I would even go so far as to declare, saying that philosophy, and he who merely poses as a philosopher, rejects empirically grounded cognitive science with respect to brain operation and demonstrable functionality, is a case of pathological stupidity. — Mww

Yes, I agree completely. But the speculatively projected metaphysical or ontological implications of empirically grounded cognitive science are another matter altogether; that was all I have been trying to get across.

.....speculatively projected metaphysical or ontological implications of empirically grounded cognitive science are another matter altogether..... — Janus

Ahhhh....I see. What you meant by grounding presupposition? I was going there myself, with “the philosophical admissions of the cognitive scientist himself”.

Call it....close enough?

Sorry, didn't think I was being so mean.

By the law of parsimony, when making grandiose claims, the burden of proof is on the claimant. You made claims of a consciousness-field; a view that is shared by few and for which no evidence has so far been given. It adds an entire level of complexity that is unnecessary. Why is it my burden to disprove your speculative claim? I also cannot disprove that the moon is made of cheese.

If you want me to argue against it, offer some evidence that it is so : An antenna in the brain, or a reason for evolution to have resulted in brains that receive transmissions from non-physical sources, or any data suggesting that the consciousness-field exists, etc.

As a partial answer to one of my questions, you admitted that no thoughts occur until "picked up" by the brain. So doesn't that make consciousness a product of brain?

Sure, we might all be bits of code in a super-computer, or everyone you meet might be a p-zombie. It's fun to speculate, but that's all it is.

Not mean, but stupid; a poor reader. I haven't claimed anything. I have explicitly stated that a couple of times. I have presented the speculative idea that the brain might receive rather than produce consciousness and asked for an outline of what difference that would be expected to make to the observed results of neuroscience research if it were the case.

If you can't answer that, then be intellectually honest enough to admit it.

As a partial answer to one of my questions, you admitted that no thoughts occur until "picked up" by the brain. So doesn't that make consciousness a product of brain? — Real Gone Cat

I didn't "admit that " at all. I acknowledged that it is an imaginable possibility. You need to up your reading and comprehension if you want to have a decent discussion.

Ahhhh....I see. What you meant by grounding presupposition? I was going there myself, with “the philosophical admissions of the cognitive scientist himself”.

Call it....close enough? — Mww

Yeah, I don't think we are disagreeing. My point was only that a scientist could start either from the presupposition that the brain produces consciousness, or that it receives consciousness, and perform exactly all the same experiments as are being done in neuroscience. Those experiments tell us which parts of the brain are active when the person being monitored is involved in particular kinds of thought, emotion or activity.

The point being that those experiments demonstrate nothing either way as to whether consciousness is received or produced by the brain.

OK, I see how you're skinning this cat (pun intended). Just throw chum in the water - it's not your fault if the swimmer isn't fast enough. Got me.

Still, it's not a valid alternative and easily dismissed. No antenna, no reason for evolution to produce receiver-brains, no evidence of a consciousness-field, and an unnecessary added level of complexity.

You would have done better to go with p-zombies.

By the way, do you have a position to claim? Or are you just a skeptic?

Still, it's not a valid alternative and easily dismissed. No antenna, no reason for evolution to produce receiver-brains — Real Gone Cat

Then there’s the phenomenological claim that consciousness produces the brain , in the sense that the brain, as a concept arising out of natural science, is a derived abstraction grounded in the constituting activities of consciousness. An evolutionary argument would be irrelevant here, since evolutionary theory is itself a naturalistic conception and therefore also derivative.

I'm afraid that, until you can show how the brain produces consciousness, the question will always be up for debate.

Some of you want to close the book now, because you fathom that that's an impossible task.

There's no precedent whatsoever for the brain or consciousness to say, "This is what happens when the brain happens." You're essentially just classifying matter, and you don't know how matter works, either.

The final truth being that you have no idea how neurons and electrical impulses create individualized people. You just think if you repeat enough times that they do, it will magically become fact.

You can cut the brain up, switch consciousness on and off like a light bulb...and still this isn't incontrovertible proof of anything.

If we all thought as you do, there would be no science. You see, we don't formulate our beliefs until we have proof (unless ensuing proof can be predicated upon belief.)

So, explain it already. The brain is complicated and consciousness is a mystery is just another God-of-the-gaps, though.

Right, it all depends on perspective and on what is being counted as fundamental, which is what I've been trying to point out to the real gone one.

As I see it, phenomenology brackets the external world for methodological reasons and science brackets the internal world for methodological reasons. Neither are justified in making ontological claims that are beyond the ambit of their methodologies.

By the way, do you have a position to claim? Or are you just a skeptic? — Real Gone Cat

Skeptic. If anything I lean towards the view that the brain produces consciousness, but I acknowledge that is a groundless bias. That should have been clear to you from the start if you had actually read what I wrote.

Then you have overlooked me. — EugeneW

That makes two of us. Joe Mello spits out a lot of nonsense without thinking first.

Fuck off. Come back when you want to produce an argument. — Garrett Travers

The use of vulgar four-letter words is considered gauche on this genteel forum. Besides, it sounds like the exasperation of defeat. But a philosophical forum is a zero-sum game, not a win-lose conflict. We are just trying to get closer to the whole truth, not motivated to score points for "our side". We're all on the same team here. No us-vs-them arguments, just all-of-us-truth-seekers dialogues.

Unfortunately, you seem to view (idealized) "Science" as the last bastion of absolute Truth. Coming from an evangelical background, I understand the confidence that comes from the certainty of having the word-of-God in a single book. But after my loss of faith in revealed Truth, I had a few polite exchanges of views, that eventually broke-down into defensive postures, when I refused to play the game on their one-sided terms. They insisted that the only admissible "evidence" was biblical. So, some acted like stymied bullies, and began to sulk. They took their infallible books and went home.

FWIW, you may find that "triumphant" trumpeting on a philosophy forum is going to be alienating for those who doubt partisan truth-claims. In any case, Neuroscience deals in "observables", while Psychology and Philosophy are forced to grapple with "un-observables". At the moment, neither profession is in a position to feel "triumphant" on the "hard-problem" of Consciousness (to know within, hence unobservable). :smile:

Scientific Truth :
The previous discussion concentrated on only one of the controversies that surround scientific realism, the debate about whether talk of unobservables should have the same status as talk of observables. Contemporary exchanges, however, are often directed at a broader issue: the possibility of judging whether any claim at all is true. Some of these exchanges involve issues that are as old as philosophy—very general questions about the nature and possibility of truth.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-science/Scientific-truth

Skepticism vs Truth :
The view that truth in religion is ultimately based on faith rather than on reasoning or evidence—a doctrine known as fideism
https://www.britannica.com/topic/skepticism

Philosophical skepticism :
Unmitigated skeptics believe that objective truths are unknowable and that man should live in an isolated environment in order to win mental peace. . . . Mitigated skeptics hold that knowledge does not require certainty
https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Philosophical_skepticism

I'm not a dummy. However, unlike 90% of the philosophy majors on this forum, I am a physicalist - if I'm observing the night sky and I blink, the moon doesn't cease to exist. It's fascinating how so many of you want to escape from the world. I suggested to GT in an earlier post that it is probably due to egotism. One thinks, "My mind is so special, so important. How can it be limited to a hunk of meat?"

Cribbed from an online article:

'Science intentionally excludes certain aspects of the world from its investigations. It only considers what is objective and measurable.

This method of investigation assumes, as a matter of practicality, an objective domain called "nature", which exists independently of all other aspects of reality and also of the observing mind.

From that practical conceptual distinction, it came to be assumed that the category of nature described by science was, in reality, something that is real independently of any act of judgement on our part.

And if nature was an independently existing category, the idea of naturalism as a philosophical position then became a viable intellectual option, and the intellectual counterpart to the political philosophy of liberal individualism.

Following logically from this idea was the further inference that if we can’t scientifically discover if there is something more than nature, we have no other reliable method to discover it. The existence of anything beyond nature, anything supernatural, could only be justified with faith. This is where methodological naturalism subtly morphs into metaphysical naturalism - where a methdological posit is transformed into a metaphysic, a worldview - something which scientific method itself is not and does not provide.

Since faith is an unreliable method of gaining knowledge because it's not science, we should refrain from believing there is anything beyond nature without sufficient evidence. Evidence means scientific evidence because science is the only reliable way of discovering truth.

The vicious logical circle is complete, the conceptual prison sealed closed.'

From within that vicious circle, no contrary evidence can ever be admitted, because the only thing that would be considered as 'evidence' exists within the circle.

It's quite possible, even probable, that there is a distinction between the physical moon, as processed internally, and what is actually out there.

I also feel all this has a lot more to do with the "woo" of electricity than physicalists tend to let on. Aren't we as much, if not more so, electricity than physical matter? In any case, we're not divisible from electricity. And yet, there is this duality.

My point was only that a scientist could start either from the presupposition that the brain produces consciousness, or that it receives consciousness, and perform exactly all the same experiments as are being done in neuroscience. — Janus

Actually.....having thought about it overnight......if consciousness is external, then it affects the brain. If consciousness is internal, the brain is its cause but at the same time, only affects itself........

......which makes the brain affected either way, and affects being that upon which experiments are presupposed.....

(Enter silly little lightbulb thingy here)

I’ve seen people knocked out, but never a brain knocked out. People are far more than brains. — NOS4A2

Yeah, but how do you explain the difference between someone being knocked out and someone being awake? Where is the difference? You might point the person's behavior, but I can act like I'm knocked out so how do you tell the difference between someone acting like they are knocked out and someone who is actually knocked out? And how would the person that goes from being awake, to knocked out to awake again describe the difference, and would there be a discrepancy between the two descriptions (yours and theirs), and if so why? If we can act, or lie with our actions, then there must be some difference between our behaviors and what we are presently aware (conscious) of.

“Consciousness” is a silly concept, anyways. Nothing called “consciousness” moves from one area to another, so saying that it “comes from” the brain is nonsensical. Neither is it “produced” by the brain, as if the brain was a qualia factory. — NOS4A2

I agree with everything except the notion that consciousness is a silly concept. How do you explain dreams, or the fact that I can act in some way that is contrary to my present knowledge?

In defining consciousness as a silly concept then you are defining empiricism and observable evidence as silly concepts because the only way we know the world is via consciousness. It is the only thing we have any proof of, but that isn't to say that is the only thing that exists, nor does it imply that consciousness is fundamental. It's only implication is that it exists. I think, therefore I am.

When you think, how do you know that you are thinking? What form does your thinking take - entangled electrified neurons or entangled colors, shapes, feelings and sounds? Why would your thinking take the form of electrified neurons from my view but take the shape of colors, shapes, sounds, feelings etc. from your view? How would we know that we're talking about the same thing?

@Gnomon

I know you believe that you wrote a reasoned unbiased unemotional post, but you didn’t come close to one.

Your Protestant evangelical background is not where philosophical reasoning is found. Scholastic education is, which is found in Catholicism. So, your experience in religion is actually a hindrance to understanding rational theists, from Aristotle to today.

You gave an example of posters you met who used the “Bible” against you, ignoring that no one on this thread is using the Bible to counter the claim that the brain is responsible for the existence and nature of consciousness.

You spoke about truth as only a question of observables and unobservables, but not about empiricism and the place of logical empiricism in knowing what is true and false.

Everyone on this “philosophy” forum is hard at work using their Google Machine to write long posts in support of their thinking, all the while ignoring, like you have, posts that are actual philosophical arguments against the dominance of “Scientific Truth” over logical metaphysical truths.

This philosopher and theist is not taking his books and going home, but still here waiting for one of you “thinkers” to actually display the ability to think beyond the second degree of abstraction to a higher metaphysical level.

And I’m surely not “forced to grapple” with anything I have read on this forum.

It is you who was forced to ignore me and gravitate towards evangelical religion and the Bible to support your long post aided by the Google Machine.

It is not a small thing that today’s skeptics and atheists nearly always pick on Bible thumping Protestantism and very seldom on scholastic Catholicism that demands a Philosophy degree for all its priests before they study Theology.

As I see it, phenomenology brackets the external world for methodological reasons and science brackets the internal world for methodological reasons. Neither are justified in making ontological claims that are beyond the ambit of their methodologies. — Janus

I would argue that phenomenology brackets both the external and the internal world as understood according to scientific naturalism, and it does so for ontological reasons, which are used to justify it’s methodology. The notion of phenomenology as introspection is a common but mistaken assumption.

It's fascinating how so many of you want to escape from the world. I suggested to GT in an earlier post that it is probably due to egotism. One thinks, "My mind is so special, so important. How can it be limited to a hunk of meat?" — Real Gone Cat

That’s nice, but it has nothing or do with what phenomenology is about. Phenomenology is not an idealism or subjectivism , a privileging of mind over matter. It rejects both sides of this dualism in favor of a radical interaction.

Unequivocally? I cant't even think about how ethics get involved here ...
Do you want to give justice to Neuroscience in general? — Alkis Piskas

No, I want to exapnd the idea that, since the human brain is the source of all ethical framework, that no ethical framework can be used to justify a violation of the human brain/body, as to do so would be to violate ethics in its source and origin. Tell me what you think about that.

So is it brains that produce consciousness or consciousness that produce brains? And that is only part of the question. The other part of the question is how does one "produce" the other? What exactly is meant by "produce" in this context? — Harry Hindu

So, it would have to be brains that produce consciousness, as there are no structures of consciousness that can be tested for brain production, but the opposite is tested daily, as I have demonstrated with the research I have posted.

"How?" is still a mystery, but the leading theory is that all structures of the brain operate in a complex network of unparralleled sophistiction. By produce, I mean emit, generate, or otherwise enable. Much like eyesight is produced by the brain, so too is consciousness.

Even if I'm totally certain that my brain cells have absolutely nothing to do with ethics, I can see your point. :smile:

Phenomenology is not an idealism or subjectivism , a privileging of mind over matter. It rejects both sides of this dualism in favor of a radical interaction. — Joshs

Does it actually 'reject' them as false, or is it the case that the phenomenological project explores other avenues?

Does it actually 'reject' them as false, or is it the case that the phenomenological project explores other avenues? — Tom Storm

Phenomenology has to find a way to explain how it came to be that philosophers and scientists began to split into separate entities what always was a unitary phenomenon. Their explanation is that the assumption of such entities aren’t false , it’s an abstraction, an idealization.

“…first we carve nature up at artificial joints – we split mind and body apart – and then we need to fasten the two together again. But glueing the two back together does not bring back the original ‘‘integrity and nature of the whole”“ (Hanne De Jaegher )

The discussion in the Reductionism and the Hierarchy of Scale thread makes it clear why the premise of this thread and reductionism in general is baloney.

Even if I'm totally certain that my brain cells have absolutely nothing to do with ethics, I can see your point. — Alkis Piskas

Awesome!

The discussion in the Reductionism and the Hierarchy of Scale thread makes it clear why the premise of this thread and reductionism in general is baloney. — T Clark

No, it hsn't so far. Again, you're going to have to contend with the scientific research before you get to make that kind of claim, which you haven't done.

No, it hsn't so far. Again, you're going to have to contend with the scientific research before you get to make that kind of claim, which you haven't done. — Garrett Travers

I suggest other participants in this discussion take a look and decide for themselves.