What you need to do is find out what the neuroscience sources you endorse are saying about the sources you reject as false and bogus. — Joshs

A reading of just the sources I sent demonstrates the complexity of the brain, that's specifically my point. And I don't care about opinions, I care about arguments. I don't care if he loved her just so much, thought the world of her, best scientist of all time. The argument she posited is both invalid and unsound. But, the one of his you showed was not. That's how that works. But, yeah, happy to explore anything you want together. But, I will not do so with anybody unwilling to accept new data and contend with ideas. Nor will I stand for negation as a result of confusing results in research.

You treat sources your reject as though no self-respecting cognitive psychologist would treat them seriously — Joshs

No cognitive scientist would treat that kind of assertion with dignity, unless that person had a vested interest in deceiving you into believing that rationality was a myth. He/she would, of course, employ rationality to attempt as much, just like your source did, but no cognitive scientist without an agenda would do so. The brain is far too complex to relay that kind of position, especially to do it fallaciously. But, the quackery I was talking about was the gibberish non-science from that other guy who had commented.

but that reflects a misunderstanding of how such theorists are viewed within the cognitive neuroscience community. — Joshs

Yes, let me tell what that misunderstanding is. Theorists mean nothing in the realm of logical assessment, philosophy, and science. Their theories do, and if certain parts of those theories are predicated on reduction and false dichotomy fallacies, trained and dedicated philosophers like myself are gonna call that shit so fast it's going to startle everyone in the room. Gadflys and all. Don't take it personal, it's what we do. Besides, it is assertions like "rationality is an implausible fiction," which is literally a contradiction of its own assertion to ascribe truth values to the function that created truth values as a metric, that is eating the fucking world up and destroying lives. So, I can't let that kind of thing slide without comment.

On the contrary, I think it's possible to think beyond anger and blame entirely, but we can only do this by giving up the aims that anger and blame serve, ie. wealth and power.
— baker

Do you mean only the wealthy and powerful have anger and blame, or that the anger and blame the rest of us experience is somehow manipulated by the wealthy and powerful? What do you think motivates power?Is there a drive for power? Does greed motivate wealth? — Joshs

Again: I think it's possible to think beyond anger and blame entirely, but we can only do this by giving up the aims that anger and blame serve, ie. wealth and power.

In other words, people get angry and blame (others) for the purpose of securing or obtaining wealth and power.
If people wouldn't seek wealth and power, they would have no reason to get angry and blame.

There is no such thing as "narrowly focused" on the most complex and sophisticated computational entity in the known universe. Such a "narrow" categorization is not just a reductionist fallacy, but an avoidance of established science in favor of feelings. If your conclusions on such emotions are non predominantly predicated on the assessments provided by cognitive neursoscience, and as much data as you can accrue in the field, then you have no opinion. You're simply just positing thoughts. Furthermore, this statement is completely incoherent. There is no "pre-cognitive" anything in human experience, it's made-up bullshit and a further reduction. "Creative/consolidating relation" describes what appears to be nothing that makes any rational sense. And objects of attention are observed, not created. In other words, only that which exists can be apprehended by the brain in the form of sensory data and analyzed across its astronomically advanced system of networks. This is all complete gibberish. — Garrett Travers

Wow. He doth protest too much, methinks.

Sure, cognition as computation is the best we can get - and that’s fine if computation is all we’re after. I’m not denying that cognition can efficiently process almost all of human experience. Almost. And I get that what it cannot process is arguably not worth your attention. That’s an opinion, and you’re welcome to it. It’s a choice you make to dismiss any aspect of experience that makes no rational sense, just as it’s a choice I make not to. That doesn’t mean I prefer feelings to cognition, or to established science - that’s a false dichotomy. But I maintain that cognition is a narrow focus when it comes to attention - my use of ‘narrow’ being relative to the reality of experience, not to other forms of computation. If cognition were really as comprehensive as you believe, then it shouldn’t need you to come to its rescue against these ‘feelings’. It would stand up to any of the thoughts I’ve posited.

There seems to be more to human attention and more to what exists than what can be apprehended, let alone analysed. None of that would capture your attention, of course - no, it needs to be consolidated into an object for you first. Only then can you observe it as such, as if it was already there. This is a limitation you intentionally impose on how you process experience. Fair enough, uncertainty is scary. But you’re in no position to impose the same limitation on me.

Creativity is ‘making sense’ of reality. It involves awareness of, connection and collaboration with all possible qualitative ideas and available energy as well as logical structure. Feelings aren’t much use to cognition without rationality, but neither are they accurately experienced if we reduce their quality or energy to only what cognition can process - ie. only what is rational. The thing is that quality or energy may exist and even be experienced without any initial sense being ‘made’ of it. This is little more than ‘noise’ that has a quality and/or energy about it. Yes, it’s arguably ‘incoherent’ or ‘gibberish’ in relation to cognition, but it does exist (although it is no-thing). The fact that it makes no rational sense is meaningful in relation to understanding the limitations of human cognition, and its underlying susceptibility to distortions of affect.

But you go ahead and aggressively dismiss it. Use all that cognitive power you have at your disposal. I’m sure that’ll work. It’s not like qualitative relations of energetic improbability ever emerged to consolidate into anything worthwhile, like the universe, life or consciousness...so go ahead and forget I even brought it up...

But moving past this, is it really philosophically correct to not assign blame for the wrong done? — L'éléphant

Is it really philosophically correct to take for granted that the party who feels wronged is automatically the arbiter of morality?

A no-blame morality is untenable and unsustainable because it is a one-sided premise whose burden is on the person harmed. — L'éléphant

As the poor and the powerless, and the innocent animals have experienced for millennia.

What this discussion is lacking is an acknowledgment of the role of the power differential in moral judgments.

The one who can punish is in the position of power.
If punishment is justified, as a matter of principle, then might makes right. Do you want to go in that direction?

The desert proponents once argued that punishment is a way for us to acknowledge the humanity of a person. Denying him a punishment is denying his accountability for his actions. And denying his accountability is denying his moral agency. So personhood has this component of culpability. You take away this culpability, then we treat him like we treat innocent animals.

And how people treat innocent animals? By keeping them in horrible conditions and then killing them or letting them die a gruesome death.

If we believe ourselves righteous in anger towards someone, it’s a sure sign that we don’t understand where they’re coming from. That should give us pause. — Possibility

Why? People generally don't consider it very important to understand others. In fact, they generally prefer to see themselves as the arbiters of the others' reality, they prefer to see themselves as the judges over what is true for another person, esp. concerning the other person's inner life. They make this very clear in their insistence of using you-language.

Do we really think that attributing blame and directing anger towards someone will repair any damage or prevent future occurrences?

Of course. Blame and anger are effective means for gaining and keeping power over others. It's why people do it.

I think the Israeli-Palestine conflict is a clear example of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of blame and anger. What would a win-win situation look like here? Everyone is so focused on the significance of history in such a limited space, they’re ignoring aspects of the present reality. They acknowledge present pain and loss, but what’s not being recognised is the present state of humility. This is why the conflict continues, because both sides focus on past or consolidated pride to avoid a sense of humility in any present or future interaction. — Possibility

But such humility would require them to give up their identity. And --

There are few things less noble than resenting or undermining people for who they are. — Tom Storm

I should note that focusing on increasing our care and consideration implies that we believe we were acting carelessly and inconsiderately, which I consider to be forms of anger-blame. — Joshs

So if you live in a suburb, and dry your laundry by hanging it out in the air in your backyard, and your neighbor burns trash in his backyard, so that the smoke makes your laundry filthy -- you see no problem with this? You don't think he was careless and inconsiderate to do so, and that he should have at least warned you, so that you could take down the fresh laundry on time?

The solution is that you buy a dryer? But that is still care and consideration on your part, and as such, anger-blame.

What I am suggesting is that we can get rid of the concept of blame, but only when. we stop thinking of motive and intent as potentially arbitrary , capricious , vulnerable to bodily-emotive and social conditioning and shaping.

I dont know any philosopher or psychologist who follows me here — Joshs

Early Buddhism maintains something similar, but the matter is rather complex to explain (lots of things to remember).

What if ‘evil-doers’ believe they are just, and their failure isn’t one of moral intent but of insight? — Joshs

You used this line of reasoning to defend Nazis.

So Putin's "failure of insight" is what exactly? That Slavic people are inferior and must let the West rule over them? That when the West makes promises to Russia and doesn't keep them, Russia must accept this and bow to the West?

So evil and lack of conscience can be understood as a kind of arbitrariness , irrationality or capriciousness at the heart of intention and motivation, right? People are tempted, they stray from the ‘right’ path, but we don’t know why, or we assume there is no reason.
That’s my claim, that this arbitrariness is an assumption we make about ‘evil-doers’. But what if this simply reflects a failure of insight on our part? What if ‘evil-doers’ believe they are just, and their failure isn’t one of moral intent but of insight? — Joshs

And what if it's not failure at all?

I’m more interested in the philosophy and psychology of motivation. I understand your stance. What I would like to know is how you articulate the nature of wrong-doing and evil in terms of the capriciousness of straying from the path of righteousness. Tell me more about what makes such straying possible. Is it a kind of randomness? Is it an irrationality? — Joshs

I asked you (and @Tom Storm) about this before, but you didn't reply. Namely, on the difference between I-statements and you-statements (I-language and you-language).

E.g.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/632636
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/647537

I point this out because you're using you-language in your discussions of a topic that I think could be approached more effectively when acknowledging the distinction between I-language and you-language.

Why? People generally don't consider it very important to understand others. In fact, they generally prefer to see themselves as the arbiters of the others' reality, they prefer to see themselves as the judges over what is true for another person, esp. concerning the other person's inner life. They make this very clear in their insistence of using you-language. — baker

Yet everyone wants ‘world peace’ - we want an end to war, violence and oppression. We just don’t want to believe we are contributing to it in any way, and we don’t want to be ‘the one to change’. We say the problem is ‘over there’, between ‘those people’, and we label them ‘evil’, when the reality is that we are likely to behave the same way in the same situation. So it’s important for us to genuinely understand ‘their’ situation, by recognising what it would take for us to intend the same behaviour, before we can understand what it would take to change the trajectory.

So we also need to watch our use of they-language. When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement. Using ‘they’ seeks to distance our self-awareness from the statements we make. It implies a passive self-righteousness.

Is it really philosophically correct to take for granted that the party who feels wronged is automatically the arbiter of morality? — baker

You do know what I mean. Are you saying that rape is justified sometimes? lol.
No one could say, yes I raped her as a self-defense.

How about we think before we take the neutral position or the it-depends position.

What this discussion is lacking is an acknowledgment of the role of the power differential in moral judgments.

The one who can punish is in the position of power.
If punishment is justified, as a matter of principle, then might makes right. Do you want to go in that direction? — baker

First of all, I don't understand your post. Power differential in moral judgments -- what's that? Say we have a court functioning with integrity. Is it really that hard to discern fault here?

So we also need to watch our use of they-language. When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement. Using ‘they’ seeks to distance our self-awareness from the statements we make. It implies a passive self-righteousness. — Possibility

How self-righteous, and actively so!

You assume entirely too much and allow too little room.

When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement.

But perhaps we think that those might actually not be "errors of judgment" to begin with, but in fact virtues. If anything, the state of the world suggests that anger and blame are virtues, something to strive for. And that we (minority-we) are ninnies to think them vices.

Is it really philosophically correct to take for granted that the party who feels wronged is automatically the arbiter of morality?
— baker
You do know what I mean. Are you saying that rape is justified sometimes?
No one could say, yes I raped her as a self-defense. — L'éléphant

A: Tommy, why did you hit Harry?
B: Because he then hit me back!

Is Tommy the victim here?

How about we think before we take the neutral position or the it-depends position.

How about we discuss the complexity of the matter.

What this discussion is lacking is an acknowledgment of the role of the power differential in moral judgments.

The one who can punish is in the position of power.
If punishment is justified, as a matter of principle, then might makes right. Do you want to go in that direction?
— baker

First of all, I don't understand your post. Power differential in moral judgments -- what's that?

That whether something is perceived as moral or not has to do with the relative positions in the power hierarchy of those involved.

The same kind of action is perceived differently, depending on whether it was done by a person of wealth and power, or if it was done by a person of low socio-economic status.
Or if it was done by your boss or by you. Or by a teacher or his student.

If a rich person hits you with their car and runs off, they can expect to get away with it.
If you were to hit a rich person with your car and run off, you should get ready for grave consequences.

Etc.

Say we have a court functioning with integrity. Is it really that hard to discern fault here?

You mean a modern court in a democratic country where having a good lawyer can get one off the hook for pretty much anything, and where a person with few financial means has to endure injustice?

I don't know what to make of your post because all the examples you gave are abuse of the moral senses. Before we could talk about that, let's talk about what had already been considered moral judgments.

If a rich person hits you with their car and runs off, they can expect to get away with it.
If you were to hit a rich person with your car and run off, you should get ready for grave consequences. — baker

This is a funny mixture of composition, hasty generalization, and division fallacies all at once: https://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/fallacies.html#:~:text=Sweeping%20generalization%20(The%20fallacy%20of,%22Christians%20generally%20dislike%20atheists.

Where'd you pick up this nonsense argument?

You mean a modern court in a democratic country where having a good lawyer can get one off the hook for pretty much anything, and where a person with few financial means has to endure injustice? — baker

Sounds like you hate the state, buddy. As lawyers and injustice are apparatuses of state administration of law, you don't got much else to blame here. In other words, democracy itself for having given rise to such a phenomenon.

The same kind of action is perceived differently, depending on whether it was done by a person of wealth and power, or if it was done by a person of low socio-economic status.
Or if it was done by your boss or by you. Or by a teacher or his student. — baker

That's because people aren't thinking clearly. All violations of the human consciousness are evil, doesn't matter how much "power" they have.

Do we really think that attributing blame and directing anger towards someone will repair any damage or prevent future occurrences?

Of course. Blame and anger are effective means for gaining and keeping power over others. It's why people do it. — baker

This is a common misunderstanding. It is the threat of intentional violence, oppression or exclusion that is an effective means for gaining and keeping power over others. Blame and anger use this to compensate for ignorance, isolation or exclusion of affect.

But such humility would require them to give up their identity. And --

There are few things less noble than resenting or undermining people for who they are.
— Tom Storm — baker

Not give up their identity, but recognise that this sense of who they were is not the same as who they are. The significance of identity has a temporal relativity that is subject to human ignorance, isolation and exclusion.

So we also need to watch our use of they-language. When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement. Using ‘they’ seeks to distance our self-awareness from the statements we make. It implies a passive self-righteousness.
— Possibility

How self-righteous, and actively so! — baker

I had a feeling you might interpret this as a judgement of you, but it’s more an understanding of us, and a call to be self-aware. You can take this how you like - just be aware of possible implications.

I do agree that our use of ‘you-language’ implies (not intends) an ‘objective’ judgement of the other based on our own moral perspective, and that using ‘I-language’ instead at least acknowledges the relativity of this perspective. I’m only proposing that we take it a step further, by acknowledging our mutual capacity for anger and blame, for instance.

You assume entirely too much and allow too little room. — baker

You’re reading more judgement in my words than is there. I’ll grant the implication is probably not intentional, but it does present an ‘out’ that we should at least be aware of, just like being aware of the relativity of an implied (not intended) judgement in ‘you-language’ .

When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement.
— Possibility

But perhaps we think that those might actually not be "errors of judgment" to begin with, but in fact virtues. If anything, the state of the world suggests that anger and blame are virtues, something to strive for. And that we (minority-we) are ninnies to think them vices. — baker

Sure, but then we wouldn’t have any qualms about including ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, would we? When we use ‘we-language’, we’re more likely to refrain from any sense of moral judgement of what we’re describing - any distinction between ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’. An ‘error in judgement’ is recognised as part of human nature. This way we can strive for accuracy instead of ‘goodness’, which is relative.