A perspective is not a passive observation from a certain vantage, it is the creation of something new from
a certain vantage . Any ‘observation’ alters not just what it relates to, but also that which is doing the observing. — Joshs

Right but what is a view without sentience? Besides using Wittgenstein to just say, "This is nonsense!" is there any other good responses here?

I've already had answers like Whitehead and process philosophy, which is adjacent to a kind of pansychism.
I've already anticipated answers like it's all "information processing" or some such.. But then countered that how can perspective come from information processing?

Whitehead's "occasions of experience" and zombie-like information processing are forms of the "localized interactions" that I am talking about in the OP (and that I am skeptical of).

Try to remove the human temporal perspective, so that there's no "now". Y — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say ‘human’ do you have in mind an a priori ala Kant? To be human is then to be possessed of a prior categories. This makes humanity a divine notion.

But my question also included ideas of localized interactions. Whitehead proposed atomic "occasions" of experiences. That still seems odd to me. I mean it's as good a conjecture as any, but doesn't really get beyond being conjecture. — schopenhauer1

Whitehead goes some distance toward what I’m getting at in claiming that an observer alters what is observed in the act of observing it. As a result, perspective is something added onto a pre-perspectival reality, but constitutes it by producing it as something new.

He rejects Newton’s “doctrine of ‘simple location’ and ‘external relations’. “The rejected Newtonian doctrine of simple location dovetails with the conception of space and time in terms of external relations, that is, the conception of space and time as absolute ‘immovable’ containers external to and unaffected by the things located in space and time (see Newton’s Scholium cited in PR 70). By understanding spatiotemporal relations as external relations, Newton develops a “ ‘receptacle’ theory of space–time” (PR 70)—which, for clarity’s sake, should not be confused with Whitehead’s later notion of ‘the Receptacle’. Understood as such, space and time are ‘empty’ forms (PR 72) that merely ‘accommodate’ bodies, without affecting or being affected by what they accommodate. Mirroring the two inseparable aspects of the doctrine of internal relations, Newton’s externality of space and time entails, first, that bodies enjoy an independence from their spatiotemporal relations and are ‘simply located’, and, two, that space and time remain unmovable and unmodified by the extension of bodies.
Rejecting Newton’s doctrine, Whitehead takes precisely the opposite stance; Of the ‘Receptacle’— which in Adventures of Ideas is his concept referring to “the general notion of extension” (AI 258; see also AI 192)—he says: “It is part of the essential nature of each physical
actuality that it is itself an element qualifying the Receptacle, and that the qualifications of the
Receptacle enter into its own nature.” (AI 171) In other words, the fact that “the relata modify the nature of the relations” (AI 201) entails that extension as the “primary relationship” (PR 288) between actual occasions, is modified by these occasions.

He knows that to have an idea at all in mind is to have logic in play already. One can't imagine a logic-free "world". — Constance

Are you getting this view of logic from the Tractatus?
The Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations seemed to treat logic very differently

“… the logical edifice of the Tractatus came tumbling down and with it the whole notion of ‘logical form' that.played such a central role in Wittgenstein's
early thought.”” During his first six months back in Cambridge in 1929, as he wrestled with the difficulties about logical form that Ramsey had raised, he fairly quickly came to the conclusion that the very notion of logical form had to be abandoned.”(Ray Monk)

Right but what is a view without sentience? Besides using Wittgenstein to just say, "This is nonsense!" is there any other good responses here? — schopenhauer1

I think sentience as it is conventionally understood is a confused notion, as if to be sentient is to be possessed of some special substance or ineffable property in addition to how we understand physical stuff to interact. The problem is the way we wall off what we think of as the subject from the object. On one side is value, feeling and will, and on the other is dead content. No wonder we have a ‘hard problem’ and mystery of the gap between the in-itself and the for-itself. We created it with this artificial separation. Going the panpsychism route just reifies the split, and turning everything into information still assumes some sort of totalizing metaphysics. I like Nietzsche’s approach.

“Assuming that our world of desires and passions is the only thing “given” as real, that we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the reality of our drives (since thinking is only a relation between these drives) – aren't we allowed to make the attempt and pose the question as to whether something like this “given” isn't enough to render the so-called mechanistic (and thus material) world comprehensible as well? I do not mean comprehensible as a deception, a “mere appearance,” a “representation” (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer); I mean it might allow us to understand the mechanistic world as belonging to the same plane of reality as our affects themselves –, as a primitive form of the world of affect, where everything is contained in a powerful unity before branching off and organizing itself in the organic process (and, of course, being softened and weakened –).

We would be able to understand the mechanistic world as a kind of life of the drives, where all the organic functions (self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, excretion, and metabolism) are still synthetically bound together – as a pre-form of life? – In the end, we are not only allowed to make such an attempt: the conscience of method demands it. Multiple varieties of causation should not be postulated until the attempt to make do with a single one has been taken as far as it will go (– ad absurdum, if you will). This is a moral of method that cannot be escaped these days; – it follows “from the definition,” as a mathematician would say. The question is ultimately whether we recognize the will as, in effect, efficacious, whether we believe in the causality of the will. If we do (and this belief is really just our belief in causality itself –), then we must make the attempt to hypothetically posit the causality of the will as the only type of causality there is.

“Will” can naturally have effects only on “will” – and not on “matter” (not on “nerves” for instance –). Enough: we must venture the hypothesis that everywhere “effects” are recognized, will is effecting will – and that every mechanistic event in which a force is active is really a force and effect of the will. – Assuming, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire life of drives as the organization and outgrowth of one basic form of will (namely, of the will to power, which is my claim); assuming we could trace all organic functions back to this will to power and find that it even solved the problem of procreation and nutrition (which is a single problem); then we will have earned the right to clearly designate all efficacious force as: will to power. The world seen from inside, the world determined and described with respect to its “intelligible character” – would be just this “will to power” and nothing else. –“

What is a non-perspective world? — schopenhauer1

Nonlocal (i.e. infinite).

In what way can we talk of it intelligibly?

Insofar as effability is perspectival, "a non-perspective world" is ineffable.

What does that even mean when there’s no perspective?

Noise (i.e. randomness).

We get a view from nowhere. Here is true metaphysics. What then exists in the view from nowhere?

I think "metaphysics" as such consists in creating and using conceptual tools / criteria in order to deflate – render transparent to reason – 'cultural-experiential perspectives' on whatever there is. This is done by either (A) positing one map to define (determine the totality of) the territory (i.e. "idealism") and to function as the foundation of all other maps (e.g. "platonism") or (B) negating every map which does not correspond with – cannot be used for navigating – the territory and thereby populating the set of all corresponding – navigable – maps of the territory which are inherent to the territory (e.g. "irrealism" ... "actualism").

(A) positive (i.e. traditional, classical) metaphysics speculates categorically on the necessary structure of the real. Empirical, transcendental and verificationist methodologies are instances of 'anti-metaphysical skepticism'.

(B) negative (à la apophatic) metaphysics speculates categorically on the necessary structure of the unreal. This negative approach is, I contend, even less perspectival, or subjective, than the positive (à la kataphatic) approach by virtue of negating the unreal in order to make explicit (but without defining) the real.

direct, unspoken experience — T Clark

what is a direct unspoken experience?

what is a direct unspoken experience? — Jackson

Experience comes first, then the words. Words are how we process experience. It is possible, I think, to experience the world without processing. That doesn't mean I can do it, although I may have been close a few times.

Then what do you mean by experience?

Then what do you mean by experience? — Jackson

Sights, sounds, tastes, smells, feelings, emotions, memories, attention...

I may have missed your point. Are you saying we cannot be angry without using words to say we are angry?

I may have missed your point. Are you saying we cannot be angry without using words to say we are angry? — Jackson

Young children experience emotions, but they have to learn what they are, what they mean, what they are called.

Good explanation. Thanks.

Do you think a universe can persist if there is no observer/perspective? I know we can't imagine that world, but I guess my bigger question is, "what" is being outside perspective?

If you say, there is no "being" outside perspective, that is indeed Idealism and Schopenhauer would get on board with that. But, let's say you weren't an Idealist. Is there any other way to answer this? — schopenhauer1

The key point here is the precise meaning of ‘to exist’. If I were to answer ‘no’, then you would say ‘aha! So you’re claiming the universe ceases to exist in the absence of observers!’ You then try to imagine the non-existence of the whole universe, of the universe literally disappearing.

But both existence and non-existence are conceptual constructions. The idea of non-existence is just as dependent on the constructive activities of the mind as the idea of existence. And what exists outside that constructive activity of the mind, we will never know, because that is what gives meaning to the term ‘it exists’. Nothing has any meaning outside that matrix of meaning-construction.

In the background of your thinking about this, you have an idea ultimately attributable to scientific realism: we know the Universe predates h. sapiens by many billions of years and that life on Earth will run its course. But even though that is empirically true, it is also an intellectual construction or projection which implicitly depends on the knowing subject . Here is a passage I often quote in relation to this point:

'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was [that] the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.

Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy, p106

So, from the empirical perspective it is of course true that the Universe precedes our existence, but from the perspective of transcendental idealism, ‘before’ is also a part of the way in which the observing mind constructs the world.

My tentative, meta-philosophical claim is that this implies that in some sense, the appearance of conscious sentient beings literally brings the universe into existence. Not that ‘before’ we came along that it didn’t exist, but that the manner of its existence is unintelligible apart from the perspective brought to it by the observer. We can’t get ‘outside’ that perspective, even if we try and see the world as if there’s no observer. (Sorry for the length of this post.)

Young children experience emotions, but they have to learn what they are, what they mean, what they are called. — T Clark

I don’t think they have to learn what they mean in a fundamental sense. What they mean is inherent in their very expression as emotions. An emotion is a kind of appraisal of one’s situation, a way of interpreting its significance, whether one has a word label for the emotion or not.

But both existence and non-existence are conceptual constructions. The idea of non-existence is just as dependent on the constructive activities of the mind as the idea of existence. And what exists outside that constructive activity of the mind, we will never know, because that is what gives meaning to the term ‘it exists’. Nothing has any meaning outside that matrix of meaning-construction. — Wayfarer

I agree, but this is a hard idea to keep hold of. If I stop paying attention, it slips away again.

Not that ‘before’ we came along that it didn’t exist, but that the manner of its existence is unintelligible apart from the perspective brought to it by the observer. We can’t get ‘outside’ that perspective, even if we try and see the world as if there’s no observer. (Sorry for the length of this post.) — Wayfarer

This still seems to imply a factual status to the pre-human world. I prefer the idea that we could imagine a perspective within a pre-human universe, but even from
that perspective we find no neutral fact of the matter , but instead the same problem we faced when dealing with human interpretation of the world. That is , any facet of a world taken as what it is ‘in itself’ implies not only a relation with an environment to define what ‘it’ is, but a relation that produces it uniquely , and only in that moment, and only from ‘its’ perspective in that moment. A world creates and recreates itself , but in a way that is not accessible to a neutral
overview, because the nature of its fecundity is inherently perspectival. This is why matter is already value-laden

I agree, but this is a hard idea to keep hold of. If I stop paying attention, it slips away again. — T Clark

For sure. Habits of thought re-assert themselves constantly.

That is , any facet of a world taken as what it is ‘in itself’ implies not only a relation with an environment to define what ‘it’ is, but a relation that produces it uniquely , and only in that moment, and only from ‘its’ perspective in that moment — Joshs

:up: That's where phenomenology dovetails well with Buddhist philosophy, which says that nothing exists in itself, but only in relationship. And also with Rovelli's relational interpretation of qm.

I don’t think they have to learn what they mean in a fundamental sense. What they mean is inherent in their very expression as emotions. An emotion is a kind of appraisal of one’s situation, whether one has a word label for the emotion or not. — Joshs

In "How Emotions are Made," Lisa Barrett describes how children learn concepts, names, of emotions by observing their own internal states, other people's emotional expressions, and the use of words for emotions. Each emotional concept; anger, sadness, happiness; is made up of a whole bunch of different instances that they have to learn belong together. Anger can feel and be expressed very differently depending on the situation and the person involved. This is something that has to be learned.

If you say, there is no "being" outside perspective, that is indeed Idealism and Schopenhauer would get on board with that. But, let's say you weren't an Idealist. Is there any other way to answer this? — schopenhauer1

There is no problem with saying there is being outside of any perspective, or that things exist independently of any perspective; but it's obvious, by definition, that anything we say about it, including the statement that there is being outside perspective, or things existing independently of any perspective is from a perspective.

Yes, a priori, this kind of conjecturing must be projections and imaginations. We can still try to "describe" it. Like if I say, "What do you think a dog's perspective is like" and you say, "It has a lot to do with smells, patterns of reward, belly rubs, and such" I can still meaningfully gain some insight into this from my limited human perspective without actually "being" a dog myself. Of course, I am never going to have the POV of a dog, but it can be discussed like anything else.

I'm just saying not to use Witty to weaponize any inquiry on metaphysical or epistemological conjectures. Sometimes it's more about how to view a subject matter, not necessarily getting at "it" directly. We all know that there is a contradiction in thinking about non-perspective, but the dialogue surrounding such ideas is not thus a non-starter, it's just keeping in mind that it can only be conjecture. — schopenhauer1

I would agree if it just wasn't for that pesky absence of -perspective that is at the center of the issue here. The whole idea is to imagine the world/universe as if we were not there to conceive of it. Ever since, long ago, Rorty said he didn't know how anything out there got in here (pointing to his head) I have never been able to get around it. As counter intuitive as this sounds, it simply seems beyond refutation: either I am now "looking at" my brain's interior, or consciousness of the world is not brain bound.
But quite right, this kind of thinking often intrudes where unwelcome.

This negative approach is, I contend, even less perspectival, or subjective, than the positive (à la kataphatic) approach by virtue of negating the unreal in order to make explicit (but without defining) the real. — 180 Proof

:up: That's it!

Metaphysics is a tool. If it works, it's valid. — T Clark

I agree with this except for "invalid." — T Clark

Perhaps "invalid" is a problematic term, given it's use in logic to denote consistency as distinct from truth. My point is that if metaphysics is taken to be the attempt to arrive at a definitive answer as to the nature of absolute reality, then it is not, and cannot be, adequate to the task. This was the point of Kant's project.

My point is that if metaphysics is taken to be the attempt to arrive at a definitive answer as to the nature of absolute reality, then it is not, and cannot be, adequate to the task. — Janus

Metaphysics is no more the definitive answer to absolute reality than epistemology is the definitive answer to absolute truth and knowledge.
And Kant was simply doing metaphysics under the guise of epistemology.

And Kant was simply doing metaphysics under the guise of epistemology. — Jackson

If metaphysics is taken to be the science of the Real (where "real" is understood to be what is independent of human experience) then Kant was not doing metaphysics. His aim was to establish what characteristics all possible human experience and judgement must have.

If metaphysics is taken to be the science of the Real (where "real" is understood to be what is independent of human experience) then Kant was not doing metaphysics. His aim was to establish what characteristics all possible human experience and judgement must have. — Janus

I don't define metaphysics as the science of the real. It is just a topic in philosophy about what we think the totality of the world is.
And Kant is rather petty in his understanding of the world. I've read a lot of Kant and I find him boring and pedantic.

Metaphysics is just what you think the basic principles of your philosophy are. Physicalists refuse to admit they are doing metaphysics. As Wittgenstein said, logical necessity is just a failure of the imagination.

I don't define metaphysics as the science of the real. — Jackson

You may not, but traditionally metaphysics was understood according to that definition.

It is just a topic in philosophy about what we think the totality of the world is. — Jackson

What do you mean by "totality of the world"? Is thinking about that different than thinking about what the Real is?

I've read a lot of Kant and I find him boring and pedantic. — Jackson

Why did you read a lot of Kant if you found him boring and pedantic?

What do you mean by "totality of the world"? Is thinking about that different than thinking about what the Real is? — Janus

Yes. The "Real" is abstract and is itself hard to define. Is it merely that which is not False? That is more epistemology.

Is it merely that which is not False? — Jackson

No, it is traditionally considered to be that which is absolutely existent (as opposed to what appears to us to be existent).