Then I don't know what you mean by "truth skepticism". To me, it would mean to question the claim that it is true that it is raining, which according to the redundancy theory of truth would mean to question the claim that it is raining. But the redundancy theorist isn't committed to this.

It seems to me that by "truth skepticism" you actually mean "non-redundant-truth skepticism" (or "non-redundant-truth nihilism"). In which case yes, I'd agree; the redundancy theory of truth questions (or rejects) non-redundant truth.

Do you understand what truth nihilism is?

Do you understand what truth nihilism is? — Mongrel

The position that nothing satisfies the requirements to be true? Or that all claims are false?

E.g. Nietzsche: "Every belief, every considering something-true, is necessarily false because there is simply no true world".

Neither of those describes truth nihilism. Look at the section I quoted from Soames' book above. That's one form of truth nihilism.

It's called Redundancy.

Neither of those describes truth nihilism. Look at the section I quoted from Soames' book above. That's one form of truth nihilism. — Mongrel

So to be a truth nihilist just is to believe that "truth [plays no] logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does not contribute to the content of what is said"?

Yes. Think about moral nihilsm. No change in language use is required.

The Deflationary Theory of Truth - The deflationary theory has gone by many different names, including at least the following: the redundancy theory, the disappearance theory, the no-truth theory, the disquotational theory, and the minimalist theory. And it's not skepticism, as the redundancy theorist can happily accept that it is true that it is raining – which is just a redundant way of saying that they accept that it is raining. — Michael

Oh heck. I need to add Ayer and Quine to my formal statement of truth. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE REFERNECE; Dammit )

Sorry I'm late in my reply...

Yes, I think you more or less have the idea I'm working from. My moral beliefs partly comes from the Jain's doctrine of Anekantavada / 'no-one sidedness' no matter how crazy another persons moral beliefs may seem and the problems that come from Kant's 'moral imperatives' which can horribly contradict when analyzing the consequences of ones actions. As far as I can tell CONSQUENCES are the only metric that can be used to determine whether an action is good or bad, however we as human beings are WOEFULLY INADEQUATE at determining the consequences of our actions in anything but the most trivial of conditions.

Also it is my personal belief that it would HELP if everyone realized that every action (other than some of the most trivial) requires a MORAL JUDGEMENT CALL where IT ISN'T a GIVEN that we can KNOW WHAT IS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE. I know this sounds like some basic stuff on a certain level but it can get a lot more complicated than it sounds. I mean how may times is someone sure of what is the 'good' or 'right' thing to do, such as persecute people thought to be witches, and then later they find out that they were TOTALLY wrong.

Also I don't expect everyone to become a skeptic or nihilist (more or less like I am), but it might help if more people gave a little bit more pause to some of their actions (and/or were a little more swifter in others if the potential consequences require it) and perhaps used a little more critical thinking when making a judgement call before carrying out certain actions.

Than again my it is all just me as I feel like I'm in a world of crazy people that can't see the various problems that need to be fixed and other issues that could or should be ignored for the time being.
As a person partial to nihilism I think I wring my hands too often for my own good, and I should just not give a rat's backside to many issues if I can't do anything about it. However the difference between what I can and can not change is enough for me to fret over things some times as I do.

Here is the revised text. Thank you for indicating the format definition of truth nihilism.

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The Meaningfulness of Truth in the Post-Truth Era
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There’s been much discussion about ‘fake news’ recently, resulting rise to a new interest in the definition of truth. This topic explains why the controversy is likely to last a long time, via examination of the formal definition of the meaningfulness of 'post truth,' within the context of ideas of truth in modern philosophy.

The Postulation of 'Post Truth' as Truth

One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). Therefore, he states truth is ultimately undefinable, yet through our ability to reason meaningfully, truth can be known, even if people do not know that they know the truth. For example, people can know that the sun will rise tomorrow; but they do not know that they knew that until after the sun has risen.

Rhetorical misconceptions have arisen from this, whereby people state what they wish to be true as being true, then strive to find facts to prove that truth afterwards, giving rise to the ‘post-truth era.’ One famous example is President Trump’s recent assertion that President Obama was ‘wiretapping’ his phone. President Trump held that he was telling the truth because he believed it certain that evidence will be found, regardless that he had no evidence at the time.

That then is the complete explanation of how ‘post truth’ has become meaningful. However much one might attempt to dismiss such efforts as obviously absurd, it is not so easy, because of the complexities of formal definitions of what truth actually is.

The Formal Definition of Truth

In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic upon propositions (statements). There are three basic kinds of truth evaluation, which I here attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Carnap, Ayer, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Mendelson, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.

• Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves defined in formally as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality. While the truth evaluation itself requires some semantic definition of ‘truth,’ in order for the proposition to be assessed, the process of evaluating the proposition’s truth value always requires syntactic analysis alone.
• Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply an assertion. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not only on facts or data, but also on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
• Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, and additionally, they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because they involve both syntax, semantics, and additional rules. In particular, causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That is important because, in proposition logic, Aristotle’s law of excluded middle holds that any statement is either true or false; but in real-world language, there need be no excluded middle, hence, proving that a statement is not false does not imply that it is necessarily true. Metaphysical factors also influence the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result.

Compound, Contractual, and Scientific Truth

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This axiom of probabilistic certainty is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

Truth in Theology, Morality, Ethics, Law, and Metaphysics

Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Briefly:

• Theology makes assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven.
• Morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual.
• Ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society
• Law strives to define that which is right or wrong
• Metaphysics strives to define that which is real.

In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent, and therefore can be evaluated as truthful within the context of their own systems.

The Semantics of Truth

According to all modern logicians, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations. While one might initially believe the nature of truth to be intuitively obvious, the semantics of truth are complex. This starts with the issue as to whether one believes that tautological propositions are true before any person evaluates them; in which case, the truths must exist independently in some abstract space independent of material reality. That introduces the metaphysical considerations.

• Classical realists hold that Platonic ‘ideas’ do exist independent of perception, and truth is simply known by correlation. Modern realists state only external material reality exists, and abstractions are simply known by common sense (as a result, many modern philosophers refer to classical realism as idealism). Dualists hold that there separate domains of physical materiality and conceptual ideas, both of which exist, and some hold tautologies are a priori true (are still truth regardless whether they are considered). Monists hold the known reality is only physical, or only exists in the mind, or something else (such as Wittgenstein's idea of logical positivism, which holds that language is the only thing which can be absolutely known). Such different perspectives change what is actually known when a truth is ‘discovered.’ For example, deflationary theorists extrapolate from theories of logical positivism to hold that truth by correlation is all that exists, leading skeptics to the popular modern idea oftruth nihilism.
• Regardless how and whether propositional truth does exist independently of physical reality, a priori or not, empirical and causal truths may be properties attached to the proposition which are not ‘discovered,’ but rather ‘assessed.’ These latter cases introduce the meaningfulness of incorrect assessments, and how exactly something can be meaningful if its truth is beyond simple binary evaluation, such as for example, propositions which refer to non-existent objects or which contain metaphors. Thus the semantics of truth are not so simple, and become involved with metaphysical decisions defining the nature of reality, meaningfulness, and the definition of knowledge itself.
• There are also three separate positions on causality. Some hold that there is no causality without intent, and that it is otherwise simply a logical inference or deduction. The second main position is that intent does not really exist either, but is only an apparent phenomena created by the physical workings of the world. The third main group say one or both of those ideas are reductionist, and so do not give any meaning to the word 'because.' The different positions on intent may also influence truth evaluation of empirical observations on internal states, such as feelings.

Assessing Post Truth

From the above summary, it is clear that a great deal of dispute is possible on the nature of truth, which is greatly to the advantage of rhetoricians wishing to persuade others that their opinions are true. Also, however, it is clear that such opinions are, in all cases of post-truth statement, merely opinions, even if one accepts the meaningfulness of post-truth statements. However, that is far beyond that which most people who ‘just want to know the truth’ are ready to learn. So as things are, we are likely to be stuck in the post-truth era for a very long time.

Isn't this like asking what "set" means in the general, not in the particular, and being unable to offer the same meaning for "set" in the examples of:

1. Andy Murray won every set
2. He set the table
3. The set of all odd numbers has the same cardinality as the set of all even numbers
4. The Sun set at 8:00pm. — Michael

Your example offers 4 entirely different uses of the term "set," where there's clearly a similarity in the way I used "truth." In each instance, I used "truth" to reference the accuracy of the statement, although the accuracy of each statement was measured differently in each statement, or, as Banno pointed out, it was the justification that varied.

Your example offers 4 entirely different uses of the term "set," where there's clearly a similarity in the way I used "truth." In each instance, I used "truth" to reference the accuracy of the statement, although the accuracy of each statement was measured differently in each statement, or, as Banno pointed out, it was the justification that varied. — Hanover

But you're asking about how the redundancy theorist would define "truth". That you use "truth" to refer to accuracy is not that they would. The problem is that you were suggesting that the redundancy theory is wrong if it can't give a single, general definition of "truth". I was simply pointing out that there might not be a single, general definition of "truth", just as there isn't a single, general definition of "set".

Yes. Think about moral nihilsm. No change in language use is required. — Mongrel

The moral nihilist claims that nothing is moral. But the redundancy theorist doesn't claim that nothing is true. So if you're using moral nihilism as a comparison to truth nihilism then the redundancy theorist isn't a truth nihilist.

You can still affirm the claim "this man is unmarried and a bachelor" even though the "and a bachelor" part is redundant. And the redundancy theorist can still affirm the claim "it is true that it is raining" even though the "it is true that" part is redundant. Whereas the moral nihilist wouldn't affirm the claim "murder is immoral".

And the same principle with skepticism. There's a difference between being skeptical that the claim "it is raining" is true and claiming that the "it is true that" part of the claim "it is true that it is raining" is redundant.

We're going around in circles now.

Well, I am adding one sentence to my above summary:

Most people are totally disinterested in understanding alternate views, but instead only wish to prove their own views right, which is actually impossible.

Which is not my own statement either, it is Schopenhauer's. And that, I believe, completes the discussion to cover all cases. Thank you for your input.

Ok. Adios, dude.

Here is the revised text, with new introduction and conclusion.

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The Meaningfulness of Truth in the Post-Truth Era
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There’s been much discussion about ‘fake news’ recently, leading to renewed arguments on the nature of truth, In fact. most people are totally disinterested in understanding the nature of truth, but instead only wish to prove their own views right, which is actually impossible. This topic explains why, via examination of the formal definition of the meaningfulness of 'post truth,' within the context of ideas of truth in modern philosophy.

The Postulation of 'Post Truth' as Truth

One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). Therefore, he states truth is ultimately undefinable, yet through our ability to reason meaningfully, truth can be known, even if people do not know that they know the truth. For example, people can know that the sun will rise tomorrow; but they do not know that they knew that until after the sun has risen.

Rhetorical misconceptions have arisen from this, whereby people state what they wish to be true as being true, then strive to find facts to prove that truth afterwards, giving rise to the ‘post-truth era.’ One famous example is President Trump’s recent assertion that President Obama was ‘wiretapping’ his phone. President Trump held that he was telling the truth because he believed it certain that evidence will be found, regardless that he had no evidence at the time.

That then is the complete explanation of how ‘post truth’ has become meaningful. However much one might attempt to dismiss such efforts as obviously absurd, it is not so easy, because of the complexities of formal definitions of what truth actually is.

THE FORMAL DEFINITION OF TRUTH

In modern philosophy, truth is discovered by evaluating propositions (the formal representation of equivalent statements). Before considering semantics in more detail, a description follows which is commensurate with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Ramsay, Tarski, Carnap, Ayer, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Mendelson, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.

- Basic Forms of Truth

Across modern thinkers overall, there are three basic kinds of truth, depending on the proposition's type:

• Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths of this kind are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves formally defined as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality. While the truth evaluation of statements itself requires some semantic definition of ‘truth,’ in order for the statement to be assessed, the process of evaluating the proposition’s truth value always requires syntactic analysis alone.
• Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the result of the observation is the proposition's truth value. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not only on facts or data, but also on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
• Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, so they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, because they involve both syntax, semantics, and additional rules. In particular, causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That is important because, in propositional logic, Aristotle’s law of excluded middle holds that any proposition is either true or false. But in the statements of real-world language, there need be no excluded middle, hence, proving that a statement of cause is not false does not imply that it is necessarily true. Metaphysical factors also influence the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result.

- Compound, Scientific, and Contractual Truth

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This axiom of probabilistic certainty is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect propositoin, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

- Truth in Theology, Morality, Ethics, Law, and Metaphysics

Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Briefly:

• Theology strives to define that which cannot ultimately be proven.
• Morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual.
• Ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society
• Law strives to define that which is right or wrong
• Metaphysics strives to define that which is real.

In all these fields, the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these fields, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within the formal systems on which they are based; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their statements empirically, within the formal systems themselves. But when different propositions across different disciplines in each of these fields contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate when the claims by each discipline are coherent, and therefore can be evaluated as truthful within context.

THE SEMANTICS OF TRUTH

While truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, the relation between 'truth' and the proposition itself varies depending on epistemological premises. So while one might initially believe the nature of truth to be intuitively obvious, the semantics of truth are complex. This starts with the issue as to whether one believes that tautological propositions are true before any person evaluates them; in which case, the truths must exist independently in some abstract space independent of material reality. That introduces the metaphysical considerations.

• Classical realists hold that Platonic ‘ideas’ do exist independent of perception, and truth is discovered by cognitive correlation. Modern realists state only external material reality exists, and abstractions are simply known by common sense (as a result, many modern philosophers refer to classical realism as idealism). Dualists hold that there separate domains of physical materiality and conceptual ideas, both of which exist, and some hold tautologies are a priori true (are still truth regardless whether they are considered). Monists hold the known reality is only physical, or only exists in the mind, or something else (such as Wittgenstein's idea of logical positivism, which holds that language is the only thing which can be absolutely known). Such different perspectives change what is actually known when a truth is ‘discovered.’ For example, deflationary theorists extrapolate from theories of logical positivism to hold that truth by correlation is all that exists, leading skeptics to the popular modern idea of truth nihilism.
• Regardless how and whether propositional truth does exist independently of physical reality, a priori or not, empirical and causal truths might be properties attached to the proposition which are not ‘discovered,’ but rather ‘assessed.’ These latter cases introduce the meaningfulness of incorrect assessments, and how exactly something can be meaningful if its truth is beyond simple binary evaluation, such as for example, statements which refer to non-existent objects or which contain metaphors.
• There are also three main separate positions on causality. Some hold that there is no causality without intent, and that it is otherwise simply a logical inference or deduction, because there is no intent in material world, but rather it simply happens automatically. The second main position is that intent does not really exist either, but is only an apparent phenomena created by the physical workings of the world. The third main group say one or both of those ideas are reductionist, and so do not give any meaning to the word 'because.' The different positions on intent may also influence truth evaluation of empirical observations on internal states, such as feelings.

TRUTH AS OPINION
AND THE MERITS OF STATEMENTS

From the above summary, it is clear that a great deal of dispute exists on the nature of truth. That is greatly to the advantage of rhetoricians wishing to persuade others that their opinions are true. In reality, most of those asserting that they 'know 'the truth' are not attempting to state the truth at all. Instead, they are only making assertions about truth to persuade others to their point of view. If pressed, they justify this simply by claiming their belief is true, which, as it is ultimately unprovable, actually does not define knowledge at all, but rather a religious belief (whether they themselves acknowledge the existence of religion or not).

With sufficient qualification as to one's preferred metaphysical and semantic foundation, it is possible to make statements that are true within context of that belief. There always exist alternate possibilities. Indeed, according to truth nihilism, there is actually no such thing as 'truth' at all. So according to formal logic in modern philosophy, assertions of a person that some fact is undeniable truth remains an opinion, in all cases without exception.

When a statement can be found true in more than one metaphysics (and whose interpretation is more unambiguously framed within the presumed premises and resulting rules), then it may be considered to possess greater merit. Hence, in modern metaphysics, the merit of a statement is considered more fruitful to consider than the truth of a proposition.

In every single case of post-truth assertion, it is especially clear that opinions on truth are merely opinions, and no more. However, that is far beyond that which most people who ‘just want to know the truth’ are ready to learn. So as things are, we are likely to be stuck in the post-truth era for a very long time.

A note on redundancy.

While "It is true that it is raining" means no more than "It is raining", falsehood does not work the same way at all.

"It is false that it is raining" means "it is not raining".

Truth may be redundant, but falsehood is not.

Also I added the final conclusion:

When an assertion can be found true in more than one metaphysics, and whose interpretation is more unambiguously framed, then it may be considered to possess greater merit. Hence, in modern metaphysics, the merit of an assertion is considered more fruitful to consider than the truth of a proposition.

That is to say, reductionist theories can produce meaningful results, but they are only meaningful within reductionist disciplines, and thus they are considered less fruitful, which is why modern philosophers continue to seek better paradigms.

A note on redundancy.

While "It is true that it is raining" means no more than "It is raining", falsehood does not work the same way at all.

"It is false that it is raining" means "it is not raining".

Truth may be redundant, but falsehood is not. — unenlightened

That's still the redundancy theory of truth. As the Wikipedia article explains, "The strategy of Ramsey's argument is to demonstrate that certain figures of speech — those in which truth and falsehood seem to figure as real properties of propositions, or as logical values that constitute real objects, however abstract, of discussion and thought — can always be eliminated in favor of paraphrases that do not reify truth and falsehood as nouns, nor even use true and false as adjectives" and offers the example of "it is false that Caesar was murdered" meaning the same thing as "Caesar was not murdered".

The point is that "true" and "false" are superfluous additions to language, not just that part of a sentence can be removed without changing the meaning.

Yes. It is a small point intended to clarify that redundant does not mean without function as might be inferred from the constant use of 'true' in examples. One might say that 'is false' has a 'not' function which is an important operator and clearly not redundant in the 'eliminable without loss of meaning' sense that applies to 'is true'. It is a point made to the thread rather than a criticism of redundancy theory.

I'm not sure they're superfluous, or it depends on what you mean by that. It's more like, certain constructions converge on synonymy. It's the same with 'He is not bald' meaning the same as 'He is non-bald.' 'non-' is an adjectival modifier, while 'not' expresses sentential negation. They don't mean the same thing, but it so happens that in some cases the structures in which they occur make them interchangeable.

Likewise with just saying 'It's raining' and 'it's true that it's raining.'

Here's a plausible account of the semantics of 'true:' it is a predicate of propositions, true of those propositions just in case the proposition is itself true. So for example, modeling a proposition as a function from world-states to values 1 or 0, 1 for truth, 0 for falsehood, 'it is true that p' maps to 1 just in case p maps to 1 (relative to the relevant world-state, usually the actual world). 'It's raining' says that a certain state of affairs holds – a raining event is occurring – while 'It's true that it's raining' says that a certain proposition, expressed by 'that it's raining,' has a certain property. Now it so happens that when you work out both these truth conditions, they end up being the same, like in the 'bald' and 'non-bald' cases. But that doesn't mean 'true' doesn't mean anything, or that it's redundant, in that it has no uses that couldn't be achieved without it.

For example, plausibly this use of 'true' can be used to predicate properties not only of propositions, but derivatively of sentences, statements, or utterances, according as they express a certain proposition, of which the property 'true' holds. And this is something that isn't redundant – for example, if A says, 'I'm a doctor,' and B says, 'that's true,' where that is anaphoric to the proposition expressed by 'I'm a doctor,' this is something that B could not have done by merely repeating the sentence that A said: or if B said, 'I'm a doctor,' he would have said something different. So here, 'true' is used to predicate a property of the proposition expressed by A, which is different from simply saying over again what A said.

And so the predicate increases the expressive power of the language in various ways – or at least, lets us express some things using certain constructions that we couldn't otherwise.

'Truth' also seems to be a noun predicated of propositions. So we can say that something 'is a truth' just in case it's true. That also seems not to be too mysterious.

What's maybe a little more puzzling is we can use the locution 'the truth,' as in 'tell me the truth' or 'that's the truth.' This seems to function as an ordinary definite description denoting whatever truth is contextually relevant. So for example if we want to know who smashed the vase, and we're interrogating someone who we think knows, we might say 'tell me the truth,' by which we mean, 'tell me that truth which answers the question, "who smashed the vase?"' If there are then two options, p = 'a smashed the vase,' and q = 'b smashed the vase,' this is similar to asking 'tell me who smashed the vase,' or 'if a smashed the vase, tell me p, and if b smashed the vase, tell me q.'

So 'the truth' seems to be an ordinary definite description that holds of individual true propositions. If anyone wants to know what the truth is, you have to ask them, the truth about what?

Then there is the kind-term 'truth,' as in 'I value truth.' This seems akin to 'redness,' which seems to denote the property of being read. Likewise, 'truth' then seems to denote the property of being true. But since we now know that the property of being true is, and when it holds of a proposition, it's not so mysterious what's meant by this, as it's not mysterious to say something like 'I like a little redness in the cheeks.'

So for example if we want to know who smashed the vase, and we're interrogating someone who we think knows, we might say 'tell me the truth,' — The Great Whatever

The answer is not what the truth is, but what the subject of the question believes the truth to be. As it is a question about belief, the only truth the person can state is about their belief, and not whether they actually smashed the vase. That seems rather obvious to me.

the person could have smashed the vase without knowing so. Or the person could have knocked the vase off a stand without breaking it, then it broke due to a dog or something without them knowing, before they found out it was broken. Then you get into questions if they were ordered to break the vase, whether they really did break it themselves of their own volition or not, which again is contingent on one's belief of causality.

Ernest, you're tending to address a wide variety of issues (justification, knowledge, the limits of knowledge, etc.) as if it's all truth. Those things do indeed have something to do with truth. There's nothing in philosophy that isn't related in some way to truth. But it's important to make distinctions. If you want, you could start a thread asking about these distinctions.

Well I understand you saying that, as I am given to understand you believe truth is only justification. But other people believe differently, so I have to present their views too, because neither they nor you can prove each other wrong. So that's the end result, however much it does not coincide with your opinion.

Long ago I did some work, following Neils Brunsson, on why organisations are irrational. The idea is that an organisation is set up for a particular task, and hence must act; but an organisation never has all the facts; hence the action often precedes having sufficient facts to make a rational judgement.

It's the existential crisis of having to act. Even not giving a rat's arse is one action chosen amongst many. We are forced to act.

If I understand you aright, your position is that because we do not have all the facts we cannot be confident of making the right choice; we need increasingly broader perspectives from which to judge our choices; but we must acknowledge that we will never have all the facts and hence can never be confident in our choices.

This can lead to a nihilism, a pretence at refusing to make choices. But of course that is itself a choice.

My reply is that all you can do is make the best choice from where you are, and be ready to reconsider. This leads to morality that is both ad hoc and local. Ad hoc because what one considers the best choice will change over time, local because one must be able to assess the results of one's action.

One advanced thinker on the semantics of truth is Donald Davidson, who is an absolute anomalous monist (there are only ideas, or mind, or matter, or language, but it cannot be known which). — ernestm

That does not appear to meet with my understanding of anomalous monism, nor with for example, IEP.

The non-truth-nihilist says that the truth of P has nothing to do with whether anybody agrees with P.

The truth nihilist says the truth of P is nothing other than that somebody agrees with P.

Well, to me the discussion on the encyclopedia is limited to considering only mind/body dualism versus monism as being either mind or body, and excludes other possibilities--ignoring that Davidson did discuss other possibilities, and ignoring alternate postulations of the anomalous monist position. So I don't find its rendition a particular improvement.

Besides that, I recognize my description is a simplification, but in the context of presenting the difference between realism, idealism, dualism, and monism in 6 lines, anything I write has to be a simplification, or people who don't know it beforehand won't be able to understand it at all. I've already doubled its length due to various miscomprehensions here, and now the article is too long, so I am thinking of just ditching the additions and going back to how it was in the first place. This is because, what most philosophers seem to like to do is to stop at the first thing they think is wrong and then tell me I am wrong, without actually trying to understand what I am saying. So it doesn't really make sense to change things as they believe I should anyway.

The truth nihilist says the truth of P is nothing other than that somebody agrees with P. — Mongrel

Which is why the redundancy theorist isn't a truth nihilist.