You haven't addressed my points as far as I can tell. Doesn't the cat have its own life,nature and attributes, which contribute to constituting anyone's perception of it? — Janus
Husserl’s notion of intentionality fragments the holistic weave of our frame of intelligibility into separated elements.
“It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside. But what is meant by intentionality-the bare and isolated directing-itself-towards-must still be set back into the unified basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. This alone is the authentic phenomenon which corresponds to what inauthentically and only in an isolated direction is meant by intentionality.” — Joshs
Don't you accept that we are affected by the world below the level of our conscious awareness? If you want to say that we construct the world, that each one of us constructs our own worlds, and that we are not affected by anything unconsciously or other than ourselves, that would be pure idealism and then we should know just how we construct the world. But we do not and the idea seems incoherent and absurd. — Janus
You say "collaboration with the world" which is pretty much what I've been saying, but then when you claim that we are not affected in the sense of being acted upon by things other than ourselves, you seem to be denying that very collaboration. — Janus
You say that depression may be "more accurately described as an ineffective distribution of attention and effort"; as though it all relies on the willing subject, and I can only say that if you had ever suffered from severe depression you would not say that. Depression can result from "abnormal" brain chemistry, and that fact is uncontroversial. — Janus
Also I haven't said that affect is nothing but energy. Everything is energy of one kind or another, but it doesn't follow that anything is nothing but energy. — Janus
Yes, I think that's exactly right. — Janus
The modes of necessity are interrelated with the modes of contingency, so that perfect necessity is contingent in relation to a priore necessity, a priore necessity is contingent in relation to logical necessity, and logical necessity is contingent in relation to an "ur-contingency" that would transcend non-contradiction. Each mode of contingency, in turn, represents the possibility of something different from what we see in each subsequent mode of necessity. The very possibility that, in time, we can open the window or make some other alteration in reality is a case where we deal with the contingency of present time and our ability to bring about some new possibility. What this adds up to for universals is that as forms of necessity they represent the rules and guideposts that limit and direct possibility: Universals represent all real possibilities. Thus, what Plato would have called the Form of the Bed, really just means that beds are possible. What would have seemed like a reductio ad absurdum of Plato's theory, that if there is the Form of the Bed, there must also be the Form of the Television (which is thus not an artifact and an invented object at all, but something that the inventor has just "remembered"), now must mean that the universal represents the possibility of the television, which is a possibility based on various necessities of physics (conditioned necessities) and facts (perfect necessities) of history. — Meaning and the Problem of Universals, Kelly Ross
Has any thinker formulated a complete system of philosophy that did not necessitate postulating the existence of a Transcendent Factor? — charles ferraro
And with respect to each system, what is it precisely that needs to be explained by the Transcendent Factor? Is it something peculiar and unique to each system, or something common to all the systems? — charles ferraro
I'd say what needs to be explained is the commonality of experience. I see a cat, and others will also see it just where I do — Janus
Tom, any conjectures as to the "incomplete ideas" which might be unique to each system, or common to them all?
For example, Berkeley needed a transcendent Master-Mind to preserve, maintain, and explain the existence and inherent organization of ideas if and when they were not being perceived by any human mind. — charles ferraro
it must be said that things in themselves are necessary for the appearance of phenomena, no? Which means that if they are not the material or efficient causes then at least they must be a necessary condition. — Janus
If everything is mind then why can't we change the world mentally? Why is there so much consistency between the experience of people? Why can't I read minds or be read? How does the 'physical' world remain stable? — Tom Storm
Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.” — Dan Zahavi
To say something occurs 'in the mind' is not the same as to say it occurs in your mind or my mind alone. Consciousness is a collective. Through language, enculturation, and common standards we each are an aspect of a collective consciousness. This is made explicit in Jung's doctrine of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. — Wayfarer
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