I'm not saying I am an idealist am trying to describe the argument properly — Tom Storm

Yes, I know. Im not saying you are. Im imagining we are. Just like being a theist or atheist.

By the way, there are atheist idealists.

I think pain is the donut tasting like shit. The hole is just empty space. — EugeneW

The 'raw feel' is generally understood to be radically or perfectly private. So only you have access to your pain and only I have access to mine. The pre-philosophical theory is that the 'sign' pain gets its meaning from such private experience. So maybe, this theory implies, the word 'pain' has different meanings for us. But I think it's better to look at the way this sign 'pain' is traded publicly.

Yes, like there are theist materialists. Their matter differs from atheist material.

It's a relief to me that someone groks the 'uselessness' of qualia I'm trying to sketch. It's so 'obvious' eventually and yet so absurd on the face of it. For 'of course' my private experience is that which is closest to me and the last thing in the world to doubt, because, you know, 'logic' (which is just, in my view, contingent grammatical habit.)

It's actually nice that philosophy has surprises in store for those who hang in there. The later Wittgenstein only seems boring to those who aren't ready. What say you?

If you hear people talking in their sleep you have proof of the dreaming. Likewise for animals. You might even put me under a brain-scanning machine. Then you could see if I dream when asleep. What proof do you need more? — EugeneW

This to me is more of the donut metaphor. The 'dream itself' is 'logically' (grammatically) inaccessible. We talk around it when it's time to make the donut. But for the 'sign' to have a meaning requires its connection to other public events entangled with the expression of the token 'dream.'

Well, I guess an idealist would argue that everything we see, we take for granted as real when it is actually a product of mind. Does that count? — Tom Storm

One interesting thing about this plausible idealist is that 'his' vision or 'dream' of his own skull would also be a 'product of mind.' A skeptic might ask 'him' how 'he' is so sure that 'he' is some kind of singular or unified interior monologue that gazes and listens upon a world without eyes or ears (for these too are mere illusions 'products of mind,' if you ask 'him.') ('His' genitals and gender are also products of mind, as well as the concept of mind of course.)

But I think it's better to look at the way this sign 'pain' is traded publicly — lll

Not sure I understand what you mean by "sign pain". What you mean?

By the way, I had no dreams tonight that I remember now. I could have had them though, and probably had. You'll have to take my word as proof.

5. That my wife is right.

Not sure I understand what you mean by "sign pain". What you mean? — EugeneW

I simply mean the written or spoken word 'pain,' as distinct from what it is supposed (assumed) to refer to.

By the way, I had no dreams tonight that I remember now. I could have had them though, and probably had. You'll have to take my word as proof. — EugeneW

I believe you.

Good point. I take Wittgenstein to show that the meaning of the 'Yahweh' is not inside each of its users but rather in the outside in the way the mark 'Yahweh' functions along with other worldly objects. If you want the 'meaning' of 'Yahweh,' look for it as you might look for the 'meaning' of money. See what people do with the little pieces of paper, how they fit in with other things people do — lll

What all of us do with "Yahweh"? That's public meaning, oui? In Wittgenstein's universe, that's about all the meaning a word can have; any private meaning, as he said and you pointed out, "drops out of consideration and becomes irrelevant".

Sensations aren't exactly perfect when it comes to conveying Wittgenstein's point for they have secondary public correlates (facial expressions, body language that is).

A purely subjective, completely private experience that doesn't have outwardly noticeable features would be just what Wittgenstein needeed. It's odd that he couldn't find one such thing.

Perhaps we evolved to be physically, observably, expressive such that we could decode each others' private thoughts & feelings easily and accurately. It's orders of magnitude better than guessing which would be necessary sans :smile: :sad: etc. You get the idea.

Many people have learnt to act true to Shakespeare's belief that all the world's a stage and And all the men and women merely players. It's not a good idea, so I was warned, to wear your heart on your sleeves.

Lady Macbeth: Your face, my thane, is a book, where men may read strange matters. (Shakespeare again).

People who can override/alter the evolved causal chain between thoughts/feelings and body language are inscrutable. Many people aspire to such a level of control over their bodies.

Where was I?

An exclusive private experience, looks like, doesn't exist. However, we can throw people off the scent so to speak. The reason we possess this ability is probably because it's is a dog-eat-dog world and being easy to read could turn out to be an Achilles' heel if happiness, etc. is a priority.

Now what?

Stoics playing poker. Now that I'd like to see! It's on my bucket list.

What all of us do with "Yahweh"? That's public meaning, oui? In Wittgenstein's universe, that's about all the meaning a word can have; any private meaning, as he said and you pointed out, "drops out of consideration and becomes irrelevant". — Agent Smith

Exactly. That's how I see Wittgenstein see it and I agree.

The 'dream itself' is 'logically' (grammatically) inaccessible. — lll

Everything itself is inaccessible. But a thing in itseĺf can't exist. We both see the fly messing around in the empty glass of milk. We both hear him. Likewise we both have dreams. We made them private and inaccessible.

Sensations aren't exactly perfect when it comes to conveying Wittgenstein's point for they have secondary public correlates (facial expressions, body language that is). — Agent Smith

I know what you mean by correlates, but, strictly speaking, the 'private experience' grammar/logic implies (in my opinion) an empty data set. If we take philosophy to share some of the virtues of science, then we need to be able to look for correlation between two public entities. In the case of qualia, the data is missing 'in principle.' I can't correlate anything at all with the hole in your donut or the beetle in your box, for it is 'invisible by definition.' Of course we can have correlations of measurements of facial expressions and the use of tokens like 'pain' or 'joy.' (This is why I chose the donut. We do have a cluster of correlations of public events, but the obscure 'thing itself' at the center of these events, the guest of honor, has somehow lost its invitation to the party. )

We both hear him. Likewise we both have dreams. — EugeneW

I'm tempted to say 'yes, we both have dreams.' I think this is because our uses of the word 'dream' conform simultaneously to both of our grammatical expectations. If, on the other hand, you tell me that you had to wipe some dreams off your toothbrush, I'd wonder if we were still speaking the same language, if you knew what a dream was, if you had dreams.

We made them private and inaccessible. — EugeneW

How so? By simply not talking about them? What I have in mind is that I'd confuse people if I talked about 'co-dreaming' with my brother in California (far away). The grammar or logic of dreams (as a flexible rule) doesn't allow that. Of course meanings (habits of public use and associated norms) can drift.

Right you are.

Qualia, the ineffable aspect of consciousness, always at hand to remind ourselves that many questions in the philosophy of mind remain (as of yet) unanswered.

What's your take on telepathy? Is it real? If it is, what are the implications vis-à-vis qualia and consciousness? Can I get inside your head?

What's your take on telepathy? Is it real? If it is, what are the implications vis-à-vis qualia and consciousness? Can I get inside your head? — Agent Smith

I'm not aware of any evidence for it.

My bias is that my 'thoughts' (minimally muttered strings of tokens) are not fundamentally private. I speculate that it's possible, in principle at least, to read someone's so-called 'mind,' at least in simpler scenarios. I happen to be watching the show Lie to Me at the moment, and it's scary how we give ourselves away (assuming the script is somewhat science-based.) I'd rather the so-called 'soul' be an inviolable fortress but don't find it plausible.

The most careful way to express what I'm speculating is the prediction of public behavior that includes the emission of tokens (words.) Note that only the unity of the body is presupposed here, for the body is an uncontroversial public object, unlike (for philosophers at least) that old ghost 'consciousness.' As I see it, the problem with 'qualia' is 'grammar deep.' I could never 'be sure' I was telepathizing your experience, for the grammar suggest to me (ambiguously) that only the 'official' possessor or victim of these qualia could not be wrong. How does one test telepathy ? By calling the jack of spades? But that's not qualia but only a public event that suggests some kind of transmission.

Logic! Given that we're all human, we all have the same genes, genes that determine, at the very least, our general physical structures (including the brain), does it make sense to say our private experiences could be poles apart? If one apple tastes sweet, another does too, then another yet, aren't all apples sweet?

Like @180 Proof has twice reminded me: doubt must have a reason. Why should we doubt my private, inner life as not the same as yours or anyone else's - we're all cut from the same cloth in a manner of speaking, oui?

Nevertheless, cultural differences do exist (right?) between, broadly speaking, the Occident and the Orient.

How so? By simply not talking about them? — lll

Back again. Had to run for the trash takers. Forgot to put the paper container on the street.

I think by assuming that epistemic cut. It's an artificial cut for which there is no evidence. It's a chimerian cut. Laying at the basis though of science and many modern art (art being the ability of expressing "the most private personal emotions and feelings").

What's your take on telepathy? — Agent Smith

The difficulty with proving telepathy is that it doesn't occur in controlled experimental set-ups. So goes the argument. I had weird experiences though. Thinking about someone you haven't seen in years showing up around the corner.

Thinking about someone you haven't seen in years showing up around the corner — EugeneW

:lol:

Given that we're all human, we all have the same genes, genes that determine, at the very least, our general physical structures (including the brain), does it make sense to say our private experiences could be poles apart? — Agent Smith

I've thought about this objection before, and it's a good one. It's tempting to grant your point, but...It doesn't make sense to say either that they are poles apart or just the same. We have no data. None. You can say that similarity of structure implies similarity of qualia, but such a claim (also to quote @180 Proof) is 'evidence free.'

That's a 'logical' or 'grammatical' point which goes against my 'intuition' that 'of course' my little mammalian heart experiences the same love for them that my wife and my pup and my kitty feel for me.

Given that we're all human, we all have the same genes, genes that determine, at the very least, our general physical structures (including the brain), — Agent Smith

I think this is a false assumption. Genes don't program. We just use them. They're ßupplying us, together with the ribosomes, with the proteins where we need them.

but...It doesn't make sense to say either that they are poles apart or just the same — lll

I thought I made the case for our private experiences being similar (enough for government work) or even exactly identical.

doubt must have a reason. — Agent Smith

Consider that taking the metaphysical subject or Cartesian ego for granted with its qualia and Inner Light and other such mystified fireworks led to mountains and oceans of confusion. I don't deny qualia but point out (1) their uselessness for what they are supposed to be good for and (2) their tendency to confuse us about all kinds of related issues.

My primary objection is to the (what I'd call a) superstition that meaning can be founded upon them.

false assumption. — EugeneW

Why is it a false assumption. It's proven that genes are the determiners of our physical makeup. We use genes? :chin:

I thought I made the case for our private experiences being similar (enough for government work) or even exactly identical. — Agent Smith

Without a single data point?

You assume that similarity of biology implies similarity of 'private experience.'

qualia — lll

Nonphysicalism hanging by a thread. It's the last stand. Do or die!

Without a single data point? — lll

Genes?