Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".

neomac

You are taking it too personally, sir. I had fun primarily in being articulate, clear, focused, logic and versatile while formulating my objections against your view. Instead, you played very poorly at every round (and we had many), so I guess not much fun for you, independently from the scores. At your place, I wouldn't care about the scores you lost as much as about the fun you didn't have.

creativesoul

↪neomac

At time t1, an individual capable of telling time wonders what time it is. Like all other folk who know how to read the hands of a clock, they look towards one. However, unbeknownst to the individual, they looked at a particular clock that had just so happened to have stopped working exactly twelve hours prior. While looking at the clock, the individual formed belief about what time it was based upon exactly what it said. The clock said it was three o'clock, and the individual believed it was three o'clock. The belief about the time was true, but that belief is not concerning. Rather, it is their belief about that clock that is of utmost importance.

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes.

Twat.

Deleted User

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes. — creativesoul

That's quite a knot.

I suggest yanking out these two sentences, which are only tricky, rickety embellishments:

1.

False belief cannot possibly be true. — creativesoul

Everyone knows that. There's no need to state it. It only muddies the logic.

2.

Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. — creativesoul

There's no need to state this as we've already asserted that his belief is false. It's tacked-on, unnecessary and it muddies the logic.

It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes — creativesoul

Strike this. This absurdity no longer follows. We've eliminated an absurdity. :party: :party: :party: :party:

That leaves us with:

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. "That clock is working" can be [true]. — creativesoul

A much more reasonable statement.

If you choose to keep these two sentences, to my view the burden is yours to justify their inclusion.

neomac

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not [0]. The individual's belief is false [1]. False belief cannot possibly be true [2]. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true [3]. "That clock is working" can be [4]. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes [5]. — creativesoul

This is a very messy argument. But before tossing it into the trash bin (along with all your other catastrophic arguments), let’s clarify a few points.

First point, it seems you are comparing here 2 things:
- The individual's belief that that particular clock is a working one, at time t1
- And the statement “At time t1, that clock is working”
You apparently need this comparison to establish correct belief reports wrt your understanding of the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief. Let’s not forget however that this argument must be understood within your specific theoretical framework, because my theory doesn’t require any truth assessment of a belief for proper belief ascription at all (indeed such a requirement of yours suggests a confusion between logic requirements and epistemological requirements!). In addition to that, I also questioned that you can successfully identify the right belief report without running into some inconsistencies internal to your own theory for reasons that affect also your current argument. Anyway, in this post, let’s put all the latter considerations aside and focus on your last comparative argument as it is.

Second point, if the individual's belief is claimed to be false ex hypothesi, then also the statement “that clock is working” must be claimed to be false ex hypothesi. In addition to that, you made a general claim such as “False belief cannot possibly be true”, but since you did not explain the truth conditions of this claim (my idea is that it’s a contradiction in terms), one can find it as evident as “False statements cannot possibly be true” (which is also a contradiction in terms). Unless you can argue otherwise, if you wish so.

Third point, let’s assume now that we can validly infer [3] from [1] and [2] (even though the structure of your argument - as it is - does not correspond to a logically valid deduction yet, so it’s a non sequitur!):
[1] The individual's belief is false (ex hypothesi)
[2] False beliefs cannot possibly be true (contradiction in terms)
[3] Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true (conclusion)
Then we can also validly infer [3’] from [1’] and [2’] b/c the above argument and the following one share the same (il)logic structure:
[1’] The statement “that clock is working” is false (ex hypothesi)
[2’] False statements cannot possibly be true (contradiction in terms)
[3’] Therefore, the statement “that clock is working” cannot possibly be true (conclusion)
Therefore either [4] or [3] must be rejected !!! And in either case it only follows that also [5] must be rejected !!!

In other words, you should compare (assessed) false beliefs with (assessed) false statements, not (assessed) false beliefs with (unassessed) statements!!! So your messy argument amounts (among others) to an ignoratio elenchi fallacy.

Twat. — “creativesoul

Try harder, dude! ;)

creativesoul

my theory doesn’t require any truth — neomac

Clearly.

creativesoul

So your argument amounts to an ignoratio elenchi fallacy. — neomac

The irony.

At time t1, an individual capable of telling time wonders what time it is. Like all other folk who know how to read the hands of a clock, they look towards one. However, unbeknownst to the individual, they looked at a particular clock that had just so happened to have stopped working exactly twelve hours prior. While looking at the clock, the individual formed belief about what time it was based upon exactly what it said. The clock said it was three o'clock, and the individual believed it was three o'clock. The belief about the time was true, but that belief is not concerning. Rather, it is their belief about that clock that is of utmost importance.

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be true. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes.

QED

creativesoul

You've ascribed a belief to Jack that is true. I have not. Jack's belief is false.

Correct but I don’t get what is supposed to prove... — neomac

It only follows that the belief you ascribed to Jack is not Jack's belief.

neomac

↪creativesoul

> At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be true. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes.

You just fetched the same argument from the trash bin, where it should have rested for ever and ever. So I must re-toss it into the trash bin for exactly the same reasons I already explained here. Evidently you fail to understand my objection as well as how valid deductions work. The problem is not in the piece of narrative you reported about the genesis of that belief but in what you feel so ridiculously confident to infer from. This confidence comes from some preposterous assumptions that are neither properly spelt out nor properly argued, and that you simply brainwashed yourself to accept, hoping to do the same with me (or us). And you failed that too. Philosophy, as I understand it, it's the opposite of brainwashing.

> QED

Fremdschämen. That's what I feel, sir.

neomac

2 examples of inappropriate quotations:

↪creativesoul

My sentence was creatively chopped out by a deranged soul.

↪creativesoul

Taken in its context, my claim was referring to a different example from the one we are handling here, and only in order to clarify some implications of your views, not mine. (But now that you made me think about it, I would not be surprised if also on that occasion you were already committing a similar ignoratio elenchi fallacy ).

creativesoul

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false belief cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false belief.

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true belief cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true belief.

neomac

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false belief cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false belief.

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true belief cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true belief. — creativesoul

Both of your claims sound correct as much as the 4 following ones:

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false propositions cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false propositions.
If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true propositions cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true propositions.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and false beliefs cannot possibly be true, then beliefs are not equivalent to false beliefs.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and true beliefs cannot possibly be false, then beliefs are not equivalent to true beliefs.

However, differently from your former 2 claims, what these latter 4 claims make more evident is that:

We should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects (like “true proposition” or “false proposition” vs “proposition”, or “true belief” or “false belief” vs “belief”) as reported in these claims. If we do not distinguish them appropriately, then the antecedents of the conditional claims will be contradictory: e.g. if “all propositions” means “true propositions and false propositions” then “all propositions can possibly be either true or false” is a contradiction in terms, while if we take "propositions" to generically refer to any proposition prior to (or independently from) any assessment of its truth-value then there is no contradiction.
The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se.

And this shows where your ignoratio elenchi fallacy (as discussed here, see third point) is coming from:

Distinguishing qualified and unqualified subjects wrt to their alethic status assessment
But then swapping them implicitly and misleadingly while comparing propositions and beliefs

And that's why if you want to pertinently compare propositions and belief, then:

you should NOT compare assessed beliefs (i.e. “false beliefs” or “true beliefs”) with unassessed propositions (i.e. “propositions”), or unassessed beliefs (i.e. “beliefs”) with assessed propositions (i.e. “false propositions” or “true propositions”).
Instead you should compare assessed beliefs (i.e. “false beliefs” or “true beliefs”) with assessed propositions (i.e. “false propositions” or “true propositions”), or unassessed beliefs (i.e. “beliefs”) with unassessed propositions (i.e. “propositions”).

creativesoul

An astute reader with a keen eye will surely note that the critique in the post prior to this one, while seemingly reasonable, particularly at first blush, is based upon what the author takes to be an accurate report and/or rendering of what's being critiqued. It's plainly not. What I wrote can be simplified as follows...

If all A's can possibly be true or false, and false B's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false B's.
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and true B's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true B's.

The above puts what I wrote into simpler form. I'm comparing two distinctly different things, propositions and belief. As clearly shown below, the critique is not. Rather, the critique compares different kinds of the same thing. Salva veritate. There is an obvious substitution error here.

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false propositions cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false propositions.
If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true propositions cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true propositions.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and false beliefs cannot possibly be true, then beliefs are not equivalent to false beliefs.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and true beliefs cannot possibly be false, then beliefs are not equivalent to true beliefs. — neomac

If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and false A's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false A's.
If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and true A's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true A's.

In the first rendering they compared kinds of propositions. In the second, they compared kinds of beliefs. Both have the form above. Neither shares the form of the claims I made. Those claims are what is purportedly being critiqued. Hence, it is an irrelevant critique, as a result of critiquing something other than what I wrote. Given that what followed, as copied below, is based upon a fatally flawed rendering of what I wrote, there's a bit more irony involved yet once again.

However, differently from your former 2 claims, what these latter 4 claims make more evident is that:We should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects (like “true proposition” or “false proposition” vs “proposition”, or “true belief” or “false belief” vs “belief”) as reported in these claims. If we do not distinguish them appropriately, then the antecedents of the conditional claims will be contradictory: e.g. if “all propositions” means “true propositions and false propositions” then “all propositions can possibly be either true or false” is a contradiction in terms, while if we take "propositions" to generically refer to any proposition prior to (or independently from) any assessment of its truth-value then there is no contradiction.
The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se. — neomac

emphasis above is mine

Differently from my claims...

Indeed!

creativesoul

...

neomac

what the author takes to be an accurate report and/or rendering of what's being critiqued. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that you simply failed to understand the purpose of my critique.

emphasis above is mine

Differently from my claims... — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that your highlighting is pointless. Indeed I'm not misattributing any of my claims to you, since I'm explicitly stating that my 4 claims are different from your 2 claims, except for their logic structure which is the one you reported here [1]. But what my 4 claims show more clearly than your 2 claims, it logically holds also for your 2 claims.

In the first rendering they compared kinds of propositions. In the second, they compared kinds of beliefs. Hence, it is an irrelevant critique, as a result of critiquing something other than what I wrote. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that it is relevant to show:

the genesis of your ignoratio elenchi fallacy as explained here (third point).
That even if you compare beliefs and propositions you should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects in your conditionals
The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se.

[1]

If all A's can possibly be true or false, and false B's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false B's.
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and true B's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true B's. — creativesoul

neomac

An astute reader will note that the critique above holds good only if we conflate belief and statements. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that I'm not conflating anything. And it's precisely b/c I'm not conflating belief and statements that I can prove where your reasoning logically fails.

creativesoul

It is relevant to show:
the genesis of your ignoratio elenchi fallacy as explained here (third point).
That even if you compare beliefs and propositions you should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects in your conditionals
The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se. — neomac

When an author is critiquing something other than what I've wrote, and/or something that quite simply does not follow from what I wrote, it is an irrelevant critique.

neomac

When an author is critiquing something other than what I've wrote, and/or something that quite simply does not follow from what I wrote, it is an irrelevant critique. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that you are not logic.

creativesoul

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language use. Not all belief are.

creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that you are not logic. — neomac

Brilliant.

creativesoul

There's nothing at all problematic about metacognitive endeavors which point out the simplest of details such as a true belief cannot be false; a false belief cannot be true; it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood; and it is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. The first two claims can be said of true and false propositions without issue. It is unproblematic to say that when we discuss whether belief or propositions are true or false, that our reports are qualifying both propositions and beliefs.

The issue is that all truth apt belief is either true or false, and that is the case regardless of whether or not we further qualify them during our metacognitive endeavors.

So, when we know that an individual's belief is false, we can also know that it cannot possibly be true, and that the individual cannot knowingly believe whatever it is that they do at the time. If we then make the further metacognitive claim that they believe something that can be true, or something that is believable, then we've just ascribed a belief to the individual that they cannot possibly have.

If convention has issue putting what I've presented into logical notation, it is not a flaw of what I've presented, rather it is the accounting practice that is found lacking.

creativesoul

An astute reader will note that the critique above holds good only if we conflate belief and statements.
— creativesoul

I'm not conflating anything — neomac

Reminding the reader of the notion of belief you're working from again...

The contents of an individual's belief, according to your own words, "express the point of view" of the individual believer. "That clock is working" is a proposition and/or statement which expresses of the individual's point of view at time t1, according to what you've been arguing here. You've also claimed that that proposition/statement could be true, and hinted at possible world scenarios...

False belief cannot possibly be true. The statement you've been arguing in favor of can.

So, yes you are.

neomac

Reminding the reader of the notion of belief you're working from again... — creativesoul

Unfortunately for you, my objections to your ignoratio elenchi fallacy do not depend on my theory as I clearly stated:

Let’s not forget however that this argument must be understood within your specific theoretical framework — neomac

False belief cannot possibly be true. — creativesoul

Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. And that depends on the meaning of truth and false, not on the meaning of belief and proposition or statement, as I already explained.

creativesoul

Reminding the reader of the notion of belief you're working from again...
— creativesoul

Unfortunately for you, my objections to your ignoratio elenchi fallacy do not depend on my theory — neomac

You're such a moron. The objection was based upon a conflation of belief and statements. I do not conflate belief and statements. The objection was based upon what you did, not I. What you did is irrelevant.

The irony is still strong...

neomac

You're such a moron — creativesoul

The objection was based upon a conflation of belief and statements. I do not conflate belief and statements. The objection was based upon what you did, not I. What you did is irrelevant. — creativesoul

The problem is that you can not soundly prove your claims. You can not soundly prove that I'm conflating statements and beliefs, that I'm misrendering your claims, and that my arguments are irrelevant. At best you can insult me when you fail to brainwash me. And you failed on all grounds.
Additionally, the more you insult me or try to brainwash me (by repeating the same claims ad nauseam without even understanding the logic implications of what you yourself are claiming and related objections), the more you prove my point.

Look, if you are tired of debating with me, there is no need to get hysterical, just ignore my posts and my arguments.

neomac

> So, when we know that an individual's belief is false, we can also know that it cannot possibly be true, and that the individual cannot knowingly believe whatever it is that they do at the time [1]. If we then make the further metacognitive claim that they believe something that can be true, or something that is believable, then we've just ascribed a belief to the individual that they cannot possibly have [2].

On one side, claim [1] can be applied to both beliefs and propositions, so it can not be used to distinguish them (if this is the aim of such considerations). On the other, against claim [2], we can claim of a belief (or proposition) that is proven to be true (or false), that it could have been false (or true). Any belief (or proposition) capable of representing the world in a given way is contingently either true or false (unless they are contradictions or tautologies). This is perfectly consistent with the claim that both beliefs and propositions can be understood independently from their truth-value assessment. Besides truth-value assessments are fallible, so the same belief can be assigned different truth values by the same person at different times or by different subjects at the same time. In other words, identifying a belief is a distinct task from assessing its truth-value and indeed the latter task presupposes the former task.

> If convention has issue putting what I've presented into logical notation, it is not a flaw of what I've presented, rather it is the accounting practice that is found lacking.

If you have issue understanding logic, it is not a flaw of logic, rather it's you who are found lacking.

creativesoul

False belief cannot possibly be true.
— creativesoul

Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. — neomac

...we can claim of a belief (or proposition) that is proven to be true (or false), that it could have been false (or true)... — neomac

Arriving at incoherence is a sign of self-contradiction and/or equivocation. You've littered the thread and this conversation with such things. I've just been far too busy attempting to be a charitable reader to care enough to point out all of the flaws in what you've offered here. There is plenty to choose from. The irony though is that nearly all of your critiques and/or objections are invalid. You do know what that means right? They do not follow from what I've said, but rather, they follow from your interpretations thereof and/or your own linguistic framework. You've demonstrated a deeply ingrained habit of assessing my claims based upon a framework other than the one I'm employing.

How many strikes do we get again in your game before being counted out?

I am very well aware of the difficulty inherent to what I'm setting out. I am very well aware of the affront that it exemplifies, particularly against propositional logic as well as paraconsistent logic. That's okay though, because neither of those practices have ever gotten belief quite right to begin with. I suppose you also hold the rules of logical entailment as a standard also, based upon what I've seen here.

All the shit you've said about me and logic is far less convincing when you employ practices that permit changing the truth conditions of belief as well as outright attributing belief that could possibly be true to an individual that has belief that cannot possibly be true. That you do not see that as a problem is typical though, you do follow the conventional practices that allowed Russell's clock, Moore's paradox, and Gettier the footholds that they still have to this day.

The sole purpose of logic(the rules of correct inference) is to preserve the truth of the premisses. The sole purpose of logical notation is to take proper account of human thought, belief, and/or statements thereof. It is claimed that there is some basic form that that comes in. Logical notation is purportedly setting that out. Currently, convention fails on both counts. That's no secret.

creativesoul

I'm explicitly stating that my 4 claims are different from your 2 claims, except for their logic structure... — neomac

The structure was different. That is exactly what I pointed out. So, they are not just different except for that structure. To quite the contrary, they are different structures altogether, as I've already pointed out clearly enough for the average person to grasp.

creativesoul

I had fun primarily in being articulate, clear, focused, logic and versatile while formulating my objections against your view... — neomac

:smile:

The above presupposes that you have a good grasp of my view. I'd like to see you offer a comprehensive summary of the position I hold and have been arguing in favor of. I mean, in order to levy valid objections against another's viewpoint, that viewpoint must be first understood rightly. So... show me.

neomac

False belief cannot possibly be true.
— creativesoul

Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. — neomac

...we can claim of a belief (or proposition) that is proven to be true (or false), that it could have been false (or true)... — neomac

Arriving at incoherence is a sign of self-contradiction and/or equivocation. — creativesoul

Where is the contradiction? Where is the equivocation? Can you exactly spell it out? First of all notice that the subjects are different: “false belief” and “belief” (qualified vs unqualified subject). Secondly, notice that also what is predicated is in different verb's mood (i.e. “cannot possibly be…” vs “could have been…”). But I get that some intellectual effort (which you are evidently incapable of) is necessary. So here are some additional hints (and if they are not enough I'll sharpen them at the next round): the claim that you apparently need so badly is “False belief cannot possibly be true” but this is a misleading claim, because - among others - its truth conditions (which you did not specify [1]) depend on the meaning of the word “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms) not on the meaning of “belief”. In other words, reasoning in terms qualified subject (i.e. “False belief”) is ambiguous wrt what we can infer from "being a belief" or from "being false"). To avoid this ambiguity we can better render your claim (“False belief cannot possibly be true”) as a bi-conditional:

If a belief B is false then B is not true and if a belief B is true then B is not false.

Notice that in this latter statement, the subject is unqualified. Of this unqualified subject we can claim at the same time without contradiction:

1. If a belief B is false then B is not true and if B is true then B is not false
2. B is actually true (or false) and B could have been false (or true)

And BTW the same holds for propositions/statements (i.e. “False propositions/statements cannot possibly be true”):

1. If a statement S is false then S is not true and if S is true then S is not false
2. S is actually true (or false) and S could have been false (or true)
3. If a proposition P is false then P is not true and if P is true then P is not false
4. P is actually true (or false) and P could have been false (or true)

Do you agree with these conclusions? If not, can you spell out exactly why not in substantial terms (i.e. meaning, truth conditions, logic implications or presuppositions)?

The structure was different. That is exactly what I pointed out. So, they are not just different except for that structure. — creativesoul

All right, I missed to properly address this part. I’ll do it now. The distinction of A and B as 2 variables ranging over values in 2 different domains respectively, serves your specific purpose of comparing propositions and beliefs. So what your objection is highlighting [2] is the logic structure of your comparison as such. That’s fine and since I didn't clarify well enough what I took to be the same or different in the logic structure of your 2 claims wrt my 4 claims, your objection is understandable. The point is that it's grounded on a misunderstanding due to my poor phrasing. Indeed my comments were pointing at some implicit assumptions embedded in the logic structure of your 2 claims (so that's relevant for your own theory), and that do not depend on the comparison between beliefs and propositions: namely the contrast between qualified and unqualified subjects (do you deny it? [3]). Now, my 4 claims - as I said - “made more evident” this aspect by using variables ranging in the same domain. Clarified the misunderstanding, the point is that the contrast between qualified and unqualified subjects (which holds for my 4 claims too) should be relevant also in guiding a proper comparison between beliefs and propositions. And, indeed, this is the ground for my objection to your ignoratio elenchi fallacy (as discussed here, see third point). So, despite your excusable misunderstanding, my objection still holds (along with all others I made, of course [4]) .
You can however try to deny the validity of my 4 claims, for example do you deny the following ones? If yes, can you exactly spell out why in substantial terms (i.e. meaning, truth conditions, logic implications or presuppositions)?

If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and false beliefs cannot possibly be true, then beliefs are not equivalent to false beliefs.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and true beliefs cannot possibly be false, then beliefs are not equivalent to true beliefs.

How many strikes do we get again in your game before being counted out? — creativesoul

It's a bit late for that. In my game you lost a while ago. And there is no way to recover it. We are just reviewing how badly you lost. And we can continue as long as you enjoy it. Unless I get bored, of course.

[1]
you keep repeating the following claim without specifying anywhere its truth conditions:

when we know that an individual's belief is false, we can also know that it cannot possibly be true — creativesoul

What does the modal predicate "cannot possibly be" mean here? Are you saying if an individual's belief is false in the actual world, then it is not true in any possible world? In other words, if any individual's belief is false, then it is necessarily false, and if any individual's belief is true, then it is necessarily true, so there are no contingent true/false beliefs only necessary true/false beliefs? And if you do not mean that, what else do you mean exactly? Can you spell it out?
Besides do you also believe when we know that an individual's statement is false, we can also know that it cannot possibly be true? if not, why not?

[2]

If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and false A's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false A's.
If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and true A's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true A’s. — creativesoul

vs

If all A's can possibly be true or false, and false B's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false B's.
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and true B's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true B's. — creativesoul

[3] "all A's can possibly be either true or false" would be a contradiction in terms if "all A's" meant "all true A's and all false A's".

[4] Here is a list of entry points to my main objections to your preposterous claims and arguments:

1. Preposterous "CreativeSoul propositional calculi" (here)
2. Conflation between false beliefs and contradictory beliefs (here,here,here,here,here)
3. Fallacious presupposition of knowledge and truth-value assessment for proper belief report (here,here)
4. Irrelevance of "awareness" claims wrt "contradictory belief" claims (here)
5. Irrelevance of the “non-problematic understanding” argument (here)
6. Inadequacy of the “belief” notion (here)
7. Inadequacies of your “knowledge ascription” requirement (here,here,here,here)
8. Missing justification of your belief ascription practice wrt your definition of belief (here)
9. Non sequitur fallacy (here)
10. Ignoratio elenchi fallacy (here)

neomac

The above presupposes that you have a good grasp of my view. — creativesoul

Right, but what if you do not have a good grasp of your own view?

So... show me. — creativesoul

I'm quoting you when I make my objections and then I spell out in detail what I have to object to your quotations, as well as why it is relevant (here is a good example to prove my point). So this already shows what I understood about your views (unless you expect from me to parrot your claims or to fill up a questionnaire). And I expect you to do the same every time you have something specific to object against my claims or arguments. But you on the contrary waste lots posts and words in recycling the same generic objections, dismissive remarks and compulsive framing accusations, that either miss my point and its relevance, or miss what I argued to support it, or simply prove your intellectual dishonesty [1]. That's why, not surprisingly, any objection to your claims and arguments are either conflating or irrelevant according to you, no matter how preposterous your arguments and claims evidently look to everybody else.
To prove once more what I just said, your most recent posts [2] do not offer any support to the target of my objections: the ignoratio elenchi fallacy (as discussed here, see third point). Instead they point out, at best, some flaw in the way I presented my argument, and that helped me just sharpen my objection.
Another example of your shallowness is here:

False belief cannot possibly be true.
— creativesoul

Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. — neomac

...we can claim of a belief (or proposition) that is proven to be true (or false), that it could have been false (or true)... — neomac

Arriving at incoherence is a sign of self-contradiction and/or equivocation. You've littered the thread and this conversation with such things... — creativesoul

Where you accuse me of self-contradiction and/or equivocation without spelling out in detail where the contradiction or the equivocation is. You just slam your preposterous claims, and then you move on with your dumb rant as if it was enough to quote me to make your point!

Finally let's appreciate the scale of your methodological failures (practically, as catastrophic as your substantial claims and arguments): if you think I'm misunderstanding you, you can always rectify or answer my request of clarifications. But you do not address many of my pressing questions [3] and take as rectification, just repeating the same preposterous claims or arguments that I already quoted and you claim I've misunderstood. This is a very dumb dialectic strategy because if I failed to understand your claims (even when I'm directly commenting your quotes) as you state, what's the point in reiterating them? On the other side, if I don't understand, that may only depend on the non-evident logic or meaning or truth conditions of your claims wrt shared assumptions between me and you, so it's dumb just to repeat your claims (which are under question or misunderstood) and provide examples on how to apply them (as you did here

↪creativesoul

), all the more if you so candidly admit "I am very well aware of the difficulty inherent to what I'm setting out". You should instead prove your claims with logic tools and clarifications about meaning/truth conditions/logic implications or presuppositions consistent with shared assumptions between me and you [4]. If you do not do this, you are not making your view look more convincing, but simply incommensurable wrt more standard views. Indeed it's the dumbest philosophical strategy to challenge a view with claims and arguments that are unintelligible within that view, and reiterate ad nauseam until brainwashing interlocutors holding that view succeeds. And you do know what that means right? That you literally proved nothing substantially valid to support your views since the beginning of this exchange [5] up until now, especially wrt your central claim [6].
To recapitulate and not lose focus, here are the main important claims/assumptions that you didn't prove yet wrt what I questioned:

You did not prove the immense explanatory power of your definition of belief
You did not prove that you are not ascribing a contradictory belief in your “more accurate” belief report
You did not prove that the knowledge requirement is necessary for accurate belief report
You did not prove that your belief report is more accurate than the one we would normally provide in the relevant example of Jack

So spare me your sermons, insults and brainwashing sessions, and do some actual philosophical work, if you really care.

[1]

2 examples of inappropriate quotations:

↪creativesoul

My sentence was creatively chopped out by a deranged soul.

↪creativesoul

Taken in its context, my claim was referring to a different example from the one we are handling here, and only in order to clarify some implications of your views, not mine. (But now that you made me think about it, I would not be surprised if also on that occasion you were already committing a similar ignoratio elenchi fallacy ). — neomac

[2] Here is a bunch of them:

↪creativesoul

[3]
Like the following one. You keep repeating such kind of claims:

is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood; and it is impossible to knowingly be mistaken — creativesoul

But why is it impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood or to knowingly be mistaken ? What is "knowingly" supposed to mean here? Can you spell it out?

[4] As I did for example here :

[2] "all A's can possibly be either true or false" would be a contradiction in terms if "all A's" meant "all true A's and all false A's" — neomac

And I take to be shared all other substantive claims I made which are relevant for my objections and that you didn't directly nor specifically question, like this one (referred to “False belief cannot possibly be true”):

its truth conditions (which you did not specify) depend on the meaning of the word “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms) not on the meaning of “belief” — neomac

Indeed I took also your remark about the logical structure of your 2 claims, as a valid observation, because I can understand it wrt our shared assumptions, even though it didn't substantially affect my objection. And since you are proving to be so sensitive about logic structures, then there is still hope you will readily acknowledge that this other argument of yours is a non sequitur:

Yet I have another objection. Now that you made clear that your argument is only this:
Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

Then your argument (as it is) is a perfect example of non sequitur, logically speaking. I'll formalise it for you:
premise 1: Jack was mistaken (p)
premise 2: It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken (q)
conclusion: a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe (c)

p
q
-------
c

This is not a valid logic deduction!!! — neomac

[5]

Care to further discuss the topic, as compared/contrasted to my interlocutor?
— creativesoul

I don't see how we can further it. — neomac

Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one? — creativesoul

We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief.
Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to. — creativesoul

[6]

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is. — creativesoul

Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".

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