The problem is that it is nearly always interpreted as nihilism, as a literal nothingness, although I really don't think it is. It is just the ending or stepping outside the 'nightmare of history' that is being talked about. My view is that there's a shadow, in the sense intended by Jung, in the Western psyche, around this question, as a consequence of the particular religious history of the West, but that is a big argument. — Wayfarer
the passage from moment to moment is its own kind of death and re-birth. He should have focused on that instead. — Joshs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heideggerian_terminologyOne of the most interesting and important 'concepts' in Being and Time is that of Das Man, for which there is no exact English translation; different translations and commentators use different conventions. It is often translated as "the They" or "People" or "Anyone" but is more accurately translated as "One" (as in "'one' should always arrive on time").
Dasein, whiling away its own time in each case, is at the same time always a generation. So a specific interpretedness precedes every Dasein in the shape of the generation itself.
A definite sense of being guides every natural interpretation of beings....Precisely by its being inexplicit, it possesses a peculiar stubbornness...
The fundamental way of the being-there of the world, namely, having the world there with one another, is speaking… — Heidegger
'Being together with others' implies an ontological characteristic of Dasein that is equiprimordial with 'being-in-the-world'. — Heidegger
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gadamer/#DiaPhrThe prejudicial character of understanding means that, whenever we understand, we are involved in a dialogue that encompasses both our own self-understanding and our understanding of the matter at issue. In the dialogue of understanding our prejudices come to the fore, both inasmuch as they play a crucial role in opening up what is to be understood, and inasmuch as they themselves become evident in that process. As our prejudices thereby become apparent to us, so they can also become the focus of questioning in their own turn..
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Conversation always takes place in language and similarly Gadamer views understanding as always linguistically mediated. Since both conversation and understanding involve coming to an agreement, so Gadamer argues that all understanding involves something like a common language, albeit a common language that is itself formed in the process of understanding itself. In this sense, all understanding is, according to Gadamer, interpretative, and, insofar as all interpretation involves the exchange between the familiar and the alien, so all interpretation is also translative. Gadamer’s commitment to the linguisticality of understanding also commits him to a view of understanding as essentially a matter of conceptual articulation. This does not rule out the possibility of other modes of understanding, but it does give primacy to language and conceptuality in hermeneutic experience. Indeed, Gadamer takes language to be, not merely some instrument by means of which we are able to engage with the world, but as instead the very medium for such engagement. We are ‘in’ the world through being ‘in’ language.
Heidegger believes that early Greek thinking is not yet metaphysics. Presocratic thinkers ask the question concerning the being of beings, but in such a way that being itself is laid open. They experience the being of beings as the presencing (Anwesen) of what is present (Anwesende). Being as presencing means enduring in unconcealment, disclosing. ...The departure of Western philosophical tradition from concern with what is present in presencing, from this unique experience that astonished the Greeks, has had profound theoretical and practical consequences.
In contrast there can be found the concept of “the One” in the west and (tmbk, at least some interpretations) of “Brahman” in the east, such that both are here conceived as devoid of thingness … and, yet, rather than being nothingness, are then deemed the essential source for everything. — javra
In some sense, "objectification" is the end of philosophy.
It serves no meaningful purpose. — Arne
Scientific thematization and objectification have their place for Heidegger, albeit distinctly circumscribed as regional ontologies. — Joshs
People misinterpret the introduction to Heidegger's — Arne
Nobody should give a shit what a Nazi said. — Garrett Travers
That's exactly what it sounds like to ethical philosophers when someone entertains the theories of people whose ethical framework allows for complicity in genocidal violations against the Human Consciousness, through imperial statism, as if they deserve to ever be brought into the same league as philosophers. — Garrett Travers
Nobody should give a shit what a Nazi said. — Garrett Travers
And in Heideggerian terms, isn't the real issue the degree to which a scientific mode of being can be an authentic mode of being? And if so, then the scientific mode of being is inauthentic insofar as it leads Dasein to mistakenly live as if Dasein were outside the world looking in. You cannot be more "in" the world than Dasein — Arne
But don’t forget, it isn’t just the objectively present objects of empirical study that Heidegger considers inauthentic. — Joshs
On the contrary. We should be incredibly curious about what the Nazis had to say, if for no other reason than to understand one's own enemy. — Aaron R
This is short-sighted and simplistic. People who do horrible things can still have deep philosophical, ethical and/or scientific insights. It would make things a lot simpler if this weren't true, but it is true. — Aaron R
It is no punishment of him or any other Nazi to ignore what he had to say regarding the nature of being. Instead and for a serious philosopher, ignoring Heidegger because he was a bad person is self-flagellation. — Arne
Inauthentic, undifferentiated, and authentic are temporal modes of Dasein's being that have no application to entities other than Dasein. To say that something ready to hand (such as a hammer) is authentic or inauthentic makes no more sense than to say that something ready to hand (such as a hammer) is happy or sad. — Arne
Didn't disagree with this. I said care and relate them to philosophy, no not happening. — Garrett Travers
No, they can't. — Garrett Travers
most of the time we spend making our way through the world is spent in an undifferentiated mode of being rather than in an inauthentic mode of being. And the only difference between inauthentic and authentic is choice. And the hammer has no choice. — Arne
I don't see where you said this, but it's moot if we're in agreement. — Aaron R
I'm assuming that you wouldn't ignore a scientific discovery because it was made by a Nazi scientist or reject a revolutionary engineering technique because it was invented by a Nazi engineer. — Aaron R
No, I would ignore the methods by which he justified such a discovery as dispicably evil, and to be ridiculed, ostracized, and reasoned into the dust bin of history where it belongs — Garrett Travers
But, we aren't talking about discoveries of objective nature, are we? Because objective standards could never be used to justify the genoiced of the Human Consciousness. — Garrett Travers
Presumably it would have been his use of the scientific method that justified his discovery. Beyond that, I'm not sure what methods you have in mind. — Aaron R
A philosophical insight is a philosophical insight, regardless of who conceived it. — Aaron R
Do you think that none of your favorite philosophers ever acted in a way that was inconsistent with their own philosophical insights? — Aaron R
:lol:http://www.quickmeme.com/meme/3quhly
Batman's right. — Ciceronianus
(emphases added)Whoever is versed in the jargon does not have to say what he thinks, does not even have to think it properly. The jargon takes over this task. — Jargon of Authenticity, p.9
Whoever is versed in the jargon does not have to say what he thinks, does not even have to think it properly. The jargon takes over this task. — Jargon of Authenticity, p.9
Inconsistency isn't the issue. — Garrett Travers
As specifically relates to H, "resolute" (i.e. subjectivist aka "ownmost") "being-towards-death" makes for "authentic Dasein", reminiscent of soldiering (kamikazi-like), that resonates with a Kierkegaardian "knight of faith" fervor rationalized by the theodicy of death at the drum-beating heart of H's SuZ. "Authenticity" – purportedly the highest subjectivist (and historicist) goal – is the hymn of this Absolute (which for H's Dasein is (my) "death") invoked as en-chanting (i.e. "jargoning" Adorno suggests) in lieu of, or over above, public reasoning. :eyes: — 180 Proof
If wayfarer wants to throw out words such as "objectification" and fail to clarify that he is using it as a synonym for the "scientific method", then isn't he "covering up" at least as much as he may be "uncovering"? — Arne
It's precisely the issue because it leaves open the possibility that even a moral degenerate could expound profound philosophical insights despite their own repugnant behavior. Heidegger may (or may not) be one such person. — Aaron R
I've been told more than once on this forum when complaining of Heidegger's mysterious pontificating that it's my fault I can't understand him. — Ciceronianus
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