My view is that the orgin of the universe certainly does appear to be paradoical and the is no satisfactory way I know of to 'unparadoxify' it.

I don't believe actual paradoxes can exist and the most likely reason why the origin of the universe appears paradoxical is simply that there is a piece of the puzzle missing.

I think it is a waste of time - and rather silly - to imagine that the puzzle of the orgin of space and time can be solved by playing around with words, as if reality is governed by idioms of the English language.

The solution, when (or perhaps if) it gets revealed, will come from a discovery of some fact about the world that shows that some assumption we are making is invalid.

I expect it will be some asssumption we barely think of as an assumption - it will seem axiomatic today, much as what was axiomatic in the classical pictire the world was overthrown by the discoveried of quantum physics and relativity, ie that things can be in twp places at once, a cat can be both alive and dead and time doesn't always 'flow' at the same rate. Only a madman would have believed those things just over a hundred years ago. I believe there is something we take for granted that just isn't true. Our grandchildren will wonder how it was we could have believed whatever it is - but what 'whatever it is' is, I don't care to guess!

More positively, I think it might get clearer if we ever resolve quantum physics and general relativity, but I expect that will only result in even having deeper and more difficult problems - that is what science tends to do, which is why (and how) I like it!

For one, I think the "Whatever" part needs to be delineated.
Otherwise we might just replace it with, well, whatever.
What about causation then, all causes and effects, or just some past causal chains?
The kalam/cosmological argument alleges to prove one unique 1^st cause, which hence was supposedly how it all began, including causation (in fact, all causal chains, and time too).
Therefore causation has a cause of its existence?

Anyway, going by contemporary cosmology, spacetime is an aspect of the universe.
And causation is temporal, causation is another aspect of the universe, not somehow "not of the universe" (which, again, would require it's own justification).
Did "time begin to exist" as well?
I don't think it makes much sense that "time has a cause of its existence", unless "causation" is somehow extended to mean something more, something invented for the occasion.
Phrases like "a cause of causation" and "before time" seems incoherent.



In short, before applying these premises, the applicability have to be delineated.

I think I can clarify this. Instead of saying "whatever begins to exist has a cause", we can say "all that is not eternal has a cause". As you point out, "causation has a cause" is nonsensical. It follows that causation does not have a cause, and therefore causation is eternal. Does that sound surprising? Not so; it is part of what is called "eternal truths". Such eternal truths include:
- laws of logic: if p is true, then not p is false,
- laws of mathematics: 2+2=4
- laws of morality: charity is good, killing is bad. (Though this one is controversial).

I am not sure I understand your argument against the phrase "begins to exist". Even though the exact moment for the beginning of your existence is not clear, we can definitely deduce a beginning:
You exist today, and you did not exist 100 years ago; therefore your existence has a beginning.

The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God. — Purple Pond

I think you can. Sure, your awareness is not the cause of the existence of God, but it means that we can deduce the existence of God from our awareness that all temporary things have a cause. In other words, we can reason backwards, from observation to effect to cause, even though in reality things occur from cause to effect to our observations. When Descartes says "I think therefore I am", he does not mean that his thinking is the cause of his existence, but that his existence is necessary for him to think.

How about instead of "whatever begins to exist has a cause", "everything that I'm aware of has been brought into being by something else". The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God. — Purple Pond

I don't see where you're going with this. To exist, at the bare minimum, means to be not-nothing. Demonstrations like the cosmological argument are typically not based in the sort of Humean empiricism you are advocating here, where reality is a disconnected disunity with only contingent repetitions.

If we take your Humean empiricist route, we can ask, why shouldn't what we aren't aware of have a cause? Or, alternatively, we can make our way back in history and find the moments in time which things we were not aware of come into our awareness. And we'll see there were causes for these.

Going all the way back, then, brings us to the hypothesis of God. You can say "this does not prove God exists" but this is basically akin to saying "there is rain, but this doesn't mean clouds exist above me". It's this sort of thing that makes me acknowledge that it's not entirely proven that God exists (just as the "rain" could just be a sprinkler) but I think the evidence favors the existence of some sort of uncaused, prime mover. Without any reason to believe it's a sprinkler, I'm going to believe it's clouds.

If the PSR applies to all things, then it applies to all becomings.

The phrasing of the Kalaam Cosmological Argument's first premise is worded as such to avoid criticism from infinite regress issues in the extremely basic versions of the cosmological argument (such as the issue raised by the rephrasing offered). It is allowed to do define its conditions for causation and I do not think saying, "it is odd" is going to cut it.

The only criticism about the first premise is this: the argument might beg the question and close out the possibilities by restricting explanations to what we observe in the current universe. For example, I see tables being made and coming into existence. However, there is an important difference between the creation of tables and the beginning of the universe. The table is being made by rearranging matter. The table is not "beginning to exist" in the same way the universe is supposed to begin to exist (assuming there was not preexisting matter before the universe that forms the current universe). The argument wants to conflate common events with an event we have never seen before and know relatively little about: the emergence of time and space. In short, the beginning of the universe is a special event and we have no reason to believe the commonly observed rules of causation apply- we may require a special explanation. This is, in fact, what the argument wants to try to do with God, but it ignores a bigger issue: we are talking about a state of affairs we know nothing about and that one can reasonably argue we can never know about. We would be talking about a time before time, a notion that does not even make much sense. As such, we have no reason to believe the special explanation must conform to the first premise, so the first premise might be false.

Of course, the argument faces several other issues, but are beyond the scope of the thread.

How about instead of "whatever begins to exist has a cause", "everything that I'm aware of has been brought into being by something else". The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God. — Purple Pond

You seem to understand the premise (vague as it is) just fine. The only thing your reformulation does is it adds to the original premise an odd dependency on your awareness - an unexpected move that you did not motivate in your preceding discussion. The conclusion of the paragraph does not follow at all, since this is the first time you even mention God.

God exists. Get over it.

"God exists. Get over it."

OK, I'm over it. Now someone else tells me that God doesn't exist and to get over it. OK, so now I'm over that, too. So I'm over both. Now what? I'm not sure that getting over a question is quite the same as answering it.

"whatever begins to exist has a cause."

I don't think it's particularly weird. But it's an assumption, not a necessary truth. It's not self-contradictory to suppose that something begins to exist and yet has no cause. It's perhaps a sign that the person making that supposition has a rather unenquiring mind but it's not necessarily a false supposition. One slightly weird thing about the statement and also about its contradictory, is that nothing could ever be found either falsify or to confirm such a statement. Maybe there's some event going on right now that has no cause but I happen to know nothing about it. Maybe there never has been and never will be such an event. Any candidate 'uncaused' event may turn out to have a cause after all - just a cause that I failed to identify.

In the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument Dr Craig boldly asserts that "whatever begins to exists has a cause". What does he mean? What does he mean by "begins to exists"? And what does it mean to cause something to begin to exist? People don't usually talk about things in terms of "begins to exist.", and I never heard somebody say "x caused y to begin to exist". Let's look at an example: — Purple Pond

This has to do with the way that we individuate things in the world, and refer to them as individual objects, separate from other individual objects. That there are separate unities which can be counted, 1, 2, 3, 4, is fundamental to mathematics, and that the separate entities can be identified and described, is fundamental to deductive logic. So within the fundamental assumptions, or premises, of these logical systems, as a foundational principle, is the belief that there are individual objects within the world.

However, experience and observation tell us that the existence of individual physical objects is temporary. They all have temporal existence, which means that they come into existence, and go out of existence with the passing of time. Because every object is generated and corrupted in time, we must assume that each object has a beginning and an ending in time. Further, we have observed that there are causes of coming into existence and ceasing to exist.

Does that help to explain the issue?

How about instead of "whatever begins to exist has a cause", "everything that I'm aware of has been brought into being by something else". The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God. — Purple Pond

I don't see how that change gets rid of the need for God. We still have all physical things having temporal existence. And if every physical thing is brought into existence by "something else", then we need to assume something like God to account for the first physical thing.

Me

If the PSR applies to all things, then it applies to all becomings.

Of course if there is no God, then there is no reason why the principle of sufficient reasons holds. The world is just the way it is, the causal argument crumbles leaving only contingency & the law of noncontradiction. There is (ultimately) no causal reason for anything.

@Samuel Lacrampe, doesn't that make the kalam/cosmological argument into an argument for Platonism instead, sort of...?

It's commonly said that Platonics are inert:

• an object is abstract (if and) only if it is causally inefficacious

Suppose x is (defined as) atemporal, "outside of time". Then there can be no time at which x exists. And x cannot change, or be subject to change, but would be inert. Interaction with x could not occur.

If we suppose otherwise for a moment, then there's the question of sufficient reason (of which Craig's 1^st premise seems a special case). Is there a sufficient reason then, that the universe is exactly 14 billion years old, and not some other age, any other age...?

It's all rather odd.

There's also a bit of oddness when speaking of time in tensed language, or at least that's how it seems to me. I guess we might suppose that we can speak of time (itself), where we implicitly mean (all of) time untensed. This suggests a block-universe, something like that. Regardless, you'd derive that "time had a cause of its existence", thus having "causation" be atemporal (in part at least).

Can we exemplify atemporal causation, in a way that matters?

- laws of logic: if p is true, then not p is false,
- laws of mathematics: 2+2=4 — Samuel Lacrampe

I'd narrow them down in this context:

• identity, x=x, p⇔p
• additive identity, 1+0=1

Anyway, for this sort of thing to have much ontological import, I'd say more (or something else) is needed.

Suppose x is (defined as) atemporal, "outside of time". Then there can be no time at which x exists. And x cannot change, or be subject to change, but would be inert. Interaction with x could not occur. — jorndoe

This all depends on how one defines "time". If time is defined by physical change, then physical change is essential to time, physical change is necessary for time to be passing, and there is no such thing as time passing when no physical change is occurring. But if physical change is defined by time, then we invert this model, and we allow for the possibility of time passing when no physical change is occurring.

Now we have two distinct definitions of time, the former and the latter. We can assume something "outside of time", in reference to the former definition, which is "inside of time" in reference to the latter definition. This assumed "thing", could cause physical change, and it would appear to be outside of time according to the former definition, because it is not itself a physical change. However, if we adopt the latter definition of 'time", which allows for time to be passing when no physical change is occurring, then we allow this to be a "cause", inside of time. That cause is properly a "cause", but it has no physical existence. It is outside of time when "time" is defined as it commonly is in physics, but it is not outside of time if we adopt a different definition of "time". The idea that there is a thing outside of time, and that it is necessarily "inert", is produced by the idea that time is defined by physical change, and that this is the correct model of time.

There is (ultimately) no causal reason for anything — Cavacava

And yet you say:

Of course if there is no God — Cavacava

You seem so sure. :-} Surely there is a logic behind St. Anselm' “that than which no greater can be conceived.”

If you are implying about the lack of certainty for the afterlife or whatever customs that people have created to prompt moral behaviour through such variable influences, then sure.

But if your existence is about the correlation between a number of variables that consists of a timeline of causal events until you authentically become conscious a priori of your own existence and separateness, you then have a purpose. That moment you become 'aware' is the beginning of existence and to Kalam whatever begins to exist has a cause. There is existing in the physical, which is vanity at best (for a majority of people who are not authentically aware but follow the herd are those I would consider non-existent), but there is existence in the Kantian transcendental, which constitutes cognition or becoming a rational, autonomous being. We then become capable of creating a good and virtuous life and experiencing genuine love and happiness (heaven).

I am moving today, but I will respond perhaps at end of day, assuming I can still think coherently.

Surely there is a logic behind St. Anselm' “that than which no greater can be conceived.”

The existence of something and our capacity to conceive it are logically independent. We can conceive things that don't exist and equally things that do; and we probably fail to conceive things that do or alternatively don't exist. So to consider what we can or cannot conceive will tell us nothing about what exists.

In the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument Dr Craig boldly asserts that "whatever begins to exists has a cause". What does he mean? What does he mean by "begins to exists"? And what does it mean to cause something to begin to exist? People don't usually talk about things in terms of "begins to exist.", and I never heard somebody say "x caused y to begin to exist". Let's look at an example:

When did you begin to exist? (You mean when was I born?) I was born April 30th 1994. What caused you to begin to exist? (You mean what brought me into being?) My parents had sex.

How about instead of "whatever begins to exist has a cause", "everything that I'm aware of has been brought into being by something else". The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God.

What are your thoughts on this first premise? Do you see anything weird or suspicious in how it's phrased? — Purple Pond

There are two other concepts that deal with the same issue. The first is Dependent Arising and the other is Münchhausen trilemma

Dependent Arising
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da

Münchhausen trilemma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma

I'm sorry I don't have time to put it in my own words but here is some of what is said in "Münchhausen trilemma" on Wiki:



"In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment used to demonstrate the impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics. If it is asked how any knowledge is known to be true, proof may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three options when providing proof in this situation:

The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each other
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts
The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options.

The name Münchhausen-Trilemma was coined by the German philosopher Hans Albert in 1968 in reference to a trilemma of "dogmatism versus infinite regress versus psychologism" used by Karl Popper.[1] It is a reference to the problem of "bootstrapping", based on the story of Baron Munchausen (in German, "Münchhausen") pulling himself and the horse on which he was sitting out of a mire by his own hair.


....



In contemporary epistemology, advocates of coherentism are supposed to accept the "circular" horn of the trilemma; foundationalists rely on the axiomatic argument. The view that accepts infinite regress is called infinitism. Advocates of fallibilism, though, point out that while it is indeed correct that a theory cannot be proven universally true, it can be proven false (test method) or it can be deemed unnecessary (Occam's razor). Thus, conjectural theories can be held as long as they have not been refuted." -Wikki

Well you put my cart before the horse. I said

Of course if there is no God, then there is no reason why the principle of sufficient reasons holds. The world is just the way it is, the causal argument crumbles leaving only contingency & the law of noncontradiction. There is (ultimately) no causal reason for anything.

I am agnostic, so my "if" is meaningful, because I am not sure if there is a God or not, however I am sure that a 'logical' God it is a fantasy, perhaps a necessary one but still if your conception of the divine is some sort of logical magician, happy trails. Logic is fine, it is important for knowledge, but it is not in my opinion extensive with experience, it can't explain experience. All the logical conundrums fall flat in the face of experience, and life goes on.

The only necessity is contingency...show me otherwise :-O

doesn't that make the kalam/cosmological argument into an argument for Platonism instead, sort of...? — jorndoe

Yes, it does in the sense that some concepts must be eternal. To think otherwise yields to a self-contradiction: One thing is eternally true, that nothing is eternally true.

Suppose x is (defined as) atemporal, "outside of time". Then there can be no time at which x exists. And x cannot change, or be subject to change, but would be inert. Interaction with x could not occur. — jorndoe

I agree that x could not change, but why could x not change other things, that is, act as their cause? E.g. the eternal law of logic is one of the causes to me thinking logically. The Formal Cause is one of Aristotle's four causes of things.

I am sure that a 'logical' God it is a fantasy, perhaps a necessary one but still if your conception of the divine is some sort of logical magician, happy trails. Logic is fine, it is important for knowledge, but it is not in my opinion extensive with experience, it can't explain experience. All the logical conundrums fall flat in the face of experience, and life goes on. — Cavacava

Oi, since when is Anselm a god? I said that surely Anslem' ontological argument on the existence of God has a logic, namely "...that than which no greater can be conceived," and not that God is logical. But wait, you say:

The only necessity is contingency...show me otherwise — Cavacava

Hmm.. and you also say:

All the logical conundrums fall flat in the face of experience, and life goes on. — Cavacava

Anselm' formula that we are unable to conceive by understanding alone of a perfect being or God which - by being an agnostic - you must agree with this contingent proposition since the nature of the divine beyond which nothing greater can be posited is neither true nor false.

My my, how logical of you.

Think of the cosmological singularity - how did the universe come to existence? No one is able to posit the very nature and the ultimate beginning of this reality and yet we assume the necessity of the singularity' existence since the universe exists. Unless, you believe that the universe is a contingent proposition?

The existence of something and our capacity to conceive it are logically independent. — Cuthbert

I have freckles. Just thought I would mention that since you appreciate the obvious. :-|

We can conceive things that don't exist and equally things that do; and we probably fail to conceive things that do or alternatively don't exist. So to consider what we can or cannot conceive will tell us nothing about what exists. — Cuthbert

You will fall into an infinite regress, the point of Anslem' ontology is that which is ultimately a perfect being cannot be thought that it cannot even be thought of as not existing.

I am agnostic, so my "if" is meaningful, because I am not sure if there is a God or not, however I am sure that a 'logical' God it is a fantasy, perhaps a necessary one but still if your conception of the divine is some sort of logical magician, happy trails. Logic is fine, it is important for knowledge, but it is not in my opinion extensive with experience, it can't explain experience. All the logical conundrums fall flat in the face of experience, and life goes on.

The only necessity is contingency...show me otherwise :-O — Cavacava

I think I more or less agree. :D

I kind of both agnostic and atheist on certain things since I know I can't prove there is a is or isn't a "God", but I'm also pretty sure that many theist go about such beliefs the wrong way. I guess I look at the issue this way Abrahamic religions "claim" they both know "God" enough to be able say both what he is about and what his will is, however it is a given that anyone that believes they know such things is a real secret squirrel if you know what I mean. Even C. S. Lewis admits that if Christ thought he was talking to "God" and he wasn't he would be "a lunatic — on the level with the man who says he is a poached egg". Even worst than Christ is Abraham who was willing to kill his son in order to appease a "God" that he wasn't even completely sure to exist.

The problem is that neither Christ, or Abraham, or any theist can have complete confidence in their invisible God that they worship. They only know that after a certain point they either have to reject that God exists or deal with the issues if he doesn't exist (and they are often indoctrinated to believe if he doesn't exist there is no point to anything anyways), so they choices they have are either continue believing in God one way or another or to try to understand what the world is like if there isn't a God.

Even though I'm partial to nihilism, I believe the reasons we do what we do are more or less still about as valid if one is atheist/agnostic as when one is a theist ( and in some ways even more so since we have to create a kind of "salvation" by ourselves instead of expecting God to give it to us) and the future of what may be could depend on what happens to the human race instead of everything being predetermined as they are if "God" existed.

In a nutshell if "God" exists, things are kind of simple and the outcome of world/universe is more depend on "God" than on us. However if it is only us things are much more complex and perhaps there is a lot more riding on our shoulders; of course this is also dependent on how many other sentient beings are also out there..

I kind of both agnostic and atheist. — dclements

You have it all figured out. :-|

One thing is eternally true, that nothing is eternally true. — Samuel Lacrampe

Nifty reasoning, @Samuel Lacrampe.
Well, of course Platonism implies Platonism.
It looks like the term "eternal" is hitching a ride with propositional consistency here, though.
The most ontological import you can derive, is that anything that exists is self-identical, or so it seems to me anyway.
Does (abstract propositional) consistency itself exist apart from all else, is it a constraint on our thinking, or something else...?

am agnostic, so my "if" is meaningful, because I am not sure if there is a God or not, however I am sure that a 'logical' God it is a fantasy, perhaps a necessary one but still if your conception of the divine is some sort of logical magician, happy trails. — Cavacava

How is it possible that something which is necessary could be a fantasy? Can this be rationalized?

Does (abstract propositional) consistency itself exist apart from all else, is it a constraint on our thinking, or something else...? — jorndoe

Here is my take on this. Abstract concepts such as laws of logic and formulas exist in themselves and are eternal: 1+1 does not cease to equal 2 just because there are no concrete things to apply it to. But this is not the case for Platonic Forms of concrete things such as "triangle-ness" and "tree-ness": a tree does not retain its tree-ness once you remove all the matter from it. I think this is also Aristotle's position.

Well, of course Platonism implies Platonism.
It looks like the term "eternal" is hitching a ride with propositional consistency here, though. — jorndoe

You are free to remove the first term "eternal". But without it, the statement is either implied to be eternally true, or not. If eternally true, then no change to the original statement. If not eternally true, then there are some instances when the statement is not true, but that is illogical: the statement "nothing is eternally true" is sometimes not true.

Note, it is possible that I misunderstood your point. If so, just ignore this comment.

You have it all figured out. :-| — TimeLine

In the area of that I spent over ten years studying/debating philosophy and know about it as much as anyone can the answer is "yes". However like Socrates who was the "wisest" man in Athens because he at least knew that he knew nothing at all, I know that there are both plenty of unknown knowns as well as unknown unknowns, as well as human fallibility/human condition that I can't do that much about. But at least I have some idea of where the field of play is and where things are out of bounds so to speak.

So if I look like a little girl trying swinging her fist whiling trying to run into a bunch of bullies on the playground when I debate, all I can say is that this far from the first rodeo I've been to and I'm almost thick skinned enough to handle almost any debate that someone wants to give me.