1. Color realism
Number One would mean that our visual system is reproducing the color that is out there in the world, or somehow directly perceiving it. Thomas Reid is one philosopher who has defended such a position.
Why isn't the position the color is inside and not outside is not a realist position. as in objective vs subjective realism. Are you saying our subjective reality is not real? — Cavacava
Realism means mind-independence. Physicalism is an objective ontology. Yes, it does need to account for subjectivity, and that's a problem.
So physicalism has a monopoly on the meaning of being a realist? I think Subjectivity has just as much a claim to ontological reality as what is mind independent and but subjective reality cannot be fully reduced to objective/physical reality. — Cavacava
Physicalism. Stating that some things can't be described, they have to be experienced supports experience being something additional to the physical.
Why? Because the physical is an objective description of the world. — Marchesk
Number One would mean that our visual system is reproducing the color that is out there in the world, or somehow directly perceiving it. Thomas Reid is one philosopher who has defended such a position. — Marchesk
Two would be a Dennettian approach. We don't actually experience color anymore than p-zombies do. It's an illusion. As such, the physical facts leave nothing out, and there is nothing more to explain. — Marchesk
So the hammer is real, but my pain when I hit my finger is not? — Cavacava
I really hate these semantic confusions. — Marchesk
Therefore, there are no "physicalists," as you construe them, because no one in their right mind denies having experiences. — SophistiCat
She can still acquire it indirectly by other means, via our division of linguistic labour, a use of colour meters and so on. That's how we get to know what things are like in places we haven't experienced ourselves, and a lack of direct experience is no good reason to reject the knowledge. — jkop
would any amount of indirect facts tell us what bat sonar experience is? — Marchesk
If we don't perceive color as an objective property of light or objects, then there is a problem for physicalism, since all the physical facts leave out the color experiences. — Marchesk
Talk of physical facts tend to leave out things which are not so relevant in physics, such as biological facts. How is that a problem for "physicalism"? — jkop
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