarily refer to the time of utterance.

So it seems like I am referring to my total experiences — Mr Bee

No, since you'll exist tomorrow and existed yesterday and had experiences then as well.

I don't think anything I can say would help convince you, since not knowing anything about eternalism yourself we are at the point where you will just assume that I am mistaken — Mr Bee

I'm being polite. What you quoted is more lucid than what you said.

It is just the idea that it has to be "anchored to the speech time" that I find objectionable. — Mr Bee

I didn't invent the English language. That's how it works.

There are other senses of what "now" could mean, as the Stanford article mentions, — Mr Bee

Those senses are not how the word is used in the English language. So if you want to use them in a non-standard way, you must flag to begin with what you are using a different, technical language, and define its terms, and state your premises in that language. In a word, you must say 'by "now," I don't actually mean "now," but xyz...'

Those senses are not how the word is used in the English language. So if you want to use them in a non-standard way, you must flag to begin with what you are using a different, technical language, and defined its terms, and state your premises in that language. In a word, you must say 'by "now," I don't actually mean "now," but xyz...' — The Great Whatever

Personally, it seems like the ontological now is more basic than the sense of "now" in terms of temporal location (but I am not saying it is how the english term is used mind you), but whatever.

Now do you accept it as a way of making my claims, as something that is framed in this "quasi-English" technical sense? If so, then let's just go with the ontological sense of "now" and call it "NOW" just to be absolutely clear.

No, since you'll exist tomorrow and existed yesterday and had experiences then as well. — The Great Whatever

Are those other times which have those experiences a part of me right NOW? If not, then they don't count.

A presentist would consider their total experience to be limited to the one existing present, so it would only be limited to their time of utterance. A stage theorist would have those times exist, but they wouldn't be considered parts of themselves either, any more than a random stranger would be considered a part of who they are.

Under the worm theory, those other times should be a part of me NOW (since they exist, in an ontological sense), so so much as I am talking about my total experiences, they should, assuming the worm theory, include experiences of all these times.

Are those other times which have those experiences a part of me right NOW? If not, then they don't count.

Under the worm theory, they should be a part of me NOW (since they exist), so so much as I am talking about my total experiences, it should, assuming the worm theory, include experiences of all these times. — Mr Bee

According to worm theory, those future and past experiences would be experiences had by stages of yourself that are part or you now in the ontological sense of "now". They are not experiences had by you now in the ordinary sense of "now" (i.e. the temporal location sense of "now"). Let us use "now-o" (ontological) and now-tl (temporal location) to disambiguate those two senses as distinguished by the eternalist theorist. Provided that you don't equivocate between those two senses, then it seems that P3 asserts that you are not experiencing anything other than sitting at your computer now-tl. But it doesn't follow from this introspectible fact that you aren't experiencing other things now-o. In fact, you are experiencing now-o everything that you experienced in the past or will experience in the future, according to the worm theorist. Of course, you can not know this on the basis of your introspective experience now-tl alone. But you can know it on the basis of your reflection on the meaning of "now-o", your memory of your own past experiences, and your expectations regarding your own future experiences.

According to worm theory, those future and past experiences would be experiences had by stages of yourself that are part or you now in the ontological sense of "now". They are not experiences had by you now in the ordinary sense of "now" (i.e. the temporal location sense of "now"). Let us use "now-o" (ontological) and now-l (location) to disambiguate those two senses as distinguished by the eternalist theorist. Provided that you don't equivocate between those two senses, then it seems that P3 asserts that you are not experiencing anything other than sitting at your computer now-l. — Pierre-Normand

Under the worm-theory, those experiences of being at my computer are had as part of a larger experience which includes other times. But simply put, it doesn't seem like I do have those experiences as a part, they just feel like they are had in general, as the totality of what I experience in an unrestricted sense (or you could say, in ontological terms).

Now you could continue to insist that I am just wrong my statement, and that what I "really" am claiming is actually restricted to a time, that fact happening to be simply beyond my ability to even notice (which is why I don't mention it), but I see absolutely no reason why I should accept your words over my own, especially since I am the one having those experiences. In other words, it seems like you are just rejecting my claims and trying to fabricate some other claim about what I am "really saying" in its place, begging the question.

For instance, you claim that I am experiencing a pain in my right foot. I say that I am not experiencing any such pain at all. In fact, I would say that I find that I am not having any sort of pain experience in general (in any part of my body) because that is just what I find through introspection. If you were to claim that "no, when you said that you weren't experiencing any pain at all, you were "really" saying that you weren't experiencing any pain in your left arm (or any body part that doesn't include your right foot). This is still compatible with you having a pain in your right foot", then I see no reason why I should take your word over mine and I don't think you would be convinced either of that response either if you were me. If you disagree with my reply then I am interested to hear what you think of it.

Personally, it seems like the ontological now is more basic than the sense of "now" in terms of temporal location (but I am not saying it is how the english term is used mind you), but whatever. — Mr Bee

There is no 'ontological' sense of 'now,' if by 'now' you mean the English word. If you do not mean this word, then why not make up a new one so as to be less confusing, and spell out what this new word means?

Now do you accept it as a way of making my claims, as something that is framed in this "quasi-English" technical sense? If so, then let's just go with the ontological sense of "now" and call it "NOW" just to be absolutely clear. — Mr Bee

You can make whatever claim you like – but it won't make more true the claim that you or I can intuit such a thing from our introspective experience. I intuit that right now I only experience such-and-such, but not that I exist only right now, or all that I experience is that. So I see no plausibility in the premise.

Are those other times which have those experiences a part of me right NOW? If not, then they don't count. — Mr Bee

I really don't know how to answer this question, because I'm not sure what it means. How can a time be a part of a person? It seems like a category error.

What I do know is that, unless I die, I'll exist tomorrow, and experience something else. So I'm not in the least inclined to believe that whatever I'm experiencing right now is all that I experience (or will/have experience(d)) while I exist.

so so much as I am talking about my total experiences, they should, assuming the worm theory, include experiences of all these times. — Mr Bee

They do include experiences of all such times; it's just that the future ones will happen latter. Obviously.

There is no ontological sense of 'now,' if by 'now' you mean the English word. If you do not mean this word, then why not make up a new one so as to be less confusing? — The Great Whatever

I just did. It's called NOW, in accord with the Stanford definition of "existing in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers", that they themselves call the ontological sense of now.

You can make whatever claim you like – but it won't make more true the claim that you or I can intuit such a thing from our introspective experience. I intuit that right now I only experience such-and-such, but not that I exist only right now, or all that I experience is that. So I see no plausibility in the premise. — The Great Whatever

Really? Sure seems like I do. Not sure about you though.

Of course, I mean that in the sense of NOW. If what you are saying is that the you that exists in every possible sense of the word (NOW) does not exhaust who you are, then I am interested in what else you consider yourself to be since frankly I find that claim implausible. Of course, it could also be that you are still insisting upon "now" as in "the specific time of this utterance". I highly suspect this is the case.

I really don't know how to answer this question, because I'm not sure what it means. How can a time be a part of a person? It seems like a category error. — The Great Whatever

Please. The "you" tomorrow and the "you" yesterday. Do they exist in any ontological sense, and are they are part of you NOW? The answer to that would again depend upon the theory of time you adopt.

Tell me, what is your stance on the philosophy of time?

They do include experiences of all such times; it's just that the future ones will happen latter. Obviously. — The Great Whatever

Great then. My argument is that I simply find nothing of the sort in my experience.

If what you are saying is that the you that exists in every possible sense of the word (NOW) does not exhaust who you are, then I am interested in what else you consider yourself to be since frankly I find that claim implausible. — Mr Bee

I don't know what this means. How many senses of existing are there? I know I exist. I know that sitting here etc. is all I experience right now. But I'm also reasonably sure that I will exist tomorrow, and that tomorrow I will experience other things. Therefore I in no way intuit that what I experience right now exhausts all my experience during the time I exist.

What is wrong with this, or do you intuit something different?

I just did. It's called NOW, in accord with the Stanford definition of "existing in the most unrestricted sense", that they themselves call the ontological sense of now. — Mr Bee

That doesn't tell me anything. Is it an adverbial? A predicate? Use it in a sentence, or give me an idea of what it means to 'exist in the most unrestricted sense.' Do other things exist 'in a restricted sense?'

Please. The "you" tomorrow and the "you" yesterday. Do they exist in any ontological sense, and are they are part of you NOW? — Mr Bee

The 'me' tomorrow and the 'me' yesterday are just me. And I would say that I existed, do exist, and will exist. I don't know what it would mean for 'them' to be a part of 'me.' Can I be part of myself? I suppose, trivially. Those times, at which I did exist and will exist, are parts of my life.

The answer to that would again depend upon the theory of time you adopt.

Presumably, the answer I adopt will depend on what's true!

Great then. My argument is that I simply find nothing of the sort in my experience. — Mr Bee

But you had found them before, and will find them later. See how that works?

I don't know what this means. How many senses of existing are there? — The Great Whatever

You know how eternalism says that the past and future exist while the presentist doesn't? Of course, you don't need to take my word that that is what those views entail.

That doesn't tell me anything. Is it an adverbial? A predicate? Use it in a sentence, or give me an idea of what it means to 'exist in the most unrestricted sense.' Do other things exist 'in a restricted sense?' — The Great Whatever

Eternalism says that the past and future exist just as much as the present does. Or to quote someone else:

Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, which takes the view that all points in time are equally real, as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real, and the growing block universe theory of time in which past and present are real while the future is not. — Wikipedia Author on Eternalism

And for the record, "real" = "exists".

The 'me' tomorrow and the 'me' yesterday are just me. And I would say that I existed, do exist, and will exist. I don't know what it would mean for 'them' to be a part of 'me.' Can I be part of myself? I suppose, trivially. Those times, at which I did exist and will exist, are parts of my life. — The Great Whatever

And see, that sounds very much like you are an A-theorist. I did mention earlier that those terms don't make sense without a flow of time (as the eternalist worm theorist asserts there isn't). That is simply because "will' and "existed" as A-theoretic terms are simply incompatible with a theory that rejects the A-theory of time!

Presumably, the answer I adopt will depend on what's true! — The Great Whatever

Fine then. Which theory of time do you think is true?

But you had found them before,and will find them later. See how that works? — The Great Whatever

Again, those terms make no sense under eternalism if we are talking about them in A-theoretic terms. You keep saying that they do but apparently you don't know yourself. So either read up on what Eternalism says, or stop making claims about what you think it should say.

Eternalism says that the past and future exist just as much as the present does. Or to quote someone else: — Mr Bee

This is not what I was asking. I was asking what this word, NOW, you've made up, means. This does not help. You need to use it in sentences.

I did mention earlier that those terms don't make sense without a flow of time (as the eternalist worm theorist asserts there isn't). That is simply because "will' and "existed" as A-theoretic terms don't make sense under a theory that rejects the A-theory of time! — Mr Bee

The terms "will" and "existed" make perfect sense, regardless of what theory you subscribe to.

Fine then. Which theory of time do you think is true? — Mr Bee

I have no particular opinion on the matter, and it should make no difference since presumably your argument should have some sort of force without prior commitment to a metaphysical thesis.

Again, those terms make no sense under eternalism if we are talking about them in A-theoretic terms. You keep saying that they do but apparently you don't know yourself. So either read up on what Eternalism says, or stop making claims about what you think it should say. — Mr Bee

But the terms do make sense, full stop, as anyone who knows English can see. Besides, why should I have to subscribe to some bizarre metaphysical theory for your argument about what you claim you can intuit introspectively to make sense? If asked what I experience, prior to any such commitment, that is how I respond. I certainly don't intuit that what I experience now is all I experience "for the duration of my existence," or any such thing.

This is not what I was asking. I was asking what this word, NOW, you've made up, means. This does not help. You need to use it in sentences. — The Great Whatever

Okay, Eternalism says that the past, the future and the present are all NOW. According to the block universe, every event from the Big Bang to whatever the end of the Universe is like exists NOW. This is in contrast to presentism, which says that only the present moment exists NOW. The Growing Block theory says that the past from the Big Bang to the present exist NOW.

I have no particular opinion on the matter, and it should make no difference since presumably your argument should have some sort of force without prior commitment to a metaphysical thesis. — The Great Whatever

If you really aren't interested in learning what the theories are, then I am not sure if I can even have a proper conversation. Even the everyday presentist viewpoint wouldn't make sense to you (which may be the case since earlier it seemed liked you did) if you just insist on taking the claims at face value regardless of clarification. I can't do anything about that. Sorry.

The terms "will" and "existed" make perfect sense, regardless of what theory you subscribe to.
...
But the terms do make sense, full stop, as anyone who knows English can see. — The Great Whatever

So you say. But that is simply just wrong.

Under the worm-theory, those experiences of being at my computer are had as part of a larger experience which includes other times. — Mr Bee

I am not sure why the worm theorist ought to be committed to that. She is committed to the temporal stages of a person being parts of that person. Those stages add up mereologically to a worm and the person is numerically identical with this worm. But it doesn't follow that experiences had by that person at different stages make up a unified experience. Likewise, my organs and limbs are part of me. But it doesn't follow that my organs are part of a unique super-organ or that my limbs are part of a super-limb. It is the stages of the subject of the experiences that are parts of the whole person (i.e. worm) according to worm theory, not necessarily the experiences themselves.

Here is another way to put the point. Having an experience is tantamount to one being in cognitive contact with some determinate aspect of one's perceptible environment (in such a way that the elements of this experiences display a synthetic unity). This is similar to one being in physical contact with a material object. One can be in contact with different objects at different times. The worm theorist is committed to the idea that she is ('now'-ontologically) in contact with all the objects her different stages have been (are, and will be) in contact with. But she is not at all committed to the idea of there being a unique object that is the mereological sum of all the objects she, as a worm, is in contact with. All of those commitments (and lack thereof) are justified by her conception of continuants and her theory of time, and are quite independent of whatever is available to her through introspection at various times.

Okay, Eternalism says that the past, the future and the present are all NOW. According to the block universe, every event from the Big Bang to whatever the end of the Universe is like exists NOW. This is in contrast to presentism, which says that only the present moment exists NOW. The Growing Block theory says that the past from the Big Bang to the present exist NOW and that NOW continues to increase with the passage of time. — Mr Bee

Alright – I still don't really get it. I don't know what the difference between a past time 'existing' versus not. It seems to me to be a confusion about the way we talk about time using tense. For example, past events happened, individuals that once were alive but are now dead did exist but don't anymore, and so on. Certainly we make reference to past times – does that mean they 'exist?' I don't know, since I don't know what it means for a time to 'exist.' What's more, the word 'exist' has to be used tensed, in reference to some time, so the very notion that a time exists may even be confused – or at least that is not how we usually use these words.

As for this NOW thing, I'm trying to grasp from your usage what it means and I can't. I can say things like, 'there was a time when...' or 'there will be a time when...' Perhaps even 'there existed a time when...' etc. So perhaps the obvious thing to say is that past times existed, and future times will exist? Is this a case of existing in 'the general' sense of NOW? But then, NOW seems to have nothing to do with 'now,' since it covers all times not just now.

If you really aren't interested in learning what the theories are — Mr Bee

Isn't this thread about your argument? Do I have to accept some sort of metaphysical theory in order for your argument to make sense / be valid / be persuasive? I'm a little lost as to your rhetorical strategy.

Is your claim about what you can intuit, and the resulting P3, something that only people who accept a certain metaphysical theory can intuit?

So you say. But that is simply just wrong. — Mr Bee

Whether the word "will" makes sense isn't contingent on any metaphysical theory, since we already observe that it makes sense independent of any such theorizing. It is an empirical fact that such words have a meaning, we know how to use them, etc.

I am not sure why the worm theorist ought to be committed to that. She is committed to the temporal stages of a person being parts of that person. Those stages add up mereologically to a worm and the person is numerically identical with this worm. But it doesn't follow that experiences had by that person at different stages make up a unified experience. Likewise, my organs and limbs are part of me. But it doesn't follow that my organs are part of a unique super-organ or that my limbs are part of a super-limb. It is the stages of the subject of the experiences that are parts of the whole person (i.e. worm) according to worm theory, not necessarily the experiences themselves. — Pierre-Normand

At this point, you are objecting to my P2. To me, P2. seems like the straightforward consequence of being an entity that consists of parts which each individually has experiences of their own. I can imagine what it is like to have two limbs without having a super-limb and similarly have multiple organs without a super organ, perhaps because the way they are defined restricts what an organ or a limb can be. But the problem is that the same can't be said for our experience. I can't possibly imagine currently being subject to multiple experiences without being subject to all of them together. What would it even be like for you to now have two experiences, and not have a larger experience that contains them both? That just seems like a basic feature of having multiple experiences in a unified consciousness.

SImilarly, if I have the property of being a man and I also have a property of being over 20, then I have the property of being both a man and over 20. Maybe you don't accept this, but if you think that any two properties cannot be said to be had together, then it would seem to give way to seemingly contradictory situations. I can be a bachelor and I can also have a property of being married, but there won't be a contradiction because I don't have the impossible property of being a married bachelor. In a sense, married bachelors can exist, but of course, this all sounds incredibly strange. As well, I would argue against the idea that I am having an experience of being in excruciating pain, and an experience of complete pleasure without saying that I have them both as not making sense.

Furthermore, while I cannot imagine a super-limb or a super-organ in any case, I can imagine a complex experience being made up of smaller experiences. Any complex experience that we would describe, such a visual image of the Mona Lisa to tasting fine wine while hearing classical music can be made sense of. In fact, it seems that experiences do seem to necessarily combine together when we consider things spatially (and this is something that all theorists on time should agree upon). We are spatially extended bodies, consisting of a complex set of sensory organs each giving rise to particular experiences that we all now have. But it doesn't seem like I have multiple separate experiences of, say, a pain in my right leg or a buzzing in my ears separately. It seems like I have a single unified experience that consists of these smaller experiences as experiential parts (I have an experience of a pain in my right leg and a buzzing in my ears). In fact I can't imagine not having them in such a manner either. So if experiences necessarily combine together over space, then the question is why should we make an exception with time? Now you may argue that time isn't like space, but they are very similar to one another, and to me they are similar enough to make analogies like this have some force (and it would be even more convincing if you are an eternalist who considers time to be just another dimension of space).

(Sorry if the above came out messy. My computer somehow decided to post it while I typing)

Alright – I still don't really get it. I don't know what the difference between a past time 'existing' versus not. It seems to me to be a confusion about the way we talk about time using tense. For example, past events happened, individuals that once were alive but are now dead did exist but don't anymore, and so on. Certainly we make reference to past times – does that mean they 'exist?' — The Great Whatever

That is actually a problem for presentism. If certain events from the past don't exist NOW, how can we say they are true? Eternalists and Growing Block theorists have a way of accounting for claims about the past, because there is a truth-maker represented by his existence at that time that they can refer to NOW. Presentists, however, don't have that luxury. So if you find yourself confused here, then you aren't alone. The fact that we can still apparently refer to events that don't exist NOW as being true under presentism is often called the truthmaker problem.

As for this NOW thing, I'm trying to grasp from your usage what it means and I can't. I can say things like, 'there was a time when...' or 'there will be a time when...' Perhaps even 'there existed a time when...' etc. So perhaps the obvious thing to say is that past times existed, and future times will exist? Is this a case of existing in 'the general' sense of NOW? — The Great Whatever

Again, it seems like you are operating under an A-theorist framework (which is of course the common everyday sense of time). If an event will happen in the sense of the passage of time, then no, it doe not exist NOW.

But then, NOW seems to have nothing to do with 'now,' since it covers all times not just now. — The Great Whatever

Exactly. NOW of course doesn't mean now as in temporal location. That was the whole point of the Stanford quote.

Isn't this thread about your argument? Do I have to accept some sort of metaphysical theory in order for your argument to make sense / be valid / be persuasive? I'm a little lost as to your rhetorical strategy. — The Great Whatever

Not at all. All I am saying is that you need to understand what I am talking about before saying that I am wrong. If you don't understand what the metaphysical theories say, then read about them first before correcting me on what they should say.

Whether the word "will" makes sense isn't contingent on any metaphysical theory, since we already observe that it makes sense independent of any such theorizing. It is an empirical fact that such words have a meaning, we know how to use them, etc. — The Great Whatever

It makes sense to the common everyday layperson but that doesn't mean it can't be false. The idea that the sun rises and sets would be acceptable to children who don't know any better, but that doesn't mean that the sun revolves around the earth no matter what.

Eternalism isn't common sense. It is not intuitive at all, and it certainly doesn't conform to our everyday beliefs about time. It says things that goes against our everyday notions of time, and that includes the idea that events had or will happen through the passage of time. That is just what it basically says.

What would it even be like for you to have two experiences, and not have a larger experience that contains them both? That just seems like a basic feature of having multiple experiences in a unified consciousness. — Mr Bee

For example, having different experiences at different times, like smelling burnt toast today and skydiving five years ago. I don't have some "larger experience" of these two events, unless that "experience" is my entire life.

Can you elaborate on what you mean here?

What needs elaboration? You asked what it is to have two experiences without having some "larger experience," as though this were impossible. I gave the example of two experiences separated in time; that were not had simultaneously.

This is under the assumption that both experiences are by together by the same subject, under the worm theory right? If not then you aren't understanding my question.

I don't experience skydiving five years ago and smelling burnt toast today as some "larger experience". This would require experiencing each moment of my life simultaneously or "all at once". Didn't you already argue against this kind of thing in the OP?

Wait, I am not sure if you are trying to disagree with me or are agreeing with me. Under what theory of time are you saying that you have both experiences? Are you saying that you have them one by one with the passing of time (as in tensed theories of time) or are you saying that you have them both in the way, say I have an experience of seeing a computer screen and an experience of a buzzing noise in my room (in the manner according to the worm theory)?

This would require experiencing each moment of my life simultaneously or "all at once". Didn't you already argue against this kind of thing in the OP? — Luke

Yes I did, but I did say that you are subject to multiple experiences regardless. The point is, can one be subject to having multiple experiences without experiencing them together? Personally, this sounds impossible to me to imagine or conceive of and it sounds inherently impossible. Perhaps it is because I recently read Chalmers and Bayne echoing the same sentiments but I just find the notion incoherent.

Wait, I am not sure if you are trying to disagree with me or are agreeing with me. Under what theory of time are you saying that you have both experiences? Are you saying that you have them one by one with the passing of time (as in tensed theories of time) or are you saying that you have them both in the way, say I have an experience of seeing a computer screen and an experience of a buzzing noise in my room (in the manner according to the worm theory)? — Mr Bee

I have "both" experiences under either theory of time. But when I speak of having them "together", I mean having them simultaneously, at the same time. It probably depends how you wish to define "experience", but I don't see any problem in talk of having more than one experience at the same time, such as having a conversation and hearing background noise at the same time. But I deny that two disparate experiences separated by a long period of time can be said to be had together or simultaneously or at the same time. That quite obvious, so I still don't understand your claim that it requires some "larger experience".

Also, I don't see why you seem to think that worm theory entails that experiences can only be had simultaneously. Is this the distinction you are making between worm theory and stage theory: whether experiences are had one-by-one or whether they can be had simultaneously? That's not how I understand it, but I also don't know that much about it.

I have "both" experiences under either theory of time. — Luke

There are different senses to having "both" experiences as I have pointed out in my last post. If you are saying you have them in both senses, then that doesn't make sense.

But when I speak of having them "together", I mean having them simultaneously, at the same time. It probably depends how you wish to define "experience", but I don't see any problem in talk of having more than one experience at the same time, such as having a conversation and hearing background noise at the same time. But I deny that two disparate experiences separated by a long period of time can be said to be had together or simultaneously or at the same time. That quite obvious, so I still don't understand your claim that it requires some "larger experience". — Luke

I am not referring to multiple experiences over time "at the same time". Like I said, this is not what I mean at all and the "larger experience" does not require making such a claim.

Wasn't your distinction between having the experiences one-by-one or (being able to) having them simultaneously? Either way I have both experiences, don't I?

The latter wasn't meant to be "had simultaneously" as "at a time". I was asking you if you are saying a temporal worm can be subject to an experience of skydiving at one time of their lives and another experience of smelling burnt toast at another and not have a larger experience that encompasses them. Of course, you could also mean it in a presentist sort of way, where I experience skydiving then smelt burnt toast according to the passage of time.

And I'm asking what that "larger experience" is. You don't have some overall (meta-) experience of all your experiences; you only have the experiences.

In the case just described, it is an experience of "Skydiving and Smelling burnt toast". It is not just having an experience of "Skydiving" and an experience of "Smelling burnt toast" separately.

Or if you are okay with a completely visual example, in the case where I am seeing a red patch in my vision and a blue patch, there will be a larger visual experience of seeing both of them together (for instance, it could be an image that has red on the left side and blue on the right).