Incorrect. Do you know how your car works? And yet, you know the car works because of the things in the car, not because of an intangible non-physical process. If we studied the brain and found things that were non-physical, then we could state, "maybe its this non-physical stuff that causes consciousness."
It seems to me that neurosemiosis, or mental processes involving signs, or producing meaning, is the act of modeling itself. Signs are types of models. Symbolizing is an act of modeling. Language is modeling of our conscious lives - our phenomenology - for others to bear witness to. Our language use is laced with phenomenological terms and projections of our phenomenology onto the world as if light is colored and ice cream is good and brains are physical outside of our own model.Base level consciousness is the neurosemiosis. The modelling is the attending. — apokrisis
From the phenomenological perspective explored here, however — but also from the perspective of pragmatism à la Charles Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as its contemporary inheritors such as Hilary Putnam (1999) — this transcendental or metaphysical realist position is the paradigm of a nonsensical or incoherent metaphysical viewpoint, for (among other problems) it fails to acknowledge its own reflexive dependence on the intersubjectivity and reciprocal empathy of the human life-world. — Joshs
Then you're a naive realist? — Harry Hindu
What does it mean to be physical? — Harry Hindu
How is it that when I observe your mental processes I experience a brain but when I observe my own I experience a mind? — Harry Hindu
What does it mean to be physical?
— Harry Hindu
To be made up of matter and energy — Philosophim
Go read the evidence of anti-psychotic drugs, hallucinegens, and amazing records of brain damage like loss of long term memory, the inability to mentally see colors, comprehend words, etc, then tell me their consciousness exists on some plane beyond the physical. — Philosophim
But what is matter? What is it that propels it? — EugeneW
It seems to me that neurosemiosis, or mental processes involving signs, or producing meaning, is the act of modeling itself. — Harry Hindu
Language is modeling of our conscious lives - our phenomenology - for others to bear witness to. Our language use is laced with phenomenological terms and projections of our phenomenology onto the world as if light is colored and ice cream is good and brains are physical outside of our own model. — Harry Hindu
There is no evidence either way as to whether consciousness "exists on some plane beyond the physical", because all our (intersubjectively corroborable) evidence is physical evidence. You're assuming that the only possible evidence is physical evidence, and then concluding that there is nothing but the physical; in other words, you;re committing the fallacy of assuming your conclusion. — Janus
Matter is not the same as energy. Equivalent yes, the same no. Pure energy particles are different from massless matter particles. — EugeneW
I am not precluding that non-physical evidence cannot exist. So no, I am not committing a fallacy. I'm simply asking you to provide evidence that the non-physical exists. — Philosophim
Theories of information, semiotics, etc. are useful heuristics. — Theorem
You would not recognize non-physical evidence. The only such evidence is that of the intuitive or imaginative faculties. But such evidence cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated. So it can never be evidence in the "public" sense, but only evidence to the individual whose imagination or intuition tells them that there is something beyond the empirical reality of the shared world. — Janus
Stop telling me what I will and will not accept, and just give me the evidence. I can intuit and imagine. Why do you think we can't corroborate that? — Philosophim
It's obvious; we intuit and imagine differently. I cannot feel your intuitions and vice versa. They thus cannot be evidence in the public sense you are asking for. — Janus
It seems to me you are the one running away; deflecting because you can't come up with a counterargument to what I'm saying about the difference between public and private evidence, the subjective nature of judgements of plausibility in relation to metaphysical questions; and their consequent undecidability. — Janus
You would not recognize non-physical evidence. The only such evidence is that of the intuitive or imaginative faculties. But such evidence cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated. So it can never be evidence in the "public" sense, but only evidence to the individual whose imagination or intuition tells them that there is something beyond the empirical reality of the shared world. — Janus
Those views seem to me to be philosophically naive and scientifically worthless, but such views are apparently widely held, our friend apokrisis seems to think they are unquestionable facts. — Daemon
So though I might have an induction that my consciousness is separate from my brain, the premises of neuroscience conclude that my consciousness comes from my brain. — Philosophim
Do you get it? I want to know I will live forever Janus. I want to die, go to heaven, see family and friends again. I want to be able to drink and smoke dope all day and it not affect who I am. I have an intuition that this could be. But that's an induction. And there is no evidence that this will happen. You claim you have evidence. Well give it! Why are you holding out? Why can't you give me something where I can rationally pursue my induction?
If you truly believed you had evidence of what was non-physical, you would rush out to help me like the good soul you are. But you don't, do you? Because I believe you're a good soul, and if you had it, you would. So don't run away. If you're a good soul, try. And if you know you can't, then just say you don't have it. We'll both be happier that way. — Philosophim
Phenomenology is socially constructed. It is a modelling exercise using language to externalise the internal in a socially pragmatic fashion. — apokrisis
So what you claim to be the facts of two different realms - the public and the private - are instead a way to frame things in a way that there is this epistemic division ... that can then allow a further level of organismic regulation emerge.
You have to construct the division to exploit the division. — apokrisis
For animals, there is no such public/private distinction. — apokrisis
Fine, then don't give me the evidence. I go about my way unchanged. Enjoy the rest of your day. — Philosophim
but the division is an inevitable fact; because I don't know what thoughts are going in your head other than what you tell me. — Janus
I don't know what your purported religious experience is like, other than how you (probably inadequately) describe it to me. — Janus
You are trying to take a position outside of human experience and reduce it to a "modeling relation". It's a form of reductionism; despite your claim that it is not atomistic, but wholistic. — Janus
All this is fine, the problem arises when the suboptimal, imperfect and/or irrational heuristic is taken to be the optimal, perfect and rational explanation and description of the world. — Daemon
If you are among those who think information plays some role in addition to what the electrochemical processes do, please explain what it is. — Daemon
(By the way, you may be right that GWT/IIT are both garbage from a scientific perspective. I don't know enough right now to weigh in on that. My intention here isn't to defend those theories specifically, but to the question your assertion that 'information' can't be a legitimate explanatory concept). — Theorem
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