Could we find the essence of life? — Samuel Lacrampe

The notion of essence is philosophically defunct. We simply do not need to be able to present a definition of life in order to do biology.

The OP appears to be a request for a justification of vitalism - the notion that there is something special about living things. But that's cobblers, too.

How is it that is seems to have a life as a whole, if it has no apparent consciousness? Having apparent consciousness was my reason to support having a life as a whole. What other reasons are there? — Samuel Lacrampe

Maybe the oyster just has all its parts functioning. So does a car, so having function parts does not distinguish lifeform from a non-lifeform, but it distinguishes alive from dead. A car cannot be dead since it was never alive. Defining alive as a lifeform with all parts functioning explains why we can't resurrect a cow. We simply don't have the technology to replace the broken parts of a non-functioning cow.
So back to what distinguishes a lifeform like a cell from a functioning car...

The notion of essence is philosophically defunct. We simply do not need to be able to present a definition of life in order to do biology. — Banno

'Not needed' does not imply 'impossible'. Essences exist, insofar that words point to real concepts, or real objective meanings. If "The notion of essence is philosophically defunct" is saying that words don't have objective meanings, then this statement is itself meaningless; and that is a self-contradiction.

So back to what distinguishes a lifeform like a cell from a functioning car... — noAxioms

So you want to find essential properties that distinguish lifeforms from non-lifeforms right? How about these:
- can reproduce,
- can grow,
- is made of organic matter (DNA, carbons, proteins ...)
- needs a form of energy

Not needed' does not imply 'impossible' — Samuel Lacrampe

All right, I will up the anti and claim that it is often impossible to identify an essence. I have in mind here the commonplace rejection of the notion posited by Russell and others, but perhaps presented most clearly in Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance.

I'll follow that by rejecting your notion that words refer to concepts. But more over, that's just not how words work.

I think essences are a particularly pernicious notion, leading to all sorts of bad philosophy, including the conclusion you mistakenly draw that without essences words have no meaning.

Perhaps we might proceed by your addressing a simple question; a child can talk about a tree, without being able to set out any even partial 'essence-of-tree'. How is that possible on your account?

Perhaps we might proceed by your addressing a simple question; a child can talk about a tree, without being able to set out any even partial 'essence-of-tree'. How is that possible on your account? — Banno

If you listen to young children speak, who are just learning how to talk, you'll hear that they use some words in ways which demonstrate that they don't know the proper way to use the word. They'll use the wrong word. They'll even make up a lot of words because they are repeating sounds, but speaking them incorrectly. Speaking words is not what is at issue here, what is at issue, is speaking correctly.

So when a child talks about a "tree", it is not necessary that the child is using the word "tree" correctly. The child might be referring to a rock or some other thing. So your question should really be, is it possible that a child may talk correctly about a tree without even being able to set out any partial 'essence of tree'? Maybe you use "essence" in a different way from me, but I would say that learning to us a word correctly is the same thing as learning the essence of what is referred to by that word. If one does not learn the "essence", then the individual develops habits which often consist of mistaken use. Therefore to consistently use the word correctly, it is necessary to have some notion of the essence. The better one understands the essence, the less likely one is to make a mistake in using the word.

With respect to the op then, what is being asked is how to use the word "life" correctly.

So you want to find essential properties that distinguish lifeforms from non-lifeforms right? How about these:
- can reproduce,
- can grow,
- is made of organic matter (DNA, carbons, proteins ...)
- needs a form of energy — Samuel Lacrampe

The list seems to define 'life' (and thus better addresses the OP) than a lot of the prior discussion about distinguishing 'alive' from 'dead'. The latter is already a life form, but one that has ceased to function.

As to the list, I don't want to be a pain but every one of them is debatable, and it might not be a complete list of necessary traits. A monotheistic god is not alive by the list above since there is no reproduction. If we encounter some huge great immortal intelligence in the galaxy, are we not to recognize it as life because it has no need to reproduce, and no critical parts the loss of which it cannot recover?
So the list above seems to be a list of symptoms, not hard requirements.

Maybe a we will create a truly self-sufficient computer life form that manufactures new members at full size, so no growth, and no organic matter. Many would not regard that as life, so I would like to ask why the list seems to have a geocentric item like that on it? Why must life be sufficiently like us, who just happen to be carbon based which is chemistry well suited to the available components and temperature of Earth.
'Organic' doesn't belong on the list because it is circular. It means stuff created (typically) by life.

What about a virtual life form in the cloud? Are computer viruses life? They meet all the criteria above except organic (being like us).

Needs a form of energy doesn't belong on the list. So does the car.

You are quite right to enter into this discussion, Meta; this is exactly the issue I have with your approach to philosophy, and seems to me to be the source of the error of your approach.

If learning to use the word "tree" is the same thing as learning tree-essence, then what role is played here by essences? What more are they than the capacity to use a word?

If what is being asked is how to use the word "life" correctly, what is gained by adding the notion of essence?

I say, nothing is gained; we would do better to talk of use, not essence.

- can reproduce,
- can grow,
- is made of organic matter (DNA, carbons, proteins ...)
- needs a form of energy — Samuel Lacrampe

Fire fits this list.

A long time ago Wayfarer (who seems to support something akin to vitalism) asked me this question. I provided this definition as my best attempt, which was not warmly received:

Life is an unnatural persistent pattern.

It has have had natural origins of course, but it is not really life until it (via evolution in our case, but not necessarily) becomes something that has no reasonable probability of just accidentally occurring.

Anyway, the definition distinguishes life from fire, and many definitions fail that. I think the computer virus qualifies as much as a biological virus.

As I mentioned, there is a distinction to be made between correct use and incorrect use. So we ought not talk about "use" in general, because the kids use words in all kinds of random ways. If you allow that there is such a distinction, then why not allow that correct use demonstrates the "essence" of the thing?

You seem to allow that there is a correct use of the word "life". What would distinguish between correct and incorrect use of the term if there was no essence to refer to?

As I mentioned, there is a distinction to be made between correct use and incorrect use. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it is not a metaphysical distinction. The correct use of "Metaphysician Undercover" is not a reference to the essence of Metaphysician Undercover.

Do you recognize a difference between the using proper nouns, such as "Metaphysician Undercover", which identify a single object, and the use of a noun which identifies a class of objects, like "tree"? It is only in the latter case that knowing how to correctly use the word is associated with knowing an essence. Knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is, and this is the essence. Do you think that one can consistently use the word "tree" correctly without knowing what a tree is?

Knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is, — Metaphysician Undercover

That's just not true. We all use words correctly without ever setting out exact definitions.

I don't know if the tree fern outside my window is actually a tree, nor if that shrub over there should really be called a tree. That does not men I do not know how to use "tree". Famously, there is nothing that is common to all, and only, fish; and yet, we use the word. That is, it is not possible to set out the essence of "tree" or "fish", and yet the words are used.

Moreover, when an essence is set out it often lead to risibility; so if berries are simple fruits stemming from one flower with one ovary and typically have several seeds, then strawberries are not berries.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree". On this we might agree, but I will not follow you by adding that there is a metaphysical entity that corresponds to what a tree is.

I don't know if the tree fern outside my window is actually a tree, nor if that shrub over there should really be called a tree. That does not men I do not know how to use "tree". — Banno

Clearly, you have stated here that you belief that you could sometimes be wrong in your use of "tree". Remember, what we are discussing is not whether you have the capacity to use "tree", but whether you have the capacity to consistently use that word correctly. Now you've admitted that you might be incorrect sometimes in your use of "tree". Wouldn't that be because you do not know the essence?

Famously, there is nothing that is common to all, and only, fish; and yet, we use the word. That is, it is not possible to set out the essence of "tree" or "fish", and yet the words are used. — Banno

I agree. In most cases it is impossible to state the essence of something. In these cases it is always possible that one's use of these words might be judged by another as incorrect, even though the first person might insist that the usage is correct. In other cases, such as technical terms, and especially mathematical terms, the essence is well defined, so we don't make those mistakes.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree". On this we might agree, but I will not follow you by adding that there is a metaphysical entity that corresponds to what a tree is. — Banno

The question is not whether there is a metaphysical entity which corresponds to what a tree is, that's not what "essence" is all about. It is a term derived from logic, so it is epistemological, and denotes that there is a correct way of using the term. So if a term has a defined essence, it must be used only according to that essence, in order that it be used correctly in logical procedures, or else mistaken conclusions (due to equivocation for example) will be produced.

It appears like you and I are talking about two different things. You claim that you can satisfactorily use words in daily communication without knowing any essences. I agree with this, because there is no real correct or incorrect way of using words in common communication, it's just a matter of pragmatics, whatever successfully allows you to communicate is acceptable. My claim is that when we are dealing with logical arguments, and mathematical applications, we must designate a correct way of using the words, so we refer to essences. What type of existence an "essence" has is something we shouldn't even discuss until we agree on the need to assume a "correct way of using a word".

Now you've admitted that you might be incorrect sometimes in your use of "tree". Wouldn't that be because you do not know the essence? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course not. There is no essence to compare my use to. All there is, is the use to which others put the word.

If "The notion of essence is philosophically defunct" is saying that words don't have objective meanings, then this statement is itself meaningless; and that is a self-contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's not what it's saying. It is saying that the categories typically referred to by words have fuzzy boundaries. The fact that a category has a fuzzy boundary does not render the category meaningless.

Consider state boundaries. Some are determined by rivers. Yet the exact location of the banks of the river, and hence its midpoint, changes slightly over time. That does not render the notion of states meaningless.

Nor does the fuzziness of the 'tall' category render meaningless, or even controversial, the statement that Michael Jordan is tall.

I'd like to go out on a limb and try to defend the following definition of life: Self perpetuating intelligence. Any and all criticisms would be appreciated.

This definition handily describes all carbon based DNA having forms of life we have actually been able to observe, but more importantly it covers many forms of life we have yet only encountered in fairy tales. The intelligence of single cells and simple multi-cellular organisms like blades of grass stems from the genetic data that governs their structure and ultimately behavior. In a sense genes are able to remember in order to make intelligent decisions about what to do, which is a basic description of intelligence.

By "self-perpetuating" I don't mean "able to reproduce" or "emerged on it's own", but rather that the "intelligence" itself (the complex decision making (involves memory)) is capable of internal development (an increase in complexity). This is what differentiates a smart phone as non-life from mold as life: the mold can evolve and get smarter.

From this, here are some examples of things that qualify as life:

Human consciousness
Grass
single-cells
Mitochondria
"Artificial" intelligence

Intuition tells me that a part of what makes looking at "life" interesting is that there is all kinds of unknown cool crap that it might do in the future. Increases in the complexity of decision making is definitely something that can make that happen.

Of course not. There is no essence to compare my use to. All there is, is the use to which others put the word. — Banno

I assume you are saying that there is no such thing as correct usage. How does logic work then?

I would argue against this "fuzzy boundary" idea. Let's take the example of 'tall'. I propose its essence to be: "that which is greater in vertical dimension, relative to X". Thus MJ is tall relative to the average human being. Remove the words 'vertical dimension', 'greater', or 'relative to X', and we no longer have the concept of 'tall'. But are any of these words unclear?

Fire fits this list. — Banno

Almost, but not quite: A fire is not made out of organic matter, because it is not matter at all but energy. Granted, organic matter is one of the causes of fire, but not the thing itself, as an effect is a different thing than its cause.

A monotheistic god is not alive by the list above since there is no reproduction. — noAxioms

It is true that my list is only comprised on material properties, and thus is adequate only for material lives such as plants, animals and humans. It does not address possible non-material lives such as angels and God. I suggest to limit the discussion to material life for now. This is only for the sake of taking simpler steps, and not to restrict the whole truth of what life consists of.

Maybe a we will create a truly self-sufficient computer life form that manufactures new members at full size, so no growth, and no organic matter. — noAxioms

Point taken again. I forgot that in the past comments, I already acknowledged that if the life of a simple cell is nothing but "the proper functioning of its parts", then a car engine fits the definition as well as simple cells. And a car engine cannot grow, reproduce, nor is it made of organic matter.

So the new list for material life is as follows:
- proper functioning of the object's parts
- needs a form of energy

What is life? — Samuel Lacrampe

Suffering.

But are any of these words unclear? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes.

Is hair included in the height measurement? If not why not? If so, does somebody become taller when a puff of wind pushes a single strand of hair up?

Is somebody that is 1 micrometre taller than average tall? What if their excess over the average is smaller than can be measured by any human instrument?

Do a whole bunch of non-tall people become tall when a 2 metre person dies?
Do a whole bunch of tall people become non-tall when a baby is born?

“Life ... is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.”

I will answer just a few of these questions, to keep the comment somewhat short:

Is hair included in the height measurement? Up to you: John is taller than Bob if hair is included. If not, then not. The object whose tallness is measured might lack details, but the concept of tallness is itself clear and does not change.

Is somebody that is 1 micrometre taller [taller] than average tall? Objectively yes, because you even included the word 'taller' in your question. I trust you understand the words in your own question.

What if their excess over the average is smaller than can be measured by any human instrument? You could say the difference in tallness is not perceivable. But perception does not change truth, and thus the tallness of a thing is not dependant on our perception of it.

Do a whole bunch of non-tall people become tall when a 2 metre person dies? As per the essence I suggested, "tallness" is relative to X. So relative to living people, yes; relative to the dead person, no.

Let's generalize: If the statement "the categories typically referred to by words have fuzzy boundaries" were to be objectively true always, then the words used in that statement, and consequently the whole statement itself, have fuzzy boundaries. In other words, we could logically never be certain of this conclusion.

It sure is. At least this life. Some have hope that the next life, still called "life" will be without suffering.

This indeed seems to be the logical conclusion if one is a real atheist. Leap of faith for the win!

What if their excess over the average is smaller than can be measured by any human instrument? You could say the difference in tallness is not perceivable. But perception does not change truth, and thus the tallness of a thing is not dependant on our perception of it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Quantum Mechanics tells us that all position measurements, which includes tallness, are probability distributions rather than exact numbers. Under most interpretations of QM there is no such thing as the exact measurement. It would seem to follow that if one wishes to believe in exact boundaries of the 'tall' category, one must adopt an interpretation of QM that assumes the existence of unknown, exact measurements. Does one, for instance, have to be a Bohmian, in order to believe in 'essences' in this way?

Further, even if one could, without ambiguity, define 'tall' in that way, the definition would not be consistent with common use. People do not use 'tall' to describe someone whose height is within one micron of the current live human average.

Let's generalize: If the statement "the categories typically referred to by words have fuzzy boundaries" were to be objectively true always, then the words used in that statement, and consequently the whole statement itself, have fuzzy boundaries. In other words, we could logically never be certain of this conclusion. — Samuel Lacrampe

Having fuzzy boundaries does not imply that statements cannot be made with certainty. I think everybody would agree that somebody whose estimated height is greater than two metres is tall, and that somebody whose estimated height is less than 1.5 metres is not tall. So we can make definite statements about such people. It is only about people between 1.5m and 2m that uncertainty arises.

We operate perfectly well every day communicating with each other using concepts that have fuzzy boundaries, because we typically only use words for those concepts in relation to phenomena that lie within the regions of certainty - ie away from the fuzzy region.

I assume you are saying that there is no such thing as correct usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am not.