Fallacious. An omnipotent person has free will, but it does not follow that a person who has free will is omnipotent.

Also, being able to do what you want is not sufficient for free will. Consider Jack, who has been programmed only ever to want to do what he can, in fact, do. Well, Jack does not have true free will, even though he always does what he wants. So, true free will does not just involve doing what one wants, it also involves being unconstrained by others. That's true of an omnipotent being, but it is not true of Jack.

It can also be true of beings who are not omnipotent, so long as the way they are is not due to external causes.

An omnipotent person has free will — Bartricks

Yes, that's exactly what I wanted to convey. There's a thread around here somewhere that asks the question "Does God have free will?"

However, there's something more interesting going on. Can you figure it out? You seem quite active today. Too much coffee?

Yes, that's exactly what I wanted to convey. There's a thread around here somewhere that asks the question "Does God have free will?" — Agent Smith

It is not at all clear to me what you're trying to convey. Does God have free will? Yes. Obviously.

Do you need to be omnipotent to have free will? No.

If you're omnipotent, will you have free will? Yes.

You're right!

Free will & Omnipotence, what's the connection?

Yes, correct.

Why is free will mixed up in power (games)?

Can a being be omnipotent without free will?
If I can do anything, but someone/something else decides what I'll be doing, what's the point of being omnipotent?


Can a being possess free will and not be omnipotent? Restrictions on being able to do what one chooses/wants to do. What's the point of just being able to want to do things, but being unable to do those things?

Can that which is omnipotent and has free will, kill itself?

Can that which is omnipotent and has free will, kill itself? — universeness

I asked the same question! Can an omnipotent god kill himself? Yes! I wouldn't be surprised if he's done that already!

I asked the same question! Can an omnipotent god kill himself? Yes! I wouldn't be surprised if he's done that already! — EugeneW

Yeah, I don't think we are the originators of such questions towards that which is proposed omnipotent. But my question was less gender-biased than yours. :rofl:
There are many such questions:
Can that which is omnipotent create something more powerful than itself?
Can it reproduce at all?
Would it be aware of its own existence and its own status as omnipotent?
How did it reach this conclusion/gain this knowledge that it became omnipotent, did it 'become' at all?
Is Omnipotence possible without omniscience and omnipresence?

Yeah, being omnipotent, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient makes one omni-impotent, omni-absent, omni-malevolent, and omni-ignorant. Those omnigods have got it all!

Those omnigods have got it all! — EugeneW

You cant have more than one Omni, can you? Two omnipotent's would have to fight it out!

I asked the same question! Can an omnipotent god kill himself? Yes! I wouldn't be surprised if he's done that already! — EugeneW

So, if it killed itself, I take it that it just sprung back to life instantly. Any 'in-between' time would be a period of 'oblivion' and in the human definition of oblivion, there is no moment of awareness within which you can enact your own recreation. If the recreation is instant then was this omnipotent actually dead at any point during the time it was killing itself? At least in the way that humans perceive dead.
I have asked these questions of others before, regarding omnipotence, and I usually get the answer 'You are trying to conceive that which the human conscience cannot conceive.' Which is a total killjoy response! In my non-omnipotent opinion.

Yes. An omnipotent person can kill themselves. Why would you think otherwise?

@Agent Smith,

Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)

I don't think your definition of "free will" is accurate. First of all, I am presuming that you are referring to libertarian free will, because compatibilism has no problem admitting that a being can have "free will" without ever being able to do whatever they want (i.e. soft determinism). Second of all, in relation to libertarian free will, at its most basic definition, it is not the ability to do whatever you want: it is the ability to do whatever you want in relation to oneself. I could, hypothetically, have full control over my own thoughts (thusly will them as I please) and yet have zero control over objects: I would still be an agent of "free will" even though I cannot do as I please in relation to the totality of existing things. Third of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists and, therefore, that is how odd, logically impossible, paradoxes arise (due to non-truth-apt claims being evaluated as if they are truth-apt): great example is can an omnipotent being create a rock it can't lift? This is only puzzling, just like asking "how far can I throw a square triangle", if one doesn't realize that it isn't truth-apt due to its logical impossibility. With regards to the latter interpretation of omnipotence, the rules of logic and reason dictate not that the being necessarily does or does not have "free will", but that it cannot "have and not have" "free will". I think a key aspect to consider here is the fact that tying will to complete power (as I think you did in your definition:"can do whatever it wants", so to speak) requires that we consider the motive when contemplating whether such a being would require "free will" or not (as it can't have both). Imagine there's two omnipotent beings: the first's will is motivated towards controlling the second's actions. As long as the second's will never fixates (becomes motivated) on breaking from the grasp of the other, there's no contradiction here to be found and, logically subsequently, the second would be omnipotent without "free will", whereas the second would have "free will" (as far as the given context provides). And since the first is omnipotent and is fixated on controlling the second, the second will will never become fixated on the first and, therefore, will never acquire free will as long as first persists. The reason this is the case is because when you define "free will" in relation to the will and its produced action, then it is a matter of what that being's will exerts, not that that being is aware of all the possibilities that it could, being omnipotent, exert. If the omnipotent being's will fixates on knowing all logically possible exertions it could perform, then it would necessarily acquire them. But, however, if that being's will never fixates on it, then it will not acquire such knowledge. In other words, a logically omnipotent being has full power to do as he wills, which is in relation to the motive behind that will: if the will manifests that action A should occur, then it will, but if it doesn't manifest it, then it won't. This means quite literally that an omnipotent being is necessarily of "free will" if it wills that it should be--prior to such, it is only known, given what I have hitherto stated, that the being either (1) has "free will" or (2) it does not (but not both).

hird of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists — Bob Ross

That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one, and thus in holding - as I do - that an omnipotent being can do absolutely anything at all, I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles. That's like thinking that becasue I 'can' throw the boiling hot cup of coffee into my own face, I have just done so. No I haven't.

When it comes to free will, it is - of course - contested exactly what it involves. But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.

Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants) — Agent Smith

No...

Frankfurt style free will and libertarian free will differ starkly. The latter, I'd wager, is far more characteristic of an omnipotent agent's free will, although the majority of theists would take a Frankfurt interpretation in relation to that agent's interaction with logic or morals (to be part of his nature).

Omnipotence is understood in the sense of bringing about states of affairs or actualizing potential in virtue of the possibility of that states of affairs or existence of that potential (unless you're a Cartesian).

Yes. An omnipotent person can kill themselves. Why would you think otherwise? — Bartricks

Not necessarily: if the omnipotent agent was necessary, and the omnipotence was essential, most metaphysicians would hold that this is not possible (once again, barring Cartesians).

Not necessarily: if the omnipotent agent was necessary, and the omnipotence was essential, most metaphysicians would hold that this is not possible (once again, barring Cartesians). — Kuro

That just demonstrates the falsity of those ideas. An omnipotent person can always divest themselves of their omnipotence, else they would not be omnipotent (it is absurd to suppose that a person who is unable to do something is nevertheless omnipotent). Thus, no omnipotent person is omnipotent 'necessarily' but rather they are omnipotent contingently. Indeed, there will be no necessary truths if there is an omnipotent being, for the omnipotent being will have the power to render any truth false if they so wish. Thus, all truths - including the truth that there is an omnipotent being - will be contingent if, that is, there is an omnipotent being (which there is).

An omnipotent being is able to do anything at all. Destroy itself. Make a square circle. Anything. Those who insist otherwise are demonstrably confused. I do not deny they exist, of course. I deny they are thinking very clearly.

What you said about Frankfurt type cases was mistaken. One can be a libertarian 'and' a Frankfurtian (plenty are). What Frankfurt type cases do - if they are successful, that is - is show that you do not need to have alternative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. But one could still argue that determinism undermines free will for other reasons.

That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one

You are correct here: I should have said "possibility" not "exists". However, this doesn't negate my point whatsoever: I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument.

I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles

Fair enough. However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, therefore my point pertained to it being equivocal to claiming a square circle is possible. I would say a square circle cannot exist, not simply that it doesn't exist in the real world right now.

But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.

As I've hopefully demonstrated in my previous post, this is not the case when one dissects it at a much deeper level.

I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument. — Bob Ross

On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.

However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory — Bob Ross

No it isn't. This is the point: to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being. If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.

That just demonstrates the falsity of those ideas. An omnipotent person can always divest themselves of their omnipotence, else they would not be omnipotent (it is absurd to suppose that a person who is unable to do something is nevertheless omnipotent). Thus, no omnipotent person is omnipotent 'necessarily' but rather they are omnipotent contingently. Indeed, there will be no necessary truths if there is an omnipotent being, for the omnipotent being will have the power to render any truth false if they so wish. Thus, all truths - including the truth that there is an omnipotent being - will be contingent if, that is, there is an omnipotent being (which there is). — Bartricks

This is just as the same Cartesian doctrine I was speaking about earlier. Yes, I said that /unless/ you're a Cartesian, you'd generally tend to think that omnipotent agents cannot actualize any potential that is non-logical because such potential does not exist in the first place, or bring about a contradictory state of affairs because it is not possible in the first place. Of course, a Cartesian takes the opinion that is otherwise, hence why I mentioned this in my initial comment as I am in perfect recognition of this position.

I'm of the opinion that it is not sensical to speak about any agent who is purportedly omnipotent in the Cartesian sense, because they can undermine any primitive conceptual schema we commit to (including the very idea that it can actualize any potential). It makes most sense first and foremost, for me, to stay wholly agnostic on any intrinsic features of this kind of entity. To be more clear, it is that I think supposing this kind of agents poses a bigger epistemic problem in virtue of the very claim supposing it (and any other claim).

What you said about Frankfurt type cases was mistaken. One can be a libertarian 'and' a Frankfurtian (plenty are). What Frankfurt type cases do - if they are successful, that is - is show that you do not need to have alternative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. But one could still argue that determinism undermines free will for other reasons. — Bartricks

Frankfurt /cases/ initially have to do with moral responsibility without free will, I agree. I'm referring to Frankfurt style /free will/, where free will is interpreted to be the actualization of whatever is in accord with an agent's higher-order volitions such that an agent can be free without being able to do otherwise. In other words, what matters is that an agent is the source of their actions. These conceptions of free will are collectively referred to as "sourcehood free will" and are primarily motivated through Frankfurt's work in two prongs: one, through Frankfurt cases, and two, through separation between internal and external reasons WRT volition. For these purposes, I call this "Frankfurt style free will".

This is just as the same Cartesian doctrine I was speaking about earlier. Yes, I said that /unless/ you're a Cartesian, you'd generally tend to think that omnipotent agents cannot actualize any potential that is non-logical because such potential does not exist in the first place, or bring about a contradictory state of affairs because it is not possible in the first place. Of course, a Cartesian takes the opinion that is otherwise, hence why I mentioned this in my initial comment as I am in perfect recognition of this position. — Kuro

What's in a word? Yes, one can label positions and one can say that some would define 'omnipotence' as 'being able to make a cup of tea'. But if one is merely able to make a cup of tea, then one is not able to do anything, but just make a cup of tea. And someone who can make a cup of tea and do a whole load of other things is 'more powerful' than the mere tea-maker. So, someone who is able to do anything is more powerful than someone who is able to do most things, bar contravene the laws of logic. Thus, if we are talking about a person who has the most power possible, then we are talking about a person who can do anything whatsoever. Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right. But it is misleading and it is not what God is. God is all powerful (omni - all - potentia - powerful: omnipotent). Again, one can use the word 'omnipotent' to mean 'a person with red hair' if one wants, but it will then not be being used to describe a defining property of God.

So, you and i both know full well that some 'define' omnipotence as being able to do all things logically possible. But when it is used in that way, it is not being used to describe an 'all powerful' being, but a being who is able to do some things and not others. Which is fine - but it is now not being used to describe 'God' and it is also, of course, not being used in a way that accords with the original meaning of the term (which means 'all powerful').

I believe in God precisely because I believe in an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good person. And an all powerful person can do anything - because it is contradictory to maintain that an all powerful person lacks the power to do some things.

I'm of the opinion that it is not sensical to speak about any agent who is purportedly omnipotent in the Cartesian sense, because they can undermine any primitive conceptual schema we commit to (including the very idea that it can actualize any potential). — Kuro

That's because you are confused and have once more conflated being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. He has not actually undermined anything, has he? So everything still makes sense. And thus it is not nonsensical to talk of a person who has the ability to make everything cease to make sense (unless you are supposing him actually do have exercised the ability in question - which he hasn't). This is what you have to do to generate nonsense - to generate actual contradictions. You have to suppose him to have done what he merely has the ability to do. Ironically it is those who think an all powerful being cannot do some things who are affirming a contradiction and thus talking actual nonsense.

To be more clear, it is that I think supposing this kind of agents poses a bigger epistemic problem in virtue of the very claim supposing it (and any other claim). — Kuro

That's just an article of faith on your part. What if I could prove to you that such a person exists? Would you decide, in advance, that no such proof exists? Is your agnosticism unreasonable?

I'm referring to Frankfurt style /free will/, where free will is interpreted to be the actualization of whatever is in accord with an agent's higher-order volitions such that an agent can be free without being able to do otherwise. — Kuro

You seem to be confusing Frankfurt-style cases with Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility. Someone can accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities without thereby being committed to Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsiblity. And the reverse is true too, for one could accept Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility but see it as a necessary condition, not sufficient and add to it the requirement that alternative possibilities be available to the agent at decision making moments.

Anyway, Frankfurt-style cases, if they work, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. They do not thereby demonstrate compatibilism to be true (even if they help that cause) and so they do not demonstrate incompatibilism to be false (and so tehy don't demonstrate libertarianism to be false).

The sourcehood condition is neutral between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. That's precisely why a Frankfurtian might nevertheless be a libertarian (or incompatibilist).

Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)

Discuss. — Agent Smith

Go into a Pizza Hut and Order a Big Mac.

Discussed.

How did the mods even let this thread continue? The OP does not fulfill the basic requirements.
Or is this a ploy to prove that you can do whatever you want.

On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.

A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this).

to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it.

If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. It is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist, therefore a being is not able to make a square circle. The idea of a square circle is a contradiction, metaphysically (whatever you are implying there) and physically (whatever may be implied there).

There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being.

There is if one is positing literally an omnipotent being. Can it create something so heavy it cannot lift it? Can it make a nonbrick brick? No. An omnipotent being is constrained or inherently supplied with logic.

If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.

I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle.

What I would ask you is: what distinction between metaphysics and eptistemology makes you think a square circle is possible in one, but not the other?

Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right. — Bartricks

These individuals make up the majority of how omnipotence is understood, from Thomists to Avicenna to many others. Descartes seems to be the only prominent philosopher in dissent here.

Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right. — Bartricks

As I explained earlier, a Thomist still would say that God can bring about any state of affairs or actualize any potential. They simply would say that the potential to violate the laws of logic is not an existing potential, so there's nothing to actualize. On a similar avenue, being good is understood as part of God's nature, so simply God is acting as himself by never doing anything evil. Other theists use that same avenue to argue that rationality is part of God's nature to produce an orderly universe, i.e. God is simply acting as himself as to be logical. So it is not anything they understand to limit God.

That's because you are confused and have once more conflated being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. He has not actually undermined anything, has he? So everything still makes sense. And thus it is not nonsensical to talk of a person who has the ability to make everything cease to make sense (unless you are supposing him actually do have exercised the ability in question - which he hasn't). This is what you have to do to generate nonsense - to generate actual contradictions. You have to suppose him to have done what he merely has the ability to do. Ironically it is those who think an all powerful being cannot do some things who are affirming a contradiction and thus talking actual nonsense. — Bartricks

There's no confusion. Ability to do something entails that it can possibly occur, not that it actually occured. So God being able to change the laws of logic or create contradictions does not mean he already did so, but can do so if he wants to i.e. it is possible that this can occur. You've done nothing but misrepresent what I said.

In any case, contradictions are fortunately not possible, so there's not any instance where God can possibly create a contradiction.

If you define your God as that which has the potential to actualize contradiction or other violations of logic, I will simply default to the nonexistence of your God in virtue of my commitment to logic:

1. Contradictions are never possible.
2. If (your) God exists, contradictions are possible or can become possible
3. Therefore your God can never exist.

That's just an article of faith on your part. What if I could prove to you that such a person exists? Would you decide, in advance, that no such proof exists? Is your agnosticism unreasonable? — Bartricks

No such proof can exist because you can never trust any absolute rule of reason, because any absolute rule of reason can be possibly false in the presence of a God that can possibly change these rules of reason if he wishes to do so. And from the perspective of a mortal, finite agent it is not possible to differniate between what rules of reason are the case versus what rules of reason simply appear to be the case in the same fashion as the former class but are deceivingly supposed to us by the kind of God that can undermine the very laws of logic and our thoughts about them.

If you go the Cartesian route, you get the Cartesian result. It's not hard. This is just another kind of Cartesian demon but made to collapse all kinds of knowledge, including logical and mathematical facts. Therefore agnosticism is simply necessitated: you can do nothing but rationally suspend judgement if any judgement is inherently unjustifiable. But we know some judgements, like ones in virtue of the fact of my experience being an experience, are justified. Therefore, your God does not exist since he'd entail not even these judgements are justified (since even basic conclusions, like my experience being my experience, can be undermined by this God who can supposedly change the behavior of identity).

Anyway, Frankfurt-style cases, if they work, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. They do not thereby demonstrate compatibilism to be true (even if they help that cause) and so they do not demonstrate incompatibilism to be false (and so tehy don't demonstrate libertarianism to be false).

The sourcehood condition is neutral between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. That's precisely why a Frankfurtian might nevertheless be a libertarian (or incompatibilist). — Bartricks

I don't disagree with this, I elaborated in my earlier comment that I called it Frankfurt style free will not because I'm referencing Frankfurt style cases themselves rather I'm saying that it's Frankfurt style free will precisely because Frankfurtian notions (including Frankfurt cases as well as theory of volitions, which I highlighted as /different avenues/ meant to support the conclusion, not as one thing) are most often what is employed to support that conception of free will.

With great POWER comes great RESPONSIBILITY

A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this). — Bob Ross

For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance. When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality. I would use 'logically possible' to describe what the laws of logic permit.

Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles. And you can point out that a square circle violates the logical laws until you are blue in the face, the simple fact is that those laws do not bind God. And thus though logically impossible, square circles are metaphysically possible, for God could make one if she so wanted.

Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.

If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. — Bob Ross

No, it is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. You are confused. It is metaphysically possible for a square circle to exist if an omnipotent being exists. It is not thereby made epistemically possible. For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. So, you are confusing different sorts of possibility.

Now, I literally believe in person who can do anything. Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction. THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.

I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle. — Bob Ross

What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x' . So, it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false. That does not mean it is false. What you are going to do is continually make this mistake.

Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.

These individuals make up the majority of how omnipotence is understood, from Thomists to Avicenna to many others. Descartes seems to be the only prominent philosopher in dissent here. — Kuro

So what? Incidentally, if Descartes thought I was right, that's pretty damn good indirect evidence that I am. You do realize he's one of the greatest minds of all time?

Now, rather than citing, let's argue. For you seem more keen to tell me things I already know than to engage with my case. What matters is what is actually the case, not what labels you put on it.

If Tom can do more things than Roger, then Tom is more powerful than Roger, yes?

Now, a god who can do anything whatsoever - including things the laws of logic say cannot be done - is more powerful than a god who is bound by those laws. That's obvious, I'd have thought. ("Oh, oh, but Thomywombists would say that something forbidden by the laws of logic is 'no thing' and thus not being able to do it is no problem". Yes, and that's called 'begging the question'. Note, I do not deny that square circles are forbidden by the laws of logic. I deny that this makes them impossible. It makes them logically impossible - for label lovers - but it does not make them 'metaphysically impossible'. Why? Because God is not bound by the laws of logic.

Why?

Because they're his laws.

Why?

Because a) they are someone's and b) the person whose laws they are would not be bound by them, and thus that person would be able to do things logically forbidden.

Remember Tom and Roger? Now the Thomywomby god is bound by the laws of logic and so can't make a square circle. Pathetic. My god can. So my god is.....more powerful than the Thomywomby god.

Contradictions aren't true, are they? So, if my god is more powerful than the Thomywomby god, then the Thomywomby god can't be the omnipotent one, can he? For that would be to affirm a contradiction.

It is deeply ironic that though I seem to be the only one here who thinks that contradictions are capable of being true, I am also the only one who makes sure not to affirm any.

There's no confusion. — Kuro

Yes there is!

Ability to do something entails that it can possibly occur, not that it actually occured. So God being able to change the laws of logic or create contradictions does not mean he already did so, but can do so if he wants to i.e. it is possible that this can occur. You've done nothing but misrepresent what I said. — Kuro

Yes, so, once more, no contradictions are actually true. You said that if there was a god who could make everything not make sense, then nothing actually makes sense. So you're just flipping and flopping.

God can make a square circles. There are no true contradictions. See? Things make sense. It is possible for them not to. They do though. See?

No such proof can exist because you can never trust any absolute rule of reason, because any absolute rule of reason can be possibly false in the presence of a God that can possibly change these rules of reason if he wishes to do so. — Kuro

Ah, so you're a dogmatist. You know already that there is no proof of God. Good job! There is.
And once more with the same mistake (am I the only one who doesn't commit it? What is it with you people??). 'Can be mistaken' doesn't mean 'is mistaken'. Christ almighty.

If you go the Cartesian route, you get the Cartesian result. — Kuro

Er, what?

I don't disagree with this, I elaborated in my earlier comment that I called it Frankfurt style free will not because I'm referencing Frankfurt style cases themselves rather I'm saying that it's Frankfurt style free will precisely because Frankfurtian notions (including Frankfurt cases as well as theory of volitions, which I highlighted as /different avenues/ meant to support the conclusion, not as one thing) are most often what is employed to support that conception of free will. — Kuro

Then you're misusing terms. You did reference Frankfurt-style cases. And you said that libertarianism is incompatible with them. It's not. It's not even clear that Harry Frankfurt himself is not a libertarian. He's never, to my knowledge, said explicitly that he's a compatibilist. And if you say introduce 'frankfurt-style free will' after having mentioned Frankfurt style cases, then you're inviting us to think that by 'frankfurt-style free will' you mean free will taht does not require alternative possibilities, yes?

Anyway, that's by the by. God has free will regardless of which theory about free will is true. For his will makes whichever theory is true, true. And free will - whatever it turns out to involve - is morally valuable. So that means God values it, for God valuing something is what makes it morally valuable. And so God values free will. And God is omnipotent, so he can reasonably be expected to have it himself, as it is unreasonable to believe God would deny himself anything he valued having.

Compare omnibenevolent vs not-omnibenevolent ... with respect to theodicy (re: "omnipotence" and "free will").