Hick is known as a pluralist. That captures the point I'm trying to make about there being a 'core insight' that is carried in the various traditions - but without merging them all into a kind of new-age syncretism. They're agreeing AND disagreeing about something real. But whatever that reality is, is out-of-scope for what we currently understand as science. — Wayfarer

Ok, so what is this "core insight"? This thing on which they both agree and disagree? This thing which cannot be "merged"?

I don't think you, or any one else, can say what it is. That's what it means for something to be ineffable. If I am wrong in theist hen all you need do is tell me what this "core insight" is.

Hence, for the purposes of the this particular topic, I do not see how this "core insight" can be of any use in setting out a definition, of any use in explaining the concept of religion.

Isn't there is a thread of self-deception in the writings of Hick, Royce, and others who would tell us how religion is ineffable?

But what underwrites virtue? — Wayfarer

That question seems to me to demonstrate a pretty fundamental misunderstanding of the logic of ethical language. it's a bit like your asking for . If one ought do such-and-such, then there is no further reason needed. The notion that it makes sense to ask why one ought be virtuous, to require a reason for being virtuous, is muddled, since being virtuous is exactly doing what one ought to do.

But the point goes deeper than mere logic, into the dynamics of action and belief. Supposing that we might find a something that underwrites ethical considerations gets the direction of fit wrong. Ethics changes the world to fit our ideas; hence ethics is not found, nor could we find something that underwrites ethics. (@Hanover, this is not unrelated to our PM discussion).

Like it or not, we decide what is virtuous.

I might here return your psychologising from yesterday. Is this really about your fear that we don't have a convincing, knock-down argument that folk should act in a certain way? Is god just a way for you to satisfy yourself that your ethical opinions are "underwritten", are authoritative?

In any case, than you for your Thoth-provoking replies.

The reason for being good is for no other reason than that we regard it as good. — Fooloso4

Yep.

The notion that it makes sense to ask why one ought be virtuous, to require a reason for being virtuous, is muddled, since being virtuous is exactly doing what one ought to do. — Banno

The question isn't why we ought be virtuous. It's why we ought do X, where X is any particular act. Once we've concluded that a particular act ought be done, we can can then call that act virtuous.

So then this construct begs the question then of "what makes an act virtuous." And you respond:

Like it or not, we decide what is virtuous. — Banno

Who is "we"? Me and you, the modern Western world, the man with the biggest guns, a wise philosopher? Who?

In any event, is this not a nod to subjectivism? If the world goes mad and finds virtue in rape, is not rape virtuous? Don't you wish to say. "I don't care what anyone says, THAT is wrong!" That is, we can say whatever we want, but wrong is wrong. Do you not agree?

Ethics changes the world to fit our ideas; hence ethics is not found, nor could we find something that underwrites ethics. ( — Banno

A contradiction. Your last statement asserted "we" underwrite our own ethics, but now there is no underwriter at all. Is this not a nod to nihilism? An argument could be made that it's better to say there is no ethics than to say we can decree the profane holy, right?

I know you take my views as improper extrapolating from yours, drawing conclusions you deny should arise from your statements, but it is a serious problem with atheistic morality to try and claim how there can be eternal truths.

The reason for being good is for no other reason than that we regard it as good.
— Fooloso4

Yep. — Banno

Which is precisely why Putin is invading Ukraine: for no reason other than he thinks it good.

While I agree, I think there is a more fundamental problem with taking god as the grounding for morality.

Even if one presumed that some given creed is the indubitable word of god, and that it sets out what we God proposes we ought do, it remains open to us to reject that proposal.

It remains open to us to decide to follow god's proposals, or not. It is we who decide what to do.

This is simply an alternate way of seeing out the issue of directionality. In ethical language, we do not seek to make our words match what is the case; we set out to make what is the case match our words.

In this sense, moral authority rests with us.

I don't think you, or any one else, can say what it is. That's what it means for something to be ineffable. If I am wrong in this then all you need do is tell me what this "core insight" is. — Banno

It is something that has be realised, known first-hand.

The "perennial philosophy" is in this context defined as a doctrine which holds [1] that as far as worth-while knowledge is concerned not all men are equal, but that there is a hierarchy of persons, some of whom, through what they are, can know much more than others; [2] that there is a hierarchy also of the levels of reality, some of which are more "real," because more exalted than others; and [3] that the wise men of old have found a "wisdom" which is true, although it has no "empirical" basis in observations which can be made by everyone and everybody; and that in fact there is a rare and unordinary faculty in some of us by which we can attain direct contact with actual reality--through the praj~naa (paaramitaa) of the Buddhists, the logos of Parmenides,(30) the sophia of Aristotle(31) and others, Spinoza's amor dei intellectualis, Hegel's Vernunft, and so on; and [4] that true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents. — Edward Conze, Buddhist Philosophy and it's European Parallels

If I attempt to relate that - even considering I possess it, which I don't - if you're not even open to the possibility that it is so, then there's nothing to discuss.

As far as the rational nature of ethics, I believe that is writ large in the entire Western philosophical corpus - Aristotle, Plato, and Kant, to name only a few.

Which is precisely why Putin is invading Ukraine: for no reason other than he thinks it good. — Hanover

And was he right? What do you think?

See where the choice sits?

Perhaps not. There will doubtless be folk too enamoured with external authority to see that the decision is theirs.

And was he right? What do you think? — Banno

I think whether he is right or wrong isn't dependent upon what I think. If I ok rape, that makes me wrong.

There will doubtless be folk too enamoured with external authority to see that the decision is theirs. — Banno

The decision is mine to decide whether to do right or wrong, but I'm not empowered to make wrong right.

If I attempt to relate that - even considering I possess it, which I don't - if you're not even open to the possibility that it is so, then there's nothing to discuss. — Wayfarer

Doesn't the way this response closes off the conversation bother you?

Even if one presumed that some given creed is the indubitable word of god, and that it sets out what we God proposes we ought do, it remains open to us to reject that proposal. — Banno

Yes, what evidence do we have that god is a moral being - other than in the fan fiction (scripture), which by most accounts seems to suggest the opposite is the case.

And if we separate our notion of god from any old books, how do we determine what god wants us to do anyway? It's all very well to argue that god provides a foundation for morality in theory, but what is that morality if god/s are not present to share their views? We are still left to our own counsel on these matters, to guess or intuit god's values.

In any event, is this not a nod to subjectivism? If the world goes mad and finds virtue in rape, is not rape virtuous? — Hanover

Are not some cultures insane by the standards of others? Can we demonstrate that we have access to virtues that transcend human perspectives?

As far as the rational nature of ethics, I believe that is writ large in the entire Western philosophical corpus - Aristotle, Plato, and Kant, to name only a few. — Wayfarer

Oh, very much so; but that's different to accepting this or that authority in some actual case. While our philosophical forefathers might show how one might think, they cannot make our decision for us.

This or that authority must be chosen, may be disregarded. Kierkegaard was honest in this regard. Others, including some in this very thread, would prefer to join Brian's mum with "Because it is written, that's why!"

I think you might agree with me that the uncritical acceptance of authority has its part to play in, say, the residential schools affair in Canada, Australia's lost Generation, and even in the Paedophilia and abuse found in so many social groups. It's a denial of the place of personal responsibility for one's actions. It's the Nuremberg defence in an unexpected context.

Anyway, interesting as all this is, it distances us from the topic at hand, which is the nature of religion.

While others may differ, I don't see a way to make morality or ethical considerations central to the concept of religion.

Ritual does seem to have some part, as does some reference to the ineffable... I'll not say "supernatural" since I don't; think that term can be made coherent, for reasons set out by Hume.

The decision is mine to decide whether to do right or wrong, but I'm not empowered to make wrong right. — Hanover

So who will do this for you? Something else for you to decide.

The directionality of ethical considerations will not relieve you of such responsibilities.

Doesn't the way this response closes off the conversation bother you? — Banno

But if you keep going back to a default position which forecloses the idea of there being a sapiential dimension to philosophy, then what is there to discuss? That was what my intemperate outburst yesterday was in response to. I felt that passage I quoted from Josiah Royce conveys something profound, but it's met with 'so what?'

While our philosophical forefathers might show how one might think, they cannot make our decision for us. — Banno

But we value philosophers because they have insights that we do not. It's not a matter of slavishly following authority, but also not a matter of rejecting the insights of the tradition because it's an authority.

Are not some cultures insane by the standards of others? Can we demonstrate that we have access to virtues that transcend human perspectives? — Tom Storm

Good question.

...forecloses... — Wayfarer

But what is being suggested is not foreclosing on the entire "sapiential" project, so much as setting aside a part which our analysis shows is fraught: the creed, the saying; other ways of addressing the getting of wisdom are still open to us, in the forms of practice; as well as what we might call showing, but which perhaps belongs to aesthetics.

So we drop the saying, and get on with showing and doing.

The aesthetic aspect of religion needs discussion in terms of the topic of this thread, too.
_____________________

But we value philosophers because they have insights that we do not. It's not a matter of slavishly following authority, but also not a matter of rejecting the insights of the tradition because it's an authority. — Wayfarer

Oh, yes, I agree. It's why we are here... but the quality of what these folk have to say varies greatly, and demands a strong critical eye.

Even if one presumed that some given creed is the indubitable word of god, and that it sets out what we God proposes we ought do, it remains open to us to reject that proposal. — Banno

Even if one accepts the word of God, the word of God remains necessarily open to interpretation. As Moses learned while leading the people to Sinai, judges are needed to interpret and administer the law.

So who will do this for you? Something else for you to decide.

The directionality of ethical considerations will not relieve you of such responsibilities. — Banno

I'm not sure the reason for this clarification, as if I abandoned my free will to God. As an aside, and a debate for another time, but relying upon the incoherence of an ability to decide for myself, as if freedom of the will is meaningful within a secular context, is an irony.

At any rate, if the power to choose what shall be right and what shall be wrong is truly a power I possess, my divine command cannot be objected to and I'd have no reason to choose one rule over the other.

Unless I do have a reason..

If I do, then I'm not deciding from scratch, but something mysterious is guiding me.

Are not some cultures insane by the standards of others? Can we demonstrate that we have access to virtues that transcend human perspectives? — Tom Storm

I suspect whatever reservation you have in condemning rape in other nations exists only in your inability to articulate a reason why your cultural values should predominate, but your conscience leaves you no doubt as to the immorality of it.

but your conscience leaves you no doubt as to the immorality of it. — Hanover

Are not the varieties of conscience as much a cultural construct as our Western, 21st century proscription of and aversion to rape?

One can fancy a fanciful culture in which it would be considered an honor to be raped....or to be sacrificed and eaten.

I'm not deciding from scratch, but something mysterious is guiding me. — Hanover

Ok, so what is this "core insight"? — Banno

The Buberian I-It versus I-Thou dynamic looks like a good starting point for a broad analysis of religion.

The confrontation with the self by way of the I-Thou experience allows the survival instinct to be in a sense expanded to the Thou - allowing us a more profound self- and other-realization (realitization!) and a powerful foundation for the golden rule.

We have an abundance of examples. Choose your judge well; and your interpreter...

I'm not sure the reason for this clarification... — Hanover

Yep.

I suspect whatever reservation you have in condemning rape in other nations exists only in your inability to articulate a reason why your cultural values should predominate, but your conscience leaves you no doubt as to the immorality of it. — Hanover

I'm happy to condemn it. I didn't give you a full answer.

I generally take an imperfect secular humanist view that actions which cause harm to human flourishing are bad. We can even set up 'objective' criteria relative to this basic goal. But I guess you must agree on this presupposition of 'flourishing' to begin with. You refer to conscience. Yep, most people are socialized to hold certain values and these are often shared across cultures and are strongly felt.

The Buberian I-It versus I-Thou dynamic — ZzzoneiroCosm

You might say God happens when the universe apart from the I - the universe as a whole - is experienced as a Thou.

I suppose the OP is designed not to discuss religion per se but the Wittgensteinian take on language and its implications vis-à-vis philosophy, specifically the nature of/problem with meaning/definitions.

If we are to construct a Venn diagram with religions, there is nothing in the region where all the circles overlap. That would be what I understand to be the essence of religion, its defining feature. Lacking such a unifying common factor, how do we understand the meaning of the word "religion"?

The meaning is to be found elsewhere then, necessarily so, oui! Wittgenstein claimed that meaning is use. What exactly this means is probably lost in translation, Wittgenstein wrote in German. :smile:

To follow your example, the article posits two types of approaches. The first are the Monothetic approaches in which all circles overlap so that some explicit criteria or group of criteria are in each circle, and these serve to define religion. These are rejected. The second are the Polythetic approaches, in which no single criteria is found in each and every circle. There are two variations on this, the first in which one can explicitly set out a group of criteria, at least one of which is found in any circle, but no circle need contain them all; the second in which explicitly lists some "bounded" criteria, which are found in all religions. It's pretty unclear how this differs from Monothetic approaches. Perhaps someone could set this out more clearly?

SO far this thread has looked at a few candidates for suitable criteria, such as ritualistic practice, ethical foundation, supernatural explanations, talk of the ineffable... non of which have been found adequate.

I do not think that the article's discussion of the two kinds of analysis does justice to the notion of a family resemblance. A more formal analysis might explicate this.

Edit: oh, and there's , but what that might look like remains unclear.

Why don't we do something different?

Buddhism and Christianity both have rituals. Check.

Christianity and Judaisim both are monotheistic. Check.

Now what's the similarity between rituals and monotheism?

To give a mathematical example by way of clarification:

56 = 7 × 8
72 = 3 × 24

There doesn't seem to be anything common between 56 and 72 when factored this way, but hold on (vide infra)

8 = 2 × 4
24 = 6 × 4

8 and 24 have a common factor, 4, as I factorized them.

To cut to the chase, first identify any and all features common between any two religions, suppose these are x, y, z. Step 2, find what's common to all x, y, z. If nothing, repeat the process like so: What's shared between x,y and y, z and x, z. Say that's a, b, c. Reiterate the process until you finally arrive at what is the essence of a given word, here "religion".

Hmm. That's different, but I don't find it especially clear. I think a better formalisation is disjunctive normal form...

(A & B) v (C & D)

...in which A, B, C... are given criteria. The advantage is that any proposition that can be parsed in first order language can be parsed in disjunctive normal form.

IN this formalisation, Monothetic definitions would look like:

A religion must satisfy criteria (A)

...for a single criteria; and

A religion must satisfy criteria (A & B & C)

...for multiple criteria. Whereas a Polythetic definitions woful look like:

A religion must satisfy criteria (A & B) v (C & D)

... for some criteria A,B,C...

Of course the number of criteria can be varied to match whatever definition you wish.

Does that make sense?

One question is, does the Polythetic definition match what Wittgenstein had in mind for family resemblances?