"Language game" is a term you use while engaging in (the social practice of) philosophy. The kinds of human interaction that constitute philosophy give meaning to the term, "language game."

I guess it's a little weird and meta from some angles. But I don't see any real problems from this angle. I think Wittgenstein has other problems, though.

Professional disciplines can have their own language games, but the problem is taking words from ordinary vocabulary and using them only quasi-technically, such that on the one hand the philosopher wants the claims made to have results for the ordinary use of the expression, yet on the other wants to be careful to divorce it from its ordinary use (so that the claims made aren't obviously false/ridiculous).

So talking about language games is a language game. It's a game in which we propose to have a transcendent viewpoint on language.

So do we have that transcendence or not?

Could you give an example of that?

on the one hand the philosopher wants the claims made to have results for the ordinary use of the expression, yet on the other wants to be careful to divorce it from its ordinary use — The Great Whatever

I think that this tendency also lies at the root of the tendency of certain philosophers to espouse elaborate metaphysical theses and then say, "Oh, what, I'm just using common sense!!" Ugh.

So talking about language games is a language game. It's a game in which we propose to have a transcendent viewpoint on language. — Mongrel

Strictly speaking, it doesn't have to be "transcendent." I don't have to "transcend" something to talk about it. If I give you the etymology of the word, "etymology," that doesn't mean I have to "transcend" etymology.

A vantage point always requires separatation. Saying something about a particular word doesn't compare to saying something about Language.

But didn't Witt mean to narrow his analysis to natural language?

A vantage point always requires separatation. Saying something about a particular word doesn't compare to saying something about Language. — Mongrel

I've never separated from myself, but I'm talking about myself in this sentence. And you're talking about language in this post, but I don't see anything separate or transcendent about it.

But I take a grain of salt regarding your self reference. There is a portion of yourself that you can't see.

It could be that I just don't understand what's actually implied by "language game." How would you describe it?

Well, a language game is a body of practices where words are used in a particular way. That's about it, as far as I can tell.

Like jargon?

This reminds me of the following passage from the Investigations:

121. One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy", there must be a second-order philosophy. But that's not the way it is; it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order. — Wittgenstein

What does he mean by "second order" there? By the usage I'm familiar with (second order logic), I agree.

Metaphilosophy is distinct from philosophy, though. Isn't it?

The classic example is in free will debates. If you use the word ordinarily, there seems to be no room for an argument to even get in the door that people don't have free will. So in insisting that we don't, the determinist has to use the word in a special way, but can't invent a new technical term, or else the thesis won't be shocking/sexy.

I am yet to see any argument or explanation that convinces me that so-called meta-philosophy is truly distinct from philosophy.'Metaphilosophy' is merely a term signifying the act of philosophy considering its own practices. That act is one of its own practices, and is already implicit in the notion of the examined life, since philosophy, whether implicitly or explicitly, is part of any human life.

Interesting perspective. I will note that it's irrelevant to the OP. Luke brought up metaphilosophy.

Is it irrelevant to the OP, though? Does the very notion of 'philosophy as language game' not at least smack of a purported standing outside of philosophy?

Yes. I guess the OP is metaphilosophy, but it's not asking if metaphilosophy is distinct from philosophy.

It's whether we should consider philosophical talk to be distinct from natural language (in its own philosophy room as Chalmers put it).

I take it to be part of the very idea of language games to rule out transcendence in language. There only is one language game or another. Each has rules. As TGW says, professional rigour sometimes tries to partition off ordinary language meanings from meanings in professional practice.

Doesn't that kind of strict philosophical use (somewhat ironically) occur when, as Wittgenstein puts it, language goes on holiday? He says that the genesis of philosophical problems is to be found in such use. To look at it the other way around; what if philosophical problems are already there (in the sense of being independent of language) but cannot be adequately formulated in terms of common usage?

2+2=4
we can generalise this to
a+a=2a

Does algebra transcend arithmetic?
Or is it just about arithmetic?

The idea is to draw attention to specific curious characteristics of some of the things we do with words.

When one plays chess, one undertakes to abide by certain rules. So moving the bishop along a diagonal is OK, but moving it along a row is not. If your opponent did so, you would accuses them of nit understanding how to play chess.

Language games are reasonably discreet, making it easier to set out the rules. Of course the rules may be implicit, in which case it might be interesting or useful to make them explicit - think of the rules involved in making a promise.

The rules may even change; as in Chess960. Knowing when and that the rules have changes is important.

It is no problem to talk about a natural language using that very language. So one can truthfully say that this sentence starts with the letter "S" and ends with a full stop.

It is a bit harder with formal languages, because inconsistencies develop very quickly. The usual practice has been to set up another language that contains the entirety of the formal language one wants to talk about - this new language being the meta-language.

So the question of meta-philosophy might be seen as asking if philosophy can talk about itself in its own terms, like a natural language, or if we need a special new language to avoid inconsistency.

But that in itself is deciding between one language game and another - do we allow philosophers to talk about philosophy in philosophical terms, or do we need meta-philosophers with a whole new language?

It seems to me that treated in this way, the notion of meta-philosophy can be seen as a lost cause.

The idea is to draw attention to specific curious characteristics of some of the things we do with words.

When one plays chess, one undertakes to abide by certain rules. So moving the bishop along a diagonal is OK, but moving it along a row is not. If your opponent did so, you would accuses them of nit understanding how to play chess.

Language games are reasonably discreet, making it easier to set out the rules. Of course the rules may be implicit, in which case it might be interesting or useful to make them explicit - think of the rules involved in making a promise.

The rules may even change; as in Chess960. Knowing when and that the rules have changes is important. — Banno

So in what light should we see Wittgenstein?

1. Creator of a language game that includes "language game."
2. Performing in a family of language games called philosophy.
3. Neither, because Witty was analyzing natural language. The language that sets out that analysis doesn't need to conform to the analysis.

It seems to me that treated in this way, the notion of meta-philosophy can be seen as a lost cause. — Banno

Possibly. I see now that I shouldn't have responded to Luke's comment because it only served to divert from my question. Lesson learned.

I take it to be part of the very idea of language games to rule out transcendence in language. There only is one language game or another. Each has rules. As TGW says, professional rigour sometimes tries to partition off ordinary language meanings from meanings in professional practice. — mcdoodle

Do you mean he was looking to rule out contextless meaning?

Doesn't that kind of strict philosophical use (somewhat ironically) occur when, as Wittgenstein puts it, language goes on holiday? He says that the genesis of philosophical problems is to be found in such use. To look at it the other way around; what if philosophical problems are already there (in the sense of being independent of language) but cannot be adequately formulated in terms of common usage? — John

Sorry.. not quite following you. What strict philosophical use?

2+2=4
we can generalise this to
a+a=2a

Does algebra transcend arithmetic?
Or is it just about arithmetic? — Banno

Not sure. You think algebra reduces to statements about arithmetic?

So in what light should we see Wittgenstein? — Mongrel

Perhaps as presenting a neat simplification we can use to understand how language works?

There does not seem to be anything stopping one language game to be about another.

Wittgenstein did recognize that there's more to language use than rules. He saw the impetus to conform in action and interaction.

So at least it's interesting to ponder what sort of action and interaction one might find in the vicinity of a theory of meaning.

I've got my speculations..