Does this becoming conform to a scheme, like for instance a dialectic? — Joshs
I'm intrigued by the triadic systems approach — jas0n
I relate to this, and I connect it with the difficulty of philosophy. Tie a knot over here and another knot comes undone over there. Or it's blanket too small for the bed. — jas0n
Good analogies. And that is why hierarchy theory seems central to me. It is the basic structure of recursion itself. It is about the self-organisation or emergence of "fit" in any holistic sense. — apokrisis
Thinking/meaning is historical, more software than hardware, more 'we' than 'I. — jas0n
As I mentioned earlier, even though I think Gallagher and Gadamer misread Heidegger , they at least recognized that he was not dissolving the self into an interpersonal ‘we’ . — Joshs
The 'interior monologue' is something that can only come after being a little we-blob. 'The subject is an effect of language' and 'the soul is the prison of the body.' Even if these are overstatements, they at least balance an old philosophical prejudice...the lonely subject, imagined as that which is most primary, most given, most secure... — jas0n
The subject is an effect of language' — jas0n
The body's interaction is always more intricate than language. It is after and with language, always again freshly ongoing and constellating this situation in the present.” — Joshs
There is no ‘interior monologue’. — Joshs
Does this becoming conform to a scheme, like for instance a dialectic?
— Joshs
I would say that yes. I am making a claim about human nature, postulating a permanent structure in human experience. — jas0n
the meaning of signs is external to the subject — jas0n
There is no ‘interior monologue’.
— Joshs
Well, sure, but this concept remains legible. I am criticizing a subjectivism that would construct the world from the idea of such a monologue ( — jas0n
So a little boy talks to himself before he talks to mommy and daddy? — jas0n
For instance, is human philosophy conceived of as something like reality's self-knowledge? — jas0n
Is reality made of signs that are neither mental nor physical ? For this distinction is itself a cut of the sign ? — jas0n
Have you looked into Derrida's différance? — jas0n
He talks to them as the others to his self-othering monologue, a compounding of otherness. Of course , he will only discover their otherness by their failure to respond to him in as anticipatable a way as his body responds to himself. — Joshs
In living, our bodies generate, imply, and enact language and culture; but with and after those, our bodies imply (project, experience, sense, practice, demand . . .) more. What they imply is inherently interactional and social, but it is more precise and implies what has never as yet formed and happened.” — Joshs
In short the precision of science (to, some say, the 15th decimal place) is against the Wittgensteinian view that language is imprecise. — Agent Smith
That's math, though, a game of symbols, a generalization of chess, one might say. One can be ultra-precise in this limited domain. — jas0n
This is Pattee's epistemic cut. Life and mind arise because they can make physical marks - like a DNA codon or a new synaptic junction - which look perfectly meaningless to the physical world that they then sneakily turn out to regulate.
It costs the body as much to code for a nonsense protein as it does for some crucial enzyme. The world - as a realm of rate dependent dynamics - can't see anything different about the two molecules in terms of any material or structural physics. Both are equally lacking in meaning - and even lacking in terms of being counterfactually meaningless as well. The two molecules just don't fit any kind of signal~noise dichotomy of the kind that semiotics, as a science of meaning, would seek to apply. — apokrisis
Life and mind earn their way in the cracks of existence by breaking down accidental barriers to maximum entropy - like the way industrialised humans are taking half a billion years worth of buried carbon, slowly concentrated into rich lodes of coal and petroleum, and burning the bulk of it in a 200 year party. — apokrisis
This is the epistemic cut issue. As I previously said, the central trick of semiosis is that a sign is really - as Pattee makes clear - a switch. And it is then easy to see the connection as well as the cut. A mechanical switch is both a logical thing and a physical thing. It has a foot on both sides of the divide.
So that fact puts a halt to the homuncular regress. The two worlds - of entropy and information - are bridged semiotically at the scale of your smallest possible physical switches. — apokrisis
Generally post-modernism is the backlash against its own structuralist past. It wants to kill the part of itself that was valuable. — apokrisis
I'd say mathematizing issues (transforming it into a mathematical one) goes a long way towards resolving them. — Agent Smith
I'm not sure how all that relates to Wittgenstein-Popper in re science-philosophy. — Agent Smith
But more correctly: The fact that I use the word "hand" and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings — shows that absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game, that the question "How do I know..." drags out the language-game, or else does away with it.
Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise, "Is there such a thing as a unicorn?" and so on. But such a question is possible only because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For how does one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns? How did one learn the method for determining whether something exists or not?
Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?
Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?
All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much as the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.
At the core of all well-founded belief lies belief that is unfounded.
Math is brilliantly stupid — jas0n
Explain yourself. — Agent Smith
he's critiquing, what he probably believes is, the impossible standards of philosophy (impossible in the sense too rigid, lacking flexibility, exacting, stringent, you get the idea). — Agent Smith
Most language is too meaningful, too suggestive, explosively untamed. It needs context, context, context. Philosophy still doesn't know what it means by 'meaning.' But (practical) math requires much less context and yet delivers far more clarity. Math is 'hard' because...most people find it too boring for the necessary concentration ? Or they drag in too much meaning and can't just see it as a calculus? I think it's harder to understand Hegel or Derrida or Wittgenstein than to learn calculus. I don't claim to have mastered any of those thinkers. The dialogue is endless. — jas0n
Mathematics is overrated then, oui? I don't know how to respond to that, math being my hobby and all. — Agent Smith
I fail to see why all this fuss about his so-called language games. If you disagree you need to tell us how contexts differ from language games. Are you up to the task? — Agent Smith
Derrida (as you may know) destabilizes this dichotomy. Signifiers refer to still other signifiers (not a signified made of pure thought-stuff that shines for/as the ghost in the machine. — jas0n
Some have claimed that our technical/abstract terms are just dead metaphors, their blood having been drained till they are imageless. — jas0n
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