If suffering is inherent in all compounded beings, you can't devise a plan to eliminate suffering.
Perhaps you could take an approach which is based on preserving a diversity of animals rather than preventing animal suffering but would still conclude with veganism. You can arrange it in P/C form, but... — Bitter Crank
If you are trying to patch up this argument, you're going to have to address the slide from "some non-human animals" to "all non-human animals" that is implicit in adopting veganism. — Postmodern Beatnik
I take issue with this. I don't think free range husbandry followed by the swift killing of animals would constitute gratuitous suffering. Therefore any gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable by changing those food production practices to free range husbandry followed by the swift killing of animals – which is consistent with a meat-eating diet. — Michael
It's not clear to me that a swift killing or the free range aspect makes the suffering any less gratuitous. The human/animal suffers less in a quantitative measure by being free range, but the swift killing undermines the quantitative reduction by the qualitative gratuity of killing them. We would object to that treatment as being extraordinarily cruel (to family and friends as well the interests of the human) to kill a human in that way. — Soylent
Suffering that is inflicted as an unavoidable consequence of a necessary action is not gratuitous since it is not preventable. — Soylent
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering. — Soylent
I suppose. You would need to specify that you are intending this as a stipulative definition, however, or else you're going to get objections from "standard" vegans (who eschew all animal products, including non-food animal products). You might also need to head off objections that your argument should apply to non-food products like leather jackets (unless you in fact want to extend the argument beyond food products).The semantic distinction is this: veganism can be defined as the practice of not using sentient animals in our food production. — Soylent
If the risk-averse assumption goes through, then we might not need the semantic distinction. You could argue that veganism (standard definition) is entailed by the main argument (which covers all sentient animals) plus the risk-averse assumption (which extends the argument to all animals, just as the "standard" vegan wants).But the risk-averse assumption would say we are poor at discerning sentience in other animals, so for risk-aversion, we can assume all animals used in food production are sentient. I would say the knowledge of some is sufficient to error on the side of caution with all. — Soylent
The trouble here is that humans have different capacities for suffering than animals. So it does not easily follow that an act which would cause gratuitous suffering in humans would also cause gratuitous suffering in non-human animals. Not all animals get attached to particular toys, for instance. Yet a young child may be terribly upset if you take away a toy and replace it with a different one (even a newer version of the old one).This rebuttal is addressed by P2 wherein the measure of gratuitous suffering is whether it would be considered gratuitous in humans. — Soylent
You're going to need at least one more clause here. When my father goes to the dentist for a root canal, it is known that he will suffer from it. That particular suffering is also preventable (he could opt out of the root canal). Yet we do not consider the suffering gratuitous. One reason is that we take it to be known that the root canal will prevent even worse suffering.Definition: If suffering is known and preventable, then said suffering is gratuitous (i.e., unjustified and wrong). — Soylent
However, I do not think that the risk-averse assumption goes through. — Postmodern Beatnik
The trouble here is that humans have different capacities for suffering than animals. — Postmodern Beatnik
You're going to need at least one more clause here. — Postmodern Beatnik
The problem is that P6 is not necessarily true depending on the subject. As far as I can tell it comes closest to being true when everyone adopts a vegan diet. There is no direct link between the person who eats the animal and the treatment of the animal. It could well be that my going vegan does not have any effect on the animals that are farmed, chances are my super market is not going to order less meat because I am no longer buying from them. — shmik
But I don't think one has to be a hard-line skeptic to deny the strong version (which is what I was responding to). There's a very soft kind of skepticism available here that says "the line is blurry, but it's not 10 miles wide." In fact, the strong version doesn't seem even remotely plausible. The weak version seems a lot more defensible. It significantly reduces the scope of the argument, but you seem to be fine with that.There will always be the hard-line skeptics that will demand proof rather than accept a principle on an assumption. — Soylent
I realize that, but I don't think that either version succeeds in doing so even if we accept it. What the risk-averse assumption tells us is that non-human animals are sentient. But even if sentience is a necessary condition for experiencing any form of suffering, it is not a sufficient condition for experiencing all forms of suffering. Sentience makes certain kinds of suffering possible, but other kinds of suffering require additional cognitive functions. Mere sentience, for instance, does not bring with it the ability to have long-term expectations or the risk of harm that comes from having such expectations dashed. So even if I were to accept that all non-human animals were sentient, it would not follow that they were all capable of suffering in the exact same way as humans. But if not everything that constitutes suffering in humans constitutes suffering in non-human animals, then the direct correspondence between human and non-human animal suffering has been broken. Therefore, we cannot assume that everything that constitutes gratuitous suffering in humans constitutes gratuitous suffering in non-human animals.This is precisely what the risk-averse assumption aims to overcome. — Soylent
This seems implausible, especially once the reasonable cost condition is in place (which I agree is helpful, particularly against the specific case I brought up previously). If gratuitous suffering is such a problem, and if it costs me very little to perform some action that would alleviate, eliminate, or reduce some gratuitous suffering, why am I not obligated to do so?We have obligations to prevent gratuitous suffering in a limited sense, if the prevention requires only that we abstain from actions that cause gratuitous suffering and not perform actions that alleviate or eliminate gratuitous suffering. — Soylent
Is this the only condition on which we can inflict or risk gratuitous suffering on ourselves? And if so, I wonder how wide a gap this creates. Is freedom too high a cost to pay for not being able to get elective surgeries? Let's say we were trying to convince someone to wait until they were 21 to get a full body tattoo despite 18 being the age at which people are generally considered adults (and thus capable of making their own decisions on matters like these). Tattooing isn't exactly pleasant, particularly a full body tattoo. This is a known risk of getting a tattoo (so there's some known suffering involved). Not getting the tattoo spares them from a certain amount of physical harm for a short period of time (so the known suffering is preventable), and the psychological harm is arguably minimal given the fact that they only have to wait three extra years to get the tattoo (so the cost to prevent the harm is reasonable). Should the 18-year-old wait? Is it obligatory that they do so? Should they wait longer?One might choose to inflict or risk gratuitous suffering on oneself (e.g., elective surgeries), if the prevention is considered to be an unreasonable cost (e.g., further harm, either psychological or physical). — Soylent
If gratuitous suffering is such a problem, and if it costs me very little to perform some action that would alleviate, eliminate, or reduce some gratuitous suffering, why am I not obligated to do so? — Postmodern Beatnik
Is this the only condition on which we can inflict or risk gratuitous suffering on ourselves? — Postmodern Beatnik
When written like this, which is the way P6 is written (ii) is not a problem. As long as each persons adoption of veganism is effective at preventing suffering the biconditional holds (here the collective can be viewed as a group of individuals).Two objections come to mind: i) the individualsobligationadoption of veganism is ineffective at preventing gratuitous suffering and ii) the collectiveobligationadoption of veganism is effective at preventing gratuitous suffering. If either is true, the biconditional is defeated. — Soylent
If you go by this then I think this 'issue' with P6 is solved.A charitable reading can grant that i) is false, the individual obligation can prevent gratuitous suffering — Soylent
I believe it is false because the biconditional is too strong. That said there are ways to fix it up, I've mentioned one using statistics. Another could be to hold that an individual has an obligation even if he doesn't know whether his specific actions will have an effect. Either of these allow you to replace the biconditional with something weaker and still get an obligation as your conclusion. — shmik
No problem! This has been fun, even if it is just an exercise.I have no particular interest to defend this argument beyond what I feel is intellectually honest, but I will address some comments for which I feel I can offer a response. — Soylent
Right. This is the point to focus on. You let me push you into a corner before by saying that we don't have certain obligations, but you had no need to make that concession. All you needed to say was "regardless of whatever other obligations we may have, we have this obligation of omission" (which is where you have now landed). After all, the argument loses nothing by remaining silent about what other obligations we may have.It's not that there may not be further obligations for people to act, but at the basic level I want to focus on the most general obligation applicable to the most/all people. — Soylent
Again, I think this is the correct response (strategically, at least). You didn't answer the tattooing question directly, but I take it from your response that you think the concern about freedom is covered by the "unreasonable cost (due to psychological harm)" clause. Is this correct?I'm inclined to say yes — Soylent
Or at least, you misunderstand me enough that you can't be sure. But in this case, you are correct that we are in agreement here.It needs to mean that each individual's (from the set of people who can go vegan) adoption of veganism has an affect on the gratuitous suffering. I'm pretty certain both me and Postmodern Beatnik agree on that but it seems that we misunderstand each other often enough that I can't be sure. — shmik
Well could you think of another possible way that some gratuitous suffering could be prevented? I could name many that would even have a closer relationship to the suffering of animals. A farmer letting two of his cows out into a field one afternoon, even though he normally doesn't do so, is enough to defeat the bi conditional. That's what I mean by too strong, it argues that the are no other ways to prevent any of the animals gratuitous suffering. It argues that someone who had been dumpster diving for his meat would have an affect on animal suffering if he became vegetarian because it can't allow that there are any individuals whose veganism has no effect.I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "too strong". It's strong insofar as it establishes a one-to-one relationship between the means and ends of an action. If another action can be substituted for the adoption of veganism by the individual, the bi-conditional is defeated since it explicitly states the only means for preventing gratuitous suffering is the adoption of veganism by the individual (hence objection ii). — Soylent
True I do have a lot of trouble constructing a coherent position from your posts.Or at least, you misunderstand me enough that you can't be sure. — Postmodern Beatnik
And yet no one else does.True I do have a lot of trouble constructing a coherent position from your posts. — shmik
P6 isn't about gratuitous suffering simpliciter, though. It's about gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. Letting the cows out one afternoon doesn't stop them from being slaughtered and processed for food. And while it may give them some pleasure, it doesn't prevent their eventual suffering. This is particularly important given that the argument is concerned with eliminating our contribution to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices (and not just reducing it). Just finding another way to reduce the suffering doesn't affect the claim that one might have to adopt a vegan diet to eliminate one's contribution to the suffering.Well could you think of another possible way that some gratuitous suffering could be prevented? — shmik
I am speaking about food production. The vast majority of gratuitous suffering during food production is a result of farming practices before the animals are slaughtered. I doubt that I am the only person who believes that even small changes in farming practices such as removing some of the confinement of the animals is enough to prevent some suffering. Some of your contribution can be preventable by changes in the practices of your supplier.P6 isn't about gratuitous suffering simpliciter, though. It's about gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. Letting the cows out one afternoon doesn't stop them from being slaughtered and processed for food. And while it may give them some pleasure, it doesn't prevent their eventual suffering. — Postmodern Beatnik
But then it's not your contribution. It may be the case that boycotting a farm could result in the farmer changing his practices. But your example of the farmer making a personal decision to let two of his cows out one afternoon has only to do with his contribution. Your contribution (or at least, the relevant portion of your contribution given the additional stipulations Soylent has made on this thread) comes from factors that you can personally control (including, but not limited to, the demand you add to the market).Some of your contribution can be preventable by changes in the practices of your supplier. — shmik
But then it's not your contribution. It may be the case that boycotting a farm could result in the farmer changing his practices. But your example of the farmer making a personal decision to let two of his cows out one afternoon has only to do with his contribution. Your contribution (or at least, the relevant portion of your contribution given the additional stipulations Soylent has made on this thread) comes from factors that you can personally control (including, but not limited to, the demand you add to the market). — Postmodern Beatnik
So there are numerous ways to read P6 (again, because it was created in such a vague way). You here are presenting a reading that all of the personal contribution is preventable iif a vegan diet is adopted. I was interpreting it as some of the personal contribution is preventable iff a vegan diet is adopted.All it requires is that one's contribution cannot be fully eliminated without adopting a vegan diet. — Postmodern Beatnik
Good thing I'm not doing that, then.This is pretty weird, trying to separate your contribution from the farming practices. — shmik
No.Are you arguing that at first I had a contribution, then that contribution disappeared, but also that it was not my contribution it was the farmers? — shmik
Of course I am going after the example. The example was your evidence, so the point doesn't stand if the evidence for it isn't any good. But that doesn't mean I think letting the cows out isn't part of farming practices. The point is that there is a difference between the farmer letting the cows out because we convince him to and the farmer letting the cows out because he does so on a whim. If he does so on a whim, then our actions didn't cause it. That seems pretty straightforwardly true. Therefore, unless the example is modified to make it such that our actions are leading to the cows being let out, it seems strange to attribute to us any reduction in their suffering that letting them out causes.If you argue that letting a couple cows out one evening isn't part of farming practices, just the farmers whim, then you are going after the example, not my main point. — shmik
If you're not concerned with reading it correctly, then yes.So there are numerous ways to read P6 (again, because it was created in such a vague way). — shmik
No, I am not. In fact, I am saying that we should understand P6 as claiming that so long as we have not adopted a vegan diet, some of our preventable contribution to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices remains. Such a reading leaves open the possibility that there are other ways of reducing the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices and that we may have other duties regarding the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices. It is a minimal strategy: whatever our other duties may be, we are at least obligated to adopt a vegan diet.You here are presenting a reading that all of the personal contribution is preventable iff a vegan diet is adopted. — shmik
It's not clear to me that a swift killing or the free range aspect makes the suffering any less gratuitous. The human/animal suffers less in a quantitative measure by being free range, but the swift killing undermines the quantitative reduction by the qualitative gratuity of killing them. We would object to that treatment as being extraordinarily cruel (to family and friends as well the interests of the human) to kill a human in that way. — Soylent
... gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted ...
Um, no it's not. It's a rhetorical device whereby the example given is very weak to show that the conditions for the claim being false are easily satisfied. It's the same as saying, 'even Brian could work out what I meant in that example'. A charitable reading would not argue that the example is false but rather look at what the argument is implying.Of course I am going after the example. The example was your evidence, so the point doesn't stand if the evidence for it isn't any good. — Postmodern Beatnik
But this isn't a charitable way of reading the argument, it is false if I have any non vegan practices which don't contribute to gratuitous suffering caused by food production. I wrote this exact thing in the post above. For example dumpster diving some of my food, eating at a party; eating the leftovers that my housemate is about to throw out; eating some chocolate you find on the street; having a sip of your friends hot chocolate; chances are that buying meat from a supermarket doesn't have an effect either etc. (think of your own example if you think those are problematic). If I cut out everything but these behaviors then I am not vegan and none of my preventable contribution remains.I am saying that we should understand P6 as claiming that so long as we have not adopted a vegan diet, some of our preventable contribution to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices remains. — Postmodern Beatnik
If the example isn't evidence (even if just by way of illustration), then what was the purpose of presenting it?Um, no it's not. — shmik
Yeah, that's called "evidence."It's a rhetorical device whereby the example given is very weak to show that the conditions for the claim being false are easily satisfied. — shmik
I was doing both at the same time, whether you realize it or not.A charitable reading would not argue that the example is false but rather look at what the argument is implying. — shmik
First of all, charity does not require us to interpret a claim in a way that makes it true at all costs. Second, you don't actually mean if you have any non-vegan practices. I sleep every night, and my sleeping at night does not contribute to gratuitous suffering caused by food production. But that clearly does not disprove (or in any way undermine) the claim. What you mean is something like "non-vegan food consumption practices."But this isn't a charitable way of reading the argument, it is false if I have any non vegan practices which don't contribute to gratuitous suffering caused by food production. — shmik
Well I was speaking to Soylent who asked me to explain what I meant by too strong, so it makes sense to give a weak example.If the example isn't evidence (even if just by way of illustration), then what was the purpose of presenting it? — Postmodern Beatnik
Of coarse I didn't expect anyone to interpret me as saying that if a farmer letting 2 of his cows out into the field on one occasion doesn't reduce their suffering during the food production process, then my argument falls apart. It makes no sense to interpret it that way.Well could you think of another possible way that some gratuitous suffering could be prevented? I could name many that would even have a closer relationship to the suffering of animals. A farmer letting two of his cows out into a field one afternoon, even though he normally doesn't do so, is enough to defeat the bi conditional. That's what I mean by too strong, it argues that the are no other ways to prevent any of the animals gratuitous suffering. — me
Of course not, actually I think most the claims to charity in this thread are garbage, if an argument has 2 interpretations both of which are problematic (in much the same ways) then neither of them is considered the charitable one.First of all, charity does not require us to interpret a claim in a way that makes it true at all costs. — Postmodern Beatnik
Now this is covered by the principal of charity, it's not even worth bringing up. Anyway I didn't realize that vegans don't sleep, that sleeping was a non-vegan practice.Second, you don't actually mean if you have any non-vegan practices.I sleep every night, and my sleeping at night does not contribute to gratuitous suffering caused by food production. But that clearly does not disprove (or in any way undermine) the claim. What you mean is something like "non-vegan food consumption practices." — Postmodern Beatnik
The problem is that the example is bad.it makes sense to give a weak example. — shmik
No one has interpreted it that way. If you think so, then you are thoroughly confused.Of course, I didn't expect anyone to interpret me as saying that if a farmer letting 2 of his cows out into the field on one occasion doesn't reduce their suffering during the food production process, then my argument falls apart. — shmik
Well, all of the claims about charity on this thread have been made by you and Soylent, with most of them made by you. So if you want to dismiss them as garbage, I won't object.I think most the claims to charity in this thread are garbage — shmik
Equivocation. Calling something a non-vegan practice is not the same as saying vegans don't do it. It is to say that it is not part of or entailed by the veganism.Anyway I didn't realize that vegans don't sleep, that sleeping was a non-vegan practice. — shmik
I'm not sparring. Perhaps you are. The fact that anyone had the gall to disagree with you on the other thread clearly set you off for some reason, and you've been trying to score points rather than make productive contributions ever since. But all I've been trying to do is get your objection expressed in a way that was both sensible and clear. We've finally achieved that, so I'm satisfied.So now that we have dispensed with the obligatory sparring — shmik
Well, of course I do. Once deciphered, they're similar to the points I made a month ago. Again, this was never about disagreeing with you. This was about the clarification process that is central to philosophy. What you are saying now is much different in form and expressed content than what you started with, even if it reflects what you were trying to get at all along. And given your incessant claim that Soylent's argument wasn't clear enough, it seems odd to exempt yourself from the same sort of demands. Surely that is not your intention, in which case there should be nothing wrong with me trying to get clear on what exactly it is you are trying to say.you agree that my point needs to be addressed in the context of this argument, good. — shmik
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