I reckon he probably will soon

Oh, you're back? That was fast.

Wanna talk about the war in Ukraine, for a change?

And that the obvious reason just why it is important to discuss what is happening in Russia. But I cannot do anything else but agree with this Russian guy. What Putin has done to Russia is truly unfortunate.

Because in Russia and for the Russians this is a tragedy. For Ukrainians it's a nightmare.

And what makes it so tragic is that when the Soviet Union collapsed the Russians avoided a bloody Civil War after the breakup of the Soviet Union (except in the Caucasus).

Yet now we do have that bloody civil war of the former Soviet Union.

I keep wishing he'd post more about Tbilisi cos I'm thinking of going. — jamalrob

Many are going. It's only to get worse.

One of the interesting things about the exodus to Tbilisi is that the country had a war with Russia. But luckily they do understand that not all Russians are rooting for Putin.

After the catastrophic "3 day war" or whatever, the next round Russia is seeming to do the way at least the Russian manuals say.

- Aleksandr Dvornikov is said to get the overall command of the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Dvornikov lead earlier the Russian forces in Syria 2015-2016.

- The area is more confined, to the Donbas, which means Russia can concentrate it's forces. It basically doesn't have to have forces in Belarus or even in Russian border facing Ukraine north of Kyiv.

- more emphasis on logistics and supply. Obviously it's not going to be a lightning quick war, so have those supplies and railways working (as Russian logistical system depends on the railway system).

I think much too emphasis is given to the May parade. In my view Putin doesn't actually need the war to end then and shouldn't especially now have distractions from preparing accordingly for the next push. But as this takes time, so does the Ukrainians have time too. In days you cannot use totally new weapon systems, but in months you can do it. And Boris Johnson walking around Kyiv with Zelensky promised for example anti-ship missiles systems for Ukraine, which they have been lacking. In a month they could be fielded and hastily trained to use.

As I said before, I don't engage with you because you're not an honest debater.

And what makes it so tragic is that when the Soviet Union collapsed the Russians avoided a bloody Civil War after the breakup of the Soviet Union (except in the Caucasus).

Yet now we do have that bloody civil war of the former Soviet Union. — ssu

Which only proves that people have to constantly maintain efforts avoid the outbreak of war. This time 'diplomacy failed' I guess.

In my view Putin doesn't actually need the war to end then and shouldn't especially now have distractions from preparing accordingly for the next push. But as this takes time, so does the Ukrainians have time too. In days you cannot use totally new weapon systems, but in months you can do it. And Boris Johnson walking around Kyiv with Zelensky promised for example anti-ship missiles systems for Ukraine, which they have been lacking. In a month they could be fielded and hastily trained to use. — ssu

The opinion of the rest of the world is that this horrific conflict should end as soon as possible.
However, as you mentioned, President Putin may not need this war to end, neither does the President of Ukraine, as it is, maybe he wants it to end in victory. "Why Ukraine Must Win" screams the Economist, I am sure that economy extends to the truth within their pages. So civilian deaths are not a determining factor here:

To end the war and save lives: come to a ceasefire and peace agreement as soon as possible (Zelenskyy said 'by May maybe we will have an agreement'). If saving lives is the biggest priority, there are many options, which I will get into next.

What a pathetic PR stunt by BoJo. Trying to viscerally be a war time prime minister.

A new word appears in Ukrainian: "Stop macronizing!"
By Christel Brigaudeau, special correspondent in Kharkiv (Ukraine), Le Parisien, April 11, 2022

The conflict has given rise to new words in the Ukrainian language. Names that pay tribute to the nation's heroes. Insults, like so many arrows shot at the invader. And then this verb full of irony: "macronete", which could be translated as "to macronize". Definition: "to be very worried about a situation, but not to do anything, in fact", summarizes on Telegram one of the online lexicons of the words of war. With this precision: the neologism owes its origin to the president of the French Republic, "who is not remembered for real help, but for his concerned photos taken from the Élysée palace".

In the cities threatened by the Russian invasion, Ukrainian residents and soldiers hail the active support of the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union to their country's resistance. Berlin and Paris are vilified though, accused of hesitation and false promises. The French president is accused of showing solidarity with Ukraine without doing anything concrete.

Macron believes in diplomacy first and foremost and has rightly been insisting on the EU breaking away from NATO for years to avoid being caught up in the imperialistic endeavours of the USA, which, by the way, proves to be totally unreliable for the degenerate nutcases it votes into office. The EU needs to become a strategic player if it wants a say about its long term future.

That he has consistently pursued a diplomatic solution makes him a statesman that understands the long game better than his 10-second attention span US and UK counterparts. Putin will have to come to the table at some point, he can't occupy Ukraine and large areas are vehemently opposed to the Russians. Other than calling Putin names, the US hasn't helped Ukraine either except making money off the militarization of Ukrainian society. We do know that when negotiations need to happen, France (and Germany and Italy) are the only countries that haven't disqualified themselves as negotiation partners.

I can appreciate his consistency and calm (and that of the French diplomatic corps) in this. It's easy to be angry but we need to keep our eye on the ball - long term peace.

The French president is accused of showing solidarity with Ukraine without doing anything concrete. — Olivier5

Fancy showing solidarity with Ukraine without doing anything concrete! It's a good job none of the contributors here would be so shallow as to spend post after post signalling their deep concern for Ukrainians, whinging about Russia (who are neither listening, nor care about your opinion) whilst doing fuck all to actually help.

...or were you helpfully offering us a single term to describe your contributions?

Macron not warmongering hard enough for the warmongers.

What a pathetic PR stunt by BoJo. Trying to viscerally be a war time prime minister. — Benkei

I just saw that, thanks, quite enjoyed it. It is the kind of thing that Prime Minister Johnson does from time to time, and we have to figure out what it all means, he seems such an affable chap. Alas, if Mr. Johnson has been Ukraine's leader or putin place of Putin he would not have done anything, thus, no war. There is a case to be made for not acting.

Anyone seeing this on Ukranian webcams would have immediately thought it was another fake atrocity, very clever move, and unexpected.

https://www.webcamtaxi.com/en/ukraine/kiev/maidan-nezalezhnosti.html

- long term peace. — Benkei

Long term peace for whom, exactly, I mean the man on the street (except the streets of Kyiv) wants that but he is over-ruled is he not, by the feudal lord is he not?

Feudalism was the system in 10th-13th century European medieval societies where a social hierarchy was established based on local administrative control and the distribution of land into units (fiefs). A landowner (lord) gave a fief, along with a promise of military and legal protection, in return for a payment of some kind from the person who received it (vassal).

https://www.worldhistory.org/Feudalism/

The military protection part is very attractive, from my point of view, anyway.

He touches upon just what the problem is. The young in Russia do not mix well with what Russia has always been and people just ignored everything. The old people were either too scared to say anything, even when the iron curtain lifted, or they were hardcore Stalinists who just wanted a new daddy to take care of them, so they blindly followed the next masculine power who looked the part. All while the young who grew up in families with decent economical stability had access to the internet and knowledge about the world, thought that they lived in a nation that was just like any other stable democratic nation, with the same freedoms and rights. But it's this ignorance of what is going on underneath, the blind eye to political events unfolding that creates the groundwork for what is happening now. The young moving out of the country means that the only people left are Putin radicalists, and people who are even more scared to do anything just like back in the Soviet era.

This is what happens if people don't actively make efforts to fight against dangerous political movements in a nation. Russia already had the groundwork made to enable what's happening now, but we can see it in places like the US as well, where corruption and Trump radicalism have the same kind of symptoms. If unchecked, it could create a foundation for changing the political landscape entirely and if people "don't care about politics" then one day they'll wake up in a world they didn't want to be in. We can point out that it's not easy to do something in a nation that is so authoritarian as Russia, but it didn't become that overnight.

One of the biggest problems with the world today is people being too comfortable to understand their apathy. Generally speaking: radicals, extremists, conspiracy nuts and so on, make up a very small minority of the world, but they still move mountains politically since they are so vocal. We usually just dismiss them as "a very vocal minority", without realizing that such a minority being vocal can have a large impact. Marketing people for a company is "a very small vocal minority", but they still get people to buy their products. So if they are a minority, then the educated, morally balanced, and larger portion of the world should be more vocal against them, against the destructive bullshit they spread. But people love their apathy.

The young in Russia do not mix well with what Russia has always been and people just ignored everything. The old people were either too scared to say anything, even when the iron curtain lifted, or they were hardcore Stalinists who just wanted a new daddy to take care of them, so they blindly followed the next masculine power who looked the part. All while the young who grew up in families with decent economical stability had access to the internet and knowledge about the world, thought that they lived in a nation that was just like any other stable democratic nation, with the same freedoms and rights. But it's this ignorance of what is going on underneath, the blind eye to political events unfolding that creates the groundwork for what is happening now. — Christoffer

And yet...

we can see it in places like the US as well — Christoffer

The US has had none of the factors you describe from Russia yet you say it is experiencing the same (or similar) problems.

Doesn't that at least imply that the factors leading to such a situation are more probably something common to both nations rather than the less parsimonious conclusion that two completely different sets of circumstances have coincidentally resulted in very similar outcomes?

if they are a minority, then the educated, morally balanced, and larger portion of the world should be more vocal against them, — Christoffer

How? Websites, newspapers and social media spreading 'misinformation' have been increasingly banned since Covid times. Naysayers have been ridiculed, de-platformed, sacked and in some cases threatened with violence. Protests have been met with militarised police under emergency powers.

Could you explain just how much more vocal you expect the 'moral majority' to be? Summary execution perhaps?

Long term peace for whom, exactly, I mean the man on the street (except the streets of Kyiv) wants that but he is over-ruled is he not, by the feudal lord is he not? — FreeEmotion

Everybody. In the short term though a ceasefire in Ukraine would be nice.

The US has had none of the factors you describe from Russia yet you say it is experiencing the same (or similar) problems. — Isaac

Why don't you read things correctly?

Russia already had the groundwork made to enable what's happening now, but we can see it in places like the US as well, where corruption and Trump radicalism have the same kind of symptoms.If unchecked, it could create a foundation for changing the political landscape entirely and if people "don't care about politics" then one day they'll wake up in a world they didn't want to be in. — Christoffer

To interpret this for you: Russia already has the groundwork to enable these problems, but the US doesn't... YET. We see the behaviors of corruption and radical movements of people under Trump. And if people "don't care about politics", they could wake up in a world similar to places like Russia. That is the point of the text, that unchecked political movements toward authoritarianism are ignored by comfortable people with apathy.

You seem to miss context when reading something, almost like you read sentences detached from the surrounding text. As you can see, I'm talking about how Russia's political groundwork for authoritarianism can happen in other nations and if the radical behaviors of the people match up, it could change the landscape in the same direction as Russia has now ended up.

How? Websites, newspapers and social media spreading 'misinformation' have been increasingly banned since Covid times. — Isaac

Yes, they spread misinformation in a time of crisis. The problem is the uneducated with a megaphone spreading misinformation that hurts other people. How many people died during this pandemic due to misinformation telling them not to get vaccinated?

Naysayers have been ridiculed, de-platformed, sacked — Isaac

That's not what I've seen. The ones that have been ridiculed, de-platformed or sacked have all taken part in spreading dangerous misinformation or acted with such disregard for safety, like nurses not caring for protocols when people risk dying around them.

Protests have been met with militarised police under emergency powers. — Isaac

The large gatherings who didn't have permission during a time when large gatherings need to be avoided? People who don't understand how a pandemic works, who don't understand that large gatherings could create super-spreading events which result in people outside of this gathering getting killed by the consequence of such a super-spreading event, don't know what the fuck they're talking about. To be blind to how pandemics work is to ignore facts.

If you can't see the difference between police trying to handle people acting stupid and risking other people's lives, as in the case of Covid demonstrations during a pandemic - and police silencing freedom of speech as a form of authoritarian censorship, then I don't think you have the ability to see different topics in their full complexity and just react to trigger markers bound to your ideological ideas.

Could you explain just how much more vocal you expect the 'moral majority' to be? Summary execution perhaps? — Isaac

At least on par with the vocal minority advocating for extreme nationalism, racism, antivaccine, conspiracy theories etc. it would balance the "marketing" of such movements.

> So how does this 'fact' link to the morality of fighting for one's nation? Lots of people value money too. Does that make fighting over money moral?

> People value money, so fighting over money is moral?

Also fighting over money can be moral of course, e.g. if fighting those who stole the money is morally defensible. Rebellions against work exploitation can be also understood as a moral fight over money as a means of subsistence and well-being.
I take moral assessment as an a posteriori comparative task based on what we actually value to determine what the best or lesser evil course of action is. And nationality is one thing that some people value.


> how come that the Russian soldiers (example of working class) prefer to kill Ukrainian families (which surely include members of the Ukrainian working class) instead of killing or mass revolting against the Russian ruling class (Putin and his entourage) if they have greater interest in opposing their ruling class more than in opposing other people? — neomac
I didn't say they realised or agreed, I just said they had more in common with each other than their rulers and bosses.

> I'm arguing that simply 'defending one's nation' alone is insufficient as a moral reason because the rich oppress the poor far more consistently than one nation oppresses another.

You just keep claiming that “the rich oppress the poor far more consistently than one nation oppresses another” without providing evidences and while being contradicted by the evidences: Ukrainian families got exterminated by Russian soldiers, no Ukrainian ruling class member has exterminated those families. And now I wonder if you need any since you do not take into account what working class representatives (like the Russian soldiers) actually prefer, arguing that either they have been blind to their interests or disagree with you on what they are but it doesn’t matter because you know better.
I don’t even get the moral reason insufficiency claim. You could claim that one is morally more justified in fighting X over Y, because X is more oppressive, but that doesn’t equate to claiming that one has no moral reason to fight Y.


> Are you saying the working class ought to be oppressed?

I don’t even understand why you keep talking about working classes. If you want to talk about it open a thread, argue for your claim, provide evidences and I’ll give you my feedback, if interested.


> I would have thought it pretty self-evident that people swanning about in luxury yachts whilst children starve to death in their rubbish was both unfair and cruel - but if you think it's fine, then I don't think there's anything I can do do convince you otherwise.

And what is the relation between Russian rich people being in a luxury yachts, while Russian children starve do death in their rubbish, with the fact that Russian soldiers are exterminating Ukrainian families and children?


> America over Isis. America over Russia. Now, those are not the only choices, what on earth have they got to do with the question of whether fighting over nationality is moral?

What?! It was you in the first place to insist on framing the war in Ukraine as a clash between the America and Russia dominance, not me. And when I’m asking you who you would morally support between Russian and American dominance, I’m asking you this precisely because you care to frame this war in this way.
On my side I was content with describing the war between Ukraine and Russia primarily as a war between Ukrainians and Russians, and argued that the clash between America and Russia is grounded on this clash between nations. So I have really nothing else to explain.
Once again since this is a war of dominance between the US and Russia according to you, which dominance would you side with? With the so treacherous, hypocritical, cynical, exploitative, immiserating, Yemeni blood thirsty West or with the all so righteous de-facto-winning misery-free new-world-order champion Mearsheimer-approved Russia?
Don’t waste your time dodging the question or musing about some utopian third option, because my challenge to your views is about consistency: if Zelensky’s moral stand and choices are to be assessed over a de facto situation or actual terms on the table (as you claim), then I don’t see why your moral stand and choices about this war can’t be assessed based on the actual clash between 2 de facto dominant powers, as you frame this war.


> Why on earth would some kind of maths be necessary? Zelensky bears some moral responsibility for the deaths if he chooses to continue fighting when he could have take a less harmful other option. That's just a statement about how moral responsibility works. It doesn't require me to do any maths. If you don't agree then you'd have to offer an alternative theory of moral responsibility; one in which people can make decisions without any blame accruing to them for the foreseeable outcomes.

Not only I already offered my arguments to support my claims (not the ones you put in my mouth) when I talked about the link between responsibility and agency, the multi-dimensional nature of my moral assessments and the right to self-defence. But I also argued against your clandestine causal theory to support Zelensky’s “some responsibility”.
I talked about math because you talked about multi-causal theory and multi causal theories would allow to evaluate the exact or statistical relevance of a cause in a given output. However the main point is not even to stress the inadequacy of your multi-causal theory. Discussing about the degree of responsibility, especially wrt other actors, is important for a proportional response: for example in morally pressing Zelensky to accept Russian demands or to formulate Ukrainian demands in a way that is more acceptable by the Russians. So if you want to talk about Zelensky’s responsibilities for the fact that Russian soldiers under Putin’s orders keep killing Ukrainians and their children you have to argue for it and assess it wrt Putin’s responsibilities to make sense to me, because if the right of the Ukrainians to defend themselves as long as they want without being morally blamefull is morally defensible (as I argued) , then Zelensky as their leader is morally justified in continuing to fight and bears no blame for that, while Putin & Russian soldiers bear all the blame for continuing this war.


> So the elected leader of a country is assumed right about the values of that country until proven wrong? Do you apply that to your own country? Was President Trump, for example, right about the values of Americans simply by virtue of being their elected leader?

From what I argued so far it should be clear that if half or so of the American population voted for Trump, I have to take into account this and what they value in Trump, of course. The same goes with Zelensky. But as I said I would consider also the value proximity between Trumpism and what I value. And other things as well. No single dimension is a priori sufficient for a moral assessment.

> Really? So your personal satiation determines what's moral? That's certainly an odd notion of morality. What about the effect on others?

As I already clarified many times, moral assessments depend on a multi-dimensional evaluation of a situation. Material well-being is one dimension I would take into account, sure. The effect on others is another dimension. And again I’m not striving for perfection, only for lesser evil.
My claim was only to make you understand why I wouldn’t support Isis wrt America dominance.
If you want to object to me for good, tell me if you would morally support Isis over America and why.


> They don't 'strongly suggest' anything of the sort.

They do, if you contrast Zelensky’s government with a Putin puppet, blaming the first while assuming more acceptable the second. At best you can claim you didn’t intend to suggest it.

> It's absolutely absurd to suggest that every time I raise a criticism about a government decision, I'm calling for them to be deposed.

Where else did I do that? Can you fully quote me?


> No. The paragraph wasn't about Russian soldiers and Putin. It was about The governments of Ukraine, the US and Europe, plus their supporters.

> What about the values of those who can't vote - children, the future generations - do they get a say?

How about the continued exposure of millions of innocent children to Russian atrocities?


Poor people bring to life children that they are incapable of taking care of, don’t they have some responsibility for the death/sickness/starvation/misery of their children? Palestinians bring to life children that they are incapable of fully protecting against the oppression of Israelis, don’t they have some responsibility for the death/sickness/starvation/misery of their children exposed to the Israelis’ oppression? So shouldn’t they stop having children?
Ukrainians do not want to be eradicated from their lands nor they want their children to grow up under a Russian dictator capable of committing another Ukrainian genocide like the Holodomor, so they act accordingly. I don’t know if Ukrainians consider Zelensky responsible for having their children killed by the Russians or exposed to a war wanted by Putin, knowing that Zelensky did not submit to Russian demands so far. If they don’t why should I?
BTW, for the third time, wouldn’t this line of reasoning of yours simply support whatever the status quo is (ruling class oppressing working class is a de facto situation right?), since no power (especially authoritarian) can be radically challenged without risking one’s (and often beloved ones’) material well-being and life?


> Negotiations failed, so either the demands were unacceptable and/or the assurances weren’t enough. Since I wasn’t there at the negotiation table, I can only guess from available evidences and plausible reasons that support either cases. I already provided some for both cases. So if assurances weren’t enough at the negotiation table (which I find plausible due to evidences and reasons), then the mistrust was too much. — neomac
That doesn't follow at all. Two parties could trust each other 100% and still not reach agreement on the deal because neither side thinks they have the concession they were looking for. It need have nothing to do with trust.

I see you continue to raise random accusations based on a surprisingly poor understanding of what I wrote. I took already into account the situation you are mentioning when I wrote “either the demands were unacceptable”. And if you were familiar with propositional logic, you would understand that my argument corresponds to the valid form:
p1. if p or q implies r
p2. p and q
c. r
So it totally follows.

> What I expect them to do is to offer concessions and make demands in the same way any party to a negotiation would.

What concessions and what demands do you expect them to do wrt Putin’s?


> If America's intention in supplying weapons is to make a profit, then one cannot say their help is moral, even if their action accidentally assists a moral cause.

This is why I wasn’t talking about intentions but about moral reasons. I don’t need to assume that the US leaders are acting out of moral intentions. All I claimed is that there are moral reasons to support Ukraine. I don’t think that in a negotiation between leaders of competing powers what counts is how adequate their intentions are wrt to their moral reasons for the simple reason that even if the intentions were genuine, it’s still possible that there is no workable agreement based on moral reasons and moral responsibility ascriptions, as this 180 page thread suggests. So what counts is reliability and fairness of the demands. Another reason why assessing morality of a choice or action on the basis of how morally genuine an intention is is not decisive, it’s because there are unintentional consequences (I will come back to this in a bit).
Besides don’t give for granted that I share your assumptions about how the weapon industry or political propaganda work.

> You agree then that I could very well be determinedly opposed to Putin's expansionism and yet advocate ending the war right now and agreeing to the terms on the table since it's perfectly possible to consider that course of action to be the one which will most effectively bring about an end to that expansionism?

No I disagree. Notice that having the intention to determinedly oppose Putin's expansionism doesn’t mean that your opposition is effective. You could be determinedly opposed to Putin's expansionism while doing something which - against your intentions - actually benefits Putin's expansionist ambitions. Indeed advocating for the acceptance of all Russian actual demands at the negotiation table doesn’t equate to actually opposing Putin’s expansionism, as much as advocating the acceptance of a working class exploitation out of fear of worse consequences in case of rebellion doesn’t equate to actually opposing a de facto working class exploitation. So concessions will not end Putin’s expansionist ambitions in any geopolitical meaningful way, they will just consolidate it.


> if Putin and Russian soldiers kill Ukrainians are immoral, if Ukrainians kill Russian invaders and murderers are moral. — neomac
Agreed. But we were talking about the US, so I don't see the relevance. Western capitalist systems kill and immiserate millions of innocent people. Russian wars kill and immiserate millions of people. Ending one by invoking the other neither helps nor has any moral force. You seemed to think it did, I'm enquiring about that.

It’s enough to re-read what I wrote because I’ve already addressed this many times already: geopolitical entities per se have no moral agency, they are theoretical abstractions useful to strategically study power dynamics. They are not good for moral responsibility ascriptions. This claim of yours “Western capitalist systems kill and immiserate millions of innocent people” may have some multi-causal plausibility (yet I can not assess it since you didn’t offer any such analysis and you didn’t consider also the millions of people that may prosper under the American system dominance wrt Russian dominance) even if it was correct, it would not suffice for responsibility ascription. For responsibility ascription, we need agency, decision makers. Russia is on war with Ukraine because Putin so decided. I’m not talking about Russian system nor Russian dominance for responsibility ascriptions, I’m talking about Putin deciding to start a war and bomb Ukrainian families and children, threatening a nuclear war, making claims about a new world order and blaming it all on the West. I’m fine if you want to talk about the moral responsibilities of Biden’s or Zelensky’s or EU’s administrations in relation to this war. If you want to talk about capitalism system and Yemen, you have to open another thread. And if you need it to prove your point, then your point is conceptually flawed as I already claimed and argued. The moral force of contrasting Russian’s war in Ukraine precisely depends on Putin’s morally illegitimate aggression of Ukraine. What is the most proper strategic response, for this I defer to people more expert than I am for the main input.


> If Putin's power consolidation was increased bu sanction and NATO involvement in the war, then ought we avoid those things?

If making concessions and avoiding sanctions will consolidate Putin’s power as well as not making concessions and adopting sanctions, I think it’s indifferent which option is chosen. Besides I would distinguish between power consolidation in Russia from power consolidation beyond Russia.
Don’t forget that according to the geopolitical experts Russia is a demographic and economic declining power, and if that is the case, wars around the world and economic sanctions could accelerate Russian decline. And the more Putin becomes aggressive the more reasons the West has to contain Russian expansionism.

> So as far as the moral case is concerned, you concede the point that continuing to fight is not morally advised simply on the grounds of 'opposing Putin's expansionism' since it is a moot point what course of action would best do that.

My point was simply that I’m well aware that there are risks when taking position on such matters. Yet I don’t think that we can take risk-free decisions on such matters, nor we can simply suspend our judgment or action just because we can’t make enough risk-free decisions, if pressed by the events.


> The word 'oppression' already covers that. What you're talking about is ‘suppression'.

Well if you take the meaning of a word based on a dictionary definition, then here is the one I used:
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/oppression?q=oppression
cruel and unfair treatment of people, especially by not giving them the same freedom, rights, etc. is morally defensible when it’s for punishing immoral people.
Don’t waste our time on wording disputes.

> I assume Ukraine demand that the invasion stops.
This is one thing they demand, not the only one though. — neomac
No. I'm sure the current Russian demands don't constitute the full sum of all they'd want either. The point is, they started the war, so it's just self-evident, they'd have a different list of grievances

Same situation, you just changed words and I do not care about your wording preferences. If one wants to explain why a negotiation fails, then either demands/grievances/expectations/complaints/wishes/concessions/requests/desires/[fill up as you please] are not perceived as acceptable and/or they are not addressed with enough assurance. And an alternative to 2 parties' strategies in terms of demands/grievances/expectations/complaints/wishes/concessions/requests/desires/[fill up as you please], can not possibly coincide with one of 2 parties' strategy.
Don’t waste our time on wording disputes, especially if I abundantly clarified my point.


> You've no idea whose views and demands I considered, since consideration goes on in my head. I only told you the course of action I thought best.

With the word “considering” I’m not referring to a process in your head but to what proves that your third strategy is opposing both Western and Russian expansionism. As you seemed to understand:
"you just repeated Putin’s demands and related blackmails without considering Ukrainian demands at all. — neomac
I know, that's why I said them. Those are the demands on the table at the moment, so of course they're Putin's. The argument was that they don't push Russian expansionism futher. They are the de facto positions already."
Don’t waste our time on wording disputes, especially if I abundantly clarified my point.


> So If I think their standard of living will be considerably worse, then It's a reasonable position to take that involving the US is not worth the benefit.

You can take side in accordance to your beliefs. So do I. Now what?


> So why do you trust those who tell you that continuing to fight is better for the Ukrainian people? Why do you trust those who tell you that life under the terms of a US/European loan system will be better than one under Russian puppet government?

Never made such claims.


If the outcomes of strategic decisions are beyond your expertise, then why do you choose to trust the experts and leaders supporting your current position and not those supporting the alternatives?

I already answered: “So for what strategy is concerned I tend to defer more to the feedback of experts and leaders, and then double-check based on what I find logic or consistent with other sources and background knowledge”



> So you are saying that Palestinians should accept Israeli de facto settlements in the West Bank because they are “de facto”? The Talibans didn’t accept any “de facto” Afghan puppet government and took back their control over Afghanistan eventually. The expression "whatever it takes” simply refers to the fact that, in geopolitical strategy, demands and options are not assessed by one party the way their competitor frame them as I said repeatedly. — neomac
No. That's literally the opposite of what I'm saying. I'm saying the actual terms matter. It's not just a question of 'capitulate to any demands to avoid war', it's 'avoid the worst option’.

What matters to me is what Ukrainians and Western leaders consider the “worst option” in geopolitically significant terms, not what you consider the “worst option” based on a load of assumptions that I find questionable or unintelligible. For example, how does your line of reasoning about de facto situation would apply in the case of the Palestinians or the Talibans? should Palestinians accept Israeli de facto settlements in the West Bank because they are “de facto”? Were the Talibans wrong in refusing to submit to the de facto Puppet regime the Americans put in Afghanistan?

This is a pretty selective memory of the Bush era. News programs constantly called Bush out on the duplicity involved in making the case for the Iraq War. There was a major investigation into the torture program and attempts to try those responsible. Go watch old episodes of the Daily Show circa 2005-2008; it is wall to wall coverage of the Bush administration's infamies.

A number of Americans have been sentenced to long prison terms for improper use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the most aggregious cases, US prosecutors sought to execute US soldiers for these crimes (e.g., https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmudiyah_rape_and_killings). Which is not to say the system is perfect, far from it, but it's ridiculous to paint the media as giving a blanket pardon to US military actions. Indeed, they often go too far the other way, removing all nuance and turning the leadership into cartoon villains.

Notably, the New York Times ran a full page ad of General Patreus as "General Betray us," but wasn't shut down, and Noam Chomsky hasn't died of polonium poisoning.

Maybe Russia wouldn't be treated as an enemy if they hadn't launched multiple invasions of their neighbors over the last few decades?

Can you cite the comments you're referring to?

But, if I understand correctly, because a few lower-ranked people did face some prosecution, all the people that orchestrated the fake intelligence, torture, mass spying and so on, it's ok that they didn't face any consequences ... because a few lowly grunts were thrown under the bus.

You're really using the daily show pointing out the absurdity, criminality and hypocrisy of the system (and people facing no consequences) as evidence the "system works"?

Austria’s Nehammer ‘pessimistic’ over Putin’s ‘war logic’

Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer has said he was “rather pessimistic” about the prospects for diplomacy ending the Ukraine conflict after his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Describing Putin as having “massively entered into a logic of war”, Nehammer told reporters following his meeting that he was “rather pessimistic” about the success of negotiations “because peace talks are always very time-intensive while military logic says: ‘Don’t spend too much time and go directly into battle'”.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/10/russia-ukraine-live-news-war-to-slash-ukraines-gdp-by-45

This still has a long ways to go, ffs. It's already been way too long. Each day these sanctions will bite more and more and then, we may see the Russians go crazy.

Not good.

WMD news:

• Eduard Basurin, press secretary of the DNR (the self-proclaimed Donetsk Republic) military command, said that "chemical troops" will need to be deployed in order to "smoke out" Mariupol defenders.
• Ramsan Kadyrov, the Chechen strongman, said in his latest video that tactical nukes should be dropped on Kiev and Kharkov if Ukraine does not surrender.

Kadyrov's troops have been taking part in the siege of Mariupol (or so he claims), and for the last several weeks he has been regularly posting videos announcing an imminent fall of Mariupol. There's no reason to take him seriously in this case either. In Russia he is allowed to say and do pretty much anything he wants, and his security forces have also been involved in assassinations abroad. But he has no say over the use of nukes, or for that matter over the general conduct of the war.

But DNR stooge's casual reference to "chemical troops" should be taken seriously. I can see Russia using chem weapons via its proxy forces, which would give it a modicum of plausible deniability.

Well. Maybe. But they surely must have heard that NATO will intervene if they use chemical weapons, or at least, this is what they've stated.

The point is that time is against them (Russia), so either they do something big quickly, or it will get very ugly for them.

I'm surprised that Russia is allowing for other countries to send arms to Ukraine.

Yes, that's exactly what I was doing. :roll:

Russian soldiers kept women in a basement for 25 days; nine are now said to be pregnant.

London: War crimes investigators have uncovered horrific cases of sexual violence committed by Russian troops in Ukraine, including women and girls kept in a Bucha basement for 25 days. Ukraine’s official ombudsman for human rights, Lyudmyla Denisova, says nine of them are now pregnant.

Denisova said she had recorded multiple cases of rape, torture and abuse by Kremlin forces in Bucha, outside Kyiv, and in other Ukrainian towns as the full extent of the Russian brutality spurred calls for President Vladimir Putin to be charged with crimes against humanity. — SMH

Yeah, his photos in combat gear "near the fighting" were sourced to inside Russia. Pretty hilarious.

NATO had held back on higher end aid. My guess is that chemical weapons would lead to more of that being released, e.g., fighters from Poland that have been offered, more drones (the Turkish drones have caused Russia no amount of grief and the US certainly could offer vastly superior drones in large numbers, but this hasn't happened because it would likely seem like too much of a provocation, plus they don't want any tech leaking), potentially more tanks, more long range missile systems.

I think there is a fear here that releasing too much aid might lead to very negative outcomes. If Russia's reorganized push with what are generally considered to now be mostly low combat effectiveness soldiers (low morale, large number of casualties, large amount of hardware lost) collapses, more weaponry could encourage Ukraine to push into areas lost in 2014.

This could have the opposite effect of what NATO wants if Putin feels his legitimacy is threatened by these losses. Russia certainly has the capability to continue the war long term (increased conscription, etc). This might result in political chaos in Moscow, but that's not really something NATO wants, or it could lead to even more unhinged attacks on civilian targets.

Kind of a balancing act.


Interesting update:

The Russian military is attempting to generate sufficient combat power to seize and hold the portions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that it does not currently control after it completes the seizure of Mariupol. There are good reasons to question the Russian armed forces’ ability to do so and their ability to use regenerated combat power effectively despite a reported simplification of the Russian command structure. This update, which we offer on a day without significant military operations on which to report, attempts to explain and unpack some of the complexities involved in making these assessments.

We discuss below some instances in which American and other officials have presented information in ways that may inadvertently exaggerate Russian combat capability. We do not in any way mean to suggest that such exaggeration is intentional. Presenting an accurate picture of a military’s combat power is inherently difficult. Doing so from classified assessments in an unclassified environment is especially so. We respect the efforts and integrity of US and allied officials trying to help the general public understand this conflict and offer the comments below in hopes of helping them in that task.

We assess that the Russian military will struggle to amass a large and combat-capable force of mechanized units to operate in Donbas within the next few months. Russia will likely continue to throw badly damaged and partially reconstituted units piecemeal into offensive operations that make limited gains at great cost.[1] The Russians likely will make gains nevertheless and may either trap or wear down Ukrainian forces enough to secure much of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, but it is at least equally likely that these Russian offensives will culminate before reaching their objectives, as similar Russian operations have done.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) reported on April 8 that the Russian armed forces have lost 15-20 percent of the “combat power” they had arrayed against Ukraine before the invasion.[2] This statement is somewhat (unintentionally) misleading because it uses the phrase “combat power” loosely. The US DoD statements about Russian “combat power” appear to refer to the percentage of troops mobilized for the invasion that are still in principle available for fighting—that is, that are still alive, not badly injured, and with their units. But “combat power” means much more than that. US Army doctrine defines combat power as “the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time.”[3] It identifies eight elements of combat power: “leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.”[4] This doctrinal definition obviously encompasses much more than the total number of troops physically present with units and is one of the keys to understanding why Russian forces have performed so poorly in this war despite their large numerical advantage. It is also the key to understanding the evolving next phase of the war.

US DoD statements that Russia retains 80-85 percent of its original mobilized combat power unintentionally exaggerate the Russian military’s current capabilities to fight. Such statements taken in isolation are inherently ambiguous, for one thing. They could mean that 80-85 percent of the Russian units originally mobilized to fight in Ukraine remain intact and ready for action while 15-20 percent have been destroyed. Were that the case, Russia would have tremendous remaining combat power to hurl against Ukraine. Or, they could mean that all the Russian units mobilized to invade Ukraine have each suffered 15-20 percent casualties, which would point to a greatly decreased Russian offensive capacity, as such casualty levels severely degrade the effectiveness of most military units. The reality, as DoD briefers and other evidence make clear, is more complicated, and paints a grim picture for Russian commanders contemplating renewing major offensive operations.

The dozens of Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that retreated from around Kyiv likely possess combat power that is a fraction of what the numbers of units or total numbers of personnel with those units would suggest. Russian units that have fought in Ukraine have taken fearful damage.[5] As the US DoD official noted on April 8, “We've seen indications of some units that are literally, for all intents and purposes, eradicated. There's just nothing left of the BTG except a handful of troops, and maybe a small number of vehicles, and they're going to have to be reconstituted or reapplied to others. We've seen others that are, you know, down 30 percent manpower.”[6] Units with such levels of losses are combat ineffective—they have essentially zero combat power. A combination of anecdotal evidence and generalized statements such as these from US and other NATO defense officials indicates that most of the Russian forces withdrawn from the immediate environs of Kyiv likely fall into the category of units that will remain combat ineffective until they have been reconstituted.

Reconstituting these units to restore any notable fraction of their nominal power would take months. The Russian military would have to incorporate new soldiers bringing the units back up toward full strength and then allow those soldiers time to integrate into the units. It would also have to allow those units to conduct some unit training, because a unit is more than the sum of individual soldiers and vehicles. The combat power of a unit results in no small part from its ability to operate as a coherent whole rather than a group of individuals. It takes time even for well-trained professional soldiers to learn how to fight together, and Russian soldiers are far from well-trained. The unit would also have to replace lost and damaged vehicles and repair those that are reparable. The unit’s personnel would need time to regain their morale and will to fight, both badly damaged by the humiliation of defeat and the stress and emotional damage of the losses they suffered. These processes take a long time. They cannot be accomplished in a few weeks, let alone the few days the Russian command appears willing to grant. Russian forces withdrawn from around Kyiv and going back to fight in Donbas in the next few weeks, therefore, will not have been reconstituted. At best, they will have been patched up and filled out not with fresh soldiers but with soldiers drawn from other battered and demoralized units. A battalion’s worth of such troops will not have a battalion’s worth of combat power.

The Russian armed forces likely have few or no full-strength units in reserve to deploy to fight in Ukraine because of a flawed mobilization scheme that cannot be fixed in the course of a short war. The Russians did not deploy full regiments and brigades to invade Ukraine—with few exceptions as we have previously noted. They instead drew individual battalions from many different regiments and brigades across their entire force. We have identified elements of almost every single brigade or regiment in the Russian Army, Airborne Troops, and Naval Infantry involved in fighting in Ukraine already. The decision to form composite organizations drawn from individual battalions thrown together into ad hoc formations degraded the performance of those units, as we have discussed in earlier reports.[7] It has also committed the Russian military to replicating that mistake for the duration of this conflict, because there are likely few or no intact regiments or brigades remaining in the Russian Army, Airborne Forces, or Naval Infantry. The Russians have no choice but to continue throwing individual battalions together into ad hoc formations until they have rebuilt entire regiments and brigades, a process that will likely take years.

ISW has been spot on about the course of the war so far. They now see good conditions for counter attacks to retake Kherson, while the biggest threat will come from the axis further east.

Notably though, Russia kept its official conscription figures fairly normal, which was a good sign for peace, but now apparently they are doing behind the scenes conscription, including on the spot conscription at road blocks.

Russia has a 20-24 population of 3.45 million, versus 9.5 million for the US. It boggles the mind to think that the leadership is so into their groupthink that they think they can hide a major war with 15,000+ KIA and 40,000 casualties from the public long term, especially if they are using older reservists and more conscription. It's the equivalent of six times all the fatalities from Iraq and Afghanistan over twenty years occuring in just two months already.