So back to the topic: there is a distinction between what is the case and what ought to be the case.

Do you agree?

This is a quite basic, pivotal piece of knowledge, don't you think? Something that could serve us well in this discussion.

Here's a principle for you: there is a difference between saying how things are and saying how they ought to be. — Banno

So do you think that the distinction Hume articulates here is between ‘the quantitative’ (‘is’) and the qualitative (‘ought’)? That he is drawing a distinction between what is or is not the case, and what can only be inferred? Or would that be an over-simplification?

No. It is better understood as a difference in direction of fit.

You are posting an abstract that is irrelevant to a specific method I am describing. Whether we ought to follow the outcome of the system in question IS IRRELEVANT.
I am trying to evaluate the system itself...and you avoid this challenge.
My system doesn't use "what is" to arrive to what "ought to be". IT identifies a common characteristic shared by KNOWN acts with positive moral value and uses it as an objective standard in our future evaluation. The system arrives to the "oughts" through the principles without taking in to account "what is the case".
Why this is so difficult for you???

So humour me. Do you agree that a description of how things are is not a description of how things ought to be?

you didn't bother to answer any of my questions when you were the one who objected to my claims....and now you demand an answer to an irrelevant question?(irrelevant to how my system functions).
That is not polite at all....

?

any acknowledgments or objections? Feedback including objective evidence is essential in a discussion

That is not polite at all.... — Nickolasgaspar

Welcome to philosophy. It's not fun to have your assumptions questioned.

Hello?

It's not fun to have your assumptions questioned. — Banno

Well, actually, it is. It's kinda why we are here.

Anyway, the wider point is that those who take descriptions of the way brains work or of social dynamics, or of the evolution of cooperation, as grounds for a moral system have to jump from how things are to how things ought to be.
And that is no small distinction. @Nickolasgaspar is not by any means alone in not being able to see this.

questioned??? with hot air?
This is not philosophy. This is pseudo philosophy.
I am the one putting my framework to the test...but you just tap dance without offering any challenges.

Well, actually, it is. It's kinda why we are here. — Banno

You do not look like you are here to question assumptions. You just declare them assumptions when they are descriptions. All I ask is for you is to check if they are accurate and point what is wrong if they are not.
But you attack a strawman.

↪Banno
You are posting an abstract that is irrelevant to a specific method I am describing. Whether we ought to follow the outcome of the system in question IS IRRELEVANT.
I am trying to evaluate the system itself...and you avoid this challenge.
My system doesn't use "what is" to arrive to what "ought to be". IT identifies a common characteristic shared by KNOWN acts with positive moral value and uses it as an objective standard in our future evaluation. The system arrives to the "oughts" through the principles without taking in to account "what is the case".
Why this is so difficult for you??? — Nickolasgaspar

So are you willing to support your objections with objective facts?

I didn’t understand your response. To recap - I understand the distinction Hume is making to be between the quantifiable (what is/is not) and the qualitative (what ought/ought not). And I see that fundamental distinction writ large in the entire debate about the ‘hard problem’ and the nature of consciousness, where the qualitative dimension appears as ‘qualia’, the significance of which is dismissed by the materialist accounts.

any acknowledgments or objections? — Nickolasgaspar

I’m afraid not. Anything I will say will be taken as evidence that I don’t understand neuroscience. But this is a philosophy forum, not a neuroscience forum, and the fact that you think neuroscience explains the problems of philosophy indicate to me that you don’t understand what kinds of problems philosophy seeks to tackle. Take a look at a couple of the pieces I pinned to my profile page, Anything but Human, and It Ain’t Necessarily So.

I understand the distinction Hume is making to be between the quantifiable (what is/is not) and the qualitative (what ought/ought not). — Wayfarer

I don't.

A qualitative statement can be a statement of what is the case. "The clouds were fluffy" is a qualitative statement, setting out what is the case. The distinction Hume is drawing is between "the cloud is fluffy" and "The cloud ought be fluffy".

Similarly, an ought statement can be quantitative: "there ought be five apples in the basket".

I wonder, where did you get that idea from?

I had thought we had discussed direction of fit at length.

not better....more rational and I accept the rules of the game. — Nickolasgaspar

Ok, ok!

My system doesn't use "what is" to arrive to what "ought to be". IT identifies a common characteristic shared by KNOWN acts with positive moral value and uses it as an objective standard in our future evaluation. The system arrives to the "oughts" through the principles without taking in to account "what is the case". — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not a philosopher so forgive me if I ask a stupid question. In brief dot points what are 'known acts with a positive value?'

How do you arrive at an ought through principles without taking in account of what is the case? Aren't principles part of what is the case?

take any act that you could accept as moral.
From helping small kids cross the street to killing a terrorist before blowing up a school.
You will find out that all actions share one thing in common. They promote the well being of those who are benefited and those who perform the action.
So by investigating as many cases as we can think, can we might agree that "well being" for the members of a society is the common denominator in every case.
If not and we do find a moral act that reduces the well being of members but it is objectively moral can we agree that it is an exception to the rule.
Do we also agree that we will need at least more than one act t (objectively wrong but against our well being) for this principle to be rejected?

So if we agree on the principle....are we reasonable to thing that if we choose the act that increases our well being ..can we be sure we have a Moral system that can produce objective moral values?
If not why?

those qualities do not demand special skills...anyone can do it.

First of all lets assume that future societies do manage to find out that a currently "immoral" practice X does promote the well being of individual members and society's as a whole in the near or far future. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not talking about finding out in future, I'm talking about a disagreement in predictions. If your metric is the harm to well-being an action might cause then you're always predicting the future since you're always talking about consequences. You say "hitting that person is bad because it will cause then harm, not "hitting that person is bad because it has caused them harm".

I'm pointing out that one could then say "yes, but it will cause them an even greater well-being further on"

It's not about updating our evidence. Lets assume we have a fixed amount of evidence for the time-being. We'd still be able to use that fixed amount of evidence to prove both arguments (the short term harm or the long term benefit). What I'm describing, in a roundabout way, is really just an example of the general problem of underdetermination applied to your 'moral science' - the same body of evidence can used to support multiple theories.

no immoral behavior against a specific population or members of a society can be justified as moral just because other larger populations (in future or contemporary) are benefited by it. — Nickolasgaspar

Possibly. But that begs the question. You're already describing the behaviour in question as immoral and we're talking about determining whether a behaviour is immoral or not. If what you mean to say is "no harmful behaviour against a specific population or members of a society can be justified as moral just because other larger populations (in future or contemporary) are benefited by it." Then clearly that's wrong (or you disagree with much of what's considered moral), because such behaviours are considered moral all the time, such as imprisonment of criminals, for example.

those qualities do not demand special skills...anyone can do it. — Nickolasgaspar

Yep! If Tom can do it, so can Dick and Harry!

so an interesting philosophical question would be why they don't do it?

The naturalistic fallacy remains: that babies act in a certain way does not imply that you ought also act in a certain way. — Banno

To be fair, the article never made such a claim, but notwithstanding, I don't see how it follows.

The declaration that one ought to do X is a declaration, not only about a fit of desire to world, but of membership of a particular set of such fits. I'd like the world to be such that Whisky were free, that doesn't mean it morally ought to be that way, yes.

So there's a sub-set of such 'mind to world' fits which are 'moral'. In other words, there exists a set of behaviours {behaviours we ought to do} one of whose membership criteria are they act to bring about a world in our minds to the actual world, but clearly not the sole membership criteria (otherwise my Whisky desire would be a member and it clearly isn't).

So the leaves the question of what that second (or more) membership criteria is/are.

People have (here) suggested that it is that sub-category of aims/fits which reduce harm. I take issue with that because of the problem of underdetermination over time, almost anything can be made to fit by claiming it reduces harm in the long term.

I don't think there's anything fundamental to rule out the possibility that this second membership criteria is 'those aims which we are biologically programmed to have as such aims'.

You might say "Ah, but what if there's a thing we ought to do that is not biological in origin, that disproves the theory". True, but you'd have to a) show that there is such a thing, and b) show that you're not wrong about its membership of that set. It's (b) that causes the most problem for your argument. See, if I were to say "we ought to punch an old lady every day" you'd tell me, in no uncertain terms, that I was wrong, I'd made a mistake, that in spite of my feeling the world ought to be that way, I'm mistaken about the inclusion of that particular desire in the set of desire which are 'moral'. So for every counter-example you give of a desire which is not biological in origin, it's possible that you too are mistaken about its inclusion in the set of such desires which are 'moral'.

Ultimately, 'moral' is just a word we use to apply to a loose affiliation of behaviours, and personally I very much doubt there more that links all those behaviour than there is which links all the things we use the word 'game' for. Nothing more than a 'family resemblance'. But regardless of my own personal theory, I don't see we have the theoretical foundation as yet to rule out the possibility that the factor which, in fact, links all those behaviours we use the word for, is actually their having a specific biological origin.

so an interesting philosophical question would be why they don't do it? — Nickolasgaspar

Why send two/many people to do a job which one can handle?

I'm not talking about finding out in future, I'm talking about a disagreement in predictions. If your metric is the harm to well-being an action might cause then you're always predicting the future since you're always talking about consequences. You say "hitting that person is bad because it will cause then harm, not "hitting that person is bad because it has caused them harm". — Isaac

A moral system do not offer predictions. It offers evaluations based on contemporary knowledge on the implications specific acts have on well being.

I'm pointing out that one could then say "yes, but it will cause them an even greater well-being further on" — Isaac

-You will need to provide an example on that where the well being of people changes dramatically during time.

What I'm describing, in a roundabout way, is really just an example of the general problem of underdetermination applied to your 'moral science' - the same body of evidence can used to support multiple theories — Isaac

-The principle is the tool by which we choose our "theory". The principle stays unchanged.

You're already describing the behaviour in question as immoral and we're talking about determining whether a behaviour is immoral or not. If what you mean to say is "no harmful behaviour against a specific population or members of a society can be justified as moral just because other larger populations (in future or contemporary) are benefited by it — Isaac

We are drifting away from the point in question. Take any act you accept as objectively moral or immoral and check whether it shares the same characteristic with any other act that you can thing (promotes or reduces the well being of members). IF that is the case then we have a metric that we can use as a principles in order to judge different acts under different situations. Surely we can identify a list of acts that we both found moral.
Can you imagine other metrics that are affected by moral or immoral acts and can be used as an objective principle for new evaluations?
I am not saying that my metric is absolutely true. I am on a quest to find out whether we can agree on that objective standard.

because we are talking about a "job" called reason and wisdom.?

So if we agree on the principle....are we reasonable to thing that if we choose the act that increases our well being ..can we be sure we have a Moral system that can produce objective moral values?
If not why? — Nickolasgaspar

Sure. As half-baked secular humanist, I've advocated wellbeing/flourishing for some years.

But there are still issues to iron out - hypothetically :-

Why make the choice to privilege wellbeing? Let's look again at your examples.

killing a terrorist before blowing up a school. — Nickolasgaspar

What if we don't give a shit about the school or its children? What if we agree with the terrorist's aims?

From helping small kids cross the street — Nickolasgaspar

What if we don't like children? Do we need them around - snivelling little shits?

There's a choice made here to care about strangers who don't really matter to us. They are not our children, right?

Are you sure that your concern for wellbeing isn't just a form of sentimentalism based on a fading Christian ethic and its concern for underdogs and losers?

Why not just take care of ourselves and our own circle and not care about other's wellbeing?

It offers evaluations based on contemporary knowledge on the implications specific acts have on well being. — Nickolasgaspar

Those evaluations are clearly predictions. "the effect on well-being of X will be", not "the effect on well-being of X was"

-You will need to provide an example on that where the well being of people changes dramatically during time. — Nickolasgaspar

I already have. Children and sweets. Well-being definitely drops just after being denied sweets, raises again on enjoying a healthy weight and full set of teeth in later life. A more extreme example is in every form of criminal punishment - the well-being of the person concerned drops during the punishment, but supposedly rises again as they enjoy being a member of a society in which their particular crime is thereby discouraged. On a larger scale, foreign aid for infrastructure investment benefits no-one in the short-term, but reduces the well-being of the country it's coming from (less welfare, education and health spending). In the long-term, however, the idea is that it helps those in greater need. Some may argue that whilst, yes, it helps those people in the long-term, it harms them in the even longer term because they become reliant on aid...

-The principle is the tool by which we choose our "theory". The principle stays unchanged. — Nickolasgaspar

No. That's not what underderemination describes.

Take any act you accept as objectively moral or immoral and check whether it shares the same characteristic with any other act that you can thing (promotes or reduces the well being of members) — Nickolasgaspar

That's what I'm saying. All such acts do in one timescale and do not in others. It cannot be determined. they all cause harm in the short term to individuals with the intention of reducing harm in the long term to society, but since the term is not fixed it cannot ever be demonstrated that they do, in fact, achieve this end.

Can you imagine other metrics that are affected by moral or immoral acts and can be used as an objective principle for new evaluations? — Nickolasgaspar

It's not about the metrics, it's about what we do with the uncertainty over their application. even if I were determined to cause no harm, such determination would not be sufficient as I would not have any way of knowing which behaviours avoided harm over any given timescale.

But there are still issues to iron out - hypothetically :- — Tom Storm

-I agree with that statement...this is why we are discussing it.

-"Why make the choice to privilege wellbeing? Let's look again at your examples.
killing a terrorist before blowing up a school. — Nickolasgaspar
What if we don't give a shit about the school or its children? What if we agree with the terrorist's aims?"
- Well for many "biological" reasons. For a start its the main reason why species evolve to be social. Being and well being is promoted through social organizations.
Our 3 basic biological drives in our biology are to survive, thrive and procreate.
Our urges to seek pleasure and avoid pain have powerful mechanisms in our brain.
Our mirror neurons, a mechanisms that reproduces the emotions experienced by other people's while we observing them, enable empathy and sympathy for anyone.
All these facts explain why we give a damn about our kids in that school and why we wouldn't want our society to allow our school to be blown up when we were kids.

There's a choice made here to care about strangers who don't really matter to us. They are not our children, right? — Tom Storm

-Sure, we talk about total strangers in our society. Would it be at our interested if we lived in a society that allows people to blow up public buildings? Is this a society that would qualify as ideal?

Are you sure that your concern for wellbeing isn't just a form of sentimentalism based on a fading Christian ethic and its concern for underdogs and losers?
Why not just take care of ourselves and our own circle and not care about other's wellbeing? — Tom Storm

-No, morality is not that altruistic. ITs more about us not being pleased living in societies where our existence and well being can be affected by others at any time.
We value our existence and our well being and by allowing others not to value them that is a treat for everyone alive.