I don't think most ontological claims are possible to vet empircally, so they can't be scientific. That said, science often informs our ontology and sometimes ontologies do make claims that science may be able to support or undermine.

With that in mind, parts of any ontology can be scientific. For example, the rise of information based ontologies comes from insights in quantum mechanics and the physics of how information is stored, particularly in black holes. If parts of the holographic principal are undermined by later discoveries in physics, it would have implications for these ontologies. I'm not even sure what to call information ontologies. They have more in common with physicalism than anything else, but seem distinct enough from them to warrant their own lable.

I feel like the creation of fully sentient behaving AI, and fully immersive virtual reality (probably involving some sort of direct stimulation of the brain) would be a boost to the credibility of physicalism in many ways, but, because some of the issues involved don't lend themselves to scientific analysis, there will still always be gaps reasonable people can disagree on when favoring one ontology over the other.

What about the necessity for coherence? Any philosophical theory must necessarily jibe with/square with other existing theories, including scientific ones like the 1st law of thermodynamics, ja? If not, anyone could think up any theory, no matter how discordant it is with the current framework of knowledge. — Agent Smith

Yes, of course, coherence is implied in a philosophical system a philosopher builds. Why don't you read Aristotle's substance and form so you could pick up the coherence there too? The parts of the explanation (the theoretical explanation) must logically connect to make a up a whole system of philosophical view -- that's coherence.

Could you explain a bit more about intelligibility? Thanks in advance. — Agent Smith

I just explained to you in my previous post. If a substance is accessible to you, it means you can understand it objectively -- epistemically it makes sense. In Descarte's cogito, he explained the self as intelligible, and through deliberation, one could understand the mind.

:ok:

A question: How would we be able to disprove dualism?

A question: How would we be able to disprove dualism? — Agent Smith

Disprove? Is there proof for dualism? You don't disprove something that never itself presented proof for its existence. I don't think any of the dual philosophers had presented proof. You either reject it or accept it.

Disprove? Is there proof for dualism? You don't disprove something that never itself presented proof for its existence. I don't think any of the dual philosophers had presented proof. You either reject it or accept it. — L'éléphant

Hitchens' razor!

So, you mean to say no one, no philosopher, has even attempted to prove dualism? I didn't know that was allowed in philosophy. What about René Descartes? What about David Chalmers (p-zombies, the hard problem of consciousness), Thomas Nagel (what is it like to be a bat?), etc.? What are all these guys on about?

Still, how would we disprove dualism? Proof and disproof are independent of each other or so I'm told i.e. it maybe harder to prove than disprove (all swans are white vs. Aussie black swans).

So, you mean to say no one, no philosopher, has even attempted to prove dualism? — Agent Smith

The word "disprove" is incorrect to use here. Like I said, no one in dualism community had presented a proof. If you don't know the techniques on how they present their philosophical system, then say so and, perhaps, I can explain further. The rest of your post above is a repetition of "disprove".

Maybe what you've been meaning to say is "refute" or "challenge" the dualist view.

The word "disprove" is incorrect to use here. — L'éléphant

Why? Dualism is a statement, oui? It is either true/false, ja? Disproving dualism is to show that it's false. :chin:

Good question. To the extent that I'm aware, the total energy in a system (here the brain) must be explained in physical terms. If dualism were true, this would be false (there would be energy that can't be explained materialistically) and we could/should then hypothesize another source (immaterial) for the extra energy. That's how I understoosd it, could be wrong. — Agent Smith

The only thing for a dualist to conclude is that qualia (thoughts, sensory impressions, emotions) don't have mass. Does electric charge have mass?

I don't think most ontological claims are possible to vet empircally, so they can't be scientific — Count Timothy von Icarus

This presupposes that what cannot be empirically verified is non-scientific. Still theòlogy, the science of the gods, is taught at our universities. Which could mean they are to vet empirically, like virtual particles are.

This presupposes that what cannot be empirically verified is non-scientific

Yes, I think that's correct, with a rather large caveat. Plenty of scientific theories are impossible to vet empircally currently. For example, multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics predict identical results. However, ways of testing between some of these have been proposed and more will likely follow in the future. Same sort of thing goes for M theory.

Proposals in science don't have to be falsifiable (e.g., Many Worlds). They do need some sort of connection to the findings of science in those cases though.

Many Worlds is a result of taking the Schrodinger Equation to its logical conclusions. Taking the equation seriously is supported by empirical results that demonstrate its accuracy in describing the world (except for that pesky collapse problem).

Meanwhile, many of the problems of ontology are necissarily not open to empirical inquiry, and it's hard to see how science can move the needle on them much. It's a very blurry difference, I will agree, but you need some sort of distinction to give science any definition at all.

I don't think most ontological claims are possible to vet empircally, so they can't be scientific. That said, science often informs our ontology and sometimes ontologies do make claims that science may be able to support or undermine.

With that in mind, parts of any ontology can be scientific. For example, the rise of information based ontologies comes from insights in quantum mechanics and the physics of how information is stored, particularly in black holes — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would argue instead that all scientific results are elements of theories , theories at elements of paradigms or scientific worldviews , and scientific worldviews are regional ontologies. so an empirical result only makes sense as an element in a relational totality that functions as a gestalt framework. A science can undermine its own claims in a minor way ( falsification) by remaining within a particular ontology(paradigm, worldview) or by replacing one paradigm with another , in which case there is a gestalt shift in the overall worldview , which is not merely a falsification, since the old and the new ontologies are not strictly commensurable.

This process is no different than how philosophy evolves., except for the fact that the methods of science tend to be more conventional and generic than those of philosophical inquiry. The methods of science don’t allow it to ‘progress’ any more effectively or quickly that philosophy.

Why? Dualism is a statement, oui? It is either true/false, ja? Disproving dualism is to show that it's false. — Agent Smith

:) You need to read up on how theories are presented. This is like going to a fight and bringing with you the wrong training.

Materialism is the claim that everything that exists is material (matter & energy, the two being equivalent, E = mc²)

$(\forall x) (Mx)$, where Mx: x is material. The negation of $(\forall x) (Mx)$ is $(\exists x) \neg (Mx)$. In other words we can falsify materialism. Find something that exists that isn't either matter or energy and we're done! Materialism is disprovable and so it has to be scientific in the Popperian sense.

Say there's something, an x, and we need to demonstrate, to prove nonphysicalism, that x isn't material (matter/energy). In the simplest of terms we need to show that x neither has mass nor volume (matter) and that no work can be done with it (energy). Is the required proof beyond our capabilities? How do we distinguish something that has no mass, no volume, no energy from nothing?

Add to our problems the fact that this x (includes the mind as per nonphysicalism) seems capable of having an effect on our bodies via the brain. Material objects like the body/the brain need energy input to do work. That means there should be an extra amount of energy that can't be explained materialistically. Have we measured this, to borrow a term from the frontiers of physics, dark energy?