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think we generally understand what it means for a painting to picture reality, and in many of the same ways we generally understand what it means for a proposition to mirror reality. — Sam26

There's several problems here. First, Wittgenstein is using a metaphor based on vision, which would be to picture or mirror reality. Metaphors are useful, but they shouldn't be taken literally. Propositions are linguistic, not visual. They can't literally "mirror" the world. The problem with metaphors in philosophy is that they can lead our intuitions astray.

Setting that a side, how do we know that a proposition matches up with things in the world? That would assume that our perception reveals things as they are, and not simply as we perceive them, which would seem to imply a direct form of realism.

What Wittgenstein needs is an account of how we justify knowing that perception and conception get a things as they are such that propositions "mirror" the world when they are true. He needs to defend a direct realist version of perception. And perhaps beyond that, a form of essentialism, because "mirroring" would presume that we carve nature at its joints when we form true propositions. A Kantian would not agree with Witty here.

Summary: an account of perception and concept formation is needed to justify propositions matching up with things in the world. You can't skip over that by simply analyzing language. Language doesn't tell you how we know about the world.

"mirroring" would presume that we carve nature at its joints when we form true propositions — Marchesk

No, to "mirror" already assumes indirect realism.

No, to "mirror" already assumes indirect realism. — Question

Then what would be direct realism for propositions? That propositions reach out into the world and touch objects? Or that objects are in propositions?

Setting that a side, how do we know that a proposition matches up with things in the world? — Marchesk

The point which Wittgenstein makes is that there is no necessity for such 'matching up with things in the world.' That results from the error of thinking that a statement is a direct description of 'the world.' There is no such 'world' that is necessarily known. All that a statement does is postulate a possible proposition, and if another person acts on the proposition in accordance with the speaker's intent, then the communication is successful. The statement may refer to something fictional, or non-existent, or totally whimisical, or be in total contradiction to that which scientific models hold that exist materially, and it makes no difference at all, in Wittgenstein's view, because there is no necessity for a proposition to match up with things in the world. Language is only a tool for communication, and epistemologically, from Wittgenstein's perspective, there is nothing else that is fruitful to define as 'the world' besides the language itself.

With respect to discussions of science modeling some physical materiality, the same applies. All that we can actually do is discuss the model, which being defined in language, is subject to the same restrictions of accuracy as language itself, defining 'objects,' 'states,' and 'events' which need have no actual reality beyond that defined in the words used to define the model. And that is the most that can be known.

Language is only a tool for communication, and epistemologically, from Wittgenstein's perspective, there is nothing else that is fruitful to define as 'the world' besides the language itself. — ernestm

Except that he does mention "the world" sometimes in a way that suggests it's independent of a language:

It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. — Wittgenstein

All that a statement does is postulate a possible proposition, and if another person acts on the proposition in accordance with the speaker's intent, then the communication is successful. — ernestm

This would entail an abandonment of propositions being statements that have truth values. The snow is white isn't true iff the snow is white. It's only said to be true if one is playing a particular language game.

But if I ask you whether it's raining outside, I'm not interesting in playing some linguistic game with the words "rain" and "outside". Rather, I'm wanting to know if I should take my raincoat. The language allows you to tell me what is the case. IOW, I want to know the truth of the proposition, "It is raining outside".

lol, yes, but he doesn't say the world can be known. He said 'the existence of things in the world is mystical.' That's exactly what I said in less mystical terms.

It does not require abandoning truth value. Propositions can still be evaluated linguistically, so it is possible to make an inference or deduction. The problem is what to do with ideas such as color, which you rightly choose as an example, because Wittgenstein himself chose the same problem to discuss. And in the very end, he concluded the same thing. The existence of color is mystical. MANY people object to that, but that was his conclusion.

Following up on that, if I can want to know whether it's actually raining outside, which can be had by going outside without any language at all, I might come to want to know whether my perception of rain could possibly be mistaken.

Maybe when I thought it was raining, the neighborhood kids had put a sprinkler on top of the house. Realizing that there in cases when I can be wrong about what I perceive, as the ancient Greeks did, I can then pose skeptical questions and follow those up with non-skeptical replies. In fact, Witty did spend some of his time worrying about skepticism, and proposing solutions to skeptical concerns.

I don't see that as using language incorrectly. Rather, it's noticing that we sometimes are mistaken and wondering what that entails. Even ordinary folks with no philosophical reading will sometimes wonder how they know what is real or whether they're inside a dream or simulation, etc.

The existence of color is mystical. MANY people object to that, but that was his conclusion. — ernestm

That's an interesting conclusion. I would say it's compatible with McGinn's cognitive closure. Funny, because Dennett really doesn't like cognitive closure, but he admires Wittgenstein.

Well, I think his point is that language is an abstraction which is also defined by experience in an indefinable way, but Wittgenstein does everything he can to avoid talking about 'experience,' so it's not immediately apparent from his writing.

While I actually agree with what you are saying, Wittgenstein has a problem with your idea, because the statement 'it is raining' assumes there is something called 'rain.' A lot of people have trouble understanding this, so I annoy descriptivist philosophers by talking about boundary conditions. How many drops of water need to fall from the sky to constitute 'rain'? When is it 'mizzling' or 'misty' or 'sleeting' rather than raining?

Those following descriptive theories say, well, the truth of the proposition is defined by a proper definition of 'rain,' which is more than X drops of water of size XX per cubic meter per second in the temperature range Y-Z.

But Wittgenstein's point is that is not WHY we say 'it is raining.' W. ways that the descriptivists have confused HOW with WHY. If your wife tells you to bring something in from the car, you reply 'it is raining' because you don't want to go outside. Maybe it is not really raining and just mizzling, but if your wife agrees with you, then the proposition would be considered true for the two of you, accomplishing the goal of the communication.

That's an interesting conclusion. I would say it's compatible with McGinn's cognitive closure. Funny, because Dennett really doesn't like cognitive closure, but he admires Wittgenstein. — Marchesk

I certainly would like to know more about that, but I think the above example clarifies the issue of 'mystical' existence. When you tell your wife 'it is raining' because you don't want to go outside and fetch something she asked for from your car, the two of you can agree it is raining, in which case you've agreed the proposition is true. But if she doesn't agree, then the two of you can argue until you're both blue in the face about whether it is raining or not, and neither of you can prove the other wrong--which you, being the rational philosopher, might realize in advance it postpones going outside and thus also meets your own objective--but as to how to evaluate 'truth' of the idea of whether it is raining or not, scientific evaluation of the amount of water falling from the sky is not going to persuade either of you as to what is 'true.' In fact, you could both collude on agreeing it is raining, when in fact neither of you believe it true, because she never really wanted anything from your car, and she was really trying to get you to cook dinner instead, so you wouldn't have to go outside. Then in exchange she fetches the thing she wanted from the car while you are cooking.....and that is the 'mystical' nature of reality, and its vague connection with experience that Wittgenstein tries to avoid discussing!

If your wife tells you to bring something in from the car, you reply 'it is raining' because you don't want to go outside. Maybe it is not really raining and just mizzling, but if your wife agrees with you, then the proposition would be considered true for the two of you, accomplishing the goal of the communication. — ernestm

Ah, but what if your wife agrees with you because the weather report said it would rain today, but there's no water falling from the sky at all? Would the proposition still be true?

While I actually agree with what you are saying, Wittgenstein has a problem with your idea, because the statement 'it is raining' assumes there is something called 'rain.' — ernestm

There is a weather condition to which the concept "rain" is about. It does have boundary conditions (so do ships I hear). And we can use "rain "in other ways (making it rain at a Gentleman's club). But that doesn't mean there isn't a weather condition to which rain usually refers. And the other uses of "rain" are borrowed from the weather condition (money raining down.

I just answered that )

So that is the 'mystical' nature of reality, and its vague connection with experience that Wittgenstein tries to avoid discussing! — ernestm

Is this just because language is flexible and somewhat arbitrary in how we use (or abuse) it's symbols? We can have a huge debate on free will, and the terms surrounding the debate can vary quite a bit, with a huge amount of semantic dispute, as they tend to do in philosophical discussions.

But that alone doesn't mean there isn't something to the free will issue that concerns people. Which is really about to what extent we are the authors of our own choices, and what responsibility do we (or others) have for those choices.

Pointing out that the terms "free" and "will" can vary depending on context does not dissolve the underlying concern people have. Here I'm mainly arguing with the point of view that Wittgenstein's approach dissolves long standing philosophical problems.

Well, I think Wittgenstein's point here is that what you trivialize by saying 'it's just because language is flexible' is entirely the real issue about truth and reality. There was a whole book on this called 'Wittgenstein's Poker' -- from the Wikipedia:

On 25 October 1946, Popper (then at the London School of Economics), was invited to present a paper entitled "Are There Philosophical Problems?" at a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club, which was chaired by Wittgenstein. The two started arguing vehemently over whether there existed substantial problems in philosophy, or merely linguistic puzzles—the position taken by Wittgenstein. In Popper's, and the popular account, Wittgenstein used a fireplace poker to emphasize his points, gesturing with it as the argument grew more heated. When challenged by Wittgenstein to state an example of a moral rule, Popper (later) claimed to have replied "Not to threaten visiting lecturers with pokers", upon which (according to Popper) Wittgenstein threw down the poker and stormed out. Wittgenstein's Poker collects and characterizes the accounts of the argument, as well as establishing the context of the careers of Popper, Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, also present at the meeting.
The book follows three narrative threads, each pivoting off the 1946 confrontation at Cambridge; the first is a documentary investigation into what precisely took place and the controversy over the differing accounts from observers; the second, a comparative personal history of the philosophers, contrasting their origins in Vienna and their differing ascents to philosophical prominence; and thirdly an exploration of the philosophical significance of the disagreement between the two and its relevance for the great debates in the early 20th century concerning the philosophy of language.[1]

People have generally agreed Wittgenstein did lose his temper, by the other accounts, but W. to the day of his death insisted that he was simply using it politely like a lecture pointer, and did not 'storm out' as Popper claimed.

ell, I think Wittgenstein's point here is that what you trivialize by saying 'it's just because language is flexible' is entirely the real issue about truth and reality. — ernestm

That has always seemed prima facie absurd to me. Now maybe some philosophical problems can be cured by understanding language as a game. Sorites would be a candidate. But others, like whether perception & cognition give us an accurate view of the world, or whether Sextus and the Cyrenaics (or Kant, Hume, Berkley, etc) were right is not. It's a legitimate question that arises because perception and cognition are fallible, and we sometimes notice this to be the case. Furthermore, our sciences have shown that common sense, which ordinary language makes great use of, often gets things wrong.

We can legitimately ask, without abusing language, whether the rain we see is as we perceive it, or something else, like maybe 10 dimensional strings of energy, or code in the Matrix.

Actually, as I did mention, I do happen to agree with you with respect to formal logic. However, in the world of real language, W does make a valid point, and that is, the purpose of a statement can be more important than its actual truth.

However W has not generally won in persuading people to that. For example, he held that Popper's view that he was 'threatening with the poker' actually proves this point. It's transpired that's a little too obscurantist for most people.

However, in the world of real language, W does make a valid point, and that is, the purpose of a statement can be more important than its actual truth. — ernestm

It can be, like with the wife raining example. But if I'm asking a philosophical question, presumably I'm puzzled by some aspect of being, not trying to avoid cooking dinner, or hopefully, performing some piece of sophistry.

Take the problem of universals. One could argue that it arises from philosophers taking words out of context. But I don't think it works in this case. Because the problem arose by noticing that although the things we perceive are particular, we form generalized concepts across particulars. And this happens throughout all language games.

Why do we do this? Well, because particulars have similarities. And what makes things similar? At this point, you have the problem of universals. And it's not unique to any language game, or even language, since we perceive both similarity and particularity, and presumably our language employs universal talk because that's the way human cognition works.

And now you're back at Plato or Kant, or modern cognitive scientists and perhaps even cosmologists (symmetry breaking and initial state of the Big Bang). You may even conclude that man is the measure, and we carve up the world as it suits us. Or you may side with the essentialists.

But either way, it's a legitimate philosophical (and maybe scientific) question.

Well, that does not run contrary to W's view. He would state that words are simply tools that we use as convenient, so if one word is useful to refer to different things, then we use it to refer to different things. He doesn't hold that there is therefore some abstraction in the world of mind that binds the different uses together.

To formal logicians, W's approach could be valid, perhaps. Nonetheless it is not as fruitful as considering abstractions and representing them with symbols, which allows derivation of more complex explanations.

My own opinion, for whatever that is worth, is that there is no necessity for any one metaphysics to be that which we use in all situations. I don't regard arguments as to 'which is true' to be meaningful. I rather consider which approach is more fruitful in different situations. And I certainly would not attempt a scientific experiment to prove my wife wrong about whether it is raining or not when she wants me to go outside, so W's view does have merit in that situation!

I'd say, if she thinks it not raining, then she can fetch things from the car while I cook dinner. That's a far more likely inference to result in mutual agreement. And it doesn't actually matter whether it is true that it is raining or not, solving the problem entirely.

What I did was add a little clarification to these thoughts and put it in a separate thread here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1349/wittgensteins-mysticism-or-not-#Item_1

It's not quite the standard view, but as I am talking about W's mysticism I exercised a little license on it to make it more intelligible. thanks for the conversation )

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Another central idea presented in the Tractatus is the truth-function theory. This theory goes hand-in-hand with the picture theory. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5)." Therefore, if you are given all elementary propositions, then you can construct every possible proposition, which fixes their limits (T. 4.51). My understanding is that this sets the limit of language, or sets a limit to what can be said. — Sam26

Sorry to go back on old posts Sam. I think this is a very important point raised here. I like to think of this situation as akin to how a computer operates because in my opinion if Wittgenstein were more of a logician, I believe he would have been an Alan Turing of his time.

Please don't take it too literally; but, you have a set of rules by which a computer operates. These rules are all logical. Now, you have some software running that sets "objects" in certain configurations by the rules of logic of the computer (through some programming language).

Can you help me fill in the gaps in this reasoning? I find it extremely helpful to think in analogies.

I'm not sure what you expect me to do, and I'm not sure if there is an analogy here or not - maybe.

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Sam, what are your thoughts about Wittgenstein's mention of "logical space" in the Tractatus? What does it mean?

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