Consider that if pleasure is the only intrinsic good, as the hedonist claims, and one does not feel pleasure in the desire for the good, as the article claims is possible, then the hedonist is contradictorily obliged to abandon his desire and pursuit of the good. — Thorongil

I think the only way around it would be if desire were malleable, in which case the hedonist would be obliged to re-shape his desires so that he does feel pleasure in desiring the good. But perhaps I have misunderstood you, or not thought it through. Just throwing some mud here and seeing if it sticks.

One can desire something without feeling any pleasure in doing so. — Thorongil

Reminds me of Taṇhā.

Or, thirdly, one can feel both pleasure and desire simultaneously. — Thorongil

I think this would essentially be pursuing your passions. For example, you could desire to know more about something, and take pleasure in doing so.

What say you about this article and my argument? — Thorongil

I think your reference to "disinterested pleasure" answers this. I don't think a hedonist would count disinterested pleasure as "good". It is interesting, though, how the end-product, pleasure, could be seen as "good" while the process of obtaining pleasure is not good! Perhaps this is answerable by simply weighing the values and realizing that if you want to feel pleasure, there has to be some work involved, and if the pay-off is not redeemable then it's not worth pursuing this pleasure.

Consider that if pleasure is the only intrinsic good, as the hedonist claims, and one does not feel pleasure in the desire for the good, as the article claims is possible, then the hedonist is contradictorily obliged to abandon his desire and pursuit of the good — Thorongil

Only if the hedonist has such a desire for the good in the first place. Also it gets hard to wrestle with when someone has a desire for pleasure; the hedonist will argue that that all desires are in truth desires for pleasure. That some can desire something while finding it painful, would, in their minds, only signify that they have found a way to transform pain into pleasure, ie masochism.

But that pleasure can exist without desire - that in my mind is the key point. The hedonist argues that pleasure is best achieved (in fact, can only be achieved) via desire (one must pursue and satisfy one's desires to achieve pleasure), whereas Buddha argues for achieving pleasure sans desire - peace of mind, equanimity, "blowing out". So the hedonist is wrong in a twofold manner; namely he fails to see that pleasure cannot be achieved via desire, since desire is infinite; and he also fails to see that there is another kind of pleasure out there, namely the one that does not depend on one's will/desire, and this is a more lasting, eternal kind of pleasure.

Very interesting article btw, thanks! :)

Only if the hedonist has such a desire for the good in the first place. — Agustino

I take hedonism to be a normative ethical system that purports to show one how to lead the good life. If it were merely descriptive, then whether one had the desire to be good or not would, I agree, be meaningless.

That some can desire something while finding it painful, would, in their minds, only signify that they have found a way to transform pain into pleasure, ie masochism. — Agustino

This obliterates the premise of the article, which is apparently empirically verifiable, that one can desire something without feeling pleasure. If one is desiring something while feeling pain, they are not experiencing pleasure, they are feeling pain. Desire =//= pleasure.

I don't think a hedonist would count disinterested pleasure as "good". — darthbarracuda

Hmm, I think they would have too.

Perhaps this is answerable by simply weighing the values and realizing that if you want to feel pleasure, there has to be some work involved, and if the pay-off is not redeemable then it's not worth pursuing this pleasure. — darthbarracuda

I don't think this gets the hedonist out of the quandery. If the pursuit of pleasure is unpleasurable, one ought not to pursue it, since pleasure is the only thing intrinsically worth pursuing. And if one does abandon this pursuit, one has effectively abandoned the central tenet of hedonism.

Not unless they simply re-define what counts as pleasure.

Into what?

Presumably into something that they prefer. I used this example elsewhere, but a rape victim might feel pleasure during the act of rape but still not find it "good".

Sounds like a road towards equivocation.

Then this whole talk of "pleasure" and "goodness" is just equivocation.

There is no pure pleasure or pure pain, but always some mix of the two. In the case of the 'rape' example I think there can be equivocation as to exactly what is meant by 'pleasure' and 'pain'. Some degree of purely involuntary physical pleasure may be felt by a rape victim; but even if there is no accompanying physical pain (which in itself seems pretty unlikely given the probably unrelaxed state of the victim), the emotional pain of being raped would likely far overwhelm the physical pleasure, meaning that as an example it does not show much at all.

Having said that I don't equate pleasure with the good or pain with evil, so I am not disagreeing with you on that score.

Note that you say

: one can take pleasure in something without feeling any desire for it, which reminds me of the notion of disinterested pleasure that Kant and Schopenhauer talk about. Or, thirdly, one can feel both pleasure and desire simultaneously. — Thorongil

Pleasure seems to be always accompanied by something...that which one is taking pleasure in, desire is [mostly] a lack of something. The pleasure we take in a stroll on a beautiful day arises from the activity we are engaged in, or the pleasure in sipping a fine Claret...pleasure never seems to be on its own.

We all desire something and it is [for the most part] something we don't currently have such as a fine Claret, we desire it because we have found pleasurable in the past. Desire is a lack, a need for something, whether it is for something pleasurable, or simply desired on a whim. Many times we don't even know why we desire what we desire, but that does not stop us from desiring it.

I think pleasure and desire come closest to being felt simultaneously in sex and perhaps drugs (the druggy is never high enough).

In Kant's aesthetic theory, there is a formal separation (distance) between interest/desire/pleasure which are aesthetics dynamic aspects and the formal/structural/beautiful characteristics of art. Adorno called Kant's aesthetics a "castrated hedonism, desire without desire", but Adorno also states that art's spiritual essence lies within this same separation. (AT pg. 11)