Brain function is just as illusory as mental function. — T Clark

I'd be interested to know what you mean. I would take "brain function" to include for example patterns of neurons firing, and "mental function" to include for example me thinking now about what I'm going to write.

Neither of those is illusory. But perhaps you meant something different.

The fact of Phase Change is undeniable ─ you can feel snow melt on your tongue ─ but explaining the mechanics of how it happened in terms of known physical laws proved impossible. — Gnomon

That is no proof that it's impossible. Non-equilibrium thermodynamics is still in infancy shoes.

Any time you can prove the brain alone generates consciousness, I'm more than ready. — theRiddler

I wouldn't say the brain alone generates consciousness, your whole body is involved, in particular your sense organs. And you need supplies like oxygen.

The brain is where it all comes together though. We could prove that by having your brain removed. Thank you for agreeing to take part in the project.

Neither of those is illusory. — Daemon

The material world is an illusion. Thus are brain functions.

Brain function is just as illusory as mental function.
— T Clark

I'd be interested to know what you mean. I would take "brain function" to include for example patterns of neurons firing, and "mental function" to include for example me thinking now about what I'm going to write.

Neither of those is illusory. But perhaps you meant something different. — Daemon

I don't consider either brain function or mental function illusory. They are both useful ways of thinking and talking about human experience and behavior. Garrett Travers seems to believe that mental function is illusory. The point I was trying to make is that, if mental function is illusory, then brain function is too.

It's a question of level of organization. Saying that mental phenomena are fully explained by neurological phenomena is the old reductionist "nothing but" argument. Another example would be to say that biological phenomena are nothing but chemical phenomena. If you want to apply that standard comprehensively, then all phenomena are nothing but interactions between sub-atomic particles. At some level that's true, but it is not a very useful way of trying to understand the world.

Ah ok. I broadly agree with that.

No, I'm talking about different levels of organization. When we talk about the nervous system, we talk about neurons and synapses. When we talk about the mind, we talk about thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. They're not the same thing whether we talk about them scientifically, philosophically, or just in an everyday manner. — T Clark

That's OK. We're talking about the same thing, but using different terminology. Empirical scientists have a matter-based vocabulary to discuss "neurons & synapses". But Psychologists and Philosophers use a different terminology to describe "thoughts, feelings, and perceptions". As far as I'm concerned, "Psychology" is merely a sciencey-sounding label for the philosophical investigation of the human Mind *1. Likewise, "Sociology" is a narrower niche for the exploration of human Culture. Both of those sub-disciplines sometimes cross the line into such traditional philosophical topics as Ethics & Beliefs. By contrast, the ancient philosophers were generalists, and did not make such reductive distinctions. Ironically, some haughty empirical scientists disparage those theoretical fields as "soft" science, because they produce no material evidence, but merely statistical correlations.

In my personal philosophical worldview, Brain & Mind are on the same evolutionary continuum, but at "different levels of organization". As noted in my reply to GT above, each transitional phase of evolution is the emergence of a more complex system from a structure of lower complexity. Ultimately, everything in the world is a specific form of fundamental Energy. But physics is now discovering that Energy is a causal form of even more essential Information : the power to enform. Shannon defined "Information" in terms of Entropy, which is merely the disorganization of Energy. I still consider Philosophy to be a general-purpose science, that can synthesize the sub-divisions of Science into a whole system of Knowledge : a worldview or cosmology. :nerd:

*1. Behaviorism was a short-lived attempt to put Psychology on an empirical basis.

How is information related to energy in physics? :
Energy is the relationship between information regimes
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/22084/how-is-information-related-to-energy-in-physics

Is science a type of philosophy? "
Philosophy has its distinctive, traditional and more recent, sub-disciplines and themes: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, political philosophy, etc., and also includes philosophy of science.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is-science-a-part-of-or-separate-from-philosophy

We're talking about the same thing, but using different terminology. — Gnomon

No, unless when we're talking about what kind of pie to have, we want to talk about the hypanthium, endocarp, and mesocarp of the pome.

The fact of Phase Change is undeniable ─ you can feel snow melt on your tongue ─ but explaining the mechanics of how it happened in terms of known physical laws proved impossible. — Gnomon
That is no proof that it's impossible. Non-equilibrium thermodynamics is still in infancy shoes. — EugeneW

FWIW, I meant it's impossible for reductive science. Non-reductive Systems Theory may be on the verge of an understanding of the nanoscale intermediate steps in a phase transition. In the link below, they conclude that different levels of organization play by different rules (parameters). That is the whole point of Holism. On the quantum scale, scientists have found that a particle can, under certain conditions, relocate on the other side of a solid barrier without passing through the space between. That may be a form of phase transition, and might be related to the holism of Entanglement. Stay tuned. :smile:


Phase transitions occur when order parameters change as a function of another parameter of the system, such as temperature. An order parameter is a measure of the degree of order across the boundaries in a phase transition system.
https://content.csbs.utah.edu/~butner/systems/DynamicalSystemsIntro.html

How Ghostly Quantum Particles Fly Through Barriers :
At the subatomic level, particles can fly through seemingly impassable barriers like ghosts. Particles can pass through solid objects not because they're very small (though they are), but because the rules of physics are different at the quantum level.
https://www.livescience.com/65043-tunneling-quantum-particles.html

No, unless when we're talking about what kind of pie to have, we want to talk about the hypanthium, endocarp, and mesocarp of the pome. — T Clark

Sorry! I thought you might agree with my non-reductive holistic perspective on the topic, I didn't realize you were talking about fruit pies. :joke:

See my reply to EugeneW above, for clarification of my Holistic approach. Do you equate Holism with Magic? I don't. :nerd:

Saying that mental phenomena are fully explained by neurological phenomena is the old reductionist "nothing but" argument. — T Clark

Yes! I agree holistically. :wink:

Ok. Organ function, the mind being the brain doing its thing, is the low hanging fruit here. Nevertheless, it's the most sensible/reasonable way to look at mind, physically speaking that is.

Let's do a comparison between the kidneys and the brain.

With kidneys, there's hardly anything controversial regarding the physicality of urine formation: we understand the physiology, the biochemistry of each and every molecule in our pee, quantitatively to boot.

With the mind, however, I haven't heard of any measurements done on thoughts: how much does a thought weigh? what is the concentration of a thought? Quantitave analysis of thinking seems impossible as the conceptual framework thereof is N/A.

Indeed, that we're lacking a go-between between the physical brain and the (apparently) nonphysical mind is the nub of the issue.

Thanks for lesson on the history of science, but I'm sure you know that the germ theory of disease is heavily reliant on microscopic evidence. Even if microscopes predated the theory in question, it's clear that micrsocopes were the X factor.

An emergent property, yes. The need for an additional idea/concept to connect the brain to the mind is what I find deeply intriguing. It bespeaks an admission by physicalists that there's something missing/incomplete in re a physical explanation for the mind.

Mind as the funtion of a (physical) brain just won't do. As I related to Cuthbert, wecan't neasure thoughts like we can, for instance, bilirubin, a product of the liver.

Interesting. However, it fails to satisfy me in the most basic sense - localization of brain function is not an explanation of how physical processes lead to thoughts. To illustrate, I know, very roughly, where the features in my smartphone are located, but the truth is I don't know how they actually work.

The mind is just the body, yep, that's what a physicalist would say, but dig a little deeper and such claims tend to fall apart. See my replies to Cuthbert and Tom Storm (vide supra).

Mind as an external force! Sounds interesting. I wonder if some conservation laws are violated if this were so.

What bothers me is that physicalists find it necessary to invent new concepts e.g. emergentism to bridge what then has to be a gap between the physical brain and the mind. The question is, is there any difference between emergentism and nonphysicalism?

Once upon a time, disease/illness were thought of as having supernatural causes (evil spirits, demonic possession, sorcery, and witch's spells).

Physicalism settled the matter definitively: diseases are caused by microbial invasion of the body. Evidence poured in from all the research labs in the world via microscopes. — Agent Smith

Tiny organisms, too small to be seen, which grew to a visible size were said to originate in "spontaneous generation". That was an accepted theory. This is very similar to the modern conception of abiogenesis. It seems like the physicalist's reliance on "supernatural causes" hasn't waned.

We need to be aware of the world we move in. This awareness is given to us by a physical brain, which at the same time shapes that world.

That doesn't mean that physicalism explains consciousness. Consciousness is an integral part of reality without which there would be no life. Materialism excludes this quality from reality and call consciousness emergent, epiphenomenal, a contingency, accompanying, thriving on, or non-essential. Which is their good right. It can't explain though how a feeling comes about and can merely state, usually in an evolutionary gene/meme-centered structure, that it is a necessity for survival. By declaring it to be a byproduct of neutral and empty material processes it relocates consciousness to an imaginary domain. Because, if it's a byproduct, then where does it reside? If it's illusionary, then why do we feel it? Physicalism has no answer. It paints itself in a corner that's getting smaller and smaller, which can easily be resolved by breaking the physicalistical wall creating the corner, letting the materialistic paint dry, or just walk over it and leave the physical room.

Tiny organisms, too small to be seen, which grew to a visible size were said to originate in "spontaneous generation". That was an accepted theory. This is very similar to the modern conception of abiogenesis. It seems like the physicalist's reliance on "supernatural causes" hasn't waned. — Metaphysician Undercover

Abiogenesis is not supernatural in character. It's an explanatory model that has at its heart, chance/luck/randomness. Quite possibly God is playing cards/dice with Himself (solitaire?) or :fear: with us. Realizing full well that we're but guests in the house of God, it'd do us good to not forget that the house always wins. :grin:

it's clear that micrsocopes were the X factor. — Agent Smith

I don't think it's clear at all. John Snow is known as the father of epidemiology. His main claim to fame is that he traced a cholera epidemic in London in 1854 to a specific contaminated well. His methods were observational - he mapped occurrences of cholera and determined they centered around the well. He solved the problem by removing the handle from the well. No microscopes involved.

Do you have specific information that shows a connection?

Interesting. However, it fails to satisfy me in the most basic sense - localization of brain function is not an explanation of how physical processes lead to thoughts. To illustrate, I know, very roughly, where the features in my smartphone are located, but the truth is I don't know how they actually work. — Agent Smith

That's more something a neurobiologist could explain, my expertise is limited to academic research. I can only tell what the scientists are find out, I can't explain the neuronal process. But, just as your Iphone works because of these process, so too does the brain.

With the mind, however, I haven't heard of any measurements done on thoughts: how much does a thought weigh? what is the concentration of a thought? Quantitave analysis of thinking seems impossible as the conceptual framework thereof is N/A.

How much does a jog weigh? When a man goes for his morning jog he’s not reaching for something like he would a morning cup of coffee. He’s just using a noun to describe a period of time that he’ll be jogging.

“Thoughts” are of the same nature. You’re just describing a period of time that you spent thinking.

it's clear that micrsocopes were the X factor. — Agent Smith

I was following up on this and came across a discussion of Louis Pasteur's work, which took place at roughly the same time as Snow's. Pasteur did use microscopes extensively.

We're talking about the same thing, but using different terminology. — Gnomon
No, unless when we're talking about what kind of pie to have, we want to talk about the hypanthium, endocarp, and mesocarp of the pome. — T Clark

OK. Let's talk about an apple pie. There is an analytical vocabulary for describing the chemistry and physics of apples, sugar, spices & dough. But that reductive analysis cannot describe the taste of an apple pie. What it feels like to eat a slice of pie requires a Holistic & Synthetic vocabulary. Likewise, we can analyze physical neural nets all day, and never know the mental sensation of enjoying a sweet dessert. Same pie, different words.

That's why cookbooks may take advantage of physics & chemistry & biology (some may even mention the "hypanthium, endocarp, and mesocarp of the pome", but their focus is on the final product as experienced by the mind of the consumer. The cookbook is talking about the same pie, but using language that is more relevant to the gustatory Qualia than to the physical substance. In a similar manner, Philosophers have developed a different vocabulary (thoughts, feelings, cognition, reason) for describing the Mind, from that of scientists analyzing the Brain (see image below). :yum:

How much does a jog weigh? :chin: Good question. I think you're onto something here.

Words like "jogging" were post facto descriptions of certain bodily functions i.e. they were observed and then named.

Thinking is ex ante; the word "thinking" was coined before anyone had seen the brain (doing it).

What do you suppose this implies?

:ok:

:ok:

:up:

Update

1. Urine is a product of the kidneys.

2. Jogging is a function of the legs.

3. Thoughts: product/function of the brain? :chin:

Abiogenesis is not supernatural in character. It's an explanatory model that has at its heart, chance/luck/randomness. — Agent Smith

The problem being that chance/luck/randomness is not an explanation of anything, nor was spontaneous generation an explanation of anything.

Realizing full well that we're but guests in the house of God, it'd do us good to not forget that the house always wins. — Agent Smith

That's a mixed metaphor. The house wins in gambling. When you are a guest in someone else's house, you are the winner, by the graciousness of the other.

The problem being that chance/luck/randomness is not an explanation of anything, nor was spontaneous generation an explanation of anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

I remember making a similar statement a long time ago. Harry Hindu believes that chance is ignorance and ignorance simply doesn't qualify as an explanation.

The rest of your post :up: even though it's a tad bit more optimistic than I would've liked.

I wouldn't really say that chance is ignorance, but it's more like the way that we represent our ignorance. So for example, if I do not know the cause of something, I might say it was a chance occurrence. In this case, what "chance" represents is the fact that I do not know. But it's a misleading usage, because it creates the appearance that I do know the cause, and the cause is something called "chance".

Like it does today. There is no question that the mind is physical. Everything else is just wishful imagination. Look at all the medicines we use to alter the mind. Depression medication, anti-psychotics, not to mention drugs like alcohol and cocaine.

Surgery and brain damage have shown that the mind is activated by the physical brain. Stimulate a certain area of the brain during surgery and a flash of mind appears to the user. Carve out chunks and a part of a person's mind is gone. There are examples of people who have lost their short term memory due to brain damage and have their mind forever changed. There is an example of a person who had brain damage, and can no longer see colors, though there is nothing wrong with their eyes.

The evidence for a material mind isn't controversial, its an overwhelming deluge of reality. You brain is damaged or dies, your mind is damaged or dies. There is absolutely no viable alternative view point.

In a similar manner, Philosophers have developed a different vocabulary (thoughts, feelings, cognition, reason) for describing the Mind, from that of scientists analyzing the Brain (see image below). :yum: — Gnomon

I haven't had much luck getting my point across on this issue, so I plan to start a new thread soon to discuss a broader application of my understanding in this area, but focused on the scientific hierarchy.

The evidence for a material mind isn't controversial, its an overwhelming deluge of reality. You brain is damaged or dies, your mind is damaged or dies. There is absolutely no viable alternative view point. — Philosophim

Seems there are running parallel threads on this. There is no material mind. There is only the approach to the brain as there is the approach to the physical world. And that approach leaves out an essential element. The noumenological giving rise to the phenomenal. Mind or consciousness are not epiphenomena, but noumena, and in this approach it's the material world the epiphenomenon or emergent property.

I haven't had much luck getting my point across on this issue, so I plan to start a new thread soon to discuss a broader application of my understanding in this area, but focused on the scientific hierarchy. — T Clark

You mentioned "different levels of organization", and listed some different words that we apply to phenomena on those different levels : level A -- "neurons and synapses" (Quanta) or level B -- "thoughts, feelings, and perceptions" (Qualia). When I Googled "different levels of organization", the articles didn't mention level B phenomena specifically.

Are you talking about increasing physical complexity of evolved organisms over time (level A)? Or are you referring to the emergence of novel system behaviors as individual parts merge into a unified System (level B)? Level A is clearly concerned with physical properties that are detected by the 5 senses. But Level B qualities (feelings) are imperceptible to human senses, except what I call the "sixth sense" of Reason (not to be confused with proprioception).

I'm guessing that your "scientific hierarchy" is limited to Level A organization, which are clearly physical. But philosophy & psychology add another level to their hierarchy, which is emergent from or superposed upon a physical substrate, but lacks the usual material properties. By that I mean, "thoughts, feelings, and perceptions" are invisible, intangible, and odorless. Hence, they are not material substances, but mental qualities that we attribute to certain human, or human-like, behaviors. :nerd:

PS___In vernacular speech we often use "properties" and "qualities" interchangeably. But psychologists & philosophers have to make a clear distinction, to avoid category errors.


What are the 7 levels of organization in the human body? :
The major levels of organization in the body, from the simplest to the most complex are: atoms, molecules, organelles, cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, and the human organism.

Typical levels of organization that one finds in the literature include the atomic, molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, organismal, group, population, community, ecosystem, landscape, and biosphere levels

What is the difference between reason and sense? :
is that reason is to exercise the rational faculty; to deduce inferences from premises; to perform the process of deduction or of induction; to ratiocinate; to reach conclusions by a systematic comparison of facts while sense is to use biological senses: to either smell, watch, taste, hear or feel.
https://wikidiff.com/reason/sense

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between possibility and actuality. .

THE THINKER

There is no question that the mind is physical. Everything else is just wishful imagination — Philosophim

That's exactly the question.

The evidence for a material mind isn't controversial, its an overwhelming deluge of reality. You brain is damaged or dies, your mind is damaged or dies. There is absolutely no viable alternative view point. — Philosophim

Possibly a digression - idealists - people like Bernando Kastrup - would not deny any of this and would maintain that matter is the illusion, not mind. For him and others, the brain and all matter is simply what mind looks like when viewed from a particular perspective.

Now to deal with this properly, we probably need to engage deeper with his ideas than this tiny fragment of his thinking, but the point I'm trying to make is that the question of brain is moot when we consider the metaphysical presupposition of idealism. It is the brain and physical things which need to be explained, not the other way around. I should add that I am not an idealist, but the argument is fascinating.