If, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y. Or in the notation of symbolic logic:
∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y.
French & Redhead’s proof is based on the assumption that when we consider a set of n particles of the same type, any property of the ith particle can be represented by an operator of the form Oi = I(1) ⊗ I(2) ⊗ … ⊗ O(i) ⊗ … ⊗ I(n), where O is a Hermitian operator acting on the single-particle Hilbert space ℋ. Now it is easy to prove that the expectation values of two such operators Oi and Oj calculated for symmetric and antisymmetric states are identical. Similarly, it can be proved that the probabilities of revealing any value of observables of the above type conditional upon any measurement outcome previously revealed are the same for all n particles.
The model of a normatively based dynamical non-linear reciprocal feedback system is precisely how many are now conceiving of consciousness. — Joshs
Increased concentrations of attractants act via their MCP receptors to cause an immediate inhibition of CheA kinase activity. The same changes in MCP conformation that inhibit CheA lead to relatively slow increases in MCP methylation by CheR, so that despite the continued presence of attractant, CheA activity is eventually restored to the same value it had in the absence of attractant. Conversely, CheB acts to demethylate the MCPs under conditions that cause elevated CheA activity. Methylation and demethylation occur much more slowly than phosphorylation of CheA and CheY. The methylation state of the MCPs can thereby provide a memory mechanism that allows a cell to compare its present situation to its recent past.
Now in particle physics, we have the same problem; particles are completely identical. Worse still, while classical objects don't share the same location, that is not always the case on quantum scales. Thus, it ends up appearing that particles have no identity at all outside the type of particle they are. Or, if they are just excitations in a field, they are all the same excitation. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The present discussion is already littered with very straightforward examples of what I mean.
In a digital computer the work is done by electrical currents, microscopic bumps and depressions on disks, and so on. When you've described this electrical and mechanical process, there isn't anything left for "information" to do.
In genetics the work is done by nucleic acids and so on, and not by "information".
In our brains the work is done by electrochemical impulses, ion exchanges and so on, and not by "information". — Daemon
Bacteria direct their movements according to the level of noxious or beneficial chemicals in their environment. In order to swim in the right direction (let's say towards an attractive chemical) it seems that the bacterium must be able to track the change in concentration of the chemical over time. That would seem to require a memory, which is an aspect of mind. — Daemon
we can see that the bacterium achieves what it does without consciousness. So I don't agree with Thompson when he says where there is life there is mind. — Daemon
Information is an emergent pattern of relations amongst physical systems that occurs at a higher level of abstraction than the underlying chemistry. It's not 'something more' than the underlying chemistry, just like the Mona Lisa isn't 'something more' than the materials that make it up. That's because the Mona Lisa exists as a result of the very specific constraints that have been imposed (via the work of the artist) on the underlying substrate. — Theorem
Now, keep this lack of haecceity in mind and think of how different particles might be seen to function very much like the way letters function in a text (a "T" is always a T; the specific T is meaningless, only its role in a word matters). You get a view of reality more similar to how we tend to think of language, than the view we get of particles as tiny balls bouncing around (which is itself just an abstraction). — Count Timothy von Icarus
The husked kernel-stuff is the latex glove? Are the latex gloves doing the yanking of the a-physical kernel stuff out of the shell it's contained in? — EugeneW
When you zoom in too far it 'disappears'. When you zoom back out it's impossible to miss. These patterns are most aptly described via the language of information, just like the patterns that arise at the level of the compound are most aptly described by the language of chemistry. — Theorem
If they are alike in every way, shape, color, chemical composition, etc., how can they be two different things? — Count Timothy von Icarus
The abstracting or yanking out is a kind of methodical ignorance that ignores currently irrelevant context. The latex gloves symbolize the necessity of caution when handling the kryptonite of philosophers, the informaniacal Mental — lll
I don't consider it kryptonite, rather a modern computer based tool — EugeneW
I would argue that the unified functioning of the bacterium is a kind of proto-consciousness. It involves sense-making, affective valence and intentional purposiveness. — Joshs
Your critique is analogous to looking at a painting through a high-powered microscope and saying, 'there's no Mona Lisa here, just a bunch of organic compounds'. — Theorem
Is the Mona Lisa the result of constraints on the part of the artist or a change in perspectival attitude of both artist and viewer, a kind of gestalt shift that transforms the sense of what one is perceiving? — Joshs
Whereas I'd say your approach is analogous to looking at a piece of burned toast and saying "there is the face of Jesus Christ". — Daemon
The interpretation of the marks in both cases is a mental activity. Christ is not in the toast, he's in your mind. — Daemon
The paper lays out and important area of research, but unfortunately it's not what I was hoping for, which is an explanation of why meaning can't be physical. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Transmitting meaning' to knowers requires that there be a knowing subject. Rational subjects can draw conclusions based on inference. I don't see how that is relevant
Much of what we do ourselves is also unconscious.
If you want to say the bacterium is conscious, then you'll also have to say that say our digestive system is conscious, that it makes sense of the food we eat and acts with intentional purposiveness.
Consciousness is about feeling, experience. There's no reason to think the bacterium feels anything, that it has any conscious experience. We know how it does what it does, we can describe that down to the finest detail, and we know that it's an unconscious process (like our digestion). — Daemon
We might usefully think about this vertical line:
I
Do you see what I'm getting at Joshs? — Daemon
I reject the notion that physical code is intrinsically semantic (contains meaning), because meaning can only be assigned by a mind (interpretation), and acquired by a mind (comprehension). — Galuchat
The key to understanding consciousness is that the functioning of a living system is a unified totality. Our digestive system isn’t a closed system, it is an aspect of the total functioning of our organism , which inseparably interweaves body, mind and environment as a single system. — Joshs
I wouldnt say much of what we do is unconscious in the sense of subsystems operating completely independently of awareness. — Joshs
It is generally accepted in neuroscience today that the brain performs a wide range of mental functions that do not enter consciousness. The title of a famous review of the relevant literature by the modern cognitive scientist John Kihlstrom says it all: there is indeed 'Perception without awareness of what is perceived, learning without awareness of what is learned'".
↪Daemon
We might usefully think about this vertical line:
I
Do you see what I'm getting at Joshs? — Daemon
Yes, I do. — Joshs
The difference, as has already been pointed out, is that 'information' is an indispensable theoretical tool used across multiple disciplines, whereas we can get along just fine without the face of Christ in our toast. — Theorem
I'm very much in agreement with what you say here, but did I satisfactorily respond to your challenge to "explain sign evaluation in terms of electrochemical impulses"? — Daemon
Talking about information helps us understand the process, but it's not required when describing the process. — Daemon
The "information" part is something in our minds, it's extrinsic to the thing we are describing. — Daemon
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