I've been posting links to the principle of charity (as well as certain fallacies) the first time I mention it on a thread for ten years. It's a habit at this point, and this is the first complaint I've ever received about it. But if all this has been about me hurting your feelings, then I apologize. I never meant to do so.OK, maybe you don't realize that its unpleasant when someone implies that your posts rely on uncharitable interpretations and that it comes across condescending when you then post a link to the principle of charity. — shmik
Not directly. I chose to write up the entire argument in propositional calculus instead as that seemed the most direct way to prove my point that the argument is valid. My indirect reply can be seen in how I represented P6 in that rendition: A <=> H (where A = "some gratuitous suffering is preventable" and H = "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet"). The preventable gratuitous suffering referenced in my abbreviation is that caused by food production practices, so this gives us "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet."To which you didn't reply. — shmik
But again, "some" follows from "all." If all x ought to P, then x1 ought to P. — Postmodern Beatnik
X ought be saved iff X can be saved.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore, all Ys ought to donate.
Therefore some Ys ought to donate. — Michael
Michael your pilot example misses the point. It changes the obligation in the shift from all to some.
The obligation is this:
If two pilots are present, then all pilots would be obligated to fly.
It follows that from that obligation that;
If two pilots are present, then some pilots would be obligated to fly. — Soylent
Well, your uncertainty notwithstanding, it's still a basic fact of logic.I'm not sure. — Michael
This argument is invalid.Consider:
X ought be saved iff X can be saved.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore all Ys ought to donate. — Michael
I have already dealt with cases like this above. They are not counterexamples to the rule because they are not cases where it is simultaneously the case that all X ought to P and not the case that some X ought to P. Instead, they are cases where x1 ought to P iff x2–xn actually P. At best, the obligation of x1 in such cases is to show up prepared to donate (and to donate iff x2–xn show up).But if one Y doesn't donate then no other Y ought to donate because their donations cannot save X. So each Y's obligation to donate is dependent on every other Y donating. — Michael
Consider:
X ought be saved iff X can be saved.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore all Ys ought to donate.
— Michael
This argument is invalid. — Postmodern Beatnik
They are not counterexamples to the rule because they are not cases where it is simultaneously the case that all X ought to P and not the case that some X ought to P. Instead, they are cases where x1 ought to P iff x2–xn actually P. At best, the obligation of x1 in such cases is to show up prepared to donate (and to donate iff x2–xn show up).
(I have also suggested that the argument in the OP is best understood as not involving such contingent responsibilities.)
Okay, but what's the problem here? If the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. But if you think the conclusion is false, then you ought to reject one of the premises. That's why it's quixotic to go up against the rule: if it's not the case that some S are P, it's not the case that all S are P.All Ys ought to save X.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore all Ys ought to donate. — Michael
It depends on whether you mean "all" in the logical sense or not. If you really mean that each player makes a football team (which is what it means in the language of logic to say that all of these 11 players make a full football team), then it would follow that some of these 11 players make a full football team. We would have a valid—but unsound—argument. But what you actually mean is "the combination of these 11 players makes a full football team," which does not involve the logical "all" and therefore does not entail the logical "some." Surely you know this, so surely you realize that this attempt at a counterexample is fatuous.If all of these 11 players make a full football team then do some of these 11 players make a full football team? — Michael
I've already made this point myself, so I'm not sure how this constitutes a response to anything I've said.So I think a distinction needs to be made between "the set of people S is X" and "each member of the set of people S are X". — Michael
The latter. This is clearer if one bears in mind the revisions I suggested—and Soylent accepted—early on in the thread (which transformed C5 into "a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to do so").With respect to the OP, is C5 to be understood as "the set of people who can adopt a vegan diet ought adopt a vegan diet" or as "each member of the set of people who can adopt a vegan diet ought adopt a vegan diet"? — Michael
But my point here, where the topic is validity, has been that the argument does not make the obligation contingent. And my point elsewhere has been that the argument should not make the obligation contingent. In order to succeed, the argument needs to be framed in terms of individual duties. And the most charitable way of reading the argument requires us to understand it as doing exactly that. So the objection is irrelevant. It basically says, "if we change the argument in such-and-such a way, it's invalid!" But of course, any argument can be made invalid if we're allowed to fiddle with the premises however we like.But if the prevention of gratuitous suffering depends on contingent responsibilities (i.e. that a sufficient number of people adopt a vegan diet) then the obligation to adopt a vegan diet depends on contingent responsibilities. — Michael
I'm not sure. Consider: — Michael
I agree that some follows from all generally. — shmik
It depends on whether you mean "all" in the logical sense or not. — Postmodern Beatnik
All Ys ought to save X.
Each element of the set Y ought to save X
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
X can be saved iff the entire set Y donate
Therefore all Ys ought to donate.
Therefore the entire set Y ought to donate
Therefore some Ys ought to donate. — Michael
Because this is the motivation behind the discussion against Soylents version of the argument. Again, you are fighting an invisible battle to prove that all -> some while we are speaking about the distinction between the set and the members of the set.So I think a distinction needs to be made between "the set of people S is X" and "each member of the set of people S are X". — Michael
I've already made this point myself, so I'm not sure how this constitutes a response to anything I've said. — Postmodern Beatnik
Read the responses to this as if I had interpreted it to be maintaining a version of the argument. The version that used the incorrect move from speaking about the set as a whole to speaking about the elements.But the choice is not between reading P6 as meaning "by everyone" or "just by one person." If the reading is "by anyone who is in a position to," as I suggested, that is going to be a very large number of people. So the fact that you cannot change your local supermarket's buying patterns alone is irrelevant. And if it were true that a vegan diet ought to be adopted by anyone who is in a position to do so, then it wouldn't matter whether or not other people will in fact do so. All that would matter is whether or not any given individual was in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
Okay, but what's the problem here? If the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. But if you think the conclusion is false, then you ought to reject one of the premises. That's why it's quixotic to go up against the rule: if it's not the case that some S are P, it's not the case that all S are P. — Postmodern Beatnik
But what you actually mean is "the combination of these 11 players makes a full football team," which does not involve the logical "all" and therefore does not entail the logical "some." Surely you know this, so surely you realize that this attempt at a counterexample is fatuous.
The latter. This is clearer if one bears in mind the revisions I suggested—and Soylent accepted—early on in the thread (which transformed C5 into "a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to do so")
...
But my point here, where the topic is validity, has been that the argument does not make the obligation contingent. And my point elsewhere has been that the argument should not make the obligation contingent. In order to succeed, the argument needs to be framed in terms of individual duties. And the most charitable way of reading the argument requires us to understand it as doing exactly that. So the objection is irrelevant. It basically says, "if we change the argument in such-and-such a way, it's invalid!" But of course, any argument can be made invalid if we're allowed to fiddle with the premises however we like.
Then the two of you shouldn't have presented your comments as objections. If I point out that "all" entails "some" and you guys respond with some version of "no, it doesn't," then the logical force of your response is a denial of the claim that "all" entails "some."Neither me nor Michael are arguing that this is not the case. — shmik
But as I have pointed out several times, Soylent's argument is not committed to anything like what you and Michael have accused it of, particularly after my suggested revisions were accepted. So if the examples were meant to be analogous to anything in the argument, they have failed at that.The examples we are presenting are not meant to be counter examples to this. They are meant to be analogous to Soylent's argument. — shmik
Except the main error I am pointing out is that they aren't analogous to anything in the argument. I can agree that the sun rises in the east while continuing to maintain that this has nothing to do with whether or not Socrates is a man.So when you say that the examples have errors you are just agreeing with the point. — shmik
Well, Soylent is free to correct me if I am wrong, but I don't think the proper interpretation of his posts has him committed to "if the set {x, y, z} is S, then x is S, y is S, and z is S." I think he has been saying the same thing as me, albeit in different terms: "if all x's are S, then x1 is S, x2 is S, x3 is S..."It's meant to be analogous to a version of the argument which from looking at Soylents posts, he upholds, even though you yourself think the version is problematic. — shmik
For one, I'm not trying to prove it. I have no need to prove it. It has long been proven, and I am just pointing it out that fact to two people who have denied it (whether they meant to or not). For another, I'm pretty sure the "battle" isn't invisible. I can see it, you and Michael must be able to see it in order to respond, and I suspect anyone else reading the thread can see it as well. And finally, if you and Michael have been trying to talk about the distinction between the set and the members of the set, then you have done an incredibly bad job of it. I made the same point at the outset of the discussion, and you've both been directing your objections at me. Moreover, you've been presenting those objections as responses to my statement of the logical fact that "all" entails "some." Only now has either of you come out with what you were supposedly saying all along. It's like putting the blank space on a tape at the beginning instead of at the end.Again, you are fighting an invisible battle to prove that all -> some while we are speaking about the distinction between the set and the members of the set. — shmik
I understand how your error came about. I just don't understand why you are so keen to defend it.Read the responses to this as if I had interpreted it to be maintaining a version of the argument. The version that used the incorrect move from speaking about the set as a whole to speaking about the elements.
Then when you said all implies some, I took that as you reaffirming that incorrect version.
Maybe then you'll see why people have responded to you by bringing up this issue, and get a different picture of how the thread progressed. — shmik
Which means it was never true that all Ys ought to save X. So again, the argument is unsound. And more importantly, it is not analogous to anything that has been argued here.The issue is that if one Y refuses to donate then this relieves the others of their obligation to donate because their donations alone cannot save X, and their donations were only obligatory on the premise that it would save X. — Michael
What both you and shmik seem to have missed is that P6 is one of the premises that was modified right away. You keep going after the version in the OP, missing the point that the version found there was discarded ages ago. The revised P6 says "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet." The explicit statement of who is to be adopting a vegan diet then comes up in the revised P9 (and then the revised C5).The point is that P6 needs to be more specific in light of this. — Michael
Context matters, Michael. The point of that comment was that changing your supermarket's buying patterns isn't the only way to reduce or eliminate one's contribution to gratuitous suffering, therefore the fact that you cannot change your local supermarket's buying patterns alone is irrelevant. Nice try, though.But as you said to shmik earlier, "So the fact that you cannot change your local supermarket's buying patterns alone is irrelevant." Except it isn't irrelevant. If I can't change my local supermarket's buying patterns alone then the second premise above fails. — Michael
And my point has been that it doesn't say this, no matter how many people want to misread it that way.The current argument seems to be saying something like "the combination of these people ought to adopt a vegan diet because gratuitous suffering caused by food production is preventable if and only if the combination of these people adopt a vegan diet (and one is obligated to prevent gratuitous suffering) — Michael
The revised P6 says "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet." — Postmodern Beatnik
Which means it was never true that all Ys ought to save X. So again, the argument is unsound. And more importantly, it is not analogous to anything that has been argued here.
Because if not, then it seems like you don't a leg to stand on as far of the topic of this thread—the logical validity of the argument—is concerned. — Postmodern Beaknik
My concern is with P8, which strikes me as an out of place assumption but I can't quite articulate the problem. Does anyone have any insight and/or solutions? Does that premise render the argument circular or is it ok to have an assumption like that in the argument for the purposes of validity? I'm not invested in the argument, I drew it up quickly just as an interesting exercise.
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.*
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted.*
P7 If a vegan diet is adopted, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable.
P8 A vegan diet is adopted.* — Soylent
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.