Not possible. Totally hopeless. Or, maybe not. It depends. Can you be more specific? Like, what?

It came to mind when we were discussing Free Will in a class. Maybe part of it has to do with the fact that 1. I'm being confronted with the fact that how one even views evidence in the first place depends on one's underlying beliefs. And 2. there are issues, like Free Will, that seem to be such that it's hard to see how evidence could even help decide one's position.

Both of these observations are apt. For instance, if one is an ardent socialist, one may not see evidence of the goodness of unfettered capitalism. It just doesn't show up in the scans. As for free will, I agree - it is very difficult to prove that free will exists. I think that we have some capacity for free will, but I don't think I can define where determinism ends and free will begins.

@Bitter Crank.... thanks for that response. (although I feel compelled to point out, that it's within the realm of possibility that those convinced of the goodness of unfettered capitalism, may find it difficult to accept any evidence that any of the underlying principles behind communism (doesn't the early Christian Church as described in Acts chapters 2 - 5 look like an ideal form of communism?) are good).

A third issue is that I find myself grasping around for my own metaphysical position. Stoicism is still attractive, but in some ways, Skepticism (maybe even a skepticism closer to that of the ancient Platonists who became skeptics) seems like it may be closer to what is the case. I suppose I could "mix and match" Skepticism and Stoicism.

Keep working on your metaphysical position. Sometimes it's a lifetime occupation.

It's simple. Free will is an illusion and anyone who tells you otherwise is a fool. :P

Obviously, I jest. But I think one thing you should consider is the psychological aspects of belief. I am not just talking about biases and underlying beliefs, I am talking about how people probably think differently from one another. It is not just they that they started with different premises and reached different conclusions- the entire process is potentially different. Of course, those psychological needs cannot be ignored as well. I do not, however, believe all disagreement is a result of different base beliefs. In some cases, the person's beliefs can just be wrong or faulty. People have changed their minds on issues because of arguments and ideas being presented to them before. In fact, we do it all the time. How far this can go is a matter of personal context.

Metaphysics done right would seek out the most rational or justified beliefs. And then these would be hypotheses or axioms to put to the test. We would judge their validity by how well they function as beliefs in pursuit of some lived purpose or other.

So it would be the usual pragmatic justification of any belief. We can figure out what logically seems to make sense as a theory - or at least stands as a clear enough alternative to make a difference whether we believe it vs not believing in it. Then we can pay attention to the consequences of acting on said belief.

This means that a large class of traditional metaphysical dilemmas may indeed be classed as theories that are "not even wrong". They don't actually frame alternatives that make a difference. So is there a god, is there freewill, is there a meaning to life? Really, unless you are advancing a position which would make some actual difference if you believed it, it only sounds like you are being philosophical to talk about the "what if". A belief with zero consequences is not really "a belief" in any strong sense.

This is why skepticism is in the end unsatisfying. You can likewise claim to disbelieve anything. There is always "some grounds" for denying any positive claim. But such disbelief has to have consequences too to be a difference that makes a difference. And also, pointing out that something can be legitimately disbelieved is only to confirm that the original belief was one of consequence. It was already doing the right thing in being framed in a way that could be found wrong. So the skeptic's position - if it has any actual value - is already incorporated (at least implicitly) in what it seeks to challenge.

The moon could be made of green cheese. But that skeptical possibility is already subsumed in the belief it is made of rock. Likewise views on god, freewill or life's meaning are properly cashed out in metaphysics only to the degree there is some positive claim that then admits to the skeptics test.

So yes, you have a problem if your beliefs about freewill or whatever are only framed in a vague and untestable fashion. Faith then seems the only option. But in fact what should be questioned is whether you really "have a belief" rather than simply some meaningless formula of words - an idea that is in philosophical reality, not even wrong.

Metaphysics did start out in this rigorous fashion. It posed concrete alternatives, asking questions like whether existence was ruled by chance or necessity, flux or stasis, matter or form, etc, etc. And the whole of science arose from this rational clarification of the options. It was a really powerful exercise in pure thought.

But the big stuff was sorted in a few hundred years in Ancient Greece. So what is left now is mostly the need to learn this way of thinking more than to attempt to solve a lot of unsolved metaphysical riddles. And worst of all is to try to treat ideas without concrete consequences as real philosophical inquiries. Metaphysics didn't become central to modern thought by worrying about beliefs with no effects.

This is why skepticism is in the end unsatisfying. — apokrisis

So the skeptic's position - if it has any actual value - is already incorporated (at least implicitly) in what it seeks to challenge. — apokrisis

My interest in Ancient Skepticism (basically those who followed in the footsteps of Plato- if there are no forms, then we can't have knowledge.) has only just begun. But, as I understand it, they didn't so much challenge or try convince anyone else of anything, as much as just believe themselves that there were as many reasons to accept any position, as there were reasons to doubt it. So, they found comfort in not making any claims about any positions.

And actually, I do like Plato, especially the way that he portrays Socrates. Socrates doesn't seem to have a conclusion in mind, or have any agenda at all when he gets into conversations. Both parties may learn something, or the conversation just might end in confusion... but, it's an interesting journey nonetheless.

But, as I understand it, they didn't so much challenge or try convince anyone else about anything, as much as just believe themselves that there were as many reasons to accept any position, as there were reasons to doubt it. So, they found comfort in not making any claims about any positions. — anonymous66

So as I say, proper scepticism would be about being able to recognise when the issue under discussion is vague or undecidable. The difference then is between whether that is so due to the question itself being "not even wrong", or due to a lack of sufficient facts.

What do you think this idea of there being "as many reasons for as reasons against" actually spells out as a situation? It could be a sign of a third ontological position - a state of equilibrium balance. As I say, metaphysical arguments do logically throw up dichotomous or dialectical alternatives like "chance vs necessity". So inquiry into existence does often result in "both sides appearing right" for a good reason. The polar choices are the extremes or the limits of possibility. And then actuality is what exists in-between as their mixing. We ask which nature is - chance or necessity - and wind up with equal reason to believe both are in play. Nature is some equilibrium balance. And that is in fact what our metaphysics predicts (if we understand polar opposites as the complementary extremes of the possible, leaving the actual as what must fall on the spectrum in-between),

So scepticism can find itself undecided when faced with a well-posed metaphysical choice. There is as much reason to believe in the one option as the other. But that then is evidence that both are true and fundamental - just as reasoning says they should be if they are the complementary bounds of what is even the possible.

And actually, I do like Plato, especially the way that he portrays Socrates. Socrates doesn't seem to have a conclusion in mind, or have any agenda at all when he gets into conversations. Both parties may learn something, or the conversation just might end in confusion... but, it's an interesting journey nonetheless. — anonymous66

Lots of stuff is interesting in life. No harm in that. But we are only still talking about Plato/Socrates because their dialectical mode of reasoning proved foundational of modern thought. The dialogues didn't result in confusion but sharply delineated alternatives that have been productive ever since.

Well of course there is plenty of confusion - like not recognising sceptism only works as the servant of hypothesis generation, or that metaphysical dichotomies are hitting the pay-dirt of finding the complementary divisions that then encompass all that is even "the possible".

But metaphysics itself aims at rational clarity and has no point if it can't achieve that. Argument which has the goal of sewing confusion is called sophistry. Plato/Socrates certainly had something to say about those bastards. :)

The dialogues didn't result in confusion but sharply delineated alternatives that have been productive ever since. — apokrisis

None of Plato's dialogues ended in confusion? Not even Euthyphro? What of Aporia in Plato's dialogues?

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

The Greek word skepsis means investigation. By calling themselves skeptics, the ancient skeptics thus describe themselves as investigators. They also call themselves ‘those who suspend’, thereby signaling that their investigations lead them to suspension of judgment. They do not put forward theories, and they do not deny that knowledge can be found. At its core, ancient skepticism is a way of life devoted to inquiry. It is as much concerned with belief as with knowledge.

Becoming an investigator sounds interesting. Perhaps it will lead to Ataraxia.

None of Plato's dialogues ended in confusion? Not even Theaetetus? What of Aporia? — anonymous66

Well, the Theaetetus is simply wrong in treating rationality as the memory of eternal ideas. Although it could then be regarded as essentially right if you understand Plato's argument less literally as making an early ontic structural argument. But either way, I don't think it is confused. It made a thesis in concrete enough fashion to become a long-lived metaphysical notion. You can understand it well enough to dispute it.

And likewise, demonstrations of aphoria are a positively instructive fact of epistemology. They show how ill-founded many common beliefs are - because they are essentially vague ideas and so fall into the class of "not even wrong". The confusion lies not in Plato's dialectics but in the weak arguments that have to be got past.

If it interests you, see my discussion of Tillich's concept of faith as "ultimate concern" in this thread:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1307/religion-will-win-in-the-end-/p6

Well, the Theaetetus is simply wrong in treating rationality as the memory of eternal ideas. — apokrisis

I changed my post... The Euthyphro is a better example of an Aporetic Dialogue.

I think what I might ultimately be dealing with is my own state of aporia (I'm puzzled by the many different metaphysical beliefs and positions) and lack of ataraxia. And I kinda forgot that the Stoics do acknowledge both issues, in that they suggest that objectivity is something to strive for, but because of our nature and the nature of our universe, we can't always create an objective view of reality. So, in those cases, it is better to suspend judgment, rather than draw an incorrect conclusion.

In regards to Ataraxia (freedom from worry) or lack thereof, I suspect the Stoics would suggest that 1. worry is not the main issue. the main issue is one's progress towards moral excellence. and concentrating on the Virtues is what is necessary and sufficient for Eudaimonia, (not reducing worry). and 2. concentrating on the present can reduce worry.

My interest in Ancient Skepticism (basically those who followed in the footsteps of Plato- if there are no forms, then we can't have knowledge.) has only just begun. But, as I understand it, they didn't so much challenge or try convince anyone else of anything, as much as just believe themselves that there were as many reasons to accept any position, as there were reasons to doubt it. So, they found comfort in not making any claims about any positions. — anonymous66

I don't know if I have mentioned these before, but have a look at these sources:

http://katjavogt.com

Professor of Philosophy at Columbia. She is also the author of the SEP article 'Ancient Skepticism' which begins:

The Greek word skepsis means investigation. By calling themselves skeptics, the ancient skeptics thus describe themselves as investigators. They also call themselves ‘those who suspend’, thereby signaling that their investigations lead them to suspension of judgment. They do not put forward theories, and they do not deny that knowledge can be found. At its core, ancient skepticism is a way of life devoted to inquiry. It is as much concerned with belief as with knowledge. As long as knowledge has not been attained, the skeptics aim not to affirm anything. This gives rise to their most controversial ambition: a life without belief. — Katja Vogt

Another quote about Belief and Truth:

I argue that the ancient skeptics and Stoics draw many...ideas from Plato’s dialogues, revising Socratic-Platonic arguments as they see fit. Belief and Truth retraces their steps through interpretations of the Apology, Ion, Republic, Theaetetus, and Philebus, reconstructs Pyrrhonian investigation and thought, and illuminates the connections between ancient skepticism and relativism, as well as the Stoic view that beliefs do not even merit the evaluations “true” and “false.” The ancient skeptics, on my reading, develop versions of the Socratic idea that an unexamined life is worth nothing. Ultimately, I hope to defend the guiding intuitions of skepticism against so-called dogmatism, understood as a confident attitude of laying out how things are. A life of investigation may well be a compelling enterprise. Contrary to the presumption that it is impossible or absurd to try to do without doxa, I argue that modes of thought that are to some degree hypothetical –that involve the proviso that one is likely to encounter new arguments and evidence as time proceeds – are often called for. Indeed, this seems to me to be almost a common-sensical insight, and certainly one that is embraced by much of science today. — Katja Vogt

You can see how this attitude is easily misinterpreted, because of the emphasis that has been put on 'belief' in culture. So in that scheme, you're either a 'believer' or an 'unbeliever', which are two poles of an apparent dichotomy. The 'unbeliever' is thought 'not to believe anything' - but this easily morphs into 'believing in nothing' - which turns out to be just another belief! So 'armchair skepticism' is something quite different to the principled skepticism of the Greek philosophers.

@Wayfarer Thanks! After creating this thread, I had a renewed desire to read Plato's dialogues.

Is it the case that all disagreements come down to Metaphysical beliefs (and faith in those beliefs)? Is it possible to come to any agreement on any issue, when the root issue is Metaphysics? — anonymous66

I sorry I'm late to this thread and hopefully my post won't be too redundant. I think if one goes about trying to get everyone to come to a common agreed upon beliefs/morals etc then we already do, it will be a bit of a tough battle; but perhaps to work with what people already believe and very, very slowly sometimes even taking several generations slowly assimilate people of different religions or systems of belief to work better together.

Part of this is due to the fact that a lot of people are not able and/or willing to change their ideology at the drop of a hat. As a person partial to nihilism, I can tell you the many times I have tried to explain my views to others only to come back nearly empty handed.

Maybe another way to look at the problem is that anyone has to be pragmatic (as well as hedonistic to some degree) and even if people come for different ideology and cultures, almost all people are concern with their welfare as well as the welfare of others who happen to be vital to their own welfare in some regard or another. Although it isn't uncommon for people to be indifferent and/or hostile to those who they believe are not important to their own welfare.

Out of curiosity, I'm kind of interested in what topic you are having difficulty in discussing the matter with your classmates or other people you are dealing with.

If it's not too late, what exactly do you understand "Metaphysical Position" to mean?

If it's not too late, what exactly do you understand "Metaphysical Position" to mean? — tim wood

A metaphysical position would be something like what the world ontologically consists of and how we know that.

As a person partial to nihilism, I can tell you the many times I have tried to explain my views to others only to come back nearly empty handed. — dclements

As a nihilist, wouldn't you expect to be empty handed?

Is it the case that all disagreements come down to Metaphysical beliefs (and faith in those beliefs)? Is it possible to come to any agreement on any issue, when the root issue is Metaphysics? — anonymous66

I'd say that all disagreements about metaphysical matters certainly do come down to metaphysical beliefs. Metaphysical questions cannot be decided by empirical studies; they can only be decided by pure and/ or practical reason and there is no reason without presupposition.

Well. let's see: does the world consist of anything "ontologically" that it does not otherwise consist of? And what is that we're supposed to know? And how do we know that? And how do we know anything?

Without some qualification of these things, the discussion cannot reasonably proceed. It can of course proceed unreasonably, which many discussions do.

Well. let's see: does the world consist of anything "ontologically" that it does not otherwise consist of? — tim wood

That just means is there something fundamental the world is made up of, like water, matter, math, ideas, etc.

If so, is there a way we can know this to be the case? Is there a way we can know anything about the world? Were the ancient skeptics right? What does it mean to know?

But you're right, qualification is always needed, although the terms ontology and epistemology are well established in philosophy, and shouldn't need to be debated.

It seems fair to say the world a) exists and b) is made of something. And I think you're exactly correct in implying that a and b and our further knowledge depend on our presuppositions. Which leaves exactly your question, "What does it mean to know?"

As to ontology, that appears to have become a word that means whatever anyone wants it to mean. It's been pointed out, though, that being has no predicates (e.g., it isn't green, loud, quick, over there, on the shelf, many, next to anything, early or late), so knowledge of being, ontology, is tricky at best, or even not possible. That is, ontology may be a one-word oxymoron.

One fellow did offer a definition that made a good deal of sense, aguing from Aristotle's Metaphysics, in short that ontology, if it is to be anything at all, should be the study of absolute presuppositions - topic for another thread.

Out of curiosity, I'm kind of interested in what topic you are having difficulty in discussing the matter with your classmates or other people you are dealing with. — dclements

Some topics that come to mind are: How should we treat the poor? How should we treat those who disagree with something that we hold dear? What kind of society should we create? How should atheists treat the religious? How should the religious treat atheists?

Would it be naive and simplistic to suggest that perhaps the point of Plato's dialogues is to argue that: no matter what knowledge is, or how to attain it, the best life is the (examined) virtuous life?

Is it the case that all disagreements come down to Metaphysical beliefs (and faith in those beliefs)? Is it possible to come to any agreement on any issue, when the root issue is Metaphysics? — anonymous66

It seems to me that metaphysics is unavoidably speculative. It seems to me that no metaphysics can be proved.

Couldn't any metaphysics be shored-up with enough ad-hoc assumptions, ("epicycles") to "answer" objections to it, and explain whatever someone asks for an explanation of?

Physicalism posits a brute-fact, but that doesn't prove that physicalism is wrong.

I suggest that, though we can't prove which metaphysics is correct, we can compare the metaphysicses by Ockham's Principle of Parsimony. Is there a metaphysics that doesn't make any assumptions, or posit a brute-fact? Sure, the one that I propose, and call "Skepticism".

Someone could call Skepticism an "unfalsifiable proposition". Sure it is.

When you defend Flat-Earth advocacy by more and more assumptions, to explain all the ways that observations contradict Flat-Earth, you're making it an unfalsifiable proposition.

But Skepticism is a different kind of unfalsifiable proposition, because it doesn't need any assumptions.

Of course Physicalism is an unfalsifiable proposition too, depending on a brute-fact.

Well, maybe Physicalism isn't unfalsifiable: There was a quantum-mechanics specialist, someone with high academic standing (I don't remember his name) who wrote a book in which he said that quantum-mechannics lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world.

That sounds like a very rare instance of physics establishing a conclusion about metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, maybe Physicalism isn't unfalsifiable: There was a quantum-mechanics specialist, someone with high academic standing (I don't remember his name) who wrote a book in which he said that quantum-mechannics lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world.

That sounds like a very rare instance of physics establishing a conclusion about metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't see that physics is taking a position. Physics is offering the Schrodinger's equation as a way of probabilistically predicting the position of the election and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Beyond this we enter the domain of metaphysics, as we should be. Understanding the nature of nature is the providence of philosophy not science.

What we do have is a physicist taking a metaphysical position based upon his/her interpretation of quantum physics, which is fine, but it does cross the line into metaphysics. My own preferred interpretation is the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation. I prefer this approach because it is real, it embraces cause, it is non-deterministic allowing for the possibility of choice. In addition, the concept of a quantum potential that guides as acts non-locally fully explains all observed "spooky behavior" of elections, e.g. delayed choice and quantum entanglement at a distance. Undoubtedly there is more to be known and or understanding will evolve.

Metaphysics doesn't provide final answers, rather it continues to explore by positing questions and creating potential new ways of looking at things. This is all that is possible in a fluid, every changing universe where nothing stands still. In this regard, metaphysics is analagous to art, to the extent that I believe that understanding art provides a terrific doorway into metaphysics.

I don't see that physics is taking a position. Physics is offering the Schrodinger's equation as a way of probabilistically predicting the position of the election and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Beyond this we enter the domain of metaphysics, as we should be. Understanding the nature of nature is the providence of philosophy not science.
[//quote]

That's what I thought. I thought that physics doesn't say anything about metaphysics. But that physicist author, someone with impressive credentials in quantum-mechanics, said otherwise. So I took that to mean that there was an exception. ...that there was an instance of physics saying something about metaphysics..

Well, maybe it isn't so implausible if we admit that science might sometimes be able to say something about is limitations.

Sure, scientists have a way of claiming mistakenly that science covers metaphysics, or that science has all the answers to everything. So I know that scientists sometimes overstep science's limitations, and apply it beyond its legitimate area of applicability.

So is his statement not true? Does quantum-mechanics not contradict the notion of an objective physical world that exists independently of us?

I don't claim to be able to answer that, but I just re-emphasize that that author was someone with impressive credentials in quantum-mechanics. I should find the book, name the author, and quote the passage, but it was a long time ago. Obviously a quote without the name of the author, or his exact words isn't very compelling.
— Rich

Metaphysics doesn't provide final answers

I've been saying that no metaphysics can be proved, and so the subject can only be speculative.

But metaphysicses can be compared by the standard of parsimony, and the need for a brute-fact.

So even if we can't say which metaphysics is true, we can compare their merit on the basis of parsimony, the need for assumptions, and the need for a brute-fact.

And, without saying for sure what's true, we can say, "There's no reason to believe that....". (referring to a claim made, or something posited, by a metaphysics)

So there's much of interest that can be said about metaphysicses, even if it can't be proved which one is true.

rather it continues to explore by positing questions and creating potential new ways of looking at things

No doubt about that.

Michael Ossipoff