Yes. An omnipotent person can kill themselves. Why would you think otherwise? — Bartricks

I think otherwise, for reasons I have already stated above and the fact that I also reject the concept that such an entity has ever or can ever exist. Your vote for is merely equal in status to my vote against.

As a person who is interested in philosophy but is not academically qualified in the field, I find the exchanges in this thread 'entertaining.' The logical tennis is 'interesting,' you can follow the logic and you can mentally cast your vote at the end of your personal analysis.
For what its worth, I vote with the dissenters.
@Bartricks will type things like

What's in a word? — Bartricks

and then go on to insist that words like 'omnipotent,' 'god' and even 'god labeled as a PERSON!' are in fact of great significance to the human condition.
I do think any attempts at logical discourse with those who are quite chiseled in their viewpoint, sooner or later reduces to a panto exchange of 'oh yes it is' and 'oh no it isn't.'
After that, reading the exchanges becomes quite boring. I freely admit that my Atheism is quite chiseled.
Chiseled, but easily dispelled, by a scientifically scrutinised appearance/manifestation of the omnipotent. I have little more than scorn to offer such concepts as the Omnis.
I place them alongside my need/will to know the biggest number.
For me, omnipotence is only important in its subjective use. 'Strongest guy in the tribe,' etc.
None of the Omnis are objective, they are all relative and subjective. Same as biggest, fastest etc.
Light speed is fastest but inflation was probably faster as is the expansion rate at the edge of the universe, RELATIVE to us. God remains nothing but a fable for those who fear things that go bump in the night, the concept as presented by human organised religion is pernicious and logically the god presented is a coward and a weakling and simply holds back human progression. But I only type of the god(s) as described by human storytellers, when I type such an opinion. I am not criticising the 'superhero' that YOU believe cares about YOU and protects YOU and YOURS from the evil YOU think exists in YOUR ID(as in Freud). If it gives you comfort then, hey ho, and off to life you go.

You didn't mention 'invisible friend' in your hackneyed philosophy free rant.

Yes, but you are not engaging with any argument. Obviously an omnipotent being can kill itself. An omnipotent being can do anything. That includes that. Obviously. If you think an omnipotent being can't kill itself it must be due entirely to you not grasping the concept of omnipotence.

↪universeness You didn't mention 'invisible friend' in your hackneyed philosophy free rant — Bartricks

So, does your invisible friend comfort you?

If your rhetoric is produced from qualifications in the study of philosophy then I am glad that there are other philosophy stalwarts (as demonstrated on the threads on omnipotence) who think your viewpoint on omnipotence is pretty vacant.

Yes, but you are not engaging with any argument. — Bartricks

Nonsense! You haven't got past qualification 1 yet. No omnipotent entity has, can or ever will exist,
anywhere at anytime, except in your mind and in the mind of anyone who subscribes to your viewpoint. That is the full extent of the power of your omnipotent entity. To me, that's almost no power at all.
Omnipotence is a label for a concept that is espoused by you and your like. You need to demonstrate that your concept has power and not just power, but more power than anything else in this Universe can demonstrate. All you have to offer are your musings. The musings of a human mind.
As a source of knowledge, the human mind is not the most reliable, especially if it has been through all sorts of influences since birth. Other human minds have to pick and choose carefully between which musings to listen to and which to disregard. Those who seem to be the most balanced are the ones I would pay most attention to. I would also pay great attention to what they actually do rather than what they say they will do or what they claim to believe.

For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance.

Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here.

When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality.

Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. I don't think you mean it this way (correct me if I am wrong), but the epistemic impossibility of a square circle prevents a square circle "from being actualized in reality". If I am correct, I don't think this is what you are trying to convey: I think "reality" probably encompasses much more for you than I am envisioning. So a further elaboration on your definition of "metaphysical possibility" would be much appreciated.

Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles.

If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" (as you put it) that are in the physical world. Therefore, supposing that God is omnipotent, then God, being the metaphysical instantiator of the physical (thusly "laws of logic"), is the determiner of that very logic itself. Am I correct here? If so, I think the fundamental flaw here is that you are trying to posit via logic that there's a realm of which isn't constraint to that very logic. In other words, you are always inevitably, in even giving this argument (if I were to grant it in its entirety, hypothetically), utilizing the "laws of logic" to even put it forth (to conclude it is valid): therefore, at best, the metaphysical possibility of that which is illogical is only true (again, if I grant it here hypothetically) in relation to the logic utilized to provide the argument in the first place. You are essentially positing a Logic (I'm just arbitrarily denoting it with a capital L to distinguish it from the logic within the physical world) that exists completely separate from logic wherein God can metaphysically instantiate whatever she desires in the physical world because she can alter the "logic", but this entire argument is completely contingent on the logic utilized to get to that conclusion: positing something overlying or beyond logic completely is a contradiction in itself, because any argument given to attempt to prove it inevitably utilizes that very logic it is supposed to proving isn't required whatsoever. Likewise, when you say:

it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false

This is contingent, if granted as true (at best), on the principle of non-contradiction. You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible: thereby you are utilizing logic to try and prove something that is allegedly out of bounds of logic itself. Any argument either of us can utter is in relation necessarily to the principle of non-contradiction, therefore a truly completely separable Logic which allows for the principle of noncontradiction to be false is not even actually possible: that very argument just used the principle of noncontradiction, therefore it is still relative to the principle of noncontradiction. Furthermore, this is also evident in the claim that the law of non-contradiction can be false, since the falseness is contingent on there either being a contradiction or no contradiction in the argument. In other words, positing a realm in which logic is not fundamentally bound to the law of non-contradiction is impossible to even posit (without it being contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place).

Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.

This is completely fair enough, and I agree that we can claim there are no square circles without every empirically testing it everywhere.

For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist.

If you exist, then it is impossible for you to metaphysically exist unless you are referring to God revoking your life hereafter, but the very moment you "know" you exist, you "know" necessarily that it is not metaphysically possible for you not to exist right now. In terms of God maybe never metaphysically instantiating you, that would entail that you never existed at all (which you concede you exist).

Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction.

As noted earlier, if it is epistemically impossible for a square circle to exist, then it is metaphysically impossible necessarily. This is because any logically argument you can attempt to provide justification for a separate Logic which allows for different logics necessarily depends on logic itself. You thereby are always operating under one universal, fundamental form of logic which neither of us can escape. Likewise, you nor I can claim that the principle of noncontradiction can ever be false because that would require our argument to be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place, which would mean we didn't get any closer to negating it whatsoever.

THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.

This is not only disrespectful towards those who hold that logic at least fundamentally comes into play with omnipotence, but it is also unproductive. I don't mind if we end up never agreeing on anything, except the principle that we should treat each other (and others) with respect. Calling someone a "totalium idiotiums" is obviously insulting. I have no problem if you think that it is indeed a contradiction, but please do not start name calling. I am genuinely attempting to understand your position while equally trying to convey mine, with as much respect as I can possibly give: that's how philosophy should be.

What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'

Although I understand (I think) what you are trying to say, I don't think this is equivocal to what we were discussing (in terms of "metaphysical" vs "eptistemic" possibility). Although I originally misspoke in my first post to the OP maker (by claiming "square circle exists"), I quickly refurbished it to "square circles are possible". Stating that epistemic impossibility directly entails metaphysical impossibility is not to "go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'", it is to go from 'epistemically impossible that x" to "metaphysically impossible that x". "to 'x'" refers to it actually existing in the objective world (or in the mind as conjured by it in the imagination), whereas possibility simply notes that it could exist, not that it does. So if I am making some sort of mistake, it will be related to the relation between "metaphysical possibility" and "epistemic possibility", not "metaphysical possibility to epistemically true that it exists".

Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.

I think you have me confused with someone else: I never mentioned that example. I mentioned the example of God making a rock so heavy she/he/it/them cannot lift it (which you never responded to). But in relation to killing himself, the more pressing dilemma is: can God kill himself and then rise himself from the dead metaphysically? I think your answer is yes, which leads us back to the more fundamental dispute about positing Logic which allows for multiple kinds of logic.

Bob

So what? Incidentally, if Descartes thought I was right, that's pretty damn good indirect evidence that I am. You do realize he's one of the greatest minds of all time? — Bartricks

I don't care if he's one of the great minds of all time. I'm mainly making a comment with regards to words and their usage in the sense that the most common philosophical understanding of omnipotence is actualizing whatever is logically possible.

If Tom can do more things than Roger, then Tom is more powerful than Roger, yes? — Bartricks

Sure. This doesn't forward an argument to your case namely in that the antecedent cannot be correct in terms of being able to actualize anything including changing logic. So this is literally the same as "if [something that'll never be true], then [my argument is true!]". Accepting it doesn't hurt me.

Now, a god who can do anything whatsoever - including things the laws of logic say cannot be done - is more powerful than a god who is bound by those laws. — Bartricks

Sure. The former God is incoherent whereas the latter God isn't.

Oh, oh, but Thomywombists would say that something forbidden by the laws of logic is 'no thing' and thus not being able to do it is no problem". Yes, and that's called 'begging the question'. Note, I do not deny that square circles are forbidden by the laws of logic. I deny that this makes them impossible. It makes them logically impossible - for label lovers - but it does not make them 'metaphysically impossible' — Bartricks

It's generally understood that metaphysical modality is a smaller modality subcontained within logical modality, in a smaller fashion to how nomic modality is encompassed within metaphysical and logical modality.

hy? Because God is not bound by the laws of logic.

Why?

Because they're his laws.

Why? — Bartricks

This does literally nothing if you're shifting the logical modality to a hypothetical metaphysical modality that encompasses the logical modality, because now I can just suppose my god "Timmy" who happens to be capable of changing the laws of metaphysics (which "supersede" logic! supposedly) such that Timmy is stronger than your god Joshua despite Timmy not violating the laws of logic while yours does. See? We can play this game forever. It's silly.

Remember Tom and Roger? Now the Thomywomby god is bound by the laws of logic and so can't make a square circle. Pathetic. My god can. So my god is.....more powerful than the Thomywomby god. — Bartricks

I'm not sure why you're making a logical inference here. It could simply be the case that your god changed the laws of logic such that despite changing the laws of logic he's still less powerful than my god Timmy. Remember? Not even logic is absolute, supposedly.

Contradictions aren't true, are they? So, if my god is more powerful than the Thomywomby god, then the Thomywomby god can't be the omnipotent one, can he? For that would be to affirm a contradiction. — Bartricks

I'm not sure why you care about a contradiction being true.

Yes, so, once more, no contradictions are actually true. You said that if there was a god who could make everything not make sense, then nothing actually makes sense. So you're just flipping and flopping.

God can make a square circles. There are no true contradictions. See? Things make sense. It is possible for them not to. They do though. See? — Bartricks

I think you're just awfully unfamiliar with modal logic to think this. Contradictions being possible is a contradiction, namely because contradictions literally /are/ impossible. So to say they're possible is to say contradictions are possible and not possible, which is a conjunction of a proposition and its negation, i.e. a contradiction.

Ah, so you're a dogmatist. You know already that there is no proof of God. Good job! There is.
And once more with the same mistake (am I the only one who doesn't commit it? What is it with you people??). 'Can be mistaken' doesn't mean 'is mistaken'. Christ almighty. — Bartricks

No one ever made the confusion between "can be mistaken" and "is mistaken," only the former was the premise of my argument, not the latter, and in either case simply the possibility of contradictions being possible is a contradiction in of itself. I'm not sure what of this is hard to parse.

Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here. — Bob Ross

Epistemology is about knowledge. To say that something is 'epistemically' possible, is to say something about our state of knowledge. So, I can be certain that I exist. My non-existence is therefore not epistemically possible (not for me). Nevertheless, it is metaphysically possible and logically possible for me not to exist.

So, when I say that square circles are possible, I am not thereby expressing the idea that 'for all we can tell' there are some. No, for I accept that it is not epistemically possible that there are any - we can know for certain that there are not (which is all it takes for it to be the case that something is not epistemically possible).

When I say that square circles are possible, I mean that they are metaphysically possible. It is possible for them to exist. I say that about anything - it is metaphysically possible for anything to exist.

It is not logically possible for square circles to exist, as the idea contains a contradiction and that violates the law of non-contradiction. But it is metaphysically possible for them to exist, for God is not bound by the law of non-contradiction and thus can create some if he so wishes.

Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. — Bob Ross

It was clearly defined. For something to be metaphysically possible, is for it to be capable of existing. There really is no way I can make that any clearer.

When I say that it is not epistemically possible for there to be square circles, I am simply expressing the idea that we can be absolutely certain there are not any in reality.

So: there are certainly no square circles in reality. It is possible for square circles to exist. I really have no way to make these notions any clearer.

If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" — Bob Ross

That bears no relation to anything I've said. I haven't mentioned the physical world once! I believe God exists. I believe God is the author of the laws of Reason. Those laws constitutively determine what is and is not possible. Thus God - as author of those laws - is not bound by them and can do anything.

You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible — Bob Ross

No. You're making stuff up! It is 'possible' for there to be square circles is not equivalent to 'there is a metaphysical reality where there are square circles'. There's just reality. When it comes to things existing, the things that exist constitute reality. And there are no square circles in existence. So, there is no reality where there are square circles.

I don't care if he's one of the great minds of all time. I'm mainly making a comment with regards to words and their usage in the sense that the most common philosophical understanding of omnipotence is actualizing whatever is logically possible. — Kuro

You don't seem to understand what omnipotence means. It means 'all powerful' (omni - all - potentia - power). That's what everyone - everyone - understands it to mean. Some then 'argue' - not define, but argue - that this amounts to being able to do all things logically possible. They 'argue' that it is no lack of power to be unable to do the impossible.

I am arguing that their view is false. Tom is more powerful than Roger if he can do more things. That's true, yes? Now, if God is in charge of the laws of logic - if they're his to make or unmake as he sees fit - then he is not bound by them and thus can do things the laws forbid. So, wait for it, that makes him 'more' powerful than a god who is bound by the laws of logic, yes? And so as God is 'all powerful' and it is a manifest contradiction to assert that a person who can do fewer things is more powerful than one who can do more, 'God' can violate the laws of logic and make square circles etc.

The case for thinking he can't relies entirely upon one thing: that the laws of logic forbid these things. And that's all you're going to be able to do - you're just going to say 'modal this and noodle that' , when I know already that the laws of logic forbid what I am saying God can do. That's the point!!! That's what being all powerful involves: it involves 'not' being bound by those laws. I mean, what do you think those laws are? Weird webs that prevent God from doing things? Forcefields? What? You think God is 'bound' by something? Then you're just confused: you don't know what you're talking about. It's like insisting that there is a man taller than the tallest man. No there isn't: he's the tallest man. And likewise, there is nothing 'binding' God - there is no cosmic glue or straightjacket he's stuck in. He is the author of the laws of logic - they're his dictates and express his power - and as such he is not bound by them. This it not hard to understand: how can someone make a square circle? Well, the first thing they need to do is 'not' be bound by the laws of logic - and how can someone do that? Well, they can be the author of those laws.

Contradictions being possible is a contradiction, namely because contradictions literally /are/ impossible. — Kuro

What total rubbish. All you're doing is insisting - not arguing - that the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true as opposed to just 'true'. I think it is just 'true', not 'necessarily' true. This is going to get you all hot under the collar and all you are going to do, I anticipate, is tell me over and over that if it is possible for a contradiction to be true, then it is true. Which is, as I say, to keep confusing possible with actual.

God is not bound by the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything. And thus there are no necessary truths. For any truth God can make untrue if he wishes. That doesn't mean there are no truths (you will make this mistake). It means there are truths, it's just that they're capable of being false. And that includes the truth that says there are no true contradictions.

Now, in saying that it is true that there are no true contradictions, I am not contradicting myself. If you think I am, explain. Generate the contradiction, do not just assert it like a dogmatist.

.

Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants) — Agent Smith

Free will is not being able to do anything one wants! It is the ability and power to act by one's choice.

Omnipotence is not being able to do anything one wants! It is a quality of having unlimited power.

The first is a human attribute. The second is pure fiction.

Like a road roller, you are compacting things you are stepping on! In this case, concepts.

Free will, it appears, exists in that we can consider all possible options in our minds. I can even mentally simulate every possible pathway from a given choice node, make a virtual choice and use my knowledge and experience to get an idea of what all possible options will look like.

Actually making the choice, however, may be determined.

Free will, it appears, exists in that we can consider all possible options in our minds. — Agent Smith

How can we consider all possible options? How would we know they will be all?
Regardless of that, even if we think of and select just a single option, wouldn't that indicate free will?
Anyway, this is all theoretical. In practice, we just act by choice. That's all. There's nothing more to it. "By choice" means of our own accord. The process of considering and selecting choices is redundant.

I can even mentally simulate every possible pathway from a given choice node, make a virtual choice and use my knowledge and experience to get an idea of what all possible options will look like. — Agent Smith

Again, free will is something much more simple than that. It's just acting by choice.