That it's a nihilistic approach.

Details?
The Wiki pages have long been a convolute mess with regard to this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deflationary_theory_of_truth#Tarski_and_deflationary_theories

I get my info from Scott Soames and his best book isn't on Kindle. I can summarize it. Tune in tomorrow.

...for the next exciting episode.

By redundancy, they mean to say that true only has a social function. — Mongrel

If you just mean that the word "true" only has a social function, then yes. But if you mean that whether or not something is true, then no. A redundancy theorist is perfectly able to say that whether or not it is raining is independent of what we say and believe.

Your take on redundancy puts no limits at all on what one can say. Its thesis is no more informative than that the word true starts with a t.

Its thesis is no more informative than that the word true starts with a t. — Mongrel

That's why it's called the redundancy theory. The point is that the word "true" is redundant; the claim "it is true that it is raining" is just the claim "it is raining".

Your take on redundancy puts no limits at all on what one can say. — Mongrel

I don't know what you mean by this. If you mean that we can't take issue with someone saying "it is raining" when it isn't raining, then you're wrong.

I think we pretty much agree about truth. It's a primal concept. Comprehension of it may be innate.

There's just confusion about what redundancy is. I'll summarize Soames' thoughts on it later.

I think we pretty much agree about truth. It's a primal concept. — Mongrel

No, that's not what we agree on. Under the redundancy theory, truth is a redundant concept. Given that "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining", truth-predication is a meaningless addition.

Sometimes "true" is redundant, specifically when the concept has been evoked by the act of assertion.

I don't know what a redundant concept is.

Someone likely said this already. Truth is a noun. As such it is a person, place, or thing, broadly speaking. Clearly a thing, if it is anything at all. But what kind of a thing? Best I can do is call it an abstract noun; i.e, an idea. When we - or I at any rate - look for the substance of this idea, I find nothing particular at all. What does that leave? It would seem to be that it is what all true propositions have in common, which is exactly that they are true. In as much as it's clear that there is no such single particular property except in this abstract and most general form, that leaves the conclusion that "truth" is almost a meaningless word. It refers to a property that a particular proposition or set of propositions possesses without providing any hint as to how that particular truth "works."

But this is not to confuse the two words true and truth. True is an adjective. It describes/identifies a property that a proposition has. AND, the nature of the proposition itself, if itself properly understood, will make clear just how that particular truth works. If, for example, you neither read nor spoke nor understood Greek, and were presented with a proposition in Greek, and assured that it were true, you would not have any idea what sort of "true" it was.

And to be sure, there are many kinds of true. If you really want to wrestle with that, I refer you to Gadamer's Truth and Method. (Wahrheit und Methode).

I suggest you start by looking up the definition of axiom on the Wikipedia.
— ernestm

There is nothing in the definition of axiom on the Wikipedia that I can determine what it is you are trying to get at. I know there are axioms that used in math and logic, but it is obvious that I'm talking about ideological/narrative axioms which are more or less the same thing as dogma. I think my argument ties directly into what Wikipedia says about dogma, and their page on axioms has a link to their page on dogma for a clarification on what non-mathematical/non-logical axioms are about.

Wiki-Dogma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogma

If this isn't what you are trying to get at please be a little less obtuse because it is difficult to guess what your argument is you are unable to explain it, and any guess I make will more likely than not be a straw man if I don't know EXACTLY what it is that your trying to get at. As far as I know, nobody is really good at guessing at what someone else's arguments are.

Given that "it is true that it is raining" means the same thing as "it is raining", truth-predication is a meaningless addition. — Michael

So I was going to provide a summary of Soame's thoughts on redundancy theory, but I'm finding that Michael has already done a great job. It's truth nihilism. Soames doesn't spend any time debating that. He spends about nine pages considering stuff like "Her thesis is true." He explains that redundancy can get a little closer to making sense if we look at it in the linguistic environment that includes "it is true that.."

So.. get over it Michael. Redundancy is truth nihilsm.

Soames didn't provide any further details about Tarski's view of redundancy other than his comment that it's nihilistic.

Gotta study ACLS. Bleh.

So I was going to provide a summary of Soame's thoughts on redundancy theory, but I'm finding that Michael has already done a great job. It's truth nihilism. Soames doesn't spend any time debating that. He spends about nine pages considering stuff like "Her thesis is true." He explains that redundancy can get a little closer to making sense if we look at it in the linguistic environment that includes "it is true that.."

So.. get over it Michael. Redundancy is truth nihilsm. — Mongrel

If by "truth nihilism" you mean something like "moral nihilism" (as you suggested earlier) then you're just wrong. Moral nihilism is the position that nothing is moral, but redundancy theory isn't the position that nothing is true.

If your only defence is "Soames and Tarski say otherwise" then that's just an appeal to authority – and a mistaken authority at that. Or by "truth nihilism" they mean something that isn't comparable to "moral nihilism".

Perhaps by "truth nihilism" they just mean that truth isn't a real property? In which case I'd agree. But of course that doesn't then entail that "redundancy puts no limits at all on what one can say" as you claimed earlier. If it's raining then the limit on what one can say is "it is raining".

And, of course, neither does this entail that "truth is agreement" as you also claimed earlier. Under the redundancy theory, "it is true that it is raining" doesn't mean "I agree that it is raining".

So you agree that redundancy is truth nihilism. Cool. I can say with confidence that we mean the same thing by "redundancy." Your position is not trivially true. It's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used. It's a failed theory.

So you agree that redundancy is truth nihilism. Cool. — Mongrel

Dishonest, much?

I said that redundancy is truth nihilism if by "truth nihilism" you just mean that truth isn't a real property. If, however, you mean it to be comparable to moral nihilism, as you suggested earlier, which is the position that moral claims are false (or meaningless), then no, redundancy isn't truth nihilism.

It's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used. It's a failed theory.

What do you mean by saying that it's not in line with the way "true" is commonly used? Are you saying that the propositions "it is raining" and "it is true that it is raining" are used in different ways, such that the two mean different things?

Dude. Are you being sincere? A moral nihilist has no problem identifying things as good or bad. A truth nihilist has no problem with "true" and "false."

So yes... redundancy is a failed theory: "His thesis is true."

Dude. Are you being sincere? A moral nihilist has no problem identifying things as good or bad. — Mongrel

Yes, I'm being sincere. The main forms of moral nihilism are expressivism, which is a form of non-cognitivism, claiming that moral statements do not express propositions, and error theory, which claims that moral beliefs and assertions are not true because they "claim that certain moral facts exist that in fact do not exist".

This isn't at all comparable to the redundancy theory.

So yes... redundancy is a failed theory: "His thesis is true."

You keep asserting this without explaining how it is a failed theory.

I did explain why it's a failed theory.

"His theory is true"

Failure.

I did explain why it's a failed theory.

"His theory is true"

Failure. — Mongrel

How does that show that the redundancy theory is a failed theory?

"His thesis is true" is not equivalent to "His thesis."

The sentential form is an obvious fail. You can try propositions.

"His thesis is true" is not equivalent to "His thesis."

The sentential form is an obvious fail. You can try propositions. — Mongrel

So? The redundancy theory isn't a theory about the syntax of truth statements. It doesn't say that any sentence of the form "X is true" is equivalent to the sentence "X".

In this case, the redundancy theory says that if his thesis is that e = mc² then to say that his thesis is true is to say that e = mc².

This along with your other claims regarding the comparability of moral nihilism and the entailment of truth as agreement shows that you don't understand the redundancy theory (or moral nihilism in the case of the former).

You just realized that the sentential form fails. You moved on to the propositional form.

Gotta go.

You just realized that the sentential form fails. You moved on to the propositional form. — Mongrel

What are you talking about?

Or maybe you didn't realize it. Still gotta go. Bye!